

# Parties, Policies and Political Reform in Hong Kong

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A report written by  
**The Hong Kong Transition Project**

commissioned by  
**National Democratic Institute for International Affairs**



and



**THE HONG KONG TRANSITION PROJECT**

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. Since 1997, NDI has conducted a series of assessment missions to Hong Kong to consider the development of the HKSAR's "post-reversion" election framework, the status of autonomy, rule of law and civil liberties under Chinese sovereignty, and the prospects for democratization beyond the 10-year transition period set forth in the Basic Law. In 2002, NDI established a field office in Hong Kong.

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The Hong Kong Transition Project<sup>1</sup> is a long-term study of Hong Kong people's transition from British subjects to SAR citizens. Citizenship requires that citizens have the power to elect their own leaders and amend or approve their own constitutional documents. The project focuses on the time period beginning in 1982, when negotiations for Hong Kong's return commenced without Hong Kong people's participation as British colonial subjects, until 2007-2008 when under the Basic Law elections under new election rules decided by Hong Kong people themselves are scheduled to take place. It is headquartered at Hong Kong Baptist University, with academic members there, the University of Macau, City University, Lingnan University and the University of Waterloo in Canada.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Surveys can be used to report a series of numbers related to a series of questions or they can be used as a diagnostic tool that tells whether a system of governance is healthy or ill, and if ill, what is wrong. This report does the latter. In Part I “Setting the scene” (pages 3-4) with hundreds of thousands of demonstrators on the streets and barely half of Hong Kongers satisfied with life here in 2003 and 2004, the system of governance was obviously in crisis. A new leader, Donald Tsang, took up office barely a year ago. In his first Policy Address in October 2005 he promised strong governance. He made a series of constitutional reform proposals meant to shore up, if not repair, governance shortly afterwards. However, his proposals failed to pass the Legislative Council (Legco) on 20 December 2005.

## Conclusions

Large proportions of the public, and especially key elements, have concluded the December reform proposals, though flawed and incomplete, deserve reconsideration and passage. They want the system to work to address their problems, not simply hand power to patriots or businessmen or professionals or to “ruling” parties. The system is meant to fix what dissatisfies and worries them; neither it nor the political parties are doing so on problem after problem. They are putting trust in Donald Tsang to make the current flawed system work. The parties are partially functional in achieving their limited role in the system, but fundamental issues remain which threaten further systemic breakdowns in times of crisis. Tsang cannot deliver strong governance without the parties; but neither can the parties deliver solutions to people’s problems without the government. The system remains fundamentally flawed. This keeps anxieties and readiness to leave Hong Kong at significant levels, particularly in younger, more educated and wealthier groups.

## CONTENTS SYNOPSIS

### Is the governance system still in crisis?

Today, instead of barely half the population satisfied with life here as at the low point in 2003, three in four are. Things feel obviously better. Yet as Part II (pages 4-11) shows, nearly half the population and large majorities of the youngest, wealthiest and best educated are posed to leave Hong Kong if the governance system fails to solve their problems and protect their interests. Has the change of Chief Executive solved Hong Kong’s fundamental problems? If not, much is at stake as critical proportions and components of the population stand ready to depart.

### What problems and worries persist?

Part III (page 12) describes the analytical framework while Part IV (pages 13-54) shows in detail that on issue after issue including economic ones, while things are no longer perceived as getting worse by a majority, neither does a majority see them as getting better. Different age groups, genders, educational and occupational groups express worries and dissatisfaction disproportional to overall results. Yet on many issues, the government and political parties seem to have very different priorities from majorities and key groupings of respondents. For example, 77 percent support increasing pollution control and environmental protection fees and charges, 61 percent are dissatisfied with the government’s performance on reducing pollution, 80 percent want increased spending on environmental protection, yet neither the government nor parties appear to be making this the number one priority the public want it to

be. During the Tung years much of this policy and priority disconnect was attributed to Beijing's influence and its rigid determination to impose "patriotic" priorities on Hong Kong's restive populace. Yet Part IV section 3 (pages 47-54) shows patriotism is neither problem nor solution to the system problems, and large majorities even of the dissatisfied and worried want Tsang, a system insider and professed patriot, to run again.

#### **What is wrong with the system and what effect did the failure of efforts to fix it have?**

Part V section 1 (pages 55-64) explains these apparent contradictions. In healthy democratic governance systems, parties function as devices to focus public concerns on what causes a majority dissatisfaction and as means to turn them into policy proposals. Parties put together a package of policies and put forward leaders pledged to implement them. (That is, they combine blocs of worry and dissatisfaction until they achieve workable support levels.) Elections render the public's verdict on the parties' packages, and hand power to them to implement new policies and programs meant to address the problems which created the public's worries and dissatisfactions in the first place. Hong Kong's governance system in terms of parties and elections do not work quite this way, and it shows up in persistent, recurrent unsolved problems that fester unnoticed by government and parties until things go obviously wrong and the public achieves and evidences very high levels of frustration.

#### **Why do large majorities support Tsang to run again?**

Part V section 2 and 3 (pages 64-69) shows that failure to fix the system by passing constitutional reforms has damaged the pro-democracy parties, not Tsang and not pro-government parties. Once evenly divided over reforms, the public support reconsidering and Legco passing the reforms by about two to one now. Majorities of the younger, better educated, upper and middle income groups, and key occupations now support the reform proposals defeated in December. Why the change in sentiments? People want the system to work and deliver solutions to their problems. Most have concluded that pro-democrats are more guilty of wanting power to hold office than wanting power to fix their problems. Barely half think parties have had a good effect on decision making in Hong Kong against 18 percent who see a bad effect. The rest, a third, think parties have made little discernable difference. The parties fail to play their part in delivering good governance.

#### **What is wrong with the parties and what can they do to fix those problems?**

Part VI (pages 69-92) shows clear evidence neither parties nor government properly focus on using power to fix people's problems or to address the worries and causes of dissatisfaction of key groups. Barely one in five believe the four biggest parties are more interested in solving their problems than in political power. The current election system with half coming from proportionally returned lists and the other half of Legco seats returned by narrow interest groups with tiny, specialized franchises seems designed to prevent coalescing of majorities around policy packages and leadership teams. While parties are more and more an accepted part of civil society and increasingly seen as vehicles of participation in decision-making, parties have not yet developed clear identities on most issues nor have they yet been seen as the natural recourse for those who have issues, concerns, worries or dissatisfactions which demand government response or new or changed policies to be implemented. But government is not delivering the goods either, measured in terms of satisfaction with their performance on respondents' problems.

## I Setting the Scene

In the waning days of December 2005 proposals for constitutional reform put forward by Donald Tsang, the successor to Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong's first Chief Executive (CE) who resigned mid-term, met defeat in the Legislative Council (Legco). The Basic Law, Hong Kong's constitution approved by the National People's Congress, specified a process of step-by-step change in the election of legislators from 20 directly elected, 10 elected by committee and 30 by functional constituencies in 1998 to 30 direct and 30 functional representatives in 2004. The Basic Law was taken by many to permit Hong Kongers on their own to determine changes to the Chief Executive election of 2007 and the Legco election of 2008. Many believed it permitted the full direct election of CE and all Legco members if the CE proposed and 40 out of 60 members of Legco voted for such direct electoral processes. However, in April 2004 the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress ruled that the 2008 Legco elections could not change the 50:50 ratios of direct and functional seats. It ruled out direct election of the CE in 2007 but hinted changes could be made in the number and composition of the existing 800 members Chief Executive Election Committee.

After Tung stepped down in March 2005 Donald Tsang, Financial Secretary under Chris Patten and then Chief Secretary for Administration under Tung after Anson Chan resigned in April 2001, won an election in which he was the sole candidate to serve until the end of Tung's term in 2007. It fell to him to propose constitutional reforms which would remain within Beijing's restrictions but which would, hopefully, make enough progress toward democracy to garner the crucial two-thirds or 40 votes needed from 35 conservatives and 25 direct election advocates in Legco. Those hopes were not to be realized. The vote of 34 for, 24 against and 2 abstentions of one each from the conservative and pro-democracy camps marked the culmination of a series of tumultuous events and confrontations stretching back to the 1995 Patten reforms, through the reunification with China of 1997 and the one year abolition of an elected Legco, the first 3 elections of Chief Executive and of legislators, and the massive demonstrations of 1 July 2003, 2004, and just before the vote in December 2005.

This report covers two public opinion surveys conducted in March 2006. The first was conducted from 25 February to 5 March just after Financial Secretary Henry Tang presented Donald Tsang's first budget as Chief Executive on February 22. It focused primarily on policies and repercussions of the constitutional reform decision. The second, commissioned by NDI, was conducted 19-31 March. It focused on attitudes toward political parties. The two surveys conducted consecutively permitted many more questions to be asked of virtually identical sample sizes and sets than a single survey alone could achieve. Telephone surveys longer than about 20 minutes tend to lose respondents to a rising degree until at about 35 minutes long the hang-up rate explodes. This makes comprehensive, but lengthy surveys uneconomic and unproductive. By combining analysis of these two surveys, this report comprehensively compares public opinion after the December 2005 reform votes with opinion prior to that signal event. It also explores the effects the votes and events have had on perceptions of political parties, political processes and policies, and political personalities.

This report also includes the first survey data on the newly formed Civic Party, a group formed in March 2006 largely from the Article 45 Concern Group, which originally formed as the Article 23 Concern Group to oppose the Tung regime's proposals to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law which stipulates that Hong Kong must enact laws against treason, sedition, subversion, secession, theft of state secrets, and association of local political groups

with foreign political groups. The first survey asked about attitudes toward Article 45 Concern Group, the second about its new party incarnation, the Civic Party, and specifically probes attitudes toward parties in Hong Kong.<sup>2</sup> The significance of this new party is that it is the first pro-democracy party to form after the failure of constitutional reform and the first pro-democracy party to pose an organized challenge as a distinct and self-professed political party to the democratic camp's flagship party and hitherto dominant force, the Democratic Party of Hong Kong. In sum, this report analyzes public opinion after a major turning point in Hong Kong's political development and looks back at the overall pattern of political and party development in Hong Kong since parties first organized and proclaimed themselves as parties in the early 1990s.

## **II Why Politics, Policies and Political Development matter**

### **1. What is at stake for the political parties and leaders?**

For political parties trying to win votes, the advantages of learning who thinks what about issues, policies, leaders and parties are obvious. For government officials trying to shape policies or push forward government agendas an accurate reading of public opinion can provide crucial guidance. Ignoring public opinion has led to several costly errors on the part of parties and government in Hong Kong. For example, government officials dramatically miscalculated public opinion in the summer of 2003 when over half a million demonstrators joined 1 July marches against legislation meant to implement Article 23. Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong's constitution, stipulates that Hong Kong must enact laws against treason, subversion, secession, sedition, theft of state secrets and association of political parties and groups with foreign political parties. While the government of the day judged it had the votes in Legco necessary to pass its proposals, it largely neglected to cultivate the public, an oversight that turned out to be very costly. In November 2003 the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) misjudged the public's perception of the nature of the local level District Council elections in that tumultuous year and suffered a defeat at the polls, which cost the party chair his post and many members, their seats. The Hong Kong Transition Project (HKTP) was the only research survey group that, based on survey data, publicly warned of a political tsunami, which would change the political landscape several days before the vote. In the September 2004 Legco election it was the turn of the Democratic Party (DP) to ignore scientific investigations of public opinion by random sample surveys. In an unjustified panic at rumors circulating that the opposition had information Lee was "in trouble," at the last minute the party launched a "save Martin Lee" campaign on Hong Kong Island. Plans to split votes between two pan democratic tickets, plans that surveys showed voters fully intended to follow, were cast aside. The unnecessary panicky appeal lost a sure win for the pro-democracy camp. Another party chair lost his position. So several ministers, the first Chief Executive and two party chairs have paid the price of ignoring or misinterpreting public opinion. Based on this history, a thorough study of comprehensive public opinion surveys conducted to the highest survey standards such as these in this report will assist parties' understanding of the electorate and thus development of strategy and positioning. However, the case can be made as well or better from the data itself, as the example below will show. And this example shows that all have a very big stake in understanding and reacting wisely to what careful surveys tell us the public feels.

