



NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE  
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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THE UNITED NATIONS IN NAMIBIA

Preliminary Report

November 1989

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## NAMIBIA REPORT

### OVERVIEW

From November 7 to 11, Namibians went to the polls to elect 72 members of a Constituent Assembly that will prepare a constitution for an independent Namibia. Despite widespread pre-election concerns about the potential for violence, fraud and delay, balloting and counting were conducted in a peaceful and administratively fair manner. More important, the commitment, determination and tolerance of the Namibian population -- over 97 percent of whom voted -- and the acceptance of the results by all the parties bode well for the emergence of democratic institutions in "Africa's last colony."

A seven-member delegation from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) observed this historic election as part of NDI's nine-month study of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. In addition, responding to a request from the chairmen of four U.S. congressional subcommittees, the NDI delegation assessed the operation of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) from April 1, 1989 through the certification of the results by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari. The following is the delegation's preliminary report. A comprehensive report will be published before the end of the year.

With respect to the UNTAG operation, the principal findings of the NDI delegation are as follows:

1. UNTAG played a critical role in ensuring the conduct of a free and fair election for members of the Constituent Assembly. UNTAG's contribution included helping to develop an election system that obtained the confidence of the population and the international community, educating Namibians about the electoral process, stabilizing the law and order situation through the activities of its civilian police (CIVPOL), and helping to administer the registration, balloting and counting processes in an efficient and effective manner.

2. The military conflict at the beginning of April, which caught UNTAG unprepared, cast a cloud on UNTAG and the Resolution 435 process. Even after the transition process was rescued, the events of April continued to have repercussions that substantially disrupted and delayed the timetable for the implementation of the settlement plan, and eroded confidence in UNTAG and the Special Representative.

3. UNTAG failed to obtain the complete cooperation of the South West Africa police (SWAPOL) in the investigation of intimidation incidents, which continued to be a serious problem until only weeks before the balloting began. Without underestimating the difficulties involved, UNTAG might have been more aggressive, particularly in the first few months of the transition, in demanding cooperation from SWAPOL.

4. While the Special Representative sought to establish a cooperative working relationship with the Administrator General and to

keep the transition process moving forward, the initial versions of the laws governing the electoral process created a system that was unacceptable to the international community. Accordingly, in response to the criticism directed against the system, the Special Representative insisted on substantial changes. Ultimately, the laws incorporated virtually all of the changes sought by the Special Representative, although the credibility of the process was threatened by the fact that the final election law was not promulgated until October 13, only 25 days before the balloting began.

5. The sui generis character of the Namibian situation notwithstanding, the successful UN effort in Namibia suggests that UN-supervised elections can play a role in resolving conflicts elsewhere, even longstanding ones. The Namibia operation demonstrated for the first time the possibilities for using an international contingent of civilian police and election supervisors who share a commitment to a free and fair elections.

#### NDI ACTIVITIES

NDI's efforts in Namibia began with a visit by the Institute's president and a senior consultant in March 1989. Based on consultations with Namibians and UN officials, NDI decided to support the activities of Namibia Peace Plan 435 (NPP 435), a nonpartisan organization established to promote the implementation of Resolution 435. In addition, NDI was encouraged to sponsor a fact-finding mission that

would review the system being developed for the Constituent Assembly election.

From May 27 to June 4, an NDI international delegation visited Namibia. The delegation was led by Senator B.A. Graham of Canada, and included politicians, election experts and political professionals from Barbados, Botswana, Pakistan, the United States and Zimbabwe. The delegation report critiqued the proposed election system and suggested specific recommendations, many of which were ultimately adopted.

NDI representatives returned to Namibia in June and July to observe the registration process and to design a voter education program. The July delegation, which was led by Congressman Donald Payne (D. N.J.), also participated in a conference on the Namibian constitution organized by NPP 435.

