



Project Report

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HAITI PRESIDENTIAL/LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

REPORT OF THE NDI
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION

NOVEMBER 29, 1987
HAITI



NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) conducts nonpartisan political development programs overseas. By working with political parties and other institutions, NDI seeks to promote, maintain and strengthen democratic institutions and pluralistic values in new and emerging democracies.

NDI received bipartisan acclaim for organizing the international observer delegation to the "snap" presidential elections in the Philippines. NDI has also conducted a series of democratic development programs in nearly 30 countries, including Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Senegal, South Korea, Taiwan and Uruguay.

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PREFACE

The debacle of the November 29, 1987 Haitian elections is history; indeed, sham elections organized by the ruling military junta have since occurred. Nonetheless, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) believes it important that the international community understand exactly what happened on November 29th and during the period preceding the elections. For this reason, NDI is publishing this report which is based on the observations of the 21-member, multinational delegation organized by NDI for the elections and on the observations of prior NDI groups that visited Haiti beginning in December 1986.

NDI is grateful to the observers for committing their time and energies to the cause of democracy in Haiti. The delegation members, listed below, literally risked their lives in undertaking the observer mission. Also, NDI thanks the U.S. Agency for International Development for its support of the election observer delegation and the National Endowment for Democracy which has funded most of NDI's work in Haiti. Finally, NDI and the observer delegation express deep respect for the brave Haitians, whose hopes for a democratic future have been, we hope, only temporarily frustrated.

George Price, Co-leader, Belize
J. Brian Atwood, Co-leader, U.S.

Herman Alvino, Venezuela	Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia
Graeme Bannerman, U.S.	Anthony Maingot,
Antonio Blavia, Venezuela	Trinidad and Tobago
Enrique Carreras, Costa Rica	Billie Miller, Barbados
Vivian Lowery Derryck, U.S.	Gildas Molgat, Canada
Neville Gallimore, Jamaica	Ousmane Ngom, Senegal
Larry Garber, U.S.	Mariano S. Quesada, Philippines
Juan Manuel Garcia-Passalacqua,	Nancy Soderberg, U.S.
Puerto Rico	Roberto Tovar, Costa Rica
Steve Horblitt, U.S.	Casimir Yost, U.S.
Julian Hunte, St. Lucia	

Also accredited as official observers were NDI staff: Sean Carroll, Ron Davidson, Leticia Martinez, Michael Stoddard, Ingrid Thomas and Geraldine Thompson.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A 21 person, multinational delegation, organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), observed the aborted November 29th presidential and legislative elections in Haiti. Based on the delegation's observations before and on November 29th, the delegation concludes:

1) The Council for National Government (CNG) is largely responsible for the failed elections which had to be postponed because of violence committed by thugs and gunmen, acting with the apparent complicity of the Government. The armed forces and police tolerated and abetted the violence perpetrated against unarmed Haitian citizens.

2) Although the election was aborted, the concept of an independent election council, as embodied in the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) established by Haiti's 1987 Constitution, emerged as a viable democratic institution. In a three month period, the nine men who served on the Council, together with their dedicated technical staff, accomplished: a successful registration drive in which over 2 million Haitians registered to vote; the preparation of over 20 million individual ballots, made necessary by the number of candidates competing for the 105 positions being contested; and installed an election process which, without CNG interference, would have provided Haitians with an opportunity to participate in fair and competitive elections for the first time in over 30 years. As a result of its activities, the CEP emerged as an institution with credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of most Haitians, and in the eyes of this delegation, allegations to the contrary notwithstanding.

3) Despite all the adversities sustained in the period leading up to the elections, and despite the shocking events of election day when unarmed citizens were fired upon and 34 killed, the determination of the citizenry to participate in the election process was formidable. Haitians wanted to vote, demonstrating an understanding of the democratic process that many assumed impossible among a largely illiterate population.

4) On election day, the polls, though they opened late in many parts of the country, were operating and citizens were casting their ballots. (In other parts of the country, the polls never opened due to the CNG's preventing the CEP from transporting necessary election paraphernalia). While the process was slow, election officials improvised where necessary so as to speed-up the pace of individual balloting, thus making it more likely


that everyone would have an opportunity to vote. There was a mood of camaraderie and good spirit as people waited patiently to cast their ballots. The good feeling and sense of civic pride in the orderliness of the day was shattered by gunfire and grenades, within two hours of the opening of the polls.

5) The international community must remain steadfast in supporting democratic progress in Haiti. Thus, elections organized in a manner inconsistent with the 1987 Haitian Constitution should not be considered legitimate. While the delegation recognizes the diplomatic sensitivities involved, any other response by the international community will only increase the frustration felt by most Haitians over the November 29th events.

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INTRODUCTION

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) organized a 21 person multinational delegation to observe the November 29 presidential/legislative elections in Haiti. The Delegation was led by former Belize Prime Minister George Price and NDI President J. Brian Atwood, and included representatives from twelve countries. NDI was invited to organize the observer delegation by both the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and the provisional National Government Council (CNG).

This report contains the findings and conclusions of the NDI delegation, based on observations in Port-au-Prince -- Haiti's capital --, Gonaives, Jacmel and Les Cayes before and on November 29th. Attempts to observe the process in other regions were prevented by the Haitian military.

The report is divided into six sections. The first section reviews NDI's efforts to promote political and electoral institutions since the departure of Duvalier on February 7, 1986; these efforts culminated in the organization of the multinational observer delegation. The second section provides an overview of Haitian electoral history, while the third summarizes developments in Haiti since February 1986. The fourth section describes the process devised by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) for the election administration, and the fifth reports the delegation's pre-election and election day observations. A sixth section contains several recommendations designed to ensure a more efficient and administratively smooth electoral process in the future.

I. THE NDI EFFORT IN HAITI

Almost 30 years of dictatorship have left Haiti bereft of the social, economic and political institutions essential to a healthy, democratic nation. As a political development institute, NDI projects in Haiti since Jean Claude Duvalier's departure have focused largely on party building and assessments of the developing electoral process.

A. Programs Prior to November 29, 1987

In August 1986, NDI brought together seventeen Haitian political and civic leaders in Puerto Rico to discuss the role of the political parties in a transitional state. (Appendix A contains a list of participants in this and subsequent NDI programs relating to Haiti). Participants debated the practical aspects of party activity, the need for coalition politics and the importance of open and civil debate. The most important outcome of the Puerto Rico

meeting was the call by the Haitian leaders for the creation of an independent electoral commission to administer the upcoming elections. This proposal was the precursor of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and the Permanent Electoral Council, established by Haiti's new Constitution which was approved in a national referendum on March 29, 1987.


NDI followed the Puerto Rico seminar with a December 1986 visit by international political leaders and election experts. In addition to a series of recommendations relating to the technical aspects of election administration, this delegation's comprehensive report called for better communication among democratic groups, stronger parties and a massive civic education campaign.

NDI, with representatives of the National Republican Institute for International Affairs (NRIIA), returned to observe the March 29 constitutional referendum. The NDI/NRIIA team concluded that certain technical problems affected the conduct of the referendum, but that none affected the credibility of the result -- an overwhelming endorsement of the Constitution.

NDI sponsored its second party-building seminar in June 1987, just as a crisis erupted over the CNG's electoral decree. In addition to technical workshops on party building, the seminar offered political party leaders an important forum in which to discuss appropriate response to the apparent usurpation of responsibility from the constitutionally designated independent election council. The seminar participants concluded that while parties were growing stronger, coalitions had yet to be built; and that division between the CNG and the Electoral Council had to be bridged to ensure free and fair elections.

The highlight of NDI's pre-election efforts was the visit of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Invited to Haiti by the Institute for Haitian Research and Development (IHRED) and sponsored by NDI, President Carter and former Prime Minister George Price of Belize traveled to Haiti October 22-23, 1987. Their visit, representing the Council of Current and Former Freely Elected Heads of Government of the Americas, demonstrated strong international support for the democratization process in Haiti.

In a meeting with the CNG, the two leaders expressed concern about the failure to investigate the murders of political party leaders Louis Eugene Athis and Yves Volel, encouraged renewed dialogue with the CEP and expressed hope that Haiti would soon take its rightful place among the democracies of the hemisphere. In discussions with members of the Electoral Council, President Carter and Prime



Minister Price expressed admiration for their courage and assured the CEP of strong international support and close observation of events in Haiti. The two leaders also met with Church leaders and presidential candidates who shared their views of the upcoming elections and hopes for a genuine democratic transition.

Finally, between November 10 and November 15, an NDI advance team visited Haiti to evaluate preparations for the presidential/legislative elections scheduled for November 29. Originally, the team also was to observe the November 15 municipal elections, but these elections were postponed because ballot material, voting slates and the required number of trained elections officials were not ready. The November 3 burning of CEP headquarters and the continued intimidation of candidates, CEP officials and CEP workers also contributed to the postponement.

The advance team concentrated on monitoring the security situation and assessing election preparations. The team traveled to Jacmel, Petit Goave, Les Cayes, Saint Marc and Gonaives to complete a broad-based assessment. The team reported that officials expected difficulties in distributing election paraphernalia, but were generally optimistic given the completion of a successful registration process, enthusiastic and generally orderly campaigning, and an overwhelming determination to conduct a free and fair vote.

B. The Observer Delegation

The 21-member observer delegation organized by NDI included nationals from twelve countries (see Appendix B for biographies of the delegates).

