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NATIONAL
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**THE NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR ELECTIONS
IN INDONESIA**

A Report of an NDI Assessment Team

February 23, 1999

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In order to achieve a transition to genuine democracy, Indonesia must establish a new governmental structure and elect a new government with popular legitimacy. The passage on January 28, 1999 of three new laws governing elections, political parties and the structure of legislative bodies is an important step in that process. Legislative elections are scheduled for June 7, 1999. Later in the year, the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) will choose Indonesia's next president.

This report reviews important provisions in the new legal framework for elections in Indonesia, describes the election system to be clarified in subsequent regulations, and points out concerns and issues to be addressed. The report also makes recommendations about additional steps necessary to conduct democratic elections. The report is based in part on the findings of a five-member team from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which met with a broad range of Indonesian government officials, political party leaders, nongovernmental organization activists, representatives of the international community and others in Jakarta from January 29 to February 4, 1999.

The New Election Law: A Unique Hybrid

Despite concerns and criticisms, all major political parties and most other significant actors seem prepared to participate in the elections under the current rules. Whatever their defects, the laws provide sufficient basis for elections in which all significant parties and civil society actors will participate.

Enacted following intense political debate and negotiation, the new election law appears to be the result of last-minute political compromises. These compromises resulted in an election system apparently without exact precedent or parallel anywhere else in the world: a unique combination of proportional representation by province with some elements of a district system. But the law itself provides only general principles; details about exactly how the system will work remain to be specified.

Consistent with the system for previous elections in Indonesia, the new election law provides for elections for the People's Representative Assembly (DPR) by proportional representation by province. However, rather than assigning individual seats based on priorities stated in party lists as in the past and as in other proportional representation election systems, the law specifies that the actual winning candidates depend on how the parties performed at the district (regency or municipality) level.

This election system is complex and seems likely to lead to what may seem to be anomalous results across the country. Such anomalies could cause confusion and dissatisfaction after election results are announced. Accordingly, it is essential that political parties, civic groups, the media and the public are made aware of how the system will work.

In its choice of a mixed system, Indonesia follows a worldwide trend. Yet Indonesia has come

The Role of the Military

The legislatures law continues to reserve seats for the military (ABRI) in the legislative branch at all levels. Many have criticized the new legal framework for failing to eliminate the seats for ABRI in the legislatures. At the same time, many share the expectation that the provision is a transitional one and that ABRI seats will be eliminated in the future.

Formation of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)

The MPR, whose main task is to choose the president every five years, includes representatives not chosen through a democratic process. The 700-member MPR is composed of the 500 members of the DPR (including the 38 military representatives), 135 representatives chosen by the provincial assemblies and 65 representatives of functional groups. In addition to the participation of the military, the existence of functional seats in the MPR gives certain, as yet unidentified elite-based groups substantial say in the choice of the president. Each member of one of these favored groups gets a second, more influential vote in choosing representatives for the MPR and thus in the indirect election of the president.

Selection of the President

The MPR does not have clear rules for the selection of a president in the event that consensus is lacking. No procedure is specified if no candidate has the support of a majority of the MPR's 700 members. There does appear to be consensus that a majority of the MPR would be required, but there are no rules about how that majority is to be ascertained in the event that there are several candidates with significant support. Accordingly, if there is significant polarization and no candidate has a majority, there is the potential that the process of selecting a president could break down and/or exacerbate tensions.

Recommendations

The report also offers recommendations regarding election regulations; transparency, outreach and voter education; election observation; training of local election committee members; the independence and credibility of the Election Commission; the resolution of complaints; and access to media and news coverage of the campaign.

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I.   INTRODUCTION

In order to achieve a transition to genuine democracy, Indonesia must establish a new governmental structure and elect a new government with popular legitimacy. After the fall of Soeharto on May 21, 1998, Indonesian political and civic leaders and governmental officials began the process of developing a new political order, including a legal framework for early national elections to be held under democratic rules. On January 28, 1999, the existing parliament – which had been elected in May 1997 under the rules of Soeharto's New Order – enacted new laws governing elections, political parties and the structure of legislative bodies. President B.J. Habibie signed these bills into law on February 1, 1999.