For the election period NDI organized a seven-member delegation, led by the Institute's president. The delegation conducted extensive interviews with UN personnel, political party leaders, Namibian government officials, diplomatic missions, and representatives of the churches, media and nongovernmental organizations. The delegates observed the role of UNTAG supervisors during the eight days of balloting and counting in several regions of the territory.

#### ELECTION RESULTS

From November 7 to November 11, some 97 percent of the 701,483 registered Namibian voters went to the polls. They voted at 358 polling stations, 265 of which were in fixed locations for the entire five-day period and 143 of which were mobile units that stopped in

several locations during the voting period. Counting took place on November 13 and 14 in 23 district counting centers located throughout the country.

The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) received 384,567 votes or about 57.3 percent of the 670,830 cast. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) garnered some 191,532 votes or 28.6 percent. Under the proportional representation system being used, SWAPO earned 41 seats in the assembly and DTA captured 21. Other parties obtaining seats were the United Democratic Front of Namibia (37,874 votes; four seats), the Action Christian National (23,728 votes; three seats), the National Patriotic Front (10,693 votes; one seat), the Federal Convention of Namibia (10,452 votes; one seat), and the Namibian National Front (5344 votes; one seat).

On November 14, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari, certified "that the electoral process in Namibia has at each stage been free and fair, and that it has been conducted to my satisfaction." The members of the new Constituent Assembly met for the first time on November 21.

#### ELECTION PROCESS: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Notwithstanding the fears of Namibians and outside observers, most of the anticipated problems with the elections did not materialize. The balloting was completed in the scheduled five days, despite the nearly universal expectation that five days would not provide sufficient time to allow all registered Namibians to vote. Similarly, despite predictions to the contrary, the process of verifying and

counting tendered ballots at a central location did not delay overall tabulation, which was completed in two days, one day less than had been expected. Likewise, the concern that Namibia's largely illiterate population would be unable to mark the ballots in a meaningful manner was belied by the small number of ballots rejected as spoiled. Finally, fears that violence would erupt during the balloting and tabulation processes were unrealized, although several violent incidents did occur in Ovamboland, in northern Namibia, after the announcement of the results.

Many people deserve credit for the success of these elections. The political parties worked together to avoid violence as they campaigned to give Namibians an opportunity to make a meaningful choice about the future of their country. The UN military and police peacekeepers helped to create the environment in which a reasonably free campaign could be conducted, notwithstanding the hostility and animosity that had developed during 23 years of armed conflict. The election administrators from the office of the Administrator General and from the UN worked tirelessly and patiently in processing voters, sometimes under difficult conditions, throughout five days of balloting. With the exception of the South West Africa police as discussed below, the South African government and its Administrator General (AG) in Namibia ultimately proved themselves willing to cooperate with the UN and the international community in the conduct of the election.

In the final analysis, though, it was the people of Namibia, who had waited so long for the opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination, that made the elections succeed. Indeed, the respon-

sible and patient conduct Namibians displayed throughout the election period was an inspiration for all who witnessed it. The international community can only hope that this lesson will resonate elsewhere in the region, including in South Africa.

#### THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION

NDI believes that UNTAG deserves considerable credit for its role in the Namibian elections. Operating in a politically charged atmosphere, the UN -- through its review of the AG's proposed laws, its military and police monitoring operations, and its supervision of the balloting and counting process -- was able to ensure that the elections produced a result that reflected the will of the Namibian people.

For this reason, NDI believes that careful scrutiny of the UN effort in Namibia may reveal valuable lessons for future UN operations. Accordingly, this report includes a critical evaluation of several specific aspects of the extensive and largely unprecedented UNTAG effort. As one would expect of any operation of this magnitude, UNTAG made mistakes in implementing the settlement plan. Nonetheless, while this report includes some specific criticisms, UNTAG's overall record is a positive one.

#### Background of UN Role in Namibia

In 1920, the League of Nations granted to South Africa a mandate to administer the territory of South West Africa. After the United Nations succeeded to the League's supervisory authority in 1946, South Africa refused to place the territory under the International



Trusteeship System. In 1966, the UN General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate and declared the territory to be the direct responsibility of the UN. In 1971, the International Court of Justice upheld the General Assembly decision and declared that South Africa was obligated to withdraw its occupation of the territory immediately.