The delegation was organized in response to the explicit invitation of both the CEP and the CNG to President Carter and Prime Minister Price during their October visit to Haiti. The CNG invitation was confirmed in a letter to NDI from Haiti Ambassador to Washington, Pierre Sam. Thus, the delegation rejects the CNG charge made following the postponement of the election that the CEP had exceeded its responsibility by inviting international observers. Even without the CNG invitation, the delegation believes that the CEP was acting in accordance with its constitutional mandate in inviting international observers. Further, such an invitation by the independent election commission welcoming international observers is consistent with contemporary practice in democratic nations.

The majority of the NDI delegation arrived in Port-au-Prince on Friday, November 27th, although several delegates had arrived earlier. Following a briefing by

U.S. Embassy officials, the NDI advance team briefed the delegates on the situation in Haiti and on some of the difficulties anticipated, given the unique circumstances under which the elections would be occurring. The terms of reference for the delegation were reviewed (see Appendix C), and the delegation was divided into six teams for the planned election day observations. (See Appendix D for team assignments).

On Saturday morning, the CEP technical director provided a detailed explanation of the voting and counting processes. He cautioned the delegation not to expect perfection, noting the serious obstacles the CEP had to overcome in preparing for the elections. He further indicated that the CEP would encourage local election officials to improvise where necessary in order to ensure that all Haitian eligible to vote had an opportunity to do so. This briefing was followed by a presentation describing the political climate in Haiti over the past month and how the different candidates conducted their campaigns.

By noon on Saturday, the Delegation began traveling to their assigned destinations for election day. Two teams left for the airport to take chartered flights to Cap Haitien and Jeremie, two more departed by car for Jacmel and Les Cayes, and two remained in Port-au-Prince.

Each team had the task of meeting with local election officials, candidates, and representatives from the Church and military on Saturday afternoon to assess preparations for the election. On Sunday morning November 29, the teams planned to observe the voting process from the open of the polls (6:00 a.m.) to the close of the polls (6:00 p.m.), and to observe the counting process Sunday night. Monday morning the teams were scheduled to return to Port-au-Prince where the entire delegation would regroup, share their observations, and prepare a statement. Several members of the NDI staff were to remain in Haiti to await the official results.

The Delegation's schedule, however, could not be carried forth. The teams assigned to Cap Haitien and Jeremie were informed when they arrived at the airport that the military had issued an order prohibiting all domestic flights. (This order not only affected the NDI observer team, but, more important, precluded the CEP from utilizing two helicopters chartered for the purpose of distributing election paraphernalia.) Further, the team assigned to visit the Artibonite Valley was advised not to travel to that region because of security concerns.



On election day, NDI teams were at the polls in and around Port-au-Prince, Jacmel and Les Cayes when they opened. The reports of the teams' observations up until 9:00 a.m., when word reached the polls that the CEP had cancelled the elections, are reported in section V, B.

Following postponement of the elections, the Delegation visited the scene of some of the more serious incidents of violence and conferred with various Haitians and representatives of other observer delegations. At noon on Tuesday morning, December 2, the members of the NDI Delegation were flown to Miami on a chartered flight along with others who had been present in the country for the elections. Upon arrival in Miami, the Delegation issued a statement, See Appendix E, and held a press conference.

II. ELECTIONS IN HAITI: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE*

To assess the current Haitian electoral process, it is useful to examine Haiti's recent experience with elections. Following the fall of President Magloire in December 1956, Haiti entered a ten-month period of political instability and confusion. Six different governments held power in Haiti between December 1956 and September 22, 1957, the date that elections were held under the military junta headed by provisional president Antonio Kerekou.

Although a number of presidential candidates came forward prior to the 1957 elections, only four -- Clement Jumelle, Daniel Fignole, Louis Dejoie and Francois Duvalier -- had a significant following. By the time of the election in September, only Dejoie and Duvalier remained as effective candidates, and it was the latter who was favored by the military junta under Kerekou.

The official results of the polling on September 22 were 679,884 votes for Duvalier and 266,992 for Dejoie. Many believe that these results in fact accurately reflected general opinion in Haiti at the time; others believe that the elections were characterized by fraud, including widespread vote-buying, and that had the elections been conducted freely and fairly, Louis Dejoie would have emerged victorious.

Francois Duvalier was installed as Haiti's president on October 22, 1957. He became President-for-Life in 1964, and remained in power until his death in April 1971. Jean Claude Duvalier assumed the presidency after his father's death, in accordance with an amendment to Haiti's constitution, enacted several months earlier, allowing the president to designate his successor. Because Jean Claude Duvalier considered himself to be Haiti's President-for-Life, presidential elections were never held during the period he ruled.

Periodic elections at the local and municipal level were held during the Duvalier years. These elections were never taken seriously for a variety of reasons. First, Haiti never implemented a voter registration program, and the number of eligible voters was never definitively known. Second, elections were consistently conducted in a

* This section initially appeared in the NDI report entitled "The Electoral Process in Haiti: A Path to Full Democracy". It is repeated here because of the strong similarities between the events of 1957 and those of 1987 with respect to elections.

haphazard manner, raising serious questions about the administrative procedures used for the setting up of polling stations, the actual voting process and the counting of the ballots. Third, and perhaps most important, limitations were placed on political activity, including the formations of political parties. Not surprisingly, most Haitians believe that elections under Duvalier were generally characterized by fraud, intimidation and corruption.



A. The Period Between February 1986 and March 1987

Upon the departure of Jean Claude Duvalier on February 7, 1986, power for the governance of Haiti was transferred to a six-member Council of National Government (CNG), which was granted the authority to act as a transitional government by the departing president. A month later, the original CNG accepted the resignation of one of its civilian members, Gerard Gourgue, who was also serving as Haiti's Minister of Justice. A reconstituted CNG was publicly announced on March 21. It comprised two military officials and one civilian: General Henri Namphy, President of the Republic; Colonel Williams Regala, Minister of Interior and National Defense; and Jacques Francois. To date, no further changes have been made in the composition of the CNG.

In June, the CNG announced an electoral timetable which set forth dates for each of the steps necessary for constituent assembly, municipal, legislative and presidential elections, and for a referendum to adopt a new constitution. On June 27, 1986, the CNG published a decree authorizing the creation of a Consultative Council comprised of 45 members -- fifteen members were appointed and thirty were chosen based on a series of somewhat informal meetings around the country. This new body was created to provide specific policy recommendations to the CNG and government ministries on a wide variety of issues.

On July 30, 1986, the CNG decreed a law on political parties which provided the Ministry of Justice with the authority to officially recognize and register political parties. Also, in July a decree concerning the mass media was adopted, although its effective date was set for October, three months later.

Elections for 41 of the 61 Constituent Assembly seats were held throughout the country on October 19, 1986. The remaining members were chosen by the CNG. The Information Ministry stated that 9.2% of Haiti's eligible voters participated in the October 19 election. Other sources report a national voter turnout of between 1% and 5%.

Two preliminary draft constitutions were prepared, one by a CNG team and the second by the Ministry of the Interior. These drafts were submitted to the Constituent Assembly which began meeting in December 1986. Contrary to fears expressed by many, the Constituent Assembly chose not to rubber-stamp either of these drafts. Instead, it embarked on the arduous task of preparing a totally new constitution for Haiti, one which bore little relation to either draft or to previous Haitian constitutions.

Among the significant provisions of the new Constitution were the following:

1. a reduction in the president's constitutional powers, achieved by increasing the powers of the legislature and by providing for a prime minister with significant administrative and decision-making power responsible to the two houses of the legislature (Articles 83-172);
2. decentralized authority made possible by establishing elected departmental and local councils (Arts. 61-87);
3. separation of the army and the police, with the latter placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice (Arts. 264-267);
4. subordination of the military to civilian courts in all cases involving civilians (Arts. 267-273);
5. establishment of a Permanent Election Council (Arts. 191-194) and a Provisional Electoral Council to administer the elections scheduled for 1987 (Arts. 289); and
6. a provision barring three categories of individuals associated with the previous regime from holding any public office for ten years (Art. 291).

Articles detailing protection of individual rights, civil service, economics and agriculture, the environment, and the family also signaled a clean break with the past.

On March 29, 1987, Haitians overwhelmingly ratified the new Constitution, marking the end, it was hoped, of the Duvalier era. NDI observers at the referendum reported that the text of the new constitution outlined a path to constructive change through democratic processes, and implied "a commitment to build a society in which the inalienable freedoms of the individual are enshrined."

B. Developments from March to November 1987

As noted above, Article 289 of the 1987 Constitution requires that a Provisional Electoral Council be established comprising nine individuals with each member appointed by a different sector of Haitian society. This process was completed by mid-May 1987.

The Constitution provides the CEP with primary authority to administer the elections prior to the installation of a new government, at which time a permanent electoral council would be appointed. In addition, Article 292 provides the CEP with jurisdiction to decide which candidates are ineligible to participate in elections under Article 291 -- the provision prohibiting former Duvalierists from holding public office for ten years.

Following the ratification of the Constitution in March, several observers noted the need for cooperation between the CEP and the CNG. While the CEP was designated as the lead authority, it was only the CNG which could provide financial and material resources, and could ensure the security of the process. However, it was not clear how the CNG would react to operating under a Constitution which provided the CEP with independent authority.

Concern over possible tension between the CNG and the CEP became a reality in June when the CNG attempted to usurp the CEP's constitutional function by refusing to promulgate the CEP drafted election law and instead promulgating an election law which provided the CEP with only limited authority. The CNG's action was met by protests from all sectors of society and a violent crackdown by the military. For two months, work on preparing for the elections ground to a halt. Bowing to the public outcry, the CNG finally revoked its election law in August and promulgated the CEP drafted law with a few insignificant changes.