On June 7, 1999, more than 125 million Indonesians are scheduled to go to the polls to elect 462 of the 500 members of a new national parliament or People's Representative Assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or DPR). The remaining 38 seats will be appointed from the Indonesia armed forces (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* or ABRI). (Law on the Composition and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRDs, the "Legislatures Law," Article 11.) Elections will be held simultaneously for the provincial assemblies (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I* or DPRD I) and the district assemblies (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah II* or DPRD II). The 500 members of parliament will join with 135 representatives chosen by the provincial assemblies (five from each of the country's 27 provinces) and 65 representatives of functional groups to form the 700-member People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* or MPR). Sometime later in the year, currently expected to be in November, the MPR will meet to choose Indonesia's next president.

This report reviews important provisions in the new legal framework for elections in Indonesia, describes the election system to be clarified in subsequent regulations, and points out concerns and issues to be addressed. The report also makes recommendations about additional steps necessary to conduct democratic elections.[1]

The NDI Assessment Mission

From January 29 to February 4, 1999, a five-member team from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) conducted a program to assess the new legal framework for elections and to make recommendations about other steps necessary to ensure open, democratic polls. The team met with a broad range of Indonesian government officials, political party leaders, nongovernmental organization activists, representatives of the international community and others.

The NDI team included Andrew Ellis, a British expert on election systems in transition environments based in Brussels; Kamal Hossain, senior advocate and former foreign minister from

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[1] NDI acknowledges in particular the substantial contribution of Andrew Ellis to the analysis in this paper and in Appendix I and the accompanying tables. While this report is based on the findings of the assessment team, NDI alone is responsible for the views expressed and for any errors herein.

provides only general principles; details about exactly how the system will work remain to be specified.

The election law leaves open critical decisions about how the new, complex system will work. **The law is not in itself specific enough to determine, given the number of votes cast for each party in each province and district (regency or municipality),[2] _either_ (1) how many seats are allocated to each party, _or_, (2) once this number of seats has been determined, precisely which candidates of the party will fill those seats.**

The resolution of this issue is _not_ a purely technical question. The acceptance of the election results by the participants and by Indonesian society in general depends on the existence of clear rules that are known and published in advance, understood to be impartial and in line with international standards, and seen to be fairly and transparently applied. Detailed regulations consistent with the law must be drawn up, approved by the new Election Commission (_Komisi Pemilihan Umum_ or KPU) and disseminated. Moreover, the issues underlying these regulations, as many involved in their development well understand, will be intensely political [3]

Allocation of Seats under the New Election System

Consistent with the system for previous elections in Indonesia, the new election law provides for elections for the DPR by proportional representation by province. (Law on General Elections, the "Election Law," Article 67.) That is, there will be separate elections in each of Indonesia's 27 provinces, and seats will be allocated to parties in proportion to the parties' overall votes in each province. This is the overriding principle that governs these elections.

Rather than assigning individual seats based on priorities stated in party lists as in the past and as in other proportional representation election systems, the law specifies that the actual winners will be determined "with consideration to the largest votes obtained by that particular political party in the districts." (Election Law, Article 68.) In other words, which candidates are actually elected to the seats earned by the parties on a provincial basis depends on how the parties performed at the district level.

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[2] Within each province, Indonesia is divided for administrative purposes into regencies (_kabupaten_) and municipalities (_kotamadya_). This report uses the term "district" to refer to both regencies and municipalities.

[3] Controversy surrounding the July 1998 elections in Cambodia illustrates why this is so important. Before those elections, authorities changed the details of the formula for seat allocation, but did not draw the attention of parties and observers to the change. As a result, immediately after polling day there were two different projections of the number of seats each party had won. The treatment of the electoral system and the determination of the results as a purely technical and internal matter contributed significantly to the unwillingness of the parties disadvantaged by the change to accept the integrity and fairness of the election results

percentage terms, although the regulations could also define best performance in terms of total number of votes.[4]

Elections will also be held at the same time and under similar rules for the provincial and district assemblies.

Implications of the New Election System

The new election system fully respects the principle that party seats are allocated by proportional representation, and every party will gain the number of seats in each province to which it is entitled in accordance with an internationally recognized system of allocating seats by proportional representation. But the actual candidates who will fill those seats, and thus be elected, will be those that performed the best within their party at the district level.