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<sup>2</sup> See Analytical Variables section below for comparative profiles of the two surveys. The variability of responses falls within the normal range of random error, +/-4 points at the 95% confidence interval, in surveys of this size, (approximately 800 respondents). See table of respondents per survey at end of report.


Hong Kong has long been a city filled with immigrants. After 1997 Mainland immigration became an especially sensitive issue that led to the first interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Hong Kong has also been a major source of emigration and in the lead up to 1997 became an especially large source. The impression many have is that emigration and immigration are no longer issues of concern. However, since 1997, though emigration abroad has slowed considerably, movement across the border and purchase and settlement in homes in Shenzhen and Guangdong province has accelerated considerably. In 1990 only approximately 50,000 Hong Kongers traversed the border on a daily basis for work or to go home on the mainland. In 2005 that number was nearly 6 times greater or nearly 300,000. The total number of Hong Kongers working on the mainland and/or living there has now exceeded 500,000 out of a population of 7 million. Shenzhen, the city immediately north of Hong Kong which in 1980 had a population of some 40,000, now is by far the larger city with a population estimated above 11 million. Nearly 24 million tourists visited Hong Kong in 2005, a massive flow exceeded only by the number of passengers flowing through Chek Lap Kok airport. The potential for massive, abrupt movements of population have risen tremendously over what they were in the 1990s. And today, options for migration out of Hong Kong are no longer only Canada or the US; today they are increasingly Shenzhen, Shanghai and Beijing. Hong Kong must not only compete globally for business; it must also compete with cities near and far to keep and attract the most talented, younger, wealthier, and best-educated components of its population.

**2. If so many are satisfied with life here now, why are so many so ready to leave?**

At its low point in 2003 , only 51 percent expressed satisfaction with life in Hong Kong. Today, 75 percent are. More dramatically, there has been a reversal of sentiment toward the government, with only one in four satisfied in 2003, but now only one in four are dissatisfied. But if sentiment has changed so dramatically, why are so many still standing ready to leave, and what would make them go? The HKTP has long asked respondents the question: “If Hong Kong is no longer suitable for you, would you leave Hong Kong?” That question was repeated in February 2006.

**Table 1 Would you leave Hong Kong if no longer suitable (FEB)**

	Count	%
Yes	358	44
Like to but cannot	33	4
No	374	46
Don't Know	40	5




These responses are nearly identical to those given in November 2005, perhaps initially indicating that the failure of constitutional reform in December had no effect on these contingency responses and thus indicating that democratic progress was not that important to the retention of population, much less the more economically desirable components. This is somewhat surprising given that significantly more respondents who said they would possibly leave supported both direct election of the Chief Executive and of all members of Legco than those who said they would not (63% of those who would leave support both but only 53% of those who would not leave).<sup>3</sup>

However, in Table 2 the single largest group of those who say they would leave have concerns with Hong Kong’s political stability. Putting that category together with other political responses such as way of life and corruption, and a sixth of Hong Kongers give these politically related reasons as their major one for pulling up their roots. This proportion nearly matches that of those giving economically related reasons such as their personal standard of living or their family or Hong Kong’s economic prospects, which is 19 percent. Significantly, six percent of the respondents cited air and water pollution and overcrowding as their major reason to leave. Many of these environmentally sensitive respondents put political issues a close second in concern (see below). For further analysis, I have regrouped the respondents in Table 2 as Economic, Political, Environmental, and Non-Leavers (including the don’t know respondents).

**Table 2 What is the major change you would find so unsuitable as to make you leave?**


FEB	Count	%
Personal standard of living	49	6
Family prospects	35	4
Hong Kong’s economic prospects	70	9
Hong Kong’s political stability	99	13
Way of life (eg, freedom)	36	4
Corruption	7	1
Air/water pollution	36	5
Overcrowding	12	1
Not leave/Don’t know	435	56



<sup>3</sup> See “Hong Kong Constitutional Reform: What do the people want?” Available at <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp>

**Table 3 Reclassified reason to leave FEB**

	Count	%
Economic reasons	154	20
Political reasons	142	18
Environmental reasons	48	6
Non-leavers	435	56



Disturbing as some may find that almost half of Hong Kong residents are willing to leave, there is worse to come. Analysis by age group shows overwhelming majorities of the younger, better-educated populace would leave Hong Kong upon unsuitable change. Nearly three out of four teenagers would leave.

**Table 4 Would leave by Age Group FEB**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-89	total
Not leave	27	42	44	57	66	79	92	55
Leave	73	58	56	43	34	21	8	45
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 74.85 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

As Table 5 shows, where ages are regrouped as those under and those over 40, 60 percent of those under 40 say they would leave, and perhaps only a third are certain they would not.


**Table 5 Leave Hong Kong by Regrouped Age FEB**

	<40	>40	total
Yes would leave	60	35	45
Like to but cannot	4	4	4
No	32	57	47
Don't Know	4	5	5
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 51.57 with 3 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

<sup>4</sup> In cross-tabulations, variables across the top forming the columns are by convention the “independent” variable (meaning the variable forming the rows is assumed to causally depend on the independent variable). Read cross-tabs, usually in columns but always to the sum total of 100. In Table 4, age affects decisions to leaves, as those youngest show a much higher propensity to leave than those in the oldest grouping of 70 years and up.






When regrouped and reasons for leaving are analyzed (all those who would like and cannot or don't know are put with non-leavers), the 58 percent of those under 40 who say they would leave show economic reasons predominate. On the other hand, at 11 percent of those under 40, the portion saying they would leave for environmental reasons is nearly double the overall average of 6 percent. Politics is the largest single reason for those over 40 to leave.

**Table 6 Reason to leave Hong Kong by Regrouped Age FEB**

	<40	>40	total
Economic reasons	29	13	20
Political reasons	18	18	18
Environmental reasons	11	3	6
Non-leavers	42	65	56
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 58.11 with 3 df p ≤ 0.0001



Another way of understanding the impact of these figures is shown in Table 7. Of those who would leave for Economic reasons, 60 percent are under age 40. Of those who would leave for political reasons, 60 percent are over age 40. Of those who would leave for environmental reasons, 70 percent are under age 40. And 70 percent of non-leavers are over age 40. Mishandling Hong Kong's political, economic, and environmental challenges could have very high costs, and put the city into a downward spiral hard to stop.

**Table 7 Regrouped Age by Reasons given for leaving Hong Kong FEB**

	Economic	Political	Environmental	Non-Leavers	total
<40	60	40	70	30	40
>40	40	60	30	70	60
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 58.11 with 3 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

If government fails and economic opportunity disappears along with political stability, Hong Kong would see much of its youngest, best-educated population leave. But that is not yet the worst if economic and political failure occurs (which would no doubt exacerbate the already poor environmental performance too). The tables below show that the wealthiest citizens also say they would leave in very large proportions, and they are much more sensitive to politics than economics. Table 8 shows that of those whose family earns \$100,000 HKD a month or more, nearly three in four say they would leave if unsuitable changes occur in Hong Kong. Majorities of those making \$40,000 per month and up say they would leave.

**Table 8 Would leave by Income FEB (Key below)**

	1-2	3	4	5	6-7	8-9	10	11	12-15	16	total
Not leave	78	79	55	63	56	56	48	39	31	27	55
Leave	22	21	45	37	44	44	52	61	69	73	45
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 59.12 with 9 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

**KEY: INCOME REGROUPED\***

**FEB**

Numbers above	Family \$ per month	Count	%
1-2	Less than 5,000	49	7
3	\$5,000-9,999	71	10
4	\$10,000-14,999	91	13
5	\$15,000-19,999	78	11
6-7	20,000-29,999**	126	18
8-9	30,000-39,999	96	14
10	\$40,000-49,999	58	8
11	\$50,000-59,999	46	7
12-15	60,000-99,999***	49	7
16	100,000+	41	6

\*Regrouped to regularize size of income groupings as much as possible to increase accuracy of analysis when this variable is tested against others. See unregrouped data in demographic section of this report.

\*\*Note increase from increments of 5,000 to increments of 10,000

\*\*\*Note change in increment

Table 9 shows a further regrouping of income into three categories, perhaps roughly equivalent to lower, middle and upper class respondents. Of those whose family income is \$50,000 per month and up, 63 percent indicate they would leave. Three percent would like to but cannot, and another five percent are unsure about leaving, meaning that approximately two-thirds of the wealthiest citizens would leave Hong Kong if unsuitable change takes place.

**Table 9 Income groups by will or will not leave Hong Kong**

	0-19,999	20,000-49,999	50,000+	Total sample
Yes would leave	33	44	63	45
Like to but cannot	5	5	3	4
No	58	46	29	46
Don't Know	4	5	5	5
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 45.13 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$




Table 10 examines the income breakdown by reasons given to leave. Of those who give Economic reasons for leaving Hong Kong, 39 percent are from families making over \$50,000 HKD per month.

**Table 10: Reasons to leave Hong Kong by Income Groups**

	Economic	Political	Environmental	Non-Leavers	total
0-19,999	30	47	51	34	41
20,000-49,999	31	33	31	38	32
50,000+	39	20	17	28	28
total	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 45.13 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Table 11 shows the proportion of each income group willing to leave or stay by the reasons given. The proportion of those making \$50,000 per month and above who would leave for environmental reasons is twice as high as the lowest income group. The high-income group also has about three times as many willing to leave for political reasons.

**Table 11: Income groups by Reasons to leave Hong Kong**

	0-19,999	20,000-49,999	50,000+	total
Economic reasons	18	19	24	20
Political reasons	11	20	30	19
Environmental reasons	4	6	8	6
Non-leavers	67	55	38	55
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 45.91 with 6 df p ≤ 0.0001



The final table in this section, Table 12, shows that of those with post-graduate education, 70 percent would leave and 61 percent of all university graduates would leave upon unsuitable changes taking place. Even a majority of those with Form 6 or year 12 and up to three years of university education (or two years local university, such as Associate Degree holders) would leave, meaning that a strong majority of nearly half the population with the highest levels of education would leave if political, economic and environmental issues are mishandled badly. (For survey breakdown of education levels see Demographic section.)

**Table 12: Education level by will or will not leave Hong Kong**

	None to Primary 6	Form 1 to F 4	Form 5 graduates	Form 6 to US year 3 Univ	University graduates	Post-graduates	total
Would leave	16	29	42	51	61	70	44
Like to but cannot	7	4	4	6	3	0	4
No	74	62	47	39	32	24	47
Don't Know	3	5	7	4	4	6	5
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 94.79 with 15 df p ≤ 0.0001

It is obviously critical for Hong Kong's future that its political system reassures Hong Kongers the issues important to them are being capably addressed. If not, many will leave.

### III The Analytical Framework

Part II made a case on why studying public opinion on political development and public policies matters, especially in Hong Kong. Parts IV through VII will detail overall responses, response patterns among demographic and other forms of groupings, and trends. Each of the questions and responses from the two surveys will be examined in relation to demographic, as well as what we characterize as associational, participatory and key attitudinal variables. Demographic details and overall results of the other variables tested against each question in the surveys are listed at the end of this report.<sup>5</sup> When and where the four sets of variables show a significant association with the question, such association will be indicated.<sup>6</sup>

**Demographic variables** include: birthplace, years residence in Hong Kong for non-Hong Kong born residents, gender, age, marital status, children, education, occupation, work sector, living quarters, religion, right of abode and monthly family income.

**Associational variables** include: experience living abroad, identity, family in mainland China and family with right of abode abroad, frequency of trips to the mainland, and commitment to living in Hong Kong.