The CNG's action in June, however, dashed whatever possibility there had been of developing a working relationship between the CEP and the CNG. Members of the CEP, as well as candidates, accused the Government of obstructionist tactics. These accusations included colluding with vandals in attacks on political and election offices. Use of sophisticated weapons in attacks presented as proof of Government connivance; only the Government, it was claimed, could acquire such weapons. The CEP stated that the Government did nothing to protect the election process at any level.

In response to these charges, the CNG claimed that it had not been asked for assistance and was falsely accused of denying requests for assistance that were never made. The Government also pointed out that the Constitution placed responsibility for the elections in the CEP and not the CNG. Further, the CNG argued, the CEP at times sought to protect its prerogatives by avoiding or delaying requests for Government involvement. Finally, the CNG claimed that unsolicited deployment of military or security forces would open the CNG to accusations of meddling in the CEP's affairs.

Despite the tension between the CEP and the CNG, the CEP hired technical staff in September, and preparations for the elections began in earnest. The preparations for the elections were fraught with serious problems of security, organization, inadequate finances and negative perception of the electoral climate by the candidates and population. During the months prior to the elections, there were many acts of election-related violence. Nearly one hundred Haitians, including political party leaders



Louis Eugene Athis and Yves Volel, were killed in such incidents. In other incidents, political activists were detained and harassed, and the media also was subject to attacks.

To many observers, the CEP's election calendar adopted in late September was overly ambitious. It required four elections throughout the country in a period of seven weeks. The CEP argued, however, that given the dates specified in the Constitution for the assumption of office by the president and the legislature, it had no viable alternatives. Nonetheless, it was not surprising when the November 15 local elections were postponed.

Beginning October 19, the CEP conducted a voter registration drive throughout the country. To the surprise of many Haitians and outside experts, the drive succeeded in registering over 2 million Haitians. In addition to establishing a register for use on election day, the registration drive encouraged the CEP to designate and prepare local election officials for the administration of the elections.

The CEP's preparations for the elections were dealt a serious blow on November 3 when its offices were burned. The arson occurred following the release by the CEP of a list of those candidates ineligible to run for president, pursuant to its explicit mandate under the Constitution. As was widely reported, the attack occurred despite the fact that there were two police stations near the CEP offices. Despite the fire and threats, the CEP continued to prepare for the presidential and legislative elections on November 29.

In the weeks preceding the elections, allegations were made that the CEP was favoring a particular candidate, usually identified as Gerard Gourgue. In part, the allegation stemmed from the fact that Gourgue, a human rights lawyer, helped choose one of the CEP members, and from the fact that the coalition supporting Gourgue's candidacy had participated in the decision to choose other members of the CEP. The delegation, however, was unable to corroborate any of the allegations concerning CEP partisanship toward Gourgue or towards any other candidate.

C. The Role of Political Parties and the Media

The ability to organize political parties and for the media to communicate freely news and information to the public are key indicators of the vibrancy of a democratic system. In this regard, Haiti had to overcome a legacy of repression against political parties and the media.

1. Political Parties

More than 70 parties emerged during the 21 months since Duvalier's departure. Many of these parties, however, existed in name only. Even some of the prominent "parties" served more as vehicles for a specific presidential candidate than political parties in the traditional sense.

The parties major activity during the period prior to the campaign was to designate candidates. Some of the better organized parties were able to designate candidates for many of the 105 positions (president, 27 senators and 77 representatives) being contested on November 29th. At the same time, several well-known individuals preferred to run as independents for senate and representative.

While several presidential candidates were initially wary of venturing outside of Port-au-Prince, in the weeks preceding November 29th many candidates managed to visit the major towns in Haiti. As a result, party headquarters for several of the leading candidates existed throughout the country.

The obstacles confronting political candidates, however, should not be overlooked. As noted earlier, two political leaders -- Louis Eugene Athis and Yves Volel -- were killed while campaigning or engaging in other political activity. Further, after the CEP's November 3 announcement of eligible candidates, the headquarters of several political parties were attacked. It was in the face of these realities that a surprisingly vibrant political campaign was conducted.

2. The Media

One significant human rights improvement which has taken place since the exit of Jean Claude Duvalier was the recognition and allowance of freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is embodied in the new Constitution (Article 28), and up until the November debacle this freedom was practiced without apparent inhibition, despite attacks on journalists, especially in July.

All three media forms -- television, radio and print -- played roles in the recent electoral activities. Some forms of the media placed their emphasis on pre-election information gathering and distribution; others tried to educate the public on the technical procedures for voting; most of the media ran advertisements and others gave their opinions on candidates. Various viewpoints (conservative, liberal, pro-CNG, pro-CEP, pro and anti United States) were expressed freely.

a) Radio - As noted in previous NDI reports, radio by far is the most important medium of communication in Haiti. Prior to the elections, radio stations were operating freely and providing extensive coverage of developments relating to the electoral process, including instructions to voters about how to cast their ballots properly. Further, there were programs on issues and interviews of candidates as well as round table discussions wherein listeners could call in questions.

b) Television - Interviews with candidates, the CEP, and representatives of the church, concerning their opinions about the current political climate in Haiti aired daily. Some television stations presented 10 minute cartoon clips showing electors how to vote. This occurred despite the Government's control of the television networks and its seeming antagonism toward the electoral process.

c) Print Press - Newspapers provided extensive coverage of the events of the electoral process, including turgid criticism of the CNG and the army. Virtually all of the candidates had press coverage, and all types of political viewpoints were expressed in the various papers.

IV. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

This section reviews the CEP's plans for the administration of the elections. Due to the security and other problems facing the CEP, many of the original plans for the administration of the elections were modified in the weeks and days before November 29.

A. Voter Registration

As noted earlier, on October 19, the CEP initiated voter registration. The process required voters to register at one of 6,000 designated sites. At the site, a registration form was completed in triplicate. The form requested information concerning the name, address, age and sex of the voter. One copy was given to the voter, a second was sent to the CEP, and a third was to be kept at the polling site for use on election day.

Voters were allowed to register at any site, although the maximum number of voters at any one site was limited to 500 voters. Once a site registered 500 voters it was closed and prospective registrants were told that they should register at a nearby site. Voter registration was scheduled to end on October 31, although in some areas, particularly in the capital and the Artibonite region, registration remained open for an additional two weeks.

B. Authorization of Candidacy

The Haitian Constitution establishes the prerequisite for candidacy for particular offices. With respect to presidential candidates, two issues involving interpretation of the Constitution were subject of considerable discussion. The Constitution requires that all former government ministers obtain a "discharge" before they can be approved as candidates (Art. 235). The legislature is assigned the power of granting discharges. However, since Haiti would not have a legislature until after January 1988, the question was who, if anyone, could grant a discharge under the provisional government.

An argument was made that the CNG had the constitutional authority to grant discharges. Under the Constitution, the CNG is expressly granted legislative powers until the new legislature is installed. After several delays, the CNG finally gave discharges to all prospective candidates who were former ministers.

The second issue involved interpretation of Article 291 which prohibits former Duvalierists from holding public office. As noted, only 23 of 35 candidates who had presented themselves as candidates for president were officially designated by the CEP; thus, the CEP rejected

the candidacies of twelve individuals ostensibly on the grounds that they fell within the Article 291 prohibition. Two weeks later, the CEP issued a list of official candidates for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, again eliminating those with ties to the Duvalier regime. As noted earlier, these decisions were met with a violent response by supporters of the disqualified candidates.

C. Distribution of Ballots

The task of preparing the ballots and ensuring their proper distribution would have been an enormous task under any circumstances. Given the election system devised, it was necessary to prepare over 20 million individual ballots. Further, given the number of candidates, the high degree of illiteracy in Haiti and the expected general confusion over participation in a new and unfamiliar process, it was decided to put the picture of each candidate on the face of the ballot, along with the candidate's name, party and a number. The prepared ballots then had to be sorted to ensure that each region, and indeed each polling place, received the appropriate ballots for the candidates competing in the senate and legislative elections in the area, as well as the ballots for all twenty-three presidential candidates.

Consequently, the Delegation was not surprised when, following the elections, there were reports that ballots for several presidential candidates had not been available in certain regions. While some candidates sought to ascribe malicious motives to the CEP, the more likely cause of the problem was the logistical difficulties involved in ensuring the proper distribution of all the ballots. Indeed, the CEP informed the Delegation prior to the elections that where ballots had not been received local election officials would be encouraged to improvise.

D. The Balloting Process

On election day, polling sites were scheduled to be open between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. Five polling officials were assigned to each site, two designated by the CEP and three by political parties. Designated party, nongovernmental and international observers were also authorized to be present at the polling stations.

Voters were required to bring their registration cards which would be checked against the registration book. They would then proceed to a table where individual ballots were available. After picking up one ballot for every candidate, the voter would be instructed to select from them one ballot for president, three ballots for senator and one ballot for deputy, placing them in an envelope which would be deposited in a ballot box. Before leaving the polling site, the voter's finger would be marked with indelible ink.

V. NDI DELEGATION OBSERVATIONS

A. Pre-election Day

Two Delegation members drove to Gonaives on the Friday before the elections to assess preparations for the elections outside Port-au-Prince. En route they encountered a road block, but could not determine who had placed it. They were able to drive past, but when returning to Port-au-Prince they saw a truck that had been set ablaze next to the road block. (The following day several observers from other delegations were turned back at the same road block; they reported that the road block had been set by those opposed to the elections and that the army in the area had refused to break the road block.)