Accordingly, the system seems likely to lead to what may seem to be anomalous results, as the examples in Appendix I illustrate. First, the elected candidates will not necessarily be those from the parties that have received the largest number of votes in a given district. Second, the system does not ensure that there will be a representative from each district.[5] Indeed, both results seem likely to occur in at least some places in each province. That is, there will be districts where the candidate from the party with the most votes will not be elected – simply because the party has performed better elsewhere and thus has filled the seats it has earned in the province – and there will be districts with no representatives. While these results may appear strange and, without appropriate explanation in advance, would undoubtedly be surprising to candidates adversely affected, they are consequences of the particular hybrid system established by the law. Such results would be fully consistent with the principles established in the law.

Such anomalies could cause confusion and dissatisfaction after election results are announced. Accordingly, it is essential that political parties, civic groups, the media and the public are made aware of how the system will work. It is incumbent on the KPU, the government and others interested in successful elections and in acceptance of the results to explain this complicated system and its political consequences.

In its choice of a mixed system, Indonesia follows a worldwide trend. Yet Indonesia has come up with its own unique compromise between the values of a party list proportional system, which ensures participation of more parties and points of view, and a district system, which fosters the

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[4] Choosing the candidates in order of performance in percentage terms seems to provide a slight bias in favor of candidates from smaller districts, which might typically be found in more rural areas. See Appendix I and Table IV.

[5] Because the election is for parties at the provincial level, not for individual candidates, technically there are not representatives from any district. But the system does require that the parties assign candidates to districts.

16.) The ban on mere ideological affiliation appears inconsistent with international norms of freedom of expression and association.

The law further requires that political parties must reach a specified threshold in these elections in order to participate in the next (2004) elections, even though they may take their seats in the 1999 DPR and DPRDs. Specifically, a party must gain 2 percent of the seats in the DPR (10 seats) – or 3 percent of the seats in the provincial and district assemblies distributed in half of the provinces and half of the districts in Indonesia – to be eligible to run in the future. Parties that fail to meet this threshold must merge with other parties to be eligible to run in the next elections. (Election Law, Article 39.)

Preventing parties from participating in the next election based on their performance in the current one would seem to inhibit their right to express their views at that time. To prevent a party from appearing on the ballot based solely on performance in previouss elections, without an opportunity to demonstrate its present strength, would seem to deny citizens their right to support a party advocating particular point of view. A threshold for the current election, in contrast, would only say that some support has to be demonstrated to achieve representation; it would not bar anyone from participating.

A number of provisions in the parties law are encouraging. Parties are to be "independent," controlled only by their members. (Parties Law, Article 1.) Even though parties must acknowledge Pancasila as the state ideology, a party need not adopt Pancasila as its own party ideology. (Article 2.) This clause especially accommodates the demands of some parties to be allowed to adopt Islam as their founding principle. Parties are nonprofit organizations, which cannot establish or own shares in for-profit firms. (Article 13.) The law requires parties to report their finances to the Supreme Court, and these reports can be audited. (Article 15.)

Administration and Supervision of Elections

The election law establishes a new Election Commission, or KPU, which is to be "free and independent," to supervise the elections. (Election Law, Article 8.) The government appoints five members of the KPU, and each party eligible to compete in the elections can name one member. The party-appointed members, taken together, have votes equal to that of the government-appointed members. (Election Law, Article 9.) The KPU, however, cannot come into existence until after the parties are qualified for the elections and party representatives are named. The process of determining which parties are eligible is scheduled to be completed on March 4, one month after the law was signed.

In the interim, the Minister of Home Affairs has appointed an 11-member advisory committee, the Election Commission Formation Preparation Committee (*Panitia Persiapan Pembentukan Komisi Pemilihan Umum* or P3KPU), composed of prominent leaders of civil society and professionals involved in preparing the legal framework for the elections. The "Team of 11" (*Tim Sebelas*), as it is popularly known, is charged with responsibility to determine which political parties have met the

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Below the KPU, the election law provides that the bodies responsible for election administration at each level of the process consist of "representatives of political parties participating in the election and of the government," including at the levels of the nation (Article 12), province (Article 14), district (Article 16), sub-district (*kecamatan*) (Article 18), and village (*desa*) or neighborhood (*kelurahan*) (Article 21). The bodies responsible for running polling stations are to be made up of "representatives of contesting parties and/or community (*masyarakat*) representatives." (Article 23). The law does not appear to give each party a separate right to sit on each election committee.