**Participatory variables** are: registration and voting in the 2004 Legco election, attendance at meetings of community/interest groups, reading of newspapers and accessing news and current affairs on radio, TV and internet, contacting government and civil society groups for help or to express concern, demonstrating, petition signing and donating to political groups, membership or support of political parties or advocacy groups, and frequency of discussion of politics and public affairs with friends and family members.

**Key attitudinal variables** include: patriotism, satisfaction with life in Hong Kong, support or opposition in principle to direct election of the CE and of all members of Legco, worry about free press, employment, air and water pollution, an aging Hong Kong population, rule of law, and social unrest and street protests, positive or negative assessment of effect of political parties in Hong Kong and optimism or pessimism about Hong Kong's future prospects as part of China.

Many of these variables will also be included in **Trend Tables**. **Trend Tables** show changes over time in responses to questions, which have been posed over a number of years by the Hong Kong Transition Project. Significant differences over time between previous surveys and the two surveys from February and March 2006 will be indicated.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote above.

<sup>6</sup> Chi-square is a measure of association. The lower the Chi-square number, i.e., the nearer zero in the number after the symbol p under each table, the less likely that the distribution of responses is a result of just random variation. Chi-square reliably shows an association at .05 or less. However, Chi-square is less useful when only small groups show wide variation from the results of other groups. Association does not necessarily indicate causality, that is, for example, age does not cause patriotism. Though older adults tend to be more patriotic toward China than those in their 30s and 40s, this is a historically related reaction associated with birthplace and education as well as experience of a time when British colonialism and discrimination was less beneficent than in the 1970s and 1980s when most of those in their 30s and 40s were growing up. Hong Kong had a series of anti-colonial riots and unrest in 1966 to 1971 that resulted in major reforms and opening up of the civil service to local Chinese. This changed local attitudes toward Hong Kong. Pride in Hong Kong becoming Chinese in 1997 has strong association with having lived in a time when Hong Kong was ruled by a heavy British hand and Chinese experienced widespread discrimination.


#### IV Attitudes toward the status quo: government performance, policies and leadership

Perhaps the most telling measure of public attitudes toward the status quo is the question of satisfaction with life. Hong Kong people have always been willing, and with rising wealth and education, increasingly able to choose where they live on the basis of the opportunities and advantages provided. Prior to 1997 those unhappy with British colonialism or fearful of Chinese communism in 1997 chose to emigrate. Perhaps 200,000 out of over 500,000 who emigrated between 1982 and 1997, returned post 1997, often with foreign passports which offered some protected status and also meant they could depart instantly. Post 1997, the measure of satisfaction with life became less one of accepting the status quo as perhaps the best available (with the option to leave if not) to become one more associated with governance. The sense of Hong Kong as home, as a place where one had a say and some participation in making things better, began to rise. Table 13 shows trend responses.

**Table 13 Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with your life in Hong Kong? TREND**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Nov 91	84	15	1
Feb 93	85	13	2
Aug 93	88	10	2
Feb 94	88	10	2
Aug 94	87	10	3
Feb 95	86	9	5
Sept 95	80	18	2
Feb 96	85	13	2
July 96	88	10	2
Feb 97	90	9	1
June 97	86	12	2
Jan 98	81	16	3
Apr 98	71	26	3
June 98	68	30	2
July 98	74	25	1
Oct 98	70	27	3
Apr 99	72	24	3
July 99	73	26	1
Nov 99	72	26	2
Apr 2000	65	33	2
Aug 2000	65	31	4
Nov 2000	67	30	3
Apr 2001	61	34	5
June 2001	71	25	4
Nov 2001	64	33	3
Apr 2002	66	31	3
Aug 2002	62	34	4
Nov 2002	66	31	3
June 2003	60	37	3
Nov 2003	51	44	4
Dec 2003	57	39	5
Apr 2004	67	27	5
June 2004	62	35	4
July 2004	55	39	6
Aug 2004	63	32	4
Nov 2004	65	32	4
May 2005	78	20	2
July 2005	78	20	2
Nov 2005	73	23	4
Feb 2006	76	22	2
Mar 2006	75	20	4

**Trend Chart: Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong**



Prior to 1997, Hong Kongers were overwhelmingly satisfied with life in Hong Kong. But at the crisis point during the Tung years, barely 51 percent expressed satisfaction. Today, satisfaction levels are approaching those last seen under British rule. The question becomes who are the unsatisfied. Is their dissatisfaction related to governance and political issues?

**1. Who are dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong?**

Table 14 shows dissatisfaction is significantly higher among those born in Hong Kong, while satisfaction and those very satisfied particularly are higher among those born in China. The very dissatisfied have been reclassified with dissatisfied in order to provide large enough samples to analyze.<sup>7</sup>

	Born in Hong Kong	Born in China	Born elsewhere	total
Dissatisfied	23	19	12	22
Satisfied	69	66	81	69
Very satisfied	8	15	8	10
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 9.892 with 4 df p = 0.0423


Dissatisfaction tends to rise with age until aged 70 and above, though the very satisfied rises strongly among those 60 and up.

<sup>7</sup> The count is 166 dissatisfied; 534 satisfied, 74 very satisfied. As with all cross-tabs, variables mentioned in Section III, including demographics, are in the appendix. See appendix for breakdown for samples as a whole.

**Table 15 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Age Group** **MARCH**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-97	total
Dissatisfied	12	17	17	24	26	26	11	21
Satisfied	80	76	74	68	64	60	68	69
Very satisfied	8	7	9	8	10	14	21	10
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 21.84 with 12 df p = 0.0394



Dissatisfaction is generally concentrated among the less educated.

**Table 16 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Education** **MARCH**

	None to Primary 6	Form 1 to Form 4	Form 5 graduates	Form 6 to US year 3 university	University graduates	Post-graduates	total
Dissatisfied	30	21	24	20	17	14	21
Satisfied	61	69	71	66	71	86	69
Very satisfied	9	10	5	14	13	0	10
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 19.97 with 10 df p = 0.0296

While there is no significant association between income and satisfaction with life in Hong Kong, occupational category does indicate an association. Managers and administrators (business and upper civil servants in this category) show the greatest dissatisfaction, with manual and service workers, the less educated in general, coming just behind. The highest levels of very satisfied are retirees and professionals.




**Table 17 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Occupation**

**MARCH**

	Manager	Professional	Service	Manual	Housewife	Retired	Student	total
Dissatisfied	29	16	23	27	20	13	13	20
Satisfied	64	68	72	69	74	66	79	70
Very satisfied	7	16	5	4	6	21	9	10
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 38.39 with 12 df p = 0.0001

**OCCUPATION RANKED BY DISSATISFACTION CHART**




Five of the six key attitudinal variables dealing with worry show significant association with satisfaction with life in Hong Kong. Worry about free press, employment, aging, pollution and rule of law all show association, while worry about social unrest is unrelated to satisfaction with life in Hong Kong. These responses begin to establish a connection between satisfaction with life here and attitudes toward government performance.

The significance of government performance to life satisfaction can be seen in the comparative table below. The issues which a majority of the population worries about are such things as air and water pollution, an aging population, and over population, fundamental issues of daily life. But they are also worried about constitutional reform disputes causing chaos and corrupt business people. These are fundamental system concerns related to its functional capabilities. Corruption and chaos over system rules intrude when governance breaks down, and despite dramatic improvement in public satisfaction with life, and as will be seen, with the performance of government, there is still a great deal of concern about the system of decision-making and rule enforcement.

**Table 18 Worry levels, all variables RANKED BY NOT WORRIED MARCH**

	Not Worried	Slightly worried	Fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
Air & water pollution	8	14	29	48	--
Aging HK population	25	23	30	21	1
Constitutional reform disputes causing chaos	38	26	20	12	3
Corrupt business people	40	26	17	12	5
Overpopulation	48	16	21	14	1
Crime	51	25	13	10	1
Corrupt gov officials	53	20	12	13	2
Employment situation	54	18	13	11	4
Free press	55	25	11	8	1
Social unrest	55	19	15	9	2
Rule of law	55	20	13	10	1
Free assembly	58	22	10	7	2
Free speech	60	22	10	7	1


\*Red font indicates over 50 percent worried to some degree



Even those aspects that show lowest levels of overall worry among the population as a whole have disproportionate impact on the attitudes of some. Some of these groups, by virtue of their age, income, education or working sector, are more important to the functioning and prosperity of Hong Kong than others. So while overall worry may be low on an issue, that particular issue may be held in higher importance, and show a higher level of worry and have greater impact on satisfaction with life in Hong Kong or with the performance of the government, among particular and sometimes critically important groups. For example, in the Table below, very and fairly worried levels in general are low.

**Table 19 Trend: Are you currently worried or not worried about: Free press ?**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
Apr 2001	50	25	13	7	5
July 2001	56	21	11	8	3
Nov 2001	53	23	12	8	4
Apr 2002	58	19	12	7	4
Aug 2002	49	26	16	5	4
Nov 2002	46	23	16	12	3
Feb 2003	47	23	16	10	5
Dec 2003	53	24	14	5	4
Apr 2004	46	26	15	10	2
May 2004	39	28	20	12	1
June 2004	36	27	18	17	3
July 2004	42	29	17	10	2
Aug 2004	41	28	20	10	2
Nov 2004	48	24	17	6	3
May 2005	58	25	10	5	2
Nov 2005	57	26	10	6	2
Mar 2006	55	25	11	8	1




In the table below, however, 30 percent and 33 percent of those very worried or somewhat worried about a free press are dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong. Not worried is 17 percent, and 13 percent of the not worried are very satisfied with life here, versus 3 percent of the very worried about a free press being very satisfied with life in Hong Kong. Those who worry about a free press have it affect their satisfaction with life in Hong Kong at a much higher level than might be expected. As the chart shows, very few of the very worried are very satisfied with life in Hong Kong.

**Table 20 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Worry about free press MARCH**

	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	total
Dissatisfied	17	25	33	30	22
Satisfied	71	69	62	67	69
Very satisfied	13	7	5	3	10
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 24.94 with 6 df p = 0.0004




The next table shows that managers and administrators have the lowest level of not worried at all about a free press and the highest level of very worried about it, with professionals coming in second highest among the very worried.

**Table 21 Levels of worry by Occupation**

	Manager	Professional	Service	Manual	Housewife	Retired	Student	total
Not worried	48	54	52	66	53	66	60	56
Slightly worried	65	25	31	17	23	15	28	25
Somewhat worried	8	12	9	13	16	11	11	11
Very worried	12	10	9	4	8	8	1	8
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 26.44 with 18 df p = 0.0901



Certain other key groups also show concern about this issue at higher levels, for example, those accessing the internet for news and current affairs show worry associated with their time spent online. This means that such persons are more likely to be influential on line in terms of expressing their worries. They comprise a group of influentials, like the managers and professionals, whose concerns can provide a catalyst for discontent in the right, or wrong, circumstances.

**Table 22 Hours per day average accessing news and current affairs websites**

	0	0.5	1	2 or more	total
Not worried	61	50	52	43	56
Slightly worried	21	32	25	34	25
Somewhat worried	11	10	14	14	11
Very worried	8	8	9	9	8
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total


Chi-square = 15.50 with 9 df p = 0.0780

The 14 percent of the population who donate to a political party worry about press freedom more than the average, and political parties tend to listen to those who donate money to them. Thus there is higher pressure on politically organized groups to act according to the higher levels of concern about an issue shown among their donors, increasing the pressure on the government to act more than might be warranted by the general level of concern on an issue. Or, attitudes toward the government by political parties and hence their support or criticism of the government, will be more influenced by the attitudes and concerns of those who donate to and support the party, making the parties more critical of the government when its priorities do not match those of the political parties.