In 1976, the Security Council adopted Resolution 385, which called for the United Nations to administer free elections in Namibia. In 1978, five Western members of the Security Council -- Canada, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States -- submitted a compromise settlement proposal, pursuant to which South Africa would administer Namibian elections under UN supervision and control. The elections would choose delegates to a constituent assembly that would write a constitution for an independent Namibia. Security Council Resolution 435 adopted the settlement proposal and constitutes the mandate for UNTAG's role in the current Namibian transition to independence. In 1982, the UN incorporated a set of constitutional principles into the settlement plan.

In December 1988, as part of the Tripartite Accords brokered by the United States, South Africa finally agreed to the implementation of the U.N. plan in exchange for the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The implementation process began officially on April 1, 1989.

#### Definition of UN Mandate

In assessing the UN's Namibia operation, it is important to recognize the scope and limitations of the Resolution 435 settlement

plan. Resolution 435 created UNTAG and authorized it to "supervise and control" the elections, but the administration of the process was left to the South African authorities. The inherent vagueness of the supervision and control mandate substantially contributed to many of the UN's implementation difficulties, and UNTAG would certainly have benefitted from a more precise definition of its role. The whole operation suffered from unreasonable expectations on the part of many segments of the Namibian population and the international community.

The UN civilian police in particular was constrained by the limits implied by its "monitoring" role. Also, after the implementation of the settlement plan began, it became apparent that widespread intimidation and election-related violence posed a more immediate threat to the transition process than the possibility of resumed armed conflict. In this regard, the settlement plan's emphasis on a military threat was outdated. As it became clear that the civilian police would have to play a particularly critical role, Mr. Ahtisaari twice found it necessary to request substantial increases in the number of CIVPOL officers. Ultimately, 1,500 were deployed, triple the number in the field at the beginning of April and more than four times the 360 provided for in the original settlement plan.

#### Events of Early April

The implementation of the settlement plan got off to an inauspicious start. On April 1, the day the implementation of Resolution 435 officially began, South Africa reported to Mr. Ahtisaari an incursion into Namibia by fighters of SWAPO's military wing, the

People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in violation of the 1988 Tripartite Accords. Recognizing the dangers such an incursion would pose to the overall transition process, Mr. Ahtisaari permitted South Africa to mobilize its forces from the bases where, under the settlement plan, they had been confined. On April 9, after a week of bitter fighting in which some 273 SWAPO and 23 government combatants were killed, all sides signed the Mt. Etjo accord, pursuant to which SWAPO agreed to withdraw all its fighters to points north of the 16th parallel in Angola and the South African Defence Force (SADF) troops were again confined to base.

Mr. Ahtisaari's decision to authorize the release of South African troops from their bases was widely criticized. Critics also questioned the UN's failure to have peacekeeping troops deployed by April 1. SWAPO, the OAU and the Front Line States were particularly strident in their condemnation. The Special Representative, though, considered his actions necessary to ensure the integrity of the Resolution 435 process.

The events of April substantially disrupted and delayed the timetable for the implementation of the settlement plan. More importantly, the events eroded confidence in Mr. Ahtisaari and in the settlement plan itself and left UNTAG's subsequent management of the implementation process vulnerable to criticism and second-guessing.

#### Intimidation and Political Climate

The presence of UNTAG military, police and civilian personnel contributed substantially to the maintenance of stability and of law

and order, despite persistent problems of intimidation. CIVPOL played a critical role in curbing and discouraging abuses by territorial security forces through its monitoring of the activities of the South West Africa police and the counterinsurgency force known as Koevoet (Afrikaans for "crowbar"). The UN military forces contributed by monitoring the border area and the confinement to base of SADF troops remaining in Namibia.