Overseeing, Monitoring and Observing the Elections

The election law stipulates that Overseer Committees (*Panitia Pengawas* or *Panwas*) are to be established at the national, provincial, district and sub-district levels by the Supreme Court and the provincial and district courts. (Election Law, Article 24.) These committees have three duties: (1) "to oversee all phases of the conduct of the election," (2) "to settle disputes that arise in the conduct of the election," and (3) "to follow up findings and disputes that cannot be resolved by reporting to the proper legal authorities." (Election Law, Article 26.) Nonetheless, the details of the relationships between the Panwas, on the one hand, and the KPU and implementation committees, on the other, "will be further regulated by the Supreme Court, in consultation with the KPU." (Election Law, Article 25.)

The election law also permits each party to have a witness present at each polling station, and it is important that the parties organize themselves to recruit and train such observers to take advantage of this right. (Election Law, Article 23.) These witnesses have the right to lodge protests during the vote count at all levels, and such protests must be dealt with "immediately." (Election Law, Articles 56, 58-62). However, these protests "cannot hamper the conduct of the election." (Election Law, Article 63.)

The law also permits nonparty domestic and foreign observers to "undertake monitoring of the conduct of the election by registering with the KPU." (Election Law, Article 27), although it does not specify details. The KPU is thus charged with responsibility for regulating these observers. The regulations should make clear that observers have access to the entire election process: registration, campaigning, polling, counting, tabulation, complaints and appeals. The regulations should also establish fair, reasonable and workable criteria for accrediting election monitoring organizations.

The Role of the Military

The new legislatures law provides that ABRI will appoint 38 representatives to the parliament or DPR (Legislatures Law, Article 11) and 10 percent of the seats in the provincial and district legislatures (Articles 18 and 25). In the previous system, there were 75 seats reserved for the military in the DPR, and 20 percent of the seats in the DPRDs.

majority of the MPR would be required, but there are no rules about how that majority is to be ascertained in the event that there are several candidates with significant support.

Accordingly, if there is significant polarization and no candidate has a majority, there is the potential that the process of selecting a president could break down and/or exacerbate tensions. On the other hand, if the MPR successfully establishes majority support for one candidate, notwithstanding multiple candidates with significant support, the precedent might be codified into future procedures.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

Government officials, election advisers, political party leaders, civic activists and others across the political spectrum in Indonesia have emphasized the importance of upcoming elections. In light of this widespread commitment to democratic elections and in the spirit of international cooperation, NDI offers the following recommendations:

- *Clear Regulations.* Because the election law is vague and establishes a complicated hybrid system of proportional representation, it is essential that the details of the election system are clearly established in regulations governing the election process that have yet to be promulgated. The rules should be clearly set out, published, widely explained and not changed. The compromise election system is likely to lead to anomalous results in some districts, and thus to avoid controversy after the elections all parties should understand the system before election day and the subsequent announcement of the results.

- *Transparency, Outreach and Voter Education.* The KPU and government officials responsible for aspects of election administration should endeavor to explain the election regulations and their own procedures and policies to appropriate representatives of political parties, nongovernmental organizations, the media and the public. The KPU and the government should welcome comments and input from such sources. Voter education – to explain the complicated system to the larger public – is essential.

- *Observation.* The regulations should make clear that observers have access to the entire election process: registration, campaigning, polling, counting, tabulation, complaints and appeals. The regulations should establish fair, reasonable and workable criteria for accrediting election monitoring organizations.

- *Training.* The new law also establishes that local level election committees will include party and community representatives, rather than government officials. Training of the members of these bodies will present a significant challenge to election authorities.

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whether or not a majority. Some scholars suggest, however, that in 1945 this term was understood to mean a "majority," or 50 percent plus one

APPENDIX I

Electoral System of Indonesia:
Votes, Seats and Party/Candidate Relationships

This note considers some implications of the new, hybrid election system in Indonesia by providing some mathematical examples. More specifically, it considers the implications of the detailed system expected to be proposed to and adopted by the KPU as well as the effects of various other ways in which the principles established in the law could theoretically be implemented.

In seeking to devise a system in which the identity of the elected candidates of each party is linked to the best performances of the party in individual districts, in accordance with Article 68 of the new election law, Indonesia appears to be breaking new ground. The motivations for this "embryonic district system" are well understood: both the desire to develop some form of linkage between representatives and their districts, and the wish to take power from central party machines to electors at the local level. But because strict proportionality and district linkage are to some extent incompatible aims, there is a significant possibility that some of the results will be surprising.