**Table 23 Levels of worry by Donate to political group in past 12 months**

	Do not donate	Donate	total
Not worried	58	41	56
Slightly worried	24	32	25
Somewhat worried	11	14	11
Very worried	7	14	8
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 13.51 with 3 df p = 0.0036



**Table 24 Levels of worry about free press by supporter or member of a political party**

	Not a member or supporter	Member or supporter	total
Not worried	58	39	56
Slightly worried	24	35	25
Somewhat worried	11	10	11
Very worried	7	17	8
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 22.32 with 3 df p ≤ 0.0001


Indeed, as the table below shows, people may specifically join a party because they are more worried about an issue than other groups, but the issues are not always, or even mainly, those shared by the majority. Of those very worried about a free press, for example, 27 percent consider themselves supporters or members of a political group, more than twice the level of

the average of 12 percent in the survey, while only 9 percent of those not worried about a free press consider themselves members of a party. In other words, people very worried about a free press are three times as likely to be members, or become members, of an organized political group.

**Table 25 Levels of worry about free press by members or supporters of a political party**

	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	total
Not member or supporter	92	83	90	73	88
Member or supporter	9	17	10	27	12
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 22.32 with 3 df p ≤ 0.0001




The priorities of public opinion in general are not those necessarily of the political groups that work with government officials, nor can government officials use general public opinion to set the priorities, which it then pressures political parties to work to accordingly. The concerns of political groups and government are different and of different degrees, with government responding to its constituents and parties responding to theirs. In a very strong sense, the government is frustrated because the political parties do not follow what they think of as the community's priorities. On the other hand, the parties are filled with and funded by people who are more concerned about matters the public may not feel to the same degree, and as party members who joined the party to push their agenda, are then in turn frustrated when their priorities are not shared by the government. Both groups then blame each other for not having priorities straight. Hong Kong parties are funded not by lobbyists and business gifts, but by small donors and members themselves.

Take worry about employment as shown in the next two tables. As might be expected, worry about employment strongly associates with satisfaction with life, with 55 percent of the very worried dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong, despite, as the trend table immediately below shows, worry about employment being significantly lower now than at nearly any time since the reunification in 1997.

**Trend Table 26 Are you worried or not worried about your employment situation ?**

	Not Worried	Slightly worried	Fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Oct 98	53	17	10	17	3
April 99	54	18	14	13	1
July 99	50	19	13	17	1
Nov 99	52	20	14	14	1
Apr 00	51	20	14	13	2
Aug 00	53	19	12	14	1
Nov 00	48	20	13	18	1
Apr 2001	48	20	13	17	3
July 2001	47	20	14	18	1
Nov 2001	38	20	19	21	2
Apr 2002	40	19	15	24	2
Mar 2003	36	21	18	23	3
June 2003	37	20	19	22	1
Dec 2003	40	20	14	21	4
Apr 2004	45	21	14	16	3
May 2004	43	23	15	13	5
June 2004	48	22	15	12	3
July 2004	46	23	15	14	2
Aug 2004	50	21	16	11	2
Nov 2004	42	24	17	14	3
May 2005	51	22	13	12	1
March 2006	54	18	13	11	4





**Table 27 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Worry about employment MARCH**

	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	total
Dissatisfied	12	24	31	55	22
Satisfied	75	72	60	42	69
Very satisfied	13	4	9	2	10
total	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 91.04 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

However, while higher levels of worry about a free press translate into party membership and political donations, worry about the economy seems to have the opposite effect. That is, those worried more about employment are less likely to vote and has no significant association with other political factors such as giving a donation to a political party. Only 9 percent of voters are very worried about employment versus 15 percent of non-voters as seen in the table below. So worry about employment does not push people to the polls or to the parties. It therefore understandably has a somewhat lesser priority with political groups than it may have with government.

**Table 28 Levels of worry about employment by voter or not voter MARCH**

	Not registered/did not vote Sept 2004	Voter	total
Not worried	52	59	57
Slightly worried	18	19	19
Somewhat worried	15	13	13
Very worried	15	9	12
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 7.658 with 3 df  $p = 0.0536$




However, those worried more about employment are less likely to be dissatisfied with Donald Tsang's performance than those more worried about a free press, so the government pays the price on those issues important to political groups, because they hold the issue against the government more.

**Table 29 Satisfaction with performance of Donald Tsang by level of worry about employment MARCH**

	Not Worried	Slightly worried	Fairly worried	Very Worried	total
Dissatisfied	12	11	18	22	14
Satisfied	79	80	78	68	78
Very satisfied	10	9	3	11	9
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 11.61 with 6 df p = 0.0714



Of those very worried about employment, 11 percent of the sample in March, 22 percent or thus 2.4 percent of the respondents, are dissatisfied with Donald Tsang. Of those very worried about a free press, some 8 percent of respondents, 42 percent as seen in the table below or some 3.4 percent of all the respondents are dissatisfied.

**Table 30 Satisfaction with performance of Donald Tsang by level of worry about free press MARCH**


	Not Worried	Slightly worried	Fairly worried	Very Worried	total
Dissatisfied	7	13	29	42	14
Satisfied with Tsang	81	82	63	55	78
Very satisfied	11	6	8	3	9
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 72.63 with 6 df p ≤ 0.0001

The chart makes clear that of those very worried about a free press, over 42 percent are dissatisfied with Tsang’s performance. This shows key areas where mistakes or improperly prepared decisions on key issues can lead to abrupt changes in public opinion in very short order.

**Chart: Satisfaction with performance of Tsang by level of worry about free press**




The table below shows that of those dissatisfied with Tsang’s performance, 19 percent are very worried about their employment situation and 17 percent somewhat worried. But even among those very satisfied with his performance, 14 percent and 5 percent, or about a fifth, are worried or somewhat worried about employment. Conclusion? Employment concerns have less of an impact on satisfaction with Tsang’s performance than might be expected.

**Table 31 Level of worry about employment among dissatisfied and satisfied with Tsang’s performance MARCH**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied with Tsang	Very satisfied	total
Not worried	50	58	62	57
Slightly worried	16	19	19	19
Somewhat worried	17	13	5	12
Very worried	19	10	14	12
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 11.61 with 6 df p = 0.0714

**Chart Level of worry about employment among dissatisfied and satisfied with Tsang's performance**




However, of those dissatisfied with Tsang's performance, 25 percent are very worried about a free press and 22 percent somewhat worried (combined 47 percent or nearly half), versus 3 percent and 9 percent respectively among those very satisfied with his performance. Conclusion? Worry about a free press has a bigger impact on satisfaction levels with Tsang's performance than employment.

**Table 32 Level of worry about a free press among dissatisfied and satisfied with Tsang's performance**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied with Tsang	Very satisfied	total
Not worried	31	60	72	57
Slightly worried employment	23	26	16	25
Somewhat worried	22	8	9	10
Very worried	25	6	3	8
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 72.63 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$



So while public opinion is less concerned about a free press and more people are more worried about employment, free press and other such issues have a larger impact on overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Tsang's performance. And since these folks worried about a free press tend to be more active in voting, donating to parties, using the internet and

joining parties, their level of dissatisfaction is felt more by the parties, which in turn act in ways the government thinks is disproportional to public concern about an issue. Worry about aging (not always by the old, either, as demographic section at end of this report shows) is also associated with dissatisfaction with life in Hong Kong but shows no significant association with satisfaction with Tsang's performance.

**Table 33 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Worry about aging MARCH**

	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	total
Dissatisfied	17	20	20	31	22
Satisfied	70	67	75	60	69
Very satisfied	13	13	5	9	10
total	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 22.22 with 6 df p = 0.0011

Worry about pollution has less of an effect on satisfaction with life in Hong Kong, but still a significantly associated one.

**Table 34 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Worry about pollution MARCH**

	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	total
Dissatisfied	19	17	16	26	21
Satisfied	65	72	76	65	69
Very satisfied	17	11	7	9	10
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 15.95 with 6 df p = 0.0141



Its association is stronger with satisfaction with Donald Tsang's performance. Of those very worried about pollution, 16 percent are dissatisfied with Tsang, 9 percent satisfied while only

11 percent of those not worried about pollution are dissatisfied with Tsang and 19 percent are very satisfied.

**Table 35 Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with Tsang among levels of worry about pollution**

	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	total
Dissatisfied	11	6	14	16	14
Satisfied	71	86	80	75	78
Tsang					
Very satisfied	19	8	6	9	9
total	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 18.67 with 6 df p = 0.0048

Put another way, as the table below shows, of those dissatisfied with Tsang’s performance, 56 percent are very worried about air and water pollution against 45 percent very worried among those very satisfied with his performance. These fairly small differences compared to the differences in the same groups on the free press issue above shows that worry about a free press has proportionately a stronger effect on satisfaction and dissatisfaction with Tsang’s performance than air pollution issues, even though vastly more people are vastly more worried about air pollution than a free press.

**Table 36 Level of worry about pollution among those Satisfied/dissatisfied with Tsang**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied with Tsang	Very satisfied	total
Not worried	7	8	19	9
Slightly worried	6	16	14	14
pollution				
Somewhat worried	31	31	19	30
Very worried	56	45	48	47
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 18.67 with 6 df p = 0.0048




The same pattern, but with an even stronger association as measured by Chi-square, can be seen with worry about rule of law. Worry about rule of law is also strongly associated with satisfaction with life here.

**Table 37 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Worry about rule of law MARCH**

	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	total
Dissatisfied	16	28	24	36	22
Satisfied	70	67	72	59	69
Very satisfied	14	5	4	5	10
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 32.58 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$




The table below indicates that only 30 percent of those dissatisfied with Tsang’s performance are not worried about rule of law (versus 57 percent in the sample as a whole once don’t knows are dropped) while 76 percent of those very satisfied are unworried about it. On the other hand, 19 percent of dissatisfied are very worried versus 6 percent very satisfied with Tsang, indicating once again that a political issue such as this has a disproportionate impact on satisfaction with leadership over other issues.

**Table 38 Level of worry about rule of law among those satisfied or dissatisfied with Tsang’s performance MARCH**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied with Tsang	Very satisfied	total
Not worried	30	59	76	57
Slightly worried rule of law	24	22	8	21
Somewhat worried	27	10	10	13
Very worried	19	8	6	9
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 53.98 with 6 df p ≤ 0.0001



The table below shows the rank correlation between the variables in this section. Rank correlation simply means that the rank given in one variable (such as very worried or very satisfied) are the same if the rank is 1, or begins to differ more and more as the number comes closer to 0, wherein no response correlates. So in the table below, the variable “Satisfy w Life” (in Hong Kong) correlates perfectly with itself (as it should). On the other hand, 0.176 indicates that 17.6 percent of responses to Satisfy w Life correlate with worry about a free press, meaning that 17.6 percent of the responses show the same degree of worry as with satisfaction. So those very worried and those very dissatisfied, or those somewhat satisfied and slightly worried correlate to this 17.6 percent extent. Worry about employment correlates 31 percent with satisfaction with life, a rather strong correlation, and worry about a free press correlates with worry about rule of law 41.2 percent of the time, a very strong correlation. Again, such a strong correlation makes sense as those worried about rule of law tend to worry also about press freedoms and other human rights.

**Table 39 Spearman Rank Correlation between satisfaction and worry variables**

	Satisfy w Life	Worry Free Press	Worry Employment	Worry Aging	Worry Unrest	Worry pollution	Worry rule of law
Satisfy w Life	1.000						
Worry Free Press	0.176	1.000					
Worry Employment	0.311	0.255	1.000				
Worry Aging	0.125	0.278	0.264	1.000			
Worry Unrest	0.079	0.187	0.169	0.253	1.000		
Worry pollution	0.093	0.206	0.154	0.297	0.199	1.000	
Worry rule of law	0.190	0.412	0.226	0.192	0.318	0.205	1.000



## **2. Who are satisfied or dissatisfied with policies and leadership?**


There is clearly an association between various worries and satisfaction with life in Hong Kong and with the government and its leaders. But parties, politics and leadership are about specific policies supported or opposed by specific groups led by specific people. These policies may and often do address areas of worry or dissatisfaction, but they are more often a source or cause of people's worry or dissatisfaction. While overall satisfaction with life in Hong Kong or worry about employment and other things could be affected by many factors outside government control, on policy issues there is much less room for government to shirk its association. Parties focus on policies and personalities though the general mood of society can certainly play a role in their powers of persuasion and mobilization.