In Gonaives, the NDI delegates observed local election officials working feverishly to prepare for the elections. The head of the Departmental Bureau of Elections (BED) expressed concern that they would not be able to distribute the ballots to most of the remote sites, and asked if helicopters could be obtained for that purpose. At the BED headquarters, approximately half the necessary ballots had arrived. All ballots still had to be sorted and distributed in less than 36 hours. While the determination of the officials was evident, it was unclear whether the BED would receive the ballots and be able to arrange for their proper distribution in time for the elections.

On Saturday, several members of the Delegation visited the BED West Headquarters in Port-au-Prince. The Delegation observed Haitians from all walks of life volunteering their services. One particularly vivid impression was of a seven-year-old child moving ballots in a wheelbarrow as they were ready to be sent out for distribution. While visiting the BED West, the Delegation received a list of towns where the CEP had postponed the elections because it had become clear that no materials would reach the polling sites in time.

Saturday afternoon the Jacmel and Les Cayes teams arrived in their destinations and were able to meet with officials in both towns. They reported high enthusiasm among those they met for the coming elections.

Later that night, at about 1:00 a.m., Delegation members in Port-au-Prince and Les Cayes heard gunfire which continued throughout the night. The Delegation also heard reports that several people had been killed during the night in some of the poorer neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince. It appeared that Saturday night's activities represented a concerted effort to intimidate the population into not leaving their homes on Sunday, election day.

B. Election Day

1. Port-au-Prince

Because the shooting, grenade throwing and fire bombing continued in downtown Port-au-Prince throughout the morning, several of the Delegation's drivers refused to leave their homes to pick up the observer teams. Instead, taxi drivers waiting outside the hotel were hired. The observers remaining in Port-au-Prince initially divided into five teams. Two teams ventured downtown, one drove north to Kenscoff, and two more visited polling sites in Petionville.

The first team to drive downtown observed a long line of people waiting to vote at a burned-out polling station across from a gas station that had just been fire bombed. One of the observers remarked that ballots were blowing everywhere in the wind, and was able to retrieve several ballots with the edges singed from the fire. As the team continued, they observed a group of Haitians on foot and another in a car shooting directly at people on the street. There were heavily armed soldiers all around the street and positioned on fire trucks. As one of the observers recalled, "intimidate is too soft a word, people were being killed." After getting caught in the midst of one of these skirmishes, the team returned directly to the hotel in Petionville.

A second car drove to Belair, one of the more impoverished sections of the city. Their car was hit three times by shots from a policeman's rifle, though no one was hurt. This team proceeded to the Holiday Inn in the center of the city, where most of the international press was based. There they heard from reporters about several gruesome incidents, including the massacre of 14 voters and a journalist at the polling station in the Argentine School. At 11:30 a.m., this team returned to the hotel in a U.S. Embassy armored car.

A third car proceeded north out of Petionville on the road to Kenscoff. They observed that only two of the polling sites had received any ballots by 7:00 a.m., an hour after the polls were scheduled to open. At the two sites where ballots had been received the previous night, the polls opened at 7:00 a.m. Approximately 40 people were waiting to vote before the polls opened, and by the time the team left the number had climbed to over 100 at each site. The process was slow but orderly in these places, and the officials seemed well-prepared.

Before returning to the hotel -- where all teams in Port-au-Prince were to meet for an 8:00 a.m. breakfast and preliminary debriefing -- the team observed the arrival at one polling site of an election official with the

long-awaited ballots. His comment upon arrival was that he had "survived a night of gunfire" by sleeping in the Community Electoral Bureau (BEC) headquarters in the heart of the city.

The fourth and fifth cars drove directly to the village square in Petionville. At 6:00 a.m. they observed some 500 voters lined up in front of the church on one side and in front of the high school on the other. On the third side of the square an entire police station stood watch over the proceedings, each man fully armed. Inside the church a morning mass was being conducted, as those standing outside in line joined in the hymns and prayers for successful elections.

The first vote was cast just after 7:00 a.m. by the director of one polling station. Again the process was slow; in one line the fastest voter to pass through required five minutes to complete the task, while the slowest took over ten minutes. With only 12 hours in which to vote, it was obvious that a more efficient method of voting would have to be improvised or all those who had gathered to vote -- well over a thousand by the time the observers left at 8:05 a.m. -- might not get the chance. However, those waiting in line were orderly, patient, determined and, in most cases, understood the voting procedure and knew for whom they intended to vote.

At approximately 8:30 a.m., the Delegation members who had returned to the hotel heard a barrage of gunfire from the direction of the Petionville village square. The shots lasted approximately ten minutes and abruptly ended. About a half hour later, one team returned to a Petionville polling site and observed 20 people trying to decide whether or not to reopen. The village square was now empty where an hour earlier there were over one thousand people present; the army had erected a barricade to prevent anyone from approaching the BEC headquarters.

At 9:30 a.m., the Delegation received confirmation that the president of the CEP, Ernst Mirville, had announced postponement of the elections due to violence.

2. Les Cayes

The team in Les Cayes observed an orderly election underway at 6:00 a.m., as scheduled. The observers noted that voters and election officials had been working and moving about before day-break, despite sporadic shooting throughout the night. At one poll, the observers saw frustration among voters because a registration book was missing and the process was temporarily delayed. The problem appeared to be solved when an improvised system was devised until the registration book could be retrieved.

According to the observer team the ballots were in place, the voters were orderly and knew how and for whom they would vote. Above all, however, the determination of the voters waiting their turn in line was evident. Once the Les Cayes team heard of the cancellation of the elections it decided to return to Port-au-Prince, arriving at around 12:30 p.m.

3. Jacmel

Delegation members in Jacmel reported a scene similar to Les Cayes. At the first site visited, ballots and ballot boxes had arrived in the early morning and were still in the process of being set up at 6:00 a.m. By 7:30 the first voters passed through, and the team noted that the process was orderly if somewhat slow. The Delegation members noted that local members of the church, press and military were on hand to observe the process and help out if needed. One army officer was observed helping voters find their preassigned voting line.

At a second polling station the observers encountered some agitation when, after a slow start, it was discovered that ballots for some candidates were missing. At about 9:30, after considerable delay at the second site, the observer team returned to the hotel to check in with the Port-au-Prince teams, whereupon they were informed that the elections had been cancelled. The team returned to the polling sites to find them abandoned and all the voting paraphernalia left behind. They later met with the local BED director who confirmed that the elections had been cancelled and told the observers he had reason to fear for his life and his family's safety.

The Jacmel observers returned to Port-au-Prince at 3:30 p.m. Sunday afternoon. They observed no violence while they were in Jacmel; indeed, the cooperation between the military and election officials there should be a model for future Haitian elections.

C. Following the Postponement

With the postponement of the elections, the number of army trucks patrolling the streets of Port-au-Prince increased markedly. The army trucks were alone, as civilians stayed in their homes.

At 6:00 p.m. on Sunday night, Lt. Gen. Namphy addressed the nation on television. Judging the elections a failure, and blaming the CEP for the failure, he also censured the CEP for inviting foreign observers. Namphy disbanded the CEP for having failed at their task, and indicated that the nine groups represented in the CEP would be asked to name replacements. Namphy suggested the day's violence was the

result of individuals trying to disrupt the elections. The military and the CNG had attempted to restore and maintain order throughout the day. Namphy also advised "international actors" to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

The Delegation continued its fact-finding efforts following the postponement. Members of the Delegation visited the scene of the election day attack on the Argentine school, where 14 voters and a Dominican journalist were killed, met with political candidates and election officials and talked with several Haitians on the streets of Port-au-Prince. The mood was one of anger and frustration. Several Haitians talked about the need for international intervention, while others indicated that Haitians must prepare for struggle. During the day, the Delegation also continued receiving reports of killings taking place in several poor neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince.

VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Delegation members continue monitoring the situation in Haiti from their respective countries. See Appendix F for articles prepared by Delegation members following return from Haiti. While the CNG has lost legitimacy among most Haitians, it pressed ahead with plans to organize new elections on January 17, 1988. A new CEP was appointed by the CNG. Most of the institutions authorized by the Constitution to designate CEP members refused to do so, and continued to recognize the legitimacy of the CEP purportedly disbanded by the CNG. The four leading presidential candidates -- Marc Bazin, Sylvio Claude, Louis Dejoie and Gerard Gourgue -- began cooperating by presenting a united front; they refused to participate in what they characterized as sham elections. They urged Haitians to boycott the elections and also have called upon the CNG to step down. At the same time, several candidates whose support prior to the November 29 elections appeared minimal, participated in the January 17 elections.

On the international level, the events of November 29th have been condemned by several governments. The U.S., Canada and France have terminated, reduced or are reassessing the assistance being provided to Haiti.

From the Delegation's perspective, the response of the OAS has been less than adequate. In a resolution approved December 7, 1987, the OAS deplored the violence which required the postponement of the election, but declined to blame the CNG for its role; indeed, the OAS resolution was sufficiently bland that the Haitian Government joined in support.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Delegation urges that elections in Haiti occur in accordance with provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Otherwise, the legitimacy which only free and fair elections can afford to a government will not exist.

As the Delegation expects that sooner or later Haitians will succeed in removing their tormentors, it offers the following recommendations regarding the administration of future elections. First, the CEP must have the cooperation of the incumbent government. The CEP must be provided with financial resources, logistical assistance and security in order to fulfill its constitutionally mandated functions.

Second, the CEP should devise some mechanism, consistent with international standards, to limit the number of candidates competing. One idea would be to require candidates to submit petitions signed by a certain number of voters before approving their candidacies.