Given the politically sensitive environment in which the results of these elections will be announced and the critical need for broad acceptance of those results, the exact system must be explained to and well understood by parties and candidates, domestic observers and other interested parties in the wider Indonesian community.

PR at Provincial Level: How Many Seats for each Party?

The first issue the system must address (and which must be expressed in the regulations) is how many seats are allocated to each party. While Article 67 of the election law provides for proportional representation at the provincial level, there are a number of different methods for allocating seats that would be consistent with this provision. Some examples of these methods are shown in Table I.

NDI understands that Indonesian authorities intend to use the "largest remainder method" with an "n+1 quota," which is a well-established international standard for which procedures exist. (See Table I, Version A.2.) These procedures can easily be written as draft regulations and adopted by the KPU.

Which Candidates are Elected from a Given Party?

Once it is determined how many seats each party has won, the next question is to identify which individual candidates have won those seats. This issue is much less straightforward than the determination of how many seats the party has gained. The system seeks to link the identity of each party's elected candidates to the best performances of the party in individual districts (regencies or municipalities).

of each district may, however, be achieved at the expense of rewarding good (or even adequate) individual party performances. In particular, the fact that the last seat to be allocated will always go to the party that remains one seat short of its provincial total can produce the result that a very poor performance by a party in a district can be rewarded with the attached candidate getting a seat.

Table III: Same Alternatives in Larger Districts

Table III demonstrates the same possible effects in an example with six parties competing in eight districts under the same conditions

Expected System in Indonesia

As indicated above, the KPU is currently expected to adopt Version 1, where seats earned at the provincial level are assigned to the best performances of each party at the district level regardless whether they have achieved pluralities or not. Thus, it is likely that there will be districts where the attached candidates who are elected are from parties that did not receive pluralities in those districts and that there will be districts with no representatives

Best Percentage or Highest Total Vote?

Since the districts within Indonesia's provinces are of different sizes, the system must also determine whether to consider that a party's best performances are (i) those places it received the largest number of votes, or (ii) those places where it received the highest percentages of the votes. It is expected that the KPU will choose the latter method.

Table IV illustrates the effect of this choice. The five districts here have electorates in the ratio 4:2:2:1:1. There is a big difference between the two methods: of the five candidates who are elected under the first alternative, only one is also elected under the second.

Under the highest total vote method, it is very unlikely that there will be a representative attached to any smaller district. Note in the example that the candidate attached to a district in which a party polls 71 percent of the vote is not elected. The link between districts and representatives will be confined to larger districts.

Under the percentage method, links are more likely to exist where a district of any size is a particular stronghold of one or more parties.

More Seats than Districts in a Province

These questions become even more complex – and pose significant challenges to the drafting of regulations – where there are more seats than districts in a given province. The questions to be determined appear to be:

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determine how many candidates they wish to assign to each district. This effect is not shown directly in the example, which assumes that each party runs one candidate in each district.

Table I

PR at Provincial Level: Recognised Methods of Seat Allocation

The current intention is to use largest remainder with 'n+1' quota, which is a standard and recognised method. Procedures for this method should be adopted as regulations and published as early as possible.

Assumptions: A Province with Five Seats and three parties winning percentages (A 51%, B 33% and C 16%)

Total % of Vote Won in Province per Party			Number of Seats Awarded		
A	B	C	A	B	C

A.   Largest Remainder (two variations)

1. 'n' quota, 100/5 = 20:

	A	B	C		A	B	C
Full quotas	40.0	20.0			2	1	
Remainder	11.0	13.0	16.0				
Seats from largest remainders						1	1
			Result		**2**	**2**	**1**

2. 'n+1' quota, 100/6 +0.01 = 16.67:   **(method currently planned for Indonesia)**
(method currently planned)

	A	B	C		A	B	C
Full quotas	50.0	16.7			3	1	
Remainder	0.99	16.3	16.0				
Seats from largest remainders						1	
			Result		**3**	**2**	**0**

B.   Highest Average

1. D'Hondt divisors, 1, 2, 3...

Steps

	A	B	C		A	B	C
1	51.0	33.0	16.0		1		
2	25.5	33.0	16.0			1	
3	25.5	16.5	16.0		1		
4	17.0	16.5	16.0		1		
5	12.8	16.5	16.0			1	
			Result		**3**	**2**	**0**

2. Sainte-Laguë divisors, 1,3,5...

Steps

	A	B	C		A	B	C
1	51.0	33.0	16.0		1		
2	17.0	33.0	16.0			1	
3	17.0	11.0	16.0		1		
4	10.2	11.0	16.0				1
5	10.2	11.0	5.3			1	
			Result		**2**	**2**	**1**

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Table II (con't)

Version 3.