The following sets of tables looks at these specific policies, comparing public responses first on policy issues in May 2005 when Donald Tsang first took office and in late February to early March 2006, one year after his predecessor announced his mid-term retirement. The first table in this section shows trends in expectations about the financial future of the respondent's family. While there has been a large drop in those who expect that situation to deteriorate over the coming 12 months, there have been significantly smaller changes in those who expect their family situations to improve. At the lowest point, only 4 percent of respondents expected improvement in June 2003, a time of very high dissatisfaction with the government and the time that saw over half a million demonstrators on the streets in protest on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July. That figure expecting improvement is up to 16 percent, a significant rise from 4 percent to be sure, but still a decided minority of respondents. That portion is still virtually the same as the portion, 15 percent, who anticipate deterioration in family finances in the coming year.

The bottom line is in terms of hailing some vast improvement in sentiment toward the government as being based on a strong upturn in the economy and thus in economic optimism, the first table indicates such sentiments are neither overwhelming nor widespread. Specific policies on issues and decisions that ignite controversy by affecting interests can thus push aside any credibility lent to the government for its supposed delivery of good times to all. People do not seem to see such effects yet in their futures, though the 47 percent of people expecting deterioration in family fortunes in June 2003 has diminished considerably. Things are not getting worse for most; they just are getting better for the majority.

**Table 40 How do you expect your family financial situation to change over the next 12 months?**


	Improve a lot	Improve somewhat	Stay same	Deteriorate somewhat	Deteriorate a lot	DK
Oct 98	1	7	47	31	7	7
Apr 99	--	8	57	27	8	4
July 99	-	10	52	24	6	7
Nov 99	--	9	62	20	4	5
Apr 00	1	13	58	18	5	5
Aug 00	1	12	60	15	6	6
Nov 00	--	11	63	15	6	4
Apr 2001	--	8	60	19	7	5
Nov 2001	--	5	43	32	15	5
Apr 2002	1	6	52	26	12	4
Aug 2002	1	5	49	27	12	6
Nov 2002	1	6	48	27	13	5
Mar 2003	--	5	44	31	15	5
June 2003	--	4	44	34	13	5
Nov 2003	1	7	56	20	8	8
Apr 2004	1	10	62	18	5	5
May 2004	1	9	62	17	8	3
June 2004	1	10	64	16	4	5
July 2004	--	7	67	16	5	5
Aug 2004	1	11	63	17	6	3
May 2005	1	12	65	12	4	6
Feb 2006	--	16	66	12	3	3



The first table in the next set is from May 2005, when Donald Tsang first took office. The top two issues of dissatisfaction, education reform and pollution, simply swapped place in the second table from the February survey.

**Table 41 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with performance of the HK government on the following issues: Rank order by dissatisfaction MAY 2005**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neutral	DK
Implementing education reforms	19	63	11	8
Reducing pollution in HK	27	59	10	4
Providing medical services	34	52	11	3
Creating jobs	30	48	17	5
Increasing supply of affordable housing	33	42	16	10
Consulting with the public	37	40	17	6
Caring for the elderly	43	38	15	4
Preparing to make all Legco seats directly elected	25	38	16	21
Defending rights of HKers working on mainland	25	37	13	24
Ensuring judicial independence & rule of law	48	29	11	11
Providing municipal services	48	27	17	8



The next table shows areas which have seen a drop or rise in satisfaction between May 2005 and February-March 2006, with blue showing increases in satisfaction or drops in dissatisfaction, and red showing increases in dissatisfaction or decreases in satisfaction.


**Table 42 Satisfaction with HK Government performance by Dissatisfaction FEB 2006**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Neutral	DK
Reducing pollution in HK	21	61	15	3
Implementing education reforms	16	60	20	5
Providing medical services	42	44	12	2
Reducing unemployment	34	39	23	3
Preparing to make all Legco seats directly elected	22	38	23	17
Caring for the elderly	42	38	17	3
Reforming taxes	32	35	27	6
Increasing supply of affordable housing	35	35	21	8
Consulting with the public	43	32	21	5
Defending rights of HKers working on mainland	24	32	21	23
Improving municipal services	51	21	22	6
Ensuring judicial independence & rule of law	56	15	18	10

Blue: Significant increase in satisfaction or decrease in dissatisfaction

Red: Significant increase in dissatisfaction or decrease in satisfaction

Black: No significant change between May 2005 and Feb 2006





The table below shows the point differences between those satisfied and dissatisfied, with greater dissatisfaction indicated with negative numbers in red and greater satisfaction indicated with positive numbers in blue. There has been considerable improvements in satisfaction with municipal services and ensuring judicial independence and rule of law (this is prior to the security bill proposals now coming before Legco, please note) as well as strong improvements in consulting with the public, affordable housing, caring for the elderly,

reducing unemployment, and providing medical services. The only significant area of deterioration in satisfaction is with reducing pollution.

**Table 43 Difference between Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction, May 2005 and Feb 2006**

	Difference May 2005	Difference Feb 2006
Reducing pollution in Hong Kong	- 32	- 40
Implementing education reforms	- 44	- 44
Providing medical services	- 18	-2
Reducing unemployment	- 18	- 5
Preparing to make all Legco seats directly elected	- 13	- 16
Caring for the elderly	- 5	+4
Reforming taxes		- 3
Increasing supply of affordable housing	- 9	+0
Consulting with the public	- 3	+11
Defending rights of HKers working on mainland	- 12	- 8
Improving municipal services	+ 21	+30
Ensuring judicial independence & rule of law	+ 19	+ 41

\*\*Negative sign indicates more dissatisfaction than satisfaction; positive sign, more satisfaction than dissatisfaction





There are some demographic differences in responses to these issues that are of interest. Gender, age, education and income play some role in both the satisfaction with a policy and the degree of response to a policy. Groups tend to pay greater or lesser attention to policies as they are affected by them. In this sense, it becomes important to consider the views of the more concerned groups.

For example, in terms of gender differences, in the table below levels of satisfaction are lower among women while the very dissatisfied about education reforms levels are much higher. Women as mothers appear more concerned about educational issues than men.

**Table 44 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on education reforms by gender FEB**

	Male	Female	total
Satisfied	19	13	16
Neutral/Don't Know	27	24	25
Dissatisfied	32	33	33
Very Dissatisfied	23	60	27
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 9.590 with 3 df p = 0.0224



Since women appear more involved than men with education, their significantly higher level of dissatisfaction indicates a need to address educational reforms with gender differences in mind.

On tax reforms, women tend to neutral and don't know more than men, though they show significantly higher levels of very dissatisfied than men and lower levels of satisfaction.

**Table 45 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on reforming taxes by gender FEB**

	Male	Female	total
Satisfied	37	27	32
Neutral/Don't Know	30	37	33
Dissatisfied	27	27	27
Very Dissatisfied	6	10	8
total	100	100	100



table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 12.69 with 3 df p = 0.0054

Men tend to stronger views on Legco reform, with higher levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the issue than women, while women tend to take a neutral or don't know response.

**Table 46 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on preparing to make all Legco seats directly elected by gender FEB**

	Male	Female	total
Satisfied	26	19	22
Neutral/Don't Know	33	47	40
Dissatisfied	27	25	26
Very Dissatisfied	14	9	12
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 17.89 with 3 df p = 0.0005



Men are again more significantly more satisfied with the government ensuring rule of law than women though the levels of dissatisfaction are about the same between genders.

**Table 47 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on ensuring judicial independence and rule of law by gender FEB**

	Male	Female	total
Satisfied	61	52	56
Neutral/Don't Know	25	32	28
Dissatisfied	12	14	13
Very Dissatisfied	3	2	2
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 9.037 with 3 df p = 0.0288

These political issues appear to be of greater concern to men than women, though women outnumber men as registered voters and tend to turn out to vote as much or more than men.

Men also seem to carry more of the conversation in public about politics while women seem to more quietly hold to their views and focus on their areas of concern such as education and as seen below, housing. Housing is clearly a matter, unlike politics, where women have views as strongly as men, with men and women showing equal levels of neutral and don't know responses, but with women more dissatisfied than men.

**Table 48 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on increasing supply of affordable housing by gender FEB**

	Male	Female	total
Satisfied	39	32	35
Neutral/Don't Know	30	30	30
Dissatisfied	22	31	26
Very Dissatisfied	10	8	9
total	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 8.549 with 3 df p = 0.0359

Younger age groups tend to be significantly more dissatisfied and much less satisfied with educational reforms than those aged 50 and up, though this does not have any association with whether respondents have children or not. See table below.

**Table 49 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on education reforms by age group FEB**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-89	total
Satisfied	11	15	13	9	21	39	21	16
Neutral/Don't Know	31	32	19	24	24	20	45	26
Dissatisfied	31	31	36	36	33	23	16	32
Very Dissatisfied	27	22	33	31	22	18	18	27
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 61.27 with 18 df p ≤ 0.0001






The next table shows that working aged population tend to show lower levels of satisfaction on government performance on reducing pollution, with those in their 50s showing the highest levels of dissatisfaction.

**Table 50 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on reducing pollution by age group FEB**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-89	total
Satisfied	33	18	22	19	20	25	32	21
Neutral/Don't Know	16	29	17	16	10	18	21	18
Dissatisfied	36	41	45	46	50	44	29	44
Very Dissatisfied	15	12	16	19	20	13	18	17
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 30.22 with 18 df p = 0.0354



And the same working age population show significantly lower levels of satisfaction with performance on reducing unemployment, with those in their 40s registering the most dissatisfaction.

**Table 51 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on reducing unemployment by age group FEB**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-89	total
Satisfied	46	38	30	26	38	53	32	35
Neutral/Don't Know	27	29	26	25	23	23	40	26
Dissatisfied	22	32	34	33	26	20	13	29
Very Dissatisfied	5	2	10	16	13	5	16	11
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 47.73 with 18 df p = 0.0002

The table below shows that the issue of defending the rights of Hong Kongers working and investing on the Mainland is one that particularly concerns those from 30 to 60, especially men. They appear to have higher levels of dissatisfaction than other age and gender groups. Since men of this age are the ones usually working on the Mainland, this indicates that this is another example of an issue to those involved, much more so than of the general population, wherein satisfaction is lower than among the general sample.

Political parties that draw on specific areas of concern among specific groups are vehicles that reflect the responses of these interest groups that are more motivated by their dissatisfactions than satisfactions. The government tends to see parties as complainants filled with the dissatisfied, and in some sense this is true. But the parties are vehicles for expressing the views of those most affected by specific policies. It is with those groups concerned that solutions are found to work or not to their satisfaction.

As seen in the next section, while patriotism and satisfaction with the government are associated, one should not make the leap to conclude that dissatisfaction stems from or proves someone or some group unpatriotic. On the contrary, a specific dissatisfaction felt more keenly than among the populace in general motivates people to seek out the likeminded in order to combine their pressures and raise the profile of their concerns high enough for the government to take action. The government governs by generalities; the parties survive by specific concerns and acting as collectors of dissatisfied in areas and among groups suffering government neglect or oversight.

**Table 52 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on defending rights of Hong Kongers working and investing on Mainland by age group FEB**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-89	total
Satisfied	40	35	24	19	24	20	11	25
Neutral/Don't Know	38	47	43	38	38	57	63	43
Dissatisfied	16	15	25	30	23	18	16	23
Very Dissatisfied	5	2	8	13	14	5	11	9
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 54.06 with 18 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Take another example of the above, the issue of preparing to make all Legco seats directly elected. The highest educated groups are clearly much less satisfied with the government on this issue than less educated groups.