Third, the balloting process must be made to move quicker. The number of individual ballots on the table should be reduced, perhaps by preparing coupon books, as contemplated at one time by the CEP; the coupon books would include ballots for all the candidates competing for an office in a particular constituency. This would make the voters task in selecting the appropriate number of ballots to place in the envelope somewhat easier.

Finally, the CEP should work with various citizens groups to ensure that problems are detected quickly both before and on election day. As was demonstrated on and before November 29th, there are a great many Haitians committed to the democratic process who could be willing to contribute their time and energy to ensuring effective and efficient elections; the CEP must devise ways of utilizing this vast resource.

Appendix A

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANTS/
OVERALL NDI HAITI PROJECTS

Haiti - Institution-Building In A Transitional Democracy
Conference, August 26-29, 1986
Puerto Rico

Vicente Sanchez Baret, Dominican Republic
Marco Tulio Cardozo, Venezuela
Enrique Carreras, Costa Rica
Mamadou Faye, Senegal
Neville Gallimore, Jamaica
Larry Garber, United States
Juan Manuel Garcia-Passalacqua, United States
Samuel Gejdenson, United States
Henry Giraudy, St. Lucia
Gabriel Guerra-Mondragon, United States
Robert Henderson, United States
Steven Horblitt, United States
Julian Hunte, St. Lucia
Anthony Maingot, United States
Ousmane Ngom, Senegal
Roberto Tovar, Costa Rica
Jose Rodriguez-Iturbe, Venezuela
Mark Siegel, United States
Kenneth Wollack, United States
Boyce Slayman, United States

The Electoral Process in Haiti: A Path to Full Democracy
International Survey Mission, December 8-13, 1986
Haiti

Enrique Carerras, Costa Rica
David Collenette, Canada
Leroy Cooke, Jamaica
Judith Corley, United States
Vivian Lowery Derryck, United States
Angela Gallimore, Jamaica
Neville Gallimore, Jamaica
Larry Garber, United States
Juan M. Garcia-Passalacqua, United States
Steven Horblitt, United States
Mariano Quesada, The Philippines
Kenneth Wollack, United States



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INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION DELEGATION
to the
ELECTIONS IN HAITI
November 29, 1987

Barbados

Hon. Billie Miller
Senate Leader of the Opposition
Barbados Labour Party
Former Minister of Education

Belize

H.E. George Price
Former Prime Minister
Republic of Belize
(Delegation Leader)

Canada

Hon. Gildas Molgat
Senator
Liberal Party

Costa Rica

Hon. Enrique Carreras
National Executive Committee
Partido Liberacion Nacional

Hon. Roberto Tovar
National Director
Partido Unidad Social Cristiano

Jamaica

Hon. Neville Gallimore
Minister of Education
Jamaica Labour Party

Liberia

Hon. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
Managing Director
Equator Advisory Services, Ltd.
Washington, DC

The Philippines

Mariano S. Quesada
Former Chairman
National Citizens Movement
for Free Elections (NAMFREL)

Puerto Rico

Juan Manuel Garcia-Passalacqua
Attorney
President of Analysis, Inc.

Saint Lucia

Hon. Julian Hunte
Leader
St. Lucia Labour Party

Senegal

Ousmane Ngom
Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Parti Democratique Socialist

Trinidad

Anthony Maingot
Director of Graduate Program
in International Studies
Florida International Univ.
Miami

United States

J. Brian Atwood
President
National Democratic Institute

Graeme Bannerman
President of Bannerman & Assoc.
Former Legislative Assistant to
Senator Richard Lugar

Toward A Democratic Haiti
(Constitutional Referendum Observation)
March 24-31, 1987
Haiti

Vivian Lowery Derryck, United States
Larry Garber, United States
Randy Grodman, United States
Robert Henderson, United States
Margaret Thompson, United States

Haiti: Party-Building in a Transitional Democracy
June 24-26, 1987
Haiti

David Collette, Canada
Vivian Lowery Derryck
Juan Manuel Garcia-Passalacqua, United States
Gracia Hillman, United States
Steven Horblitt, United States
Thomas King, United States
Billie Miller, Barbados
Al Raby, United States
Kenneth Wollack, United States

Advance Mission to Haiti
September 2-October 2, 1987
Haiti

Vivian Derryck
Larry Garber

Council of Current and Former Freely Elected Heads of
Government of the Americas
October 22-23, 1987
Haiti

Jimmy Carter, United States
George Price, Belize
Vivian Derryck, United States
Robert Pastor, United States

Advance Mission for International Observer Delegation
November 10-15, 1987
Haiti

Larry Garber
Michael Stoddard
Ron Davidson
Karen Curtis

APPENDIX C

November 24, 1987

To: NDI International Observer Delegation
From: Brian Atwood
Re: Terms of Reference

The observations of this delegation and other credible sources will form the basis for our conclusions regarding the November 29th presidential and legislative elections in Haiti. The delegation, therefore, must attempt to document observations and in all cases to distinguish factual information from subjective judgements.

Based on observations in the different regions of Haiti, the delegation will attempt to offer a national perspective in its statement which NDI expects to issue Monday afternoon, November 30, in Port-au-Prince. Prior to the issuance of the delegation statement on the 30th, NDI requests that delegates limit their comments to the media to personal observations of events. In addition, in offering comments to the media on election day, three caveats should always be included: first, that the observer's comments are based on observations in only one region; second that the key part of the process will be the count; and third, the circumstances under which these elections are occurring.

This will be a difficult election to observe as it is occurring under unprecedented circumstances. In evaluating the elections, these circumstances and the fact that Haiti is recently emerging from thirty years of dictatorship must be accounted for. At the same time, Haitians have the right, enshrined in their constitution adopted in March 1987, to select their leaders through a fair and genuine electoral process.

NDI hopes that each member of the delegation will prepare in writing a short personal reflection based on his/her observations which can be included in the NDI election observer report. Based on NDI's work in Haiti over the past 18 months, the following are among the issues that appear most poignant for consideration by the NDI international observer delegation.

I. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE

A. The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)

- 1) Despite the various incidents reported, was it able to prepare for and administer the elections in a manner consistent with its constitutional mandate?

Participant List
Page 2

United States (continued)

Vivian Lowery Derryck
Vice President for Programs
National Democratic Institute

Larry Garber
Senior Consultant for
Election Processes
National Democratic Institute
Legal Advisor, International
Human Rights Law Group

Steve Horblitt
Legislative Director
Congressman Walter Fauntroy,
Chairman, Congressional
Task Force on Haiti

Nancy Soderberg
Legislative Assistant
Senator Edward Kennedy

Casimir Yost
Executive Director
World Affairs Council
San Francisco

Venezuela

Dr. Hermann Alvino
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Prof. Antonio Blavia
Consejo Superior de la Universidad
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NDI Staff and Consultants

Sean Carroll
NDI Staff

Ron Davidson
Consultant

Leticia Martinez
NDI Staff

Michael Stoddard
NDI Staff

Ingrid Thomas
NDI Staff

Geraldine Thompson
NDI Staff

- 2) Did the transitional government (the CNG) provide the CEP with security, financial and logistical assistance?
- 3) Was the CEP able to conduct a civic education program for polling officials and voters?

B. The Political Campaign

- 1) Despite the incidents reported (including the assassination of two candidates and the burnings of several party headquarters), were the candidates able to travel around the country informing voters as to their plans for Haiti's future?
- 2) Other than through personal appearances, how did the candidates communicate with Haitian voters?
- 3) Did the media play a significant role in informing Haitians about the campaign and the records of the candidates?

II. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

A. Voter Registration

- 1) How many Haitians registered to vote?
- 2) Were the registration books ready for use by polling officials on election day?
- 3) Did those who registered know where to find their polling site?
- 4) Did those who did not register seek to vote on election day?

B. Preparation of Election Paraphenelia

- 1) Were the requisite number of ballots and counting forms prepared?
- 2) Were they properly sorted and distributed? What steps were taken to ensure that the election paraphenelia reached the most remote sites?

C. The Polling Site

- 1) Were the requisite five polling officials present at each polling site?
- 2) Were security forces present at the polling sites?

3) Were there nongovernmental and nonpartisan observers (e.g. from Mouvel or the Brigades of Vigilance) present at the polling sites?

4) What time did the polling sites open and close?

D. Voting Procedures

1) Were voters required to show their registration cards prior to voting?

2) Did the polling officials instruct voters how to cast their votes properly?

3) Were voters provided with an opportunity to cast a secret ballot if they so desired?

4) Were there indications that voters were subject to any form of pressure or intimidation?

5) Were the voters' fingers marked with indelible ink so as to prevent double voting?

6) Were there any indications or reports of fraud occurring at the polling site (i.e. stuffing ballot boxes, destroying ballots for a particular candidate, etc.)?

7) Were all voters, even those in line at 6:00 p.m., allowed to vote?

E. The Counting Process

1) Who was present when the polls closed?

2) How long did it take before the actual counting began?

3) How were disputes regarding the counting of ballots resolved?

4) At what time was the counting of the ballots at the polling sites completed?

5) By what method did individual officials attest to the validity of count?

6) What was the procedure for transmitting the results to Port-au-Prince?

III. THE RESULTS

A. Announcement of Official Results

- 1) When does the CEP expect that the official results will be announced?
- 2) Are unofficial results available prior to the announcement of the official results?
- 3) Do the unofficial results appear to be a reliable indicator of the official results?

B. Period following the Elections

- 1) Do the various candidates accept that the election was fairly administered?
- 2) Have they expressed a willingness to support the process as it moves forward to the run-off elections?