Incidents of intimidation committed by members of the security forces apparently declined over time only to be replaced by intimidation by representatives of political parties. The last several weeks before the elections, however, were virtually free of violence or serious allegations of intimidation. A contributing factor was the code of conduct initiated by Mr. Ahtisaari and agreed to by all political parties in September. Thereafter, representatives of all parties attended biweekly meetings under UN auspices to discuss problems and concerns.

Notwithstanding the above, it would have been desirable for UNTAG to have adopted a more aggressive and uniform policy with respect to the investigation of alleged incidents of intimidation. Many CIVPOL officers, feeling constrained by their role as monitors, could only urge victims of intimidation to file reports with SWAPOL, despite the fact that in many cases security force members themselves were the target of the complaints. UNTAG should, at a minimum, have insisted on receiving cooperation from SWAPOL, including more consistent notification of patrols, prompt investigation of referred complaints, and access to investigation files. In general, CIVPOL would have been more

effective had it been explicitly authorized to conduct investigations, to issue formal complaints, and to make arrests.

CIVPOL also was hampered by a lack of equipment, a problem exacerbated by SWAPOL's relative lack of cooperation. In the north, for example, SWAPOL patrols in armored personnel carriers, Casspirs, often purposely eluded the slower, less numerous CIVPOL vehicles. UNTAG only obtained a few Casspirs in September.

### Koevoet

The UN wavered in particular in its response to the ongoing Koevoet problem. For months, after the government had simply integrated Koevoet into SWAPOL, Koevoet members continued to be the source of many reported incidents of intimidation and assault. The AG finally demobilized Koevoet in September, only five weeks before the election. Rather than solve the problem of intimidation, however, the demobilization only transformed it. Ex-Koevoet members, often in DTA colors or hired as DTA party organizers, continued to terrorize and intimidate SWAPO supporters. In retrospect, many believe that the complete demobilization of Koevoet was a mistake. It might have been preferable to confine Koevoet units to base where UNTAG could closely monitor their activities.

### Negotiation of Election Laws

Resolution 435 left responsibility for drafting and promulgating all laws governing the registration and election process with the South African-appointed Administrator General. The settlement plan required,

however, that the Special Representative be satisfied that the process was "free and fair" at each stage. Despite some apparent initial reluctance to exercise his authority, Mr. Ahtisaari was directly involved in ensuring the fairness and adequacy of all aspects of the electoral process, including the registration, campaign, election and counting phases.

Mr. Ahtisaari used the authority implicit in the 435 mandate to negotiate substantial changes in the laws governing amnesty, discrimination, voter registration, political party qualification, election procedures, and procedures of the Constituent Assembly. At Mr. Ahtisaari's insistence, for example, the election law permitted political parties to designate pollwatchers to observe the balloting process inside the polling places, avoided the use of numbered envelopes that might compromise the secrecy of ballots, and provided for district-level counting. The latter change allowed the count to be completed in little more than a day, as opposed to the two or more weeks contemplated by the AG's draft law.

The SR and his staff could have adopted earlier a more aggressive stand toward the AG's proposed election law, as well as toward the proclamations granting amnesty and repealing discriminatory laws. Indeed, over time UNTAG appeared to change its attitude about the AG's proposed electoral system, at first seeming to accept the AG's general approach, but later demanding radical changes in the proposed system. The AG ultimately agreed to changes in the law that the UN insisted upon, but the promulgation of the law was delayed until October 13, only 25 days before the beginning of the election. This delay deprived

the parties of an opportunity to educate the electorate thoroughly about the particulars of the process.

### Registration

During the registration process, UNTAG personnel were present at all registration sites monitoring, and in many cases assisting, the election officials responsible for the registration of voters. The registration period provided an opportunity for UNTAG field personnel to establish and prove their operational capabilities as well as to be seen by the general Namibian population. Through the use of mobile registration centers and an extended registration period, more than 90 percent of the estimated population eligible to vote was registered.