**Table 53 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on preparing for making all Legco seats directly elected by education FEB**

	None to Primary 6	Form 1 to F 4	Form 5 graduates	Form 6 to US year 3 Univ	University graduates	Post-graduates	total
Satisfied	23	29	18	29	17	21	22
Neutral/Don't Know	52	52	42	33	35	21	40
Dissatisfied	16	13	32	27	31	39	26
Very Dissatisfied	9	6	9	11	17	18	11
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Chi-square = 52.82 with 15 df p ≤ 0.0001




These educated respondents predominate among the business managers and administrators and the professions, and to no surprise, the same association of dissatisfaction being higher among these groups on this issue is found, as shown in the next table. These educated people are used to making their own decisions, charting their own course, and taking responsibility upon themselves. The patronizing they experience from the British-influenced civil service they find causes them to become resentful, and as a result, they more and more insistently criticize the government, making the government more reluctant to engage them or to label them as critics and obstructionists, when what they want is to take responsibility in their own hands to solve what they feel are pressing problems the government is ignoring or ineptly addressing.

**Table 54 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on preparing for making all Legco seats directly elected by occupation FEB**

	Admin	Professionals	Service	Manual	House-wife	Retired	Student	total
Satisfied	22	20	19	32	16	22	30	22
Neutral/Don't Know	35	25	41	39	55	51	36	40
Dissatisfied	27	40	31	22	18	17	24	26
Very Dissatisfied	16	16	9	8	11	10	10	11
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 44.70 with 18 df p = 0.0005



This assessment holds in case after case by occupation. For example, education reforms are most dissatisfying to administrators and professionals who must hire and supervise people and by the students themselves.

**Table 55 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on education reforms by occupation FEB**

	Admin	Professionals	Service	Manual	House-wife	Retired	Student	total
Satisfied	12	10	15	24	15	28	10	16
Neutral/Don't Know	24	25	26	22	18	30	30	25
Dissatisfied	30	35	38	33	33	25	36	33
Very Dissatisfied	34	30	22	21	34	18	24	26
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 35.45 with 18 df p = 0.0083

Retirees register the highest dissatisfaction with government performance on reducing pollution. This is understandable given their age and state of health. But professionals and managers whose business is subject to being affected by pollution also register the highest levels of dissatisfaction, with administrators and managers showing combined dissatisfaction levels of nearly three out of four, by far the highest.

**Table 56 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on reducing pollution by occupation FEB**

	Admin	Professionals	Service	Manual	House-wife	Retired	Student	total
Satisfied	16	21	18	32	15	27	26	21
Neutral/Don't Know	13	23	21	19	18	13	13	18
Dissatisfied	50	36	42	41	56	39	47	45
Very Dissatisfied	20	21	19	8	11	21	14	17
Dissatisfied total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 33.00 with 18 df p = 0.0167

Managers, administrators and professionals who may tend to work or want to work on the Mainland also register the highest levels of dissatisfaction on the issue of the government's defense of the rights of Hong Kongers on the Mainland.

**Table 57 Levels of satisfaction with performance of government on defending rights of Hong Kongers working on Mainland by occupation FEB**

	Admin	Professionals	Service	Manual	House-wife	Retired	Student	total
Satisfied	24	26	22	27	17	18	40	24
Neutral/Don't Know	32	37	48	40	48	55	44	44
Dissatisfied	27	27	24	27	26	18	12	23
Very Dissatisfied	17.7	10.3	6.25	6.41	9	8.51	4.35	8.93
Dissatisfied total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 45.31 with 18 df p = 0.0004

So criticising government is not a function of patriotism or the lack thereof, though patriotism is associated with being satisfied with the government and of Donald Tsang as section three below will show. First, a set of tables showing policies the public supports or opposes and those areas of expenditure they would cut or increase. Of five policies supported by majorities, two are tax increases (counting mandatory medical insurance as a tax) while two concern the private sector (setting a 5-day workweek and minimum wage). Only one decrease in tax is supported, a decrease in salary tax. Substantial pluralities support an increase in fees and charges for commercial services, selling more land and abolishing all appointed District Council seats. Majority opposition exists for only two policies, privatizing


government services and increasing social services fees and charges (such as medical and school fees). These results hold little support for the fears of those who believe democracy would bring in irresponsible socialist policies of taxing and spending for public benefits.

**Table 58 Would you support or oppose the SAR Government to adopt the following policies? FEB Ranked by combined support level**

	<i>Combined support</i>	Strongly support	Support	Neutral DK	Oppose	Strongly oppose
Increase pollution control and environmental protection fees & charges	77	16	61	8	15	1
Decrease salary tax	65	12	53	20	13	1
Set 5-day workweek	60	17	43	20	16	3
Set a minimum wage	56	18	38	18	20	6
Introduce mandatory medical insurance	52	6	46	17	26	4
Increase commercial fees & charges for government services	48	5	43	20	29	3
Abolish all appointed District Council seats	46	11	35	28	25	1
Introduce land border-crossing tax	45	5	40	16	31	7
Sell more land	45	3	42	32	20	2
Decrease profits tax	39	4	34	24	31	6
Sell gov holdings such as MTR/KCR	38	3	35	25	32	5
Introduce goods & services tax	35	3	32	18	33	14
Privatize gov services	27	3	24	22	40	11
Increase social services fees & charges (eg medical)	23	2	21	14	47	16

Blue: majority support

Red: majority oppose




On the other hand, while taxes are well supported, so is expenditure. There seems little demand for government to reduce either spending or taxes. On the contrary, there is strong support for collecting the taxes and spending the money to clean up the environment or provide safe food, for example.

**Table 59 Which of these areas of government expenditure would you cut or increase spending on? FEB Ranked by Combined Increase**

	<i>Combined increase</i>	Greatly increase	Increase	No change	Cut	Substantial cut	Don't Know
Environmental protection	80	11	69	15	3	--	2
Food safety	72	7	65	24	1	--	3
Medical services	70	10	60	23	4	--	3
Primary & Secondary Education	70	8	62	21	4	--	4
University Education	65	9	56	24	5	--	7
Hi-tech subsidies	65	8	57	23	6	--	6
Continuing Education/Job retraining	63	5	58	24	6	1	5
Public infrastructure	57	5	52	26	7	1	9
Crime fighting	55	5	50	37	2	--	5
Recreation, culture	46	3	43	42	6	1	5
Public housing	45	4	41	36	11	1	6
CSSA (public assistance)	28	2	26	38	23	3	9

Blue: Combined majority for increased spending



Section 2 thus provides little support for the idea that demand for democracy is based on demands to bring socialism to Hong Kong or to use democracy as a means to open up the treasury to buy favor with the populace. On the contrary, Hong Kongers connect the need for taxes with the demand for spending; they just have a different set of priorities from the government, and the political parties are the only existing vehicles for many to try to make their demands heard by a government that seems to set its own priorities according to its own lights, or on the basis of broad public opinion instead of interest sectors. There has been a recurrent appeal to “patriotism” to lessen dissatisfaction, dampen demands for direct elections, and create support for the leadership of the Chief Executive since 1997, but as section 3 will show, patriotism has little association with support for a second term for Chief Executive Tsang or satisfaction with his performance.

### 3. Patriotism, the Mainland, and satisfaction with life and the government


The trend table below shows solid improvement in optimism about Hong Kong’s future as a part of China. The fear of the Mainland has receded from the levels seen in 2002 and 2003, but the overwhelming optimism of 1997 seems still a bit of a ways off, though no longer impossibly distant.

**Trend Table 60 How do you feel currently about HK’s future prospects as a part of China?**

	Optimistic	Neither/DK	Pessimistic
Feb 1997	62	32	6
June 1997	60	33	7
July 1998	47	36	17
Apr 1999	42	40	17
July 1999	40	42	18
Nov 1999	40	43	17
Apr 2000	42	40	17
Aug 2000	30	48	22
Nov 2000	38	42	20
Apr 2001	30	46	24
June 2001	33	42	26
July 2001	27	37	36
Nov 2001	24	36	41
Apr 2002	26	34	37
Aug 2002	17	36	46
Nov 2002	25	39	37
Mar 2003	18	32	50
June 2003	21	40	38
Apr 2004	33	37	30
May 2004	36	42	22
June 2004	36	44	21
July 2004	40	39	21
Aug 2004	43	41	16
May 2005	52	36	12
Feb 2006	51	38	11



**How do you feel currently about HK's future prospects as a part of China?**



Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong, the general question introduced at the beginning of this section, appears often related to patriotism. The next table takes the question asked about how people feel on 1<sup>st</sup> October National Day for China and recodes those answering proud and excited in a group labeled “Patriotic” with those answering indifferent or just another holiday into “Not patriotic.” Clearly the patriotic are more likely to be very satisfied and less likely to be dissatisfied than the non-patriotic.

**Table 61 Satisfaction related to Patriotism MARCH**


	Not patriotic	Patriotic	total
Dissatisfied	24	14	21
Satisfied	69	69	69
Very satisfied	7	17	10
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 17.75 with 2 df p = 0.0001

While the patriots in the table make up about 23 percent of the overall sample after dropping the don't know responses, satisfaction with the Hong Kong government's dealing with the Mainland attains a much higher level, and considerably higher now than it did during Tung Chee-hwa's rule, as the trend table shows. If “patriotism” is by definition love of country (and arguably its government), then patriotism seems little related to attitudes toward the SAR government's dealing with the Central authorities.

**Table 62 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong Government (SAR government) in dealing with the mainland? TREND**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 95	21	46	33
Sept 95	23	48	29
Feb 96	30	41	29
July 96	37	38	25
June 97	44	41	15
Jan 98	44	32	24
July 98	61	25	14
Oct 98	57	26	17
July 99	43	42	15
Nov 99	39	46	15
Apr 2000	42	43	15
Aug 2000	42	45	13
Nov 2000	44	43	13
Apr 2001	32	51	17
July 2001	45	42	13
Nov 2001	36	49	16
Apr 2002	46	40	14
Aug 2002	41	42	18
Nov 2002	46	42	11
Feb 2003	33	49	18
June 2003	36	49	15
Nov 2003	49	37	14
April 2004	33	53	14
May 2004	29	57	15
June 2004	30	64	7
July 2004	39	51	10
Aug 2004	46	43	10
Nov 2004	51	40	9
May 2005	64	24	12
Nov 2005	71	21	9
Feb 2006	67	21	12
Mar 2006	62	24	13




While the level of satisfaction with the SAR government's handling of relations with the Mainland has risen, the association between those dissatisfied with life and dissatisfied with the SAR's government handling of these relations is strong. While it may be true that those dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong are inclined to be dissatisfied with many aspects of life here, the repeated association of dissatisfaction with life and various other governmentally related issues indicates that government performance affects satisfaction above any psychological propensities to simply be a dissatisfied personality.

**Table 63 Satisfaction with life by Satisfaction with SAR government's Mainland relations MARCH**

	Dissatisfied with life	Satisfied with life	Very satisfied with life	total
Dissatisfied with SAR handling Mainland	43	24	12	27
Satisfied	55	71	60	67
Very satisfied	2	4	28	6
total	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 84.92 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$



The next table shows association between satisfaction with life and satisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong government in general is even stronger, despite the trend table below showing a significant improvement since Donald Tsang assumed office in 2005.