Appendix D
TEAM ASSIGNMENTS

Petionville

George Price
Brian Atwood
Neville Gallimore
Vivian Derryck
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
Gildas Molgat
Roberto Tovar
Michael Stoddard

Downtown Port-au-Prince

Herman Alvino
Mariano Quesada
Graeme Bannerman

Kenscoff

Larry Garber
Juan Manuel Garcia-Passalacqua
Nancy Soderberg

Les Cayes

Anthony Maingot
Julian Hunte
Sean Carroll

Jacmel

Billie Miller
Casimir Yost
Antonio Blavia
Leti Martinez

November 30, 1987
For Immediate Release

STATEMENT OF THE NDI INTERNATIONAL
OBSERVER DELEGATION ON THE ABORTED
HAITIAN ELECTION

The 30-person international delegation organized by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs observed an unprecedented event on November 29, 1987 in Haiti -- the cancellation of an election in progress because of rampant violence unleashed against peaceful, defenseless, determined and patriotic voters and election officials. The provisional Haitian government, the CNG, which took office promising to maintain order until a new government could be elected, failed in its self-proclaimed task.

The delegation, led by former Belize Prime Minister George Price and NDI President J. Brian Atwood, including party leaders from twelve countries, was invited to observe the November 29 Haitian elections by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and by the CNG.

The President of the CNG, in a meeting on October 23, 1987, with former Prime Minister Price and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, welcomed the presence of observers for the elections. This welcoming of international observers by the Haitian Government was confirmed in writing by the Haitian Ambassador to the U.S. in a letter to NDI.

While Haitians assumed the primary responsibility for administering and monitoring the November 29 elections, the invitation to international election observers was consistent with established practice. Such election observer missions are common among the nations of the international community which are governed democratically.

The conclusions contained in this statement are based on the delegation's observations in Port-au-Prince, Gonaives, Jacmel and Les Cayes. Our attempts to observe the process in other regions were prevented when the Armed Forces refused to clear chartered aircraft to fly to remote areas.

On election day, the delegation observed numerous incidents of shooting at defenseless and innocent people on the streets of Port-au-Prince. Two groups of NDI observers were fired upon, with three shots hitting the vehicle of one of the groups. The delegation also heard reports of the many people who died as a result of the violence which prevailed in much of the country and which was clearly orchestrated to frustrate the voting process.

The delegation also observed for several hours an election process which was operating despite intimidation and adverse conditions. It observed large numbers of voters waiting in lines to cast their ballots with democratic fervor in the first free Haitian election in more than three decades. We observed exultant election officials arriving at polling places with election materials, having survived a night of gunfire, fire bombings and grenade attacks. We saw Haitians from across the political spectrum volunteering in order to make the election successful. Indeed, in one region, we observed the election officials and the armed forces working together, with the latter providing the security essential for the conduct of a peaceful election.

From its observations both before and on election day, the delegation is convinced that the Provisional Electoral Council did its utmost to meet its constitutional mandate. As the delegation expected, on election day we did observe some deficiencies in the process: there were some administrative difficulties but most problems resulted from the lack of cooperation provided by the CNG on security and other matters. In particular, the CNG failed to secure the roads and denied the CEP permission to use helicopters chartered by the CEP with the full knowledge and consent of the CNG. This prevented the distribution of election materials in several regions of Haiti. It is our view that the armed forces and the police tolerated and in some cases abetted the violence which disrupted the elections.

Despite all the adversities sustained in the period leading up to the elections, the Haitian people wanted to vote. They were deprived of this opportunity only when the CEP found it necessary at 9:00 a.m. on election day, but hours after polls had opened, to postpone the election to prevent the likelihood of further massacres. Based on our observations, we reject unequivocally the CNG's attempt to cast blame on the CEP for the failure of the elections; this was clearly caused by the violence which only the CNG was in a position to prevent.

As an international delegation, we commit ourselves to follow closely the situation in Haiti and to urge our governments to do all in their power to prevent the further loss of life and to ensure Haitians their right to freely choose their own Government. Haiti's neighbors and the Organization of American States, of which Haiti is a member state, have a major responsibility in this regard.

We will also urge our governments and our parties to consider the crisis facing Haiti as a matter of the utmost urgency.

Finally, we are confident that the people of Haiti will ultimately prevail in conducting a free, fair and peaceful election in the future. We commit ourselves to return to observe that event and to continued solidarity with the people of Haiti as they pursue their democratic aspirations.

MEMBERS OF THE NDI DELEGATION

George Price, Co-Leader, Belize
J. Brian Atwood, Co-Leader, U.S.

Herman Alvino, Venezuela
Graeme Bannerman, U.S.
Enrique Carreras, Costa Rica
Vivian Lowery Derryck, U.S.
Neville Gallimore, Jamaica
Larry Garber, U.S.
Juan Manuel Garcia-Passalacqua, Puerto Rico
Steve Horblitt, U.S.
Julian Hunte, St. Lucia
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Liberia
Anthony Maingot, Trinidad & Tobago
Billie Miller, Barbados
Gildas Molgat, Canada
M. Ousmane Ngom, Senegal
Mariano S. Quesada, The Philippines
Nancy Soderberg, U.S.
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-###-

Los Angeles Times

411,000 Sunday

Friday, January 15, 1988

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U.S. Must Stop Playing Ostrich in Haiti 'Toothless Diplomacy' May Fuel Incipient Revolution

By J. BRIAN ATWOOD

Something resembling an election will be held in Haiti this Sunday, but few Haitians are planning to participate. Unlike the many who stay away from the polls in the United States, the choice to do so in Haiti is an act of civic responsibility.

Haiti's military government, after actively sabotaging the Nov. 29 elections, has drawn up its own rules for Sunday's effort to elect a civilian president and legislature. It has hand-picked an electoral council. Its troops will occupy the polling places and scrutinize ballots to ensure that the citizens have done their duty—not to democracy but to the Duvalierist tradition.

This is a sad result for the thousands who braved the bullets last November. Their civic obligation will be to stay home—though they risk a fine, harassment and even imprisonment if they do so.

The election may well be the lightning rod for the revolution that is daily growing in the hearts of Haiti's democrats. But if brave Haitians are to protest their lot, will the international community of democrats step forward and offer its support? Not if recent events and actions are any indication.

Last week in Barbados the member nations of the Caribbean community met to consider the situation in Haiti. These neighboring democratic countries have a stake in the outcome. Talk before the meeting focused on denying diplomatic recognition to the new Haitian government. Such strong action was not to be in the cards.

The United States, in the person of a deputy assistant secretary of state, was present in Barbados—albeit behind the scenes. We might as well have stayed home given the results.

Seeking consensus at all costs, the group issued a mild communique, acknowledging the "offending features of the electoral process" and calling on the Namphy government to restore "credibility to the electoral process, including in particular the provision for secret balloting."

The communique did not threaten; rather, it pleaded with Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy to conduct a free and fair election. It was a minimalist approach, with little relevance to what is actually happening in Haiti.

Walter Fauntroy, the delegate from Washington who attended the Barbados meeting, accused the Caribbean leaders of "abandon(ing) moral leadership."

The Reagan Administration's closest ally in the Caribbean, Prime Minister Edward Seaga of Jamaica, led the effort to soften the Barbados communique. And Secretary of State George P.

Shultz expressed support for the statement. This exercise in toothless diplomacy sent an unmistakable message to the Haitian people: The United States has lost interest.

Leaving aside the appearance of amorality, this episode demonstrated that Haiti is not yet to Ronald Reagan what Nicaragua or even Panama has become. The governments of these two nations receive, correctly, the scorn of the United States; the world knows that the United States wants a change. The leaders in these places

who have ambushed democracy are the subjects of American derision and intrigue.

It is lamentable that the highest levels of our government are not more interested in Haiti. At a minimum, we should issue a statement before the election condemning the Haitian government for its refusal to modify the election process, as we have demanded. This will show the citizens who boycott the election that we are on their side.

Few expected, or wanted, the United States to treat Haiti like Grenada and send an invasion force. But we could have expected an aggressive multilateral effort to isolate the Namphy government and demonstrate international solidarity with the internal opposition. After all, the Reagan Administration invested \$7 million in the Nov. 29 election, and has said that it supports the hemisphere's democratization movements.

The Administration's apparent hope now is that a civilian will be elected on Sunday who will gradually accumulate power and steer the country away from the Duvalierists and toward democracy. That, it is said, will move Haiti's troubles off the front pages and offer at least some hope of future democratization.

It is more likely that the new president of Haiti will enjoy the power of the current president of Panama. You don't know his name? That is because the name that you do know—Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, the corrupt and ruthless Panamanian dictator—is the real ruler, as Gen. Namphy will be.

The problem in Haiti will not disappear even if it is temporarily off the front pages. One day a future U.S. Administration will have to deal with a Haitian crisis that will immediately threaten U.S. interests. It will be made worse because the Reagan Administration did not recognize a crisis when it saw one.

J. Brian Atwood is the president of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, which has worked in Haiti since Jean-Claude Duvalier left the country in 1986 and which was the sponsor of the international observer delegation to the Nov. 29 election.



HELIOPIORRE. In Universal, Mexico City

Los Angeles Times

Thursday, December 3, 1987

Haiti Debacle Cries for Intervention Democratic Community Must Give Voters Alternative to Guns

By BRIAN ATWOOD

Policy-makers around the hemisphere are this week considering their options for dealing with a military government in Haiti that has sabotaged an election fervently desired by its own people. The policy alternatives can become clear only after a realistic analysis of what caused this aborted election.

I was the co-leader, with former Prime Minister George C. Price of Belize, of an international observer delegation to the Haitian elections, sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Our group of 30 men and women from 12 nations represented the full ideological spectrum, yet we had little trouble developing a strong consensus view of what happened.