### Voter Education and Media

Given Namibia's high illiteracy rate (estimated at 60 percent) and inexperience with democratic procedures, there was a major need for voter education using the radio broadcast medium. The UN was unprepared for the public information and communications strategy that the situation demanded. UNTAG eventually implemented a program to encourage voter participation and to help voters to cast their ballots in an informed manner, and it convinced the state-owned broadcast media company, the South West Africa Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC), to provide air time for civic education messages.

UNTAG was less successful in convincing SWABC to provide more balanced news coverage. In June, SWABC invited representatives of each contesting political party to consult on election coverage and on

establishing a schedule for the broadcast of each party's campaign message. Further, by agreement of the parties, news coverage was provided on a rotating alphabetical basis with each party theoretically treated equally. However, according to a four-month study conducted by NPP 435, SWABC news coverage of the election was extremely biased, weighted toward the government and the status quo. UNITAG should have pressed its case for a restructuring of the SWABC editorial board to ensure representation of diverse points of view.

### Election Supervision

For the balloting and counting period, the UN brought in an additional 1,700 election supervisors from 27 countries. These supervisors worked together with the AG's election personnel to administer a cumbersome balloting process. Indeed, the assistance provided by the UN supervisors, who serve as election officials in their respective countries, was a major reason balloting was completed in the prescribed five-day period.

### Repatriation Process

Between June and September, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) successfully repatriated approximately 42,000 Namibians from 46 countries, especially from Angola and Zambia. These returnees apparently included a number of former PLAN combatants. The UNHCR transported these returnees to Namibia and provided them with material assistance. The operation cost some \$39.1 million (just slightly



higher than the estimated \$38.5 million) and was considered highly successful.

#### Mission to Investigate Alleged SWAPO Detainees

Perhaps the most criticized aspect of the UN operation was its handling of allegations that SWAPO continued to hold detainees in Angola and Zambia. Pursuant to the mandate of the settlement plan, the SR had to be satisfied that all Namibians remaining outside of the territory had been given a free and voluntary choice whether to return. Accordingly, in September a UN delegation visited 16 former SWAPO camps in Angola and Zambia.

The delegation did not uncover any evidence that SWAPO was continuing to hold prisoners, and it made a complete report detailing its efforts to find information about each alleged remaining detainee. The report qualified the delegation's findings by carefully spelling out the logistical and informational constraints that the delegation faced. Nevertheless, former detainees and their supporters considered the mission a whitewash, designed to provide SWAPO a clean bill of health. In fact, some if not all of the political parties competing against SWAPO made the allegations of continued detentions the focal point of their campaigns, arguably exploiting the issue solely for political gain.

Unfortunately, the UN mission came late in the transition process, after the issue had become highly politicized. Further, the mission's failure to include representatives of ex-detainees, its inability to obtain the participation of the International Committee for the Red

Cross, and its reliance on the cooperation of SWAPO hurt its credibility, if not its effectiveness.

#### PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE UN OPERATIONS

In view of the apparent success of the UN's Namibia operation, there has been discussion of using the UN in other regions where elections are contemplated as a means of conflict resolution. In considering Namibia as a model for UN involvement in supervising elections, however, it is important to recognize the combination of factors that make the Namibia situation sui generis: the long-standing UN involvement, the intransigence of South Africa, the relationship of the Namibian conflict to larger regional conflicts, the struggle against apartheid within South Africa, and the thaw in East-West relations. Nevertheless, the experience in Namibia demonstrates that a UN mission can contribute to the fair conduct of elections. The UN record in Namibia -- including Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, Secretary General reports, and the election system finally agreed upon and implemented -- establishes a UN perspective on what constitutes a fair, democratic election. Governments and multinational and nongovernmental organizations, however, can contribute by monitoring future UN operations to ensure adherence to these standards.

Moreover, the cost of the UNTAG operation was some \$500 million. Certainly cost will be an issue in other election-monitoring operations. Nonetheless, the value to world peace of ending bitter regional conflicts, with all their attendant hardships, is hard to underestimate.

## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Despite the successful completion of the election phase, the Namibian transition to independence, to be sure, is not complete. The Constituent Assembly must now draft and adopt a constitution. Although there appears to be substantial consensus on many issues, tough negotiations can be expected before the Assembly obtains the approval of the requisite two-thirds majority.

Although the implementation of Resolution 435 through certification of the elections has not been flawless, the recent experience in Namibia suggests that the United Nations has played an invaluable and constructive role in ensuring that the elections were free and fair. Those committed to supporting the democratic aspirations of the Namibian people, which were so evident during the balloting process, must continue to monitor the situation during the writing of the constitution and after independence.

**ATTACHMENTS**

# Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

United States Senate

Washington, DC

October 24, 1989

The Honorable Walter F. Mondale  
Chairman

National Democratic Institute  
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Vice President Mondale:

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) has made an important contribution to promoting a free and fair electoral process in Namibia. NDI's August report offered an excellent review of the situation in Namibia and an effective critique of the proposed electoral laws. We note with satisfaction that several of the potential problems identified in the report have been resolved through changes in the election law that was adopted earlier this month.


From your report and the reports of others, we understand that the United Nations is playing an important, and in many ways, unique role in the Namibian election process. This has significance, particularly if the election proceeds in a free and fair manner, for other regions of the world where elections are contemplated as a possible means of resolving long-standing conflicts.

To better understand the role of the United Nations in the Namibian electoral process, we request that NDI prepare a comprehensive report on this subject. The report should focus particular attention on the U.N. operation as it related to the formulation of administrative and legal procedures, to the government and political parties, and to the complaints of election-related intimidation.


Given NDI's knowledge of the Namibian situation and its experience observing elections in countries around the world, we are convinced that an NDI report on this subject would be objective and place in perspective the contribution of the U.N. to the process. Because of our concern with this matter, we would appreciate an immediate report on the U.N. role in monitoring the balloting and counting processes.

We also would request that NDI prepare a more complete report using the official arrival of the U.N. Transitional Assistance Group through certification of the election results as a timeframe.

Sincerely,




Senator John Kerry  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Terrorism,  
Narcotics and International  
Operations  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
United States Senate



Representative Howard Wolpe  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Africa  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
United States House of  
Representatives



Senator Paul Simon  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on African Affairs  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
United States Senate



Representative Gus Yatron  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Human Rights  
and International  
Organizations  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
United States House of  
Representatives



# NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Suite 605, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-3136 • FAX (202) 328-3144  
• Telex 5106015068 NDIIA

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## DELEGATION LIST - TEAM MEMBERS NAMIBIAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

NOVEMBER 7 - NOVEMBER 11, 1989

Brian Atwood, Delegation Leader  
President  
National Democratic Institute  
Washington, DC

Joan Bingham  
Consultant  
National Democratic Institute  
Washington, DC

Eric Bjornlund  
Consultant/Legal Advisor  
National Democratic Institute  
Washington, DC

Larry Garber  
Senior Consultant  
National Democratic Institute  
Washington, DC

Patricia Keefer  
Namibia Project Director  
National Democratic Institute  
Washington, DC

Michael McAdams  
Former Senior Vice President  
Reese Communications  
Washington, DC

Katherine Moore  
Program Assistant  
National Democratic Institute  
Washington, DC



# NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Suite 605, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 328-3136 • FAX (202) 328-3144 • Telex 5106015068 NDIIA

## CONSULTATIONS AND MEETINGS

### UNTAG

Martti Ahtisaari  
Special Representative

Ambassador Joseph Legwalia  
Deputy Special Representative

Cedric Thornberry  
Director  
Office of Special Representative

Steven Fanning  
Commander  
Untag Police Monitoring Unit

Victor Andrev  
Regional Director  
Windhoek

Geoffrey Mariki  
District Director  
Gibeon

Hugo Anson  
Press Spokesman

Dr. Kwame Opoku  
Senior Legal Advisor

Ambassador B. Akporode Clarke  
Representative in Angola  
United Nations Mission