**Table 64 Are you currently satisfied with the general performance of the Hong Kong Government?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 93	60	31	9
Aug 93	57	28	15
Feb 94	58	28	14
Aug 94	56	30	14
Feb 95	43	35	22
Sep 95	46	45	9
Feb 96	60	26	15
July 96	67	21	11
Feb 97	73	20	7
June 97	66	27	7
Jan 98	51	35	4
Apr 98	48	41	12
June 98	37	56	7
July 98	42	49	9
Oct 98	42	48	10
April 99	46	43	11
July 99	40	52	7
Nov 99	41	51	8
Apr 2000	39	53	8
Aug 2000	30	61	4
Oct 2000	31	62	6
Nov 2000	35	58	7
Apr 2001	32	58	10
June 2001	37	55	7
July 2001	35	59	5
Nov 2001	24	68	7
Apr 2002	31	60	9
Aug 2002	22	72	6
Nov 2002	23	69	9
June 2003	23	69	8
Nov 2003	20	75	5
Dec 2003	16	79	6
Apr 2004	23	67	10
May 2004	24	68	5
June 2004	20	73	6
July 2004	20	72	8
Aug 2004	25	67	8
Nov 2004	33	61	6
May 2005	46	48	7
July 2005	56	34	10
Nov 2005	65	27	4
Feb 2006	61	32	2
Mar 2006	63	33	5




The next table shows that seventy percent of those dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong are dissatisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong government, the greatest such association. One in four very satisfied with life are also very satisfied with the government's performance, another high figure. Satisfaction with life and satisfaction with the government are strongly associated.

**Table 65 Satisfaction with SAR government's performance among those satisfied or dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong MARCH**

	Dissatisfied with life	Satisfied with life	Very satisfied with life	total
Dissatisfied with HK government performance	70	25	19	34
Satisfied	30	74	57	63
Very satisfied	1	2	25	4
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 195.3 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$



The bottom line in terms of satisfaction with Donald Tsang is that it is high and while it dipped in July 2005, has returned to very high levels. Patriotism seems little related to satisfaction with government performance and Tsang's leadership.

**Table 66 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with performance of C. E. Donald Tsang?**


	Very Dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Very Satisfied	COMBINED SATISFACTION	DK
May 2005	1	9	67	9	76	16
July 2005	1	8	52	6	58	33
Nov 2005	1	8	72	10	82	9
Feb 2006	2	11	69	9	78	7
Mar 2006	1	12	71	8	79	9

There is among those dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong a significantly higher level of dissatisfaction with the CE's performance, indicating political leadership has an effect on attitudes toward life but not as strong as government performance as a whole. The change in March 2005 from the previous discredited leadership to Tsang's hands has improved attitudes, and probably vice versa to some extent, with economic recovery contributing some spillover into satisfaction with life and from that, to satisfaction with Tsang.

**Table 67 Satisfaction with life by Satisfaction with Tsang's performance MARCH**

	Dissatisfied with life	Satisfied with life	Very satisfied with life	total
Dissatisfied with CE Tsang's performance	24	12	6	14
Satisfied	70	81	69	78
Very satisfied	6	7	25	9
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 43.41 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$



The correlation table below indicates the strength of association among these variables.

**Table 68 Spearman Rank Correlation of Satisfaction variables above**

	Satisfied w Life	Satisfied w Gov	Satisfied w SAR handling Mainland	Satisfied with Tsang performance
Satisfied w Life	1.000			
Satisfied w Gov	0.394	1.000		
Satisfied w SAR handling Mainland	0.314	0.405	1.000	
Satisfied with Tsang performance	0.205	0.288	0.357	1.000

While three out of four or more are satisfied with Tsang's performance, the proportion supporting him for a second term falls somewhat to two out three wanting him to run for a

second full term in 2007. Fully one in four answered neutral or don't know. However, only 7 percent of the population do not want him to run again.

**Table 69 Do you want to see Donald Tsang running as Chief Executive in 2007? FEB**


	Count	%
Definitely not want	21	3
Would not want	36	4
Neutral/Don't Know	210	26
Would want	433	54
Definitely would want	105	13

As the table below indicates, even of those dissatisfied with Tsang's performance, nearly a third would want to see him run again.

**Table 70 Support for a second term among dissatisfied and satisfied with Tsang FEB**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied with Tsang	Very satisfied	total
Definitely not want	14	1	3	3
Would not want	17	3	0	5
Neutral/Don't Know	38	19	5	20
Would want	29	66	41	58
Definitely would want	2	12	51	15
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Chi-square = 225.2 with 8 df Percent of Column Total p ≤ 0.0001



Given electoral rules that virtually guarantee Tsang a second term if he seeks it, the responses indicate a high degree of support for another five years. This is despite the failure of his constitutional reform and despite his evident failure to persuade the pro-democrats to cooperate with his rule and support his agenda. The next two parts examine and compare the public attitudes above with those on constitutional reforms and toward the political parties.

## V Attitudes toward change: constitutional reform and elections


Constitutional reform was more than a contention between parties and the government. It was about further formalizing and opening up participation in government decision-making, of course by voters and the public, but especially for the parties. The details of the proposals were thus of particular concern for the parties in Legco, and the results of its defeat clearly have repercussions which, unexpectedly, are more direct and stronger on the parties than on Donald Tsang or the government, and particularly strong on the pro-democracy parties and Legco members. Assessing and understanding this is more than an issue of historical interest; it appears set to determine the future course of politics through the next Chief Executive and Legco elections.

### 1. Attitudes toward the rejected 2007-08 constitutional reforms

Before the December 2005 vote on Donald Tsang's constitutional reform package, respondents were evenly divided with 39 percent supporting the proposals and 37 percent opposed.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 71 Do you support or oppose Legco members to pass the government's reform proposals as they are without changes?**

	21-23 Nov N=403
Strongly support	6
Support	33
Oppose	30
Strongly oppose	7
Don't Know	24




The table below from the survey in February 2006 shows quite different results. While 25 percent said they opposed it, considerably down from the 37 percent who responded in opposition in November, 36 percent said they supported it.

<sup>8</sup> The package proposed doubling the Chief Executive Election Committee from 800 to 1,600 and adding all 529 members of the District Councils as ex officio members to it. The package also proposed adding 10 seats to Legco, five directly elected from geographic constituencies and five returned from the District Councils who would vote with the Functional Constituency half of Legco. Out of 529 DC members, 400 were directly elected in first past the post constituencies, 27 were elected from rural committees by New Territories indigenous residents, and 102 are appointed by the government. The local level District Councils were set up in 1982 and were Hong Kong's first representative body elected by universal suffrage. One of the major objections pro-democrats had to the reforms were the appointed members of District Councils having power to vote for the Chief Executive and for the DC Legco representatives. See "Hong Kong Constitutional Reform: What do the people want?" available at <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp>.



**Table 72 Did you support or oppose Legco members to pass the government's constitutional reform proposals last December? FEB**

	Count	%
Strongly supported	32	4
Supported	255	32
Opposed	167	21
Strongly opposed	37	4
Don't know	314	39




Another difference, in November there was no significant variance between male and female or among age groups in their support or opposition. In February, there were significant differences, with men much more supportive in their recollection of their stance while females were much more uncertain, with half answering they don't know how they stood on the reform proposals.

**Table 73 Supported in December Legco to pass reforms by gender**

	Male	Female	Total
Supported	42	30	36
Opposed	31	20	25
Don't Know	27	51	39
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 46.48 with 2 df  $p \leq 0.0001$




The more highly educated tended to be more supportive of the reforms though the highest levels also saw higher levels of opposition and much lower levels of don't know, indicating that the reforms were of more interest and concern to the more highly educated.

**Table 74 Supported in December Legco to pass reforms by education**

	None to Primary 6	Form 1 to F 4	Form 5 graduates	Form 6 to US year 3 Univ	University graduates	Post-graduates	total
Supported	28	25	36	48	36	49	36
Opposed	18	25	23	24	31	30	25
Don't Know	55	50	41	28	34	21	39
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 38.37 with 10 df p ≤ 0.0001



Administrators and managers (business and higher civil service management) say they overwhelmingly supported it while professionals were nearly evenly divided. Retirees, the most conservative though professedly pro-government on most other issues, say they opposed the package more than supported it, the only group to do so.

**Table 75 Supported in December Legco to pass reforms by occupation**

	Admin	Professionals	Service	Manual	Housewife	Retired	Student	total
Supported	50	33	35	33	29	28	42	36
Opposed	20	36	24	24	16	32	26	25
DK	29	31	41	42	55	40	32	39
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 34.78 with 12 df p = 0.0005

Those who own property, either private or through the home ownership scheme, were more supportive of the proposals while other groups were far more evenly divided.

**Table 76 Supported in December Legco to pass reforms by living quarters**

	Villa/village	Private (own)	Private (rent)	Home Ownership Scheme	Public Housing	total
Supported	28	41	25	43	24	36
Opposed	31	26	25	22	27	25
Don't Know	41	33	50	35	50	39
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 27.53 with 8 df p = 0.0006

Surprising for those who recall then Bishop, now Cardinal Zen calling out Catholics to join the march against the proposals, Catholics recall being more supportive than opposed by 10 percentage points, with Buddhists, whose leaders have been very supportive of the government, show more opposed than supportive by nearly the same margin. Those of no religion and traditional Chinese beliefs were much more supportive by even wider margins.

**Table 77 Supported in December Legco to pass reforms by religion**

	None	Catholic	Protestant	Buddhist/Taoist	Ancestor worship	total
Supported	37	40	34	24	38	36
Opposed	26	30	29	32	17	25
Don't Know	37	30	37	44	45	39
total	100	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 14.91 with 8 df p = 0.0609

A follow-up question asked:

**Table 78 Would you support or oppose the government to ask Legco to reconsider the reform package as it was in December and hold another vote on it?**

	Count	%
Strongly support	66	8
Support	276	34
Oppose	202	25
Strongly oppose	59	7
Don't Know	202	25

**Would you support or oppose the government to ask Legco to reconsider the reform package as it was in December and hold another vote on it?**




This was clearly a more polarizing question. The 4 percent who say they strongly supported the package in December become 8 percent strongly supporting reconsideration. The 4 percent strongly opposed become 7 percent strongly opposing reconsideration, but the overall margin of about 10 points in favor remains the same.

However, if the package were actually resubmitted to Legco, opinion in favor of its passage now changes dramatically, from a 10 point margin in favor to a 26 point margin in favor, or even more dramatically, to among those with an opinion, over two to one in favor of passing the reforms. The table below shows that support now clearly favors Legco passage by a wide margin, though still about 30 percent remain on the sidelines.

**Table 79 Would you support or oppose Legco to approve the constitutional reform package if given another chance to vote on it?**

	Count	%
Strongly support	59	7
Support	324	41
Oppose	130	16
Strongly oppose	46	6
Don't Know	246	30




Since the better than two to one margin in favor of Legco passing the reforms if reconsidered still leaves less than an outright majority supporting the reforms, one might assert it still lacks majority support. However, the responses to this question analyzed by demographic breakdown indicate some very significant shifts in opinion among crucial groups. The majority in support among these influential groups would tend to carry the don't know block

with them if in reality the package came back up for vote. For example, an outright majority of men support passing the reforms if another chance to vote on them was given. Women tend to defer to male opinion among those women expressing don't know.

**Table 80 Would support Legco approving reform package if another vote by gender**

	Male	Female	total
Support	51	44	48
Oppose	27	17	22
Don't Know	23	38	31
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 26.04 with 2 df  $p \leq 0.0001$




A majority of those under 40 support approval if another vote came up. Older folks tend to defer to younger if they have no set opinion already.

**Table 81 Would support Legco approving reform package if another vote by age under/over 40**

	<40	>40	total
Support	54	44	48
Oppose	22	22	22
Don't Know	24	34	30
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 10.17 with 2 df  $p = 0.0062$




Margins of support for passage widen dramatically for all educational groups but those with post-graduate degrees. The narrow margin of support among the most highly educated could weaken support among less educated, but university graduates and those with some university education support passage. The tiny number of post-graduates versus the large number of university and some university educated would tend to increase the university graduate sentiments in influence above those of the much smaller number of post-graduates.

**Table 82 Would support Legco approving reform package if another vote by Education**

	None to Primary 6	Form 1 to F 4	Form 5 graduates	Form 6 to US year 3 Univ	University graduates	Post-graduates	total
Support	37	44	53	55	47	42	48
Oppose	16	18	18	20	29	39	22
Don't	47	38	29	26	24	18	31
Know							
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 37.77 with 10 df p ≤ 0.0001




The same is true for occupational groups, with the business sector and students indicating majorities in support. Even retirees shift from opposition to a wide margin of support.