Most prominent in our minds was the commitment of the Haitian people to vote. Before the 6 a.m. opening of the polls the lines began to form. In many cases 500 voters, the maximum registered for a polling station, were already in line at the opening.

Only a few hours later some would be massacred and thousands shot at in a systematic effort to either kill them indiscriminately or scare them away. Our lasting impression will be of those who courageously picked themselves up after the first volley of gunfire to return defiantly to the voting line.

Some governments, evidently including our own, want to describe the Haitian government as simply being too passive in failing to protect and facilitate the electoral process. The growing evidence of complicity between the military and the terrorists is dismissed with the rationale that these were isolated incidents involving individuals—as in, “Every police force has its bad elements.”

It may be diplomatically convenient to see the situation this way in order to retain

some relationship, and some leverage, with the Haitian government. The cost is a total loss of credibility with a Haitian people who will one day prevail over the thugs.

The evidence that the Haitian government actively planned to sabotage the election may be circumstantial, but it is both overwhelming and utterly persuasive. Military vehicles were seen accompanying the hit squads. Military and police officials fired at defenseless voters, journalists and observers (one of our groups was fired on by a police officer). We were not permitted to fly to remote areas to observe the election. The election council was not permitted to use available helicopters to fly voting materials to the provinces. Roads out of the capital were blocked by thugs and military personnel working together. Police and military personnel stood by or participated in the burning of ballots and voting places on election eve. Adding all this up, it is difficult to picture the government as being merely “passive.”

Our government is now urging this same group of officials to make good on a hollow promise to conduct a fair election before Feb. 7, 1988, when a constitutionally elected government is supposed to take over. This is a waste of effort. Even if these malicious conspirators were to see a vision on the road to Damascus, the Haitian people would not participate in an election run by government leader Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy and his cohorts.

The real fear that the international community ought now to have is that, once burned, the Haitian people may resort to bullets to remove the Duvalierists and give up on ballots.

It is too early to conclude that these courageous voters who braved gunshots to re-form their voting lines have given up on democracy. Their political institutions may be weak, and they themselves may be uneducated, but clearly they like the

notion that they as individuals can make a free choice. This is a time for the community of democracies to come to their assistance.

The diplomatic pressure should be on Namphy to step aside in favor of a provisional civilian government that will conduct a credible election. If he refuses, as expected, then the Organization of American States should urgently consider a peacekeeping force that will respond to the humanitarian need of the Haitian people for protection under a rule of law, and to the need for a secure environment within which to conduct a free, fair and open election.


Military intervention is a politically charged issue in Latin America, but in the case of Haiti it takes on a different cast. One of our institute's Latin American delegates, who opposed the invasion of Grenada and aid to the Nicaraguan Contras, said: “There is interventionism, and there is interventionism: the Haitian people will welcome a multinational peacekeeping force with flowers.”

This election day will live in infamy in the minds of Haitians. The new reality created by that tragedy cannot be ignored as the options are considered. We can use the techniques of traditional diplomacy and try to negotiate with the discredited government. Such an approach will not head off the revolt of people who want a new Haiti, but it will convince them that the international community was on the wrong side when it really counted. Or we can treat Haiti as the special case that it is and begin now to create an active, hemisphere-wide policy of escalating pressure, possibly culminating with a positive response to a request by the Haitian people to send a peacekeeping force.

Brian Atwood is the president of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in Washington.

'Choosing' Haiti's new president

IT IS NOT known what Gen. Henri Namphy of Haiti and Gen. Manuel Antonio a Noriega called each other when



**ANTHONY
MANIGOT**

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following the tragic cancellation of the Nov. 29 elections in Haiti. There is much that one can surmise, however. After all, the Panamanian is an experienced king-maker, a veteran of the game of guaranteeing electoral out-

come, of seeing that the right man gets chosen, if not elected.

In 1984, Noriega saw to it that economist Nicolas Ardila Barletta won over an octogenarian (but still popular) former rabbi-rouser, Arnulfo Arias. Barletta had been a student of U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz at the University of Chicago; this surely guaranteed his brilliance as well as his access to Washington, where, so many of the politicians believe, the solutions to Caribbean problems lie.

Also, Barletta fell about of the general — and there was nothing Washington could do to save him: He was gone within the year.

Now, it appears, Noriega's Haitian counterpart also has gone for the best man, at least in a technical sense. Leslie Manigat, the president-elect of Haiti, has to be placed in a league with Joaquin Balaguer of the Dominican Republic and Oscar Arias of Costa Rica as the best formally educated

presidents of the Western Hemisphere.

A descendant of a long line of Haitian military men, diplomat, and educator, Manigat instinctively gravitates toward intellectual debates and scholarly circles. He has been in enough of them: University of Haiti, Johns Hopkins University, Yale University, the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris, the Institute of International Relations in Trinidad, and the Universidad Simón Bolívar in Venezuela. He did not gain his reputation easily: Manigat has been a tireless researcher and writer, even after he decided formally to enter the race for president after he went to Venezuela in 1978.

It was there, carefully cultivating contacts among both the social democratic Acción Democrática and the Christian Democratic COPEI party, that Manigat began to shape his political movement. His ideas about politics in general and about post-Duvalier Haiti in particular did not take shape in that South American democracy, however. Already by 1984, one year after he went into exile from the Duvalier regime (which he had served up to 1981), Manigat knew quite definitely what the Haitian process should be.

Because the ideas that men write down before they enter active politics are useful windows to their political minds, Manigat's early scholarship is informative. In a significant 1984 study on Haitian politics, Manigat cited five different scenarios of what the post-Duvalier process would look like. He left no doubt that the fifth and final scenario was his choice: "A nationalist and progressive regime will emerge, able to ensure the



Leslie Manigat

'take-off' toward national integration through a triple-stage process: democratization through an authoritarian stage; modernization through a stage of technocracy; and socialization through a stage of structural reform."

One can only assume that this initial authoritarian stage is the one about to begin with his presidency today. The immediate question is, since the Haitian constitution limits the presidential term to five years and prohibits immediate re-election, can we expect the "technocratic" stage within the next five years or after them?

Manigat cited two major obstacles that Haiti will have to overcome to guarantee this process — one external, the other internal.

"It's major external challenge," he wrote, "will be to prevent eventual foreign aid from again dominating domestic politics. . . . How will this be achieved in a country where over 70 percent of the development funds and between 50 percent and 60 percent of the national budget comes from foreign sources? How can Haiti avoid this dependence when the deficit in agricultural production now stands at nearly 60 percent and is rising yearly? What would happen to Haitian education, for instance, if the 50 percent of the budget that currently comes from foreign sources were removed?"

Does all this mean that the modernizing stage will have to be delayed, which is the same as saying that the "authoritarian" stage will have to be prolonged?

The external problem, however, pales in the face of what Manigat expected internally: "It's major internal challenge will be to overcome the forces and supporters of the traditional system and to mobilize the people in the building of a new national regime: technological, modern, socialist, honest, and, to the extent possible, progressively democratic."

Manigat emphasized the word socialist but qualified the "progressively democratic" with the conditional "to the extent possible." Beyond this, the immediate question is: How can one expect a man who owes his office to the very forces of "tradition" to then move against them?

In politics there is the system and there is the man. The question is, how are these two brought together? Unfortunately for Manigat and for Haiti, this coming together has not occurred under the best of circumstances.

The heroic people of Haiti

By ANTHONY P. MAINGOT
And JULIAN HUNTE

Article 52 (1) of the new Haitian constitution mandates that voting is "a duty of the citizen." Article 52 (2) specifies that failure to abide by this provision "shall be punishable by law."

What a grotesque irony that the attempt of so many Haitians to abide by these legal requirements meant a death sentence. And how brutally trenchant and cynical the death sentence was executed by the very government sworn to uphold the constitution. This is the unequivocal conclusion we derive from our nightmarish experience as international observers assigned to the outlying Department of the South and its capital, Les Cayes.

We had known full well that the elections of Nov. 29 were but another round in a complex battle of wills, personal pride and ultimate political and economic control between the military group in power (the National Council of Government, or CNG) and the nine-member independent Provisional Electoral Council (the CEP). The latter had won virtually every previous round: the composition of the CEP, passing the Electoral Law of 1987, securing the constitutional provisions on its independence, the exclusion from the elections of candidates with Duvalierist antecedents and then, critically, forcing the CNG to back down from its attempt to recapture control of the electoral machinery.

The generals (and there are 17 in little Haiti) had lost more than just face in these rounds. There was the new and old legal and illegal business interests to defend; for some it might even be a matter of their continued freedom should certain candidates win. The CEP had a major battle on its hands and it might have overestimated its strength. With outside financial, technical and human assistance pouring in, with the support of virtually every civic and religious organization in the country and with the eyes and ears of the whole world turned toward Haiti, the CEP seemed to be on the verge of polling off an incredible feat: becoming the first independent agency of political change in the history of the republic.

Our observations and conversations in Les Cayes the day before the elections had convinced us that there were objective reasons for believing that the CEP had prepared for the battle carefully and soundly. Fully 75 percent of the 288,000 people over age 18 in the Department had been registered and supplied with voter registration cards; virtually every one of the 550 polling stations had been supplied with the necessary registers, ballots (one for each candidate), indelible ink and damper, instruction picture-posters on how to vote, and



United Press International / Reuters

Haitians line up to vote on Haiti's new constitution last March. Last Sunday hundreds of Haitians voted before the election was canceled: "Time and time again we heard the same theme: They will have to kill us to stop us from voting."

assigned poll assistants and watchers. Our conversations with the bishop, the military commander, civic leaders and departmental leaders of the CEP all led us to believe that the people of this historically independent-minded part of the country were ready.