Shirley Perry  
District Director  
Tsumeb

Fred Eckhard  
Press Spokesman

John Truman  
Assistant Electoral Officer

Peter Fitzgerald  
Commander  
Civilian Police Unit  
Ovamboland

John Rwambuya  
Regional Director  
Ovamboland

Hans Glittenberg  
Regional Director  
Keetmanshoop

Mpazi Sinjela  
Special Assistant  
Deputy Special  
Representative

Margaret Kelly  
Senior Liaison Officer

Paul Szasz  
Senior Legal Advisor

Mikael Magnusson  
Deputy Regional Director  
Mariental

Gennady Tchistov  
District Director  
Grootfontein



Office of the Administrator General

Ambassador Karl von Hirschburg

Raymond Matthew  
Assistant Electoral Officer

Brig. E. Molendorff  
Regional Commander  
South West African Police  
Ovamboland

Gerhard Roux  
Official Spokesman

Col. J. Van Tonder  
Liaison Officer (Untag)  
South West African Police  
Ovamboland

Political Parties

ACN  
Jan de Wet  
Leader  
Action Christian National

DTA  
Mishake Muyongo  
Chairman

Barney Barnes  
Regional Director

Nico Smit  
Regional Chairman  
Ovamboland

NNF  
Vekuil Rukoro  
President

Nora Chase  
International Secretary

NPF  
Moses Katjiuongua  
Leader

Urbanus Karamata  
Secretary for Education  
and Culture

R. Muramgi  
Representative

John G. Muundjua  
Treasurer

Tjeripo Ngaringombe  
Vice President  
Secretary of Foreign  
Affairs

SWAPO  
Hendrik Witbooi  
Vice President

Theo-Ben Gurirab  
International Secretary

Joshua Hoebe  
Former Secretary of Education

Nicki Nashanti  
Spokesman, Ovamboland

UDF  
Secretary-General

## Church Representatives

Rally Deffenbaugh  
Lawyer  
Lutheran Office for World Community

Bishop Kleopas Dumeni  
Executive Member  
Council of Churches in  
Namibia  
Evangelical Lutheran Church

Roger Key  
Executive Member  
Council of Churches in  
Namibia  
Anglican Church

Father Bernard Nordkamp  
Executive Member  
Council of Churches in  
Namibia  
Roman Catholic Church

## Diplomatic Organizations

Neil Haffey  
Head  
Canadian Mission

Sam Hanson  
Political Counselor  
Canadian Mission

Roger McGuire  
Director  
United States Mission

Jane Madden  
Political Counselor  
Australian Embassy

Karen Monaghan  
Attache  
United States Mission

Christopher Musanga  
Representative  
Mission of the Front-Line Stat

Mbl. Phiri  
Minister  
Malawi Mission

Amb. Alberto Ribeiro  
Mission of the People's  
Republic of Angola

Peter Wallis  
Head  
British Mission

Nick Warner  
Head  
Australian Mission

## Other Organizations

Nahum Gorelick  
Director  
Namibia Peace Plan Study and  
Contact Group (NPP 435)

Peter Koep  
Chairman  
Namibia Peace Plan Study  
and Contact Group (NPP 435)

Jeff Lake  
Director  
Foundation for Democracy

Des Matthews  
President  
Chamber of Commerce

Brian O'Linn  
Chairman  
Committee for the Prevention o  
Intimidation and Election  
Malpractices

David Smutts  
Director  
Legal Assistance Center

Piet Venter  
Chairman and Director  
South West African Broadcastin  
Corporation (SWABC)

Four Former SWAPO Detainees  
(Names not available)

International Election Observer Delegations

CIMS

Commission on Independence for Namibia

International Federation of Free Trade Unions

Inter-Parliamentary Union

Organizations of African States

OXFAM

Socialist International

U.S. Presidential Delegation

World Congress of Trade Unions