Alternative method guaranteeing one representative from each District

Rank order of party performance with shaded candidates as winning representatives.

Rank	Candi-date	Votes
1	B2	71
2	A4	60
3	A1	51
4	A3	44
5	A5	38
6	B5	37
7	B3	36
8	B4	30
9	B1	26
10	C5	25
11	C1	23
12	C2	22
13	C3	20
14	C4	10
15	A2	7

Allocation to achieve one representative in each district using the above ranking:
1. Candidate B2 wins the first of B's two seats
2. Candidates A4 and A1 win the two seats allocated to party A.
3. Candidates A3 and A5 do not qualify since their party already has it's two seats.
4. Candidate B5 picks up the second seat for party B.
5. District 3 and Party C have no representation; Party C must pick its candidate from District 3.

Seats allocated to B for 2, to A for 4, to A for 1
A has complete allocation of 2 seats: A3, A5 do not qualify for seats

Seat allocated to B for 5
B has complete allocation of 2 seats. B3, B4, B1 do not qualify for seats
Seats 5, 1 and 2 have representatives: C5, C1 and C2 do not qualify for seats

Seat allocated to C for 3

District
1	51	26	23
2	7	71	22
3	44	36	20
4	60	30	10
5	38	37	25

District 5's representative comes from the party which came second
District 3's representative comes from the party which came third

Version 3. Allocation to achieve one representative in every District

Seats allocated to B for 3 and to A for 6
Seat 6 has a representative: B6 does not qualify
Seats allocated to F for 8 and to A for 4
A has its full allocation of seats: A7 and A1 do not qualify
Seat allocated to B for 7
A has its full allocation of seats: A2 does not qualify
Seats allocated to C for 2 and to D for 1
Last remaining seat in 5 to be allocated to E

Representatives allocated to districts 1, 2, 5 and 7 do not come from the highest polling party
Representative allocated to district 5 comes from the lowest polling party

Table V

Successful candidates
Fixed Number of Seats in Each District

Winners indicated by shading: (plurality winners shown in italics)
Assumptions:
- Province with four districts, one with two seats
- Electorate of district 4 is twice electorate of each one member district
- Uniform turnout assumed

Total percentage vote

district	Party			
	A	B	C	Total
1	*51*	26	23	100
2	7	*71*	22	100
3	*44*	36	20	100
4 (2 members)	*49*	33.5	17.5	100
Total vote in province	200	200	100	

Seats won by each party	2	2	1
Plurality winners	*4*	*1*	

Version 1:

Winners are best polling candidates of each party

district			
1	51	26	23
2	7	71	22
3	44	36	20
4 (2 members)	49	33.5	17.5

District 4 has only one representative
District 1 has two representatives, from the parties which came first and third

Nigeria, Russia, Tatarstan, Romania, Ireland, Fiji, and Bosnia. Professor Horowitz most recently visited Indonesia in August 1998.

Kamal Hossain is senior advocate to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and has been involved in public service in Bangladesh for more than 30 years. He served for many years as a Member of Parliament and as the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1973-74. Dr. Hossain has participated in a number of human rights and election observer missions, including the observation mission to the 1994 elections in South Africa organized by the Commonwealth Election Observer Group, and South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) missions to the elections in Sri Lanka (1990) and Pakistan (1989), and NDI missions to assess the election framework in Hong Kong (1998). He is a board member of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development based in Montreal, Canada, and of a number of other organizations that promote human rights, good governance and sustainable development. Dr. Hossain visited Jakarta in September 1998 to participate in an NDI conference on political parties in Asia.

Blair King is program officer based in Indonesia for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Ohio State University, with a specialization in Indonesian politics. His dissertation topic is the political economy of rice production, sustainable agriculture, and peasant empowerment in Central Java, and he has also conducted research on elections, NGOs and the labor movement. In 1997-1998 Mr. King received a Fulbright-Hays grant to conduct dissertation field research in Central Java, and he previously worked for four years as an English teacher in Pekanbaru, Riau, Sumatra. Mr. King has a B.A. in International Relations and an M.A. in International Policy Studies from Stanford University. He is fluent in Bahasa Indonesia.