Not only had they mastered the technicalities of a universal suffrage election in a population with nearly 90 percent illiteracy, they seemed also in the process to have created a new sense of themselves as a great family. The whole city, Monsignor Agner told us, was going to leave the lights on and their doors open the night before the polling, symbols of their emergence from 30 years of darkness and isolation. As we rose to bid our good-byes and good nights from this towering bishop, his firm handshake seemed like a metaphor for assurance and security. We returned to the spartan accommodations of the grandiose yet somehow — at that moment — appropriately named Hotel Cocoroc.

The first indication that all was not going well in the rest of the country came from the 11 p.m. British Broadcasting Corp.'s shortwave news: Uncontrolled violence had led the CEP to cancel voting in 20 percent of the country's constituencies. Despite this we went to bed confident that things would be different in the South.

At 3 a.m. we knew differently. Suddenly the still tropical night was awoke with the clatter of machine-gun, rifle and pistol fire. After crawling toward each other on the floor, we attempted to discern any counterfiring that would indicate an attack. After all, many of the invasions and attempted

coups against Duvalier had begun in the South. However, only the barking and howling of the dogs were answering the intensifying barrage that was obviously coming from the army garrison down the block. Shortly at 4 a.m. the electricity went out and heavy firing could be heard coming from the direction of the city. Having decided that the lights had gone out — figuratively and literally — for the citizens of Cayes, we planned our exit from the area.

We had, however, underestimated the raw courage and determination of these Haitians. Despite the knocking out of their radio station (Radio Lumiere), the shooting up of the homes of several citizens and the general terror of a night of bullets, they were lined up by the hundreds before the polling places. Time and time again we heard the same theme: They will have to kill us to stop us from voting. Here were the worthy descendants of those times when the worthy two centuries ago had created the hemisphere's second independent republic. Even after the 9:10 a.m. news that the CEP in Port-au-Prince had canceled the elections because of the wretched massacres of helpless voters in that city, people continued to vote. As late as 10 we witnessed hundreds of people of the little commune of Laurent lined up to vote. A youth listening to the radio repeatedly tells them that it's hopeless; exasperatedly he turns to us and says "Non, non ha." ("We are in bad shape.")

With our hotel headquarters in Port-au-Prince still a scary 210 kilometers away, we try to put the events in

Haitian and Caribbean historical perspective. Interventions and occupations have always had broader geopolitical reasons behind them but the triggering causes were invariably humanitarian.

This was so, in 1915 in Haiti. The broader context was U.S. fear of French and German designs on the island, the immediate occasion the massacre of 167 political prisoners by a president who himself would then be taken out of the French lap and chopped to bits by an infuriated mob. The U.S. occupation that followed lasted 19 years and is today used by anti-Americans — of left and right — as a major propaganda tool. We asked ourselves whether an intervention after the flawed election of 1987 would have spared Haitians the 30 years of Duvalierism that followed.

We discussed the 1952 elections in Cuba, brought to a stop by the military coup of Fulgencio Batista. How different Cuban and Caribbean history would have been had one of the minor candidates for that election — Fidel Castro — been allowed to win or lose with ballots instead of winning with bullets.

We thought of the brave people of Venezuela and El Salvador who on different occasions had voted despite the death threats and aerial shooting.

We can now add Haiti to that list, for despite the cancellation, they had already given ample proof of their democratic will and political choice: They wanted the system changed and they were willing to die for it. The final round definitely has to belong to such a heroic people.

Anthony P. Maingot is a professor of sociology at Florida International University and a member of The Herald's Board of Contributors. Julian Hunte is leader of the St. Lucia Labour Party. Both were members of the nine-country team of election observers sponsored by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. They wrote this article for The Herald.

HAITI: A PERSONAL VIEW

Election Aborted: Violence Wins and Democracy Loses

More than 30 die in voting massacre

BY CASIMIR A. YOST
Special to The Chronicle

Undeterred by very heavy gunfire the night before in the capital city of Port-au-Prince, lines began forming at polling stations throughout Haiti before the scheduled 6 a.m. opening on November 29.

In Jacmel, on the southern coast, the first person in line at one station was a nun followed by a pregnant woman and her husband. By 7 o'clock the line behind them stretched for blocks, reflecting the 90 percent registration of eligible voters in the region.

Throughout Haiti, at schools, churches and other locations, the Haitian people began voting for a president and a national assembly.

Within three hours of opening, the polling stations were closed. More than 30 people were dead and many more wounded. Voters were shot as they waited in lines. At one polling site in Port-au-Prince at least 15 people died, victims of bullets and machetes.

Journalists were particularly targeted by roving gunmen.

The army and police not only failed to provide minimal security in most locations around the country but also, in some cases, facilitated the efforts of traveling hit squads to carry out their grisly work. Witnesses reported that in Port-au-Prince army vehicles sometimes accompanied cars filled with firing gunmen. Uniformed and helmeted men were also seen shooting and dispersing voters.

Recollections

For those who observed the brief hours of Haiti's ill-fated elections, many recollections crowd together:

- Eager young men and women setting up polling stations, earnest in their determination to prove to themselves and outside observers that democracy can succeed in Haiti.
- Long lines of Haitians, many illiterate but all excited about their first opportunity in 30 years to exercise the right to vote.
- A little old lady clutching her registration card, decided on her choices and wanting no help.
- Voters reforming in line after a car had driven past with men shooting out the windows.



CHRONICLE PHOTO

Election Observer

Casimir A. Yost, executive director of the World Affairs Council of Northern California, spent four days in Haiti as part of an international election observer delegation organized by the Washington-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

The views expressed in this article are his own.

■ The blood-stained Argentine School in Port-au-Prince where a particularly grim massacre took place.

■ And we will remember all the dead Haitians who wanted so little and perhaps so much.

Perhaps, in retrospect, the collapse of the elections should not have come as a great surprise. History and wretched leadership have conspired against the Haitian people.

Haiti is the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere after the United States, but it is also desperately poor and without a tradition of political stability. Indeed, from 1915 to 1934 it was occupied by U.S. Marines.

In 1957 Francois Duvalier became president and for the next 30 years Haiti was in the grip of a brutal dictatorship sustained by Duvalier's murderous secret police, the so-called Tonton Macoutes.

On Feb. 7, 1986, Jean Claude Duvalier, Papa Doc's son and successor, fled the country. He was replaced by an interim government, the three-member National Governing



BY ASSOCIATED PRESS

Council (CNG) headed by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, who also is commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Tonton Macoutes and their weapons went underground, out of sight but not out of action.

In March 1987 a new constitution was ratified by a referendum of the Haitian people. Under the constitution a nine-member Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) was established, charged with setting up and administering elections leading to a new civilian government to take office Feb. 7, 1990.

In June the governing council sought to usurp the CEP's constitutional responsibilities by taking over its selection functions. Significant popular protests forced them to back down, but the seeds for continuing problems were sown.

Election Preparations


As the CEP prepared for the November 29 elections, shootings and arson hampered its efforts. In much of the country the army refused to provide minimal security.

More than 2 million Haitians registered to vote, more than 70 percent of those eligible. The Roman Catholic Church gave its strong backing to the process. Voices were raised in the international community calling on Namphy and his CNG colleagues to safeguard the elections.

In the end, one can only speculate as to the degree to which the governing council and the army conspired actively with the Tonton Macoutes and other elements opposing the elections. The evidence, however, is persuasive that the army was directly and visibly involved in the violence which halted this



BY ASSOCIATED PRESS



Neighborhood vigilantes, above, wielding machetes and clubs patrolled the streets of Port-au-Prince after terrorists began attacking voting places. A Haitian policeman stands guard at a school where four people were killed and 15 others wounded while attempting to vote on November 29.

crucial stage on the road to democracy in Haiti.

Claims that the electoral council was seeking to rig the elections cannot be substantiated since the elections were not permitted to proceed to completion.

What can be substantiated is that Namphy and the governing council failed to provide security for voters and, after the cancellation of the elections, dismissed the nine members of the electoral council. Namphy's future claims and pronouncements must be viewed with the greatest suspicion. His call for new electoral council members has predictably been greeted skeptically by many Haitians.

U.S. Policy

The United States faces difficult choices. We provided significant amounts of economic and mili-

tary assistance to Haiti following the departure of Jean Claude Duvalier while backing the electoral process. President Reagan sent an official delegation to observe the elections.

Now we are confronted with the unwelcome evidence that the Namphy regime is implicated in the failure of the elections. Some Haitians are charging that the United States shares responsibility for the election day violence, given our aid channeled through the Namphy government.

President Reagan has properly cut off further nonhumanitarian assistance to Haiti. Our challenge and predicament remains how best to contribute to free and fair elections in Haiti.

Some have called for unilateral U.S. intervention to restore order and facilitate new elections. Such

intervention would serve neither U.S. interests nor those of the Haitian people. On the other hand, hoping for Namphy and his colleagues to change their spots is not the answer either.

It seems highly unlikely that Haitian problems are going to be resolved by Haitians alone. Haiti should now be high on the agendas of the Organization of American States and the United Nations. Perhaps in the halls of the OAS and the UN approaches can be devised which will give the Haitian people another chance at elections. They deserve it.

As I drove across the country on election day after voting stopped, I saw Haitians all along the route clutching their radios, listening to the news. For them the news was only bad. It may get worse if the outside world ignores the plight of this unhappy country.