**Table 83 Would support Legco approving reform package if another vote by Occupation**

	Admin	Professionals	Service	Manual	Housewife	Retired	Student	total
Support	58	44	49	41	47	37	53	48
Oppose	21	34	18	19	16	22	23	22
Don't	20	22	33	40	37	40	24	31
Know								
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 30.60 with 12 df p = 0.0023

**Would support Legco approving reform package if another vote by Occupation**



Majorities of homeowners support while the margin of support among public housing tenants reaches 43 percent in favor versus just 19 percent opposed.

**Table 84 Would support Legco approving reform package if another vote by Living Quarters**

	Villa/village	Private (own)	Private (rent)	Home Ownership Scheme	Public Housing	total
Support	44	51	36	52	43	48
Oppose	26	24	27	18	19	22
Don't Know	31	26	38	30	38	31
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 14.58 with 8 df p = 0.0678


In sum, if there is a “Middle Class” and it can be measured by income, it supports Legco passing the reforms if given another chance by a clear majority and a margin of 36 points in favor over those opposed (Middle Class those whose families make between \$20,000 and \$49,999 per month). Even the lowest level income groups support passage by a 20-point margin.

**Table 85 Would support Legco approving reform package by Income groups**

	0-19,999	20,000-49,999	50,000+	total
Support	42	55	52	49
Oppose	22	19	25	22
Don't Know	36	26	23	29
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 15.12 with 4 df p = 0.0045




Religion makes no significant difference. Catholics support passage on reconsideration by a 19-point margin. Even Buddhists and Taoists show large margins of support, with non-religionists and traditional Chinese ancestor worshippers indicating majorities in support.

**Table 86 Would support Legco approving reform package if another vote by Religion**

	None	Catholic	Protestant	Buddhist/Taoist	Ancestor worship	total
Support	50	49	45	36	50	48
Oppose	21	30	26	24	17	22
Don't Know	29	21	29	41	33	31
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 12.79 with 8 df p = 0.1191





Clearly, if the Tsang government came back with the same reform proposals rejected in December 2005, public opinion would overwhelmingly support Legco members passing it. So what went wrong with the proposed reforms, who do people blame, and what has the effect been on parties and politics?

## 2. Blame for failure of reform

In November 2005 respondents were asked prospectively:

**Table 87 How much blame would you assign the following if the constitutional reform proposals fail to pass Legco? (Ranked by A great deal and Some blame combined\*) NOV**

	A great deal	Some	Very little	None
<b>Donald Tsang</b>	19	39	28	14
<b>Beijing officials</b>	19	27	34	20
<b>Raphael Hui</b>	13	32	39	16
<b>Pro-democracy camp</b>	17	25	38	19
<b>Democratic party</b>	15	25	45	15
<b>Pro-government camp</b>	9	30	42	20
<b>Article 45</b>	11	23	47	18
<b>DAB</b>	8	25	47	20
<b>Pro-business groups</b>	7	26	42	25
<b>Liberal party</b>	7	24	51	18

\*Don't Know responses dropped for comparison


RED: Majority would assign great deal and some blame

At that time, as the reclassified table below and the chart attached makes clear, a solid majority held Donald Tsang and no others more responsible than any other party for the failure of the reforms to pass Legco.

**Table 88 Reclassified Blame for failure to pass reform NOV**

	A great deal/Some	Very little/None
<b>Donald Tsang</b>	58	42
<b>Beijing officials</b>	46	54
<b>Raphael Hui</b>	45	55
<b>Pro-democracy camp</b>	42	58
<b>Democratic party</b>	40	60
<b>Pro-government camp</b>	39	62
<b>Article 45</b>	34	65
<b>DAB</b>	33	67
<b>Pro-business groups</b>	33	67
<b>Liberal party</b>	31	69

**Chart Reclassified Blame for failure to pass reform NOV**



When asked in February 2006:

**Table 89 How much blame do you assign the following for the constitutional reform proposals' failure to pass Legco? (Ranked by A great deal/Some blame combined\*) FEB**

	A great deal	Some	Very little	None
<b>Pro-democracy camp</b>	28	22	29	20
<b>Democratic party</b>	23	20	36	19
<b>Article 45</b>	23	19	38	21
<b>Beijing officials</b>	17	20	31	33
<b>Donald Tsang</b>	16	18	36	31
<b>Pro-government camp</b>	14	16	39	30
<b>Raphael Hui</b>	11	16	37	36
<b>DAB</b>	8	15	43	34
<b>Pro-business groups</b>	8	15	38	38
<b>Liberal party</b>	6	13	43	38


\*Don't Know responses dropped for comparison

RED: Majority would assign great deal and some blame

Prospectively, respondents expected to blame Tsang, Beijing and Raphael Hui much more for the failure to pass than the pro-democracy camp. However, between the final protest march and the government's first and only concession on appointing fewer District Council members after the next election in November 2007 (leaving all 102 appointees on the Election Committee for the March 2007 Chief Executive election), public opinion appears to have taken a decided turn. Now, the top three groups getting blamed are the pro-democracy camp, the Democrats and Article 45, now the Civic Party (see below for public opinion on the newly established party). Donald Tsang comes in fifth instead of first in order of a great deal and some blame.

**Table 90 Reclassified Blame for failure to pass reform FEB**

	A great deal/Some	Very little/None
<b>Pro-democracy camp</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>
Democratic party	43	57
Article 45	42	58
Beijing officials	37	63
Donald Tsang	34	66
<b>Pro-government camp</b>	30	70
Raphael Hui	27	73
DAB	23	77
<b>Pro-business groups</b>	23	77
Liberal party	19	81



Clearly the defeat of Tsang's constitutional reforms was a Pyrrhic victory for the pro-democracy camp. In stopping what they considered unacceptable reforms, they frustrated the


public's desire for constitutional progress and improvements in governance. The extent of the damage to the pro-democracy parties will be seen in Part VI below.

### 3. The desire for constitutional change

One reason the pro-democracy camp rejected Tsang's reform proposals was many of them feared the reforms would result in a lessening of support for having full direct elections sooner rather than later. Support for directly electing the Chief Executive remains strong in principle, though there has been a visible weakening from the all time highs seen in 2003 and a rise in opposition to directly electing the CE in principle as the next table shows.

**Trend Table 91 In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of the Chief Executive?**

	Nov 2003	Dec 2004	May 2005	Nov 2005	Mar 2006
Strongly support	33	20	33	22	21
Support	48	54	42	47	50
Neutral/DK	6	10	11	19	9
Oppose	11	13	11	10	17
Strongly oppose	2	3	3	2	3




In sum, support has not weakened, but opposition has strengthened. On the other hand, support for directly electing all members of Legco appears to have weakened marginally from November 2005 and clearly from November 2003, though opposition has not strengthened.

**Table 92 In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of all Legco seats?**

	Nov 2003	Dec 2004	Nov 2005	Mar 2006
Strongly support	29	21	24	18
Support	48	52	48	48
Neutral/DK	9	9	6	15
Oppose	13	16	18	16
Strongly oppose	1	3	4	3


**Chart In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of all Legco seats?**



However people feel about the principle of directly electing the CE or all members of Legco, the table below shows overwhelming support for a competitive CE election in March 2007.

**Table 93 Do you approve or disapprove of a competition for election by more than one Chief Executive candidate? MAR**


	Count	%
Strongly approve	304	38
Approve	432	54
Disapprove	23	3
Strongly disapprove	5	1
Don't Know	41	5



Despite very strong approval for a contested election, three out of four respondents would like to see Tsang run for a second term as Chief Executive.

**Table 94 Would you want to see Donald Tsang running for a second term as Chief Executive in 2007? MAR**

	Count	%
Definitely not want	12	1
Would not want	28	4
Neutral/Don't Know	180	22
Would want	463	58
Definitely would want	123	15



In sum, the desire for direct elections remains strong, the desire for a contested Chief Executive election is overwhelming, but support for Donald Tsang is very strong as well. Clearly Hong Kongers want improvements in the government and representative system and they want the delivery of good government. They approve of the job Tsang is doing as Chief Executive and now key groups strongly support his proposals for constitutional reform. Support for the defeated reforms is now better than two to one in favor.

The key question is how have the experiences and disappointments of the year under the new Chief Executive Donald Tsang affected people's outlook on political parties, and how might the formation of the new pro-democracy Civic Party have affected sentiments? Has the shift in favor of Tsang and the rise in satisfaction with the performance of the government weakened or strengthened support for all parties, or just for some? And if so, which ones?


## VI Attitudes toward political development: parties

### 1. Participation

The survey in late March asked whether people considered themselves members *or supporters* of a political party or political advocacy group in Hong Kong. The results, 12 percent answering yes, are quite different from asking about attendance at meetings or activities of pressure and political groups or contact with such groups in the previous six months, where the average is around 2 percent. This can be seen below.

**Table 95 Do you consider yourself a supporter or member of a political party or political advocacy group in Hong Kong?**

	Count	%
Yes	98	12
No	698	87
Maybe	6	1
Don't Know	4	0.5



We also asked specifically if respondents would name the party or group of which they considered themselves supporters or members. The column on the far right of the table below extrapolates from the respondent percentages to the number of adult permanent residents this might represent in the population. These numbers should be taken as indicative only (range of error in fragmenting a sample of approximately 800 into this many subcategories precludes accuracy of the numbers in the small categories, but the overall estimate of somewhat over 500,000 supporters and members of political groups and parties is a more reliable number).

**Table 96 If so, which one?**

	Count	% of survey respondents	Of 4.5 million Adult Permanent Residents
DAB	17	2	90,000
Democrats	34	4	180,000
Liberal Party	3	0.4	18,000
Civic Party	20	2.5	112,500
Frontier	4	0.5	22,500
CTU	2	0.3	13,500
FTU	4	0.5	22,500
NWSC	1	--	
The Alliance	3	0.4	18,000
Greenpeace	6	1	45,000

Other	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>45,000</b>
No/Don't Know	<b>705</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>3.91 million</b>

The table above helps explain how it is that though the DAB has over 6,000 dues paying members while the Democratic Party has just 600, the DP is able to mount demonstrations many times larger than the DAB and has demonstrated a more than adequate capability to mobilize poll workers in comparable numbers.<sup>9</sup> It also shows that the brand new Civic Party has considerable support and that the democratic alliance as a whole well outnumbers pro-government party supporters.

The next table puts the table above into the context of civil society as a whole. The level of participation in religious, charitable, ownership committees, and mutual aid committees and professional associations lends credence to the 12 percent calling themselves supporters even if they do not attend meetings. It is perhaps also worth noting that attendance at environmental groups appears to be increasing.

**Trend Table 97 Have you attended any meetings or activities of one of the following groups in the last six months? (Percentage reporting membership/ attendance/doesn't add to 100)**


	TU	PA	KAI	MAC	CA	POL	CHA	REC	REL	OWC	EVG
Jan 1998	6	8	7	15	3	1	17	6	20		
Oct 1998	5	5	8	10	3	1	16	5	20	12	5
July 1999	5	6	6	8	2	1	13	4	15	11	3
Nov 1999	6	6	5	8	2	1	16	7	16	12	4
Apr 2000	8	10	5	9	2	2	18	6	21	14	5
Nov 2000	6	6	5	6	2	2	16	7	19	14	5
Apr 2001	4	5	5	7	2	2	11	5	17	13	4
Nov 2001	5	6	4	6	2	2	15	7	18	12	5
Apr 2002	5	8	4	6	2	1	15	7	18	12	5
Feb 2003	4	8	6	8	3	3	21	6	20	15	6
Nov 2003	6	8	5	8	2	2	17	7	21	13	6
Apr 2004	6	8	4	7	3	1	16	5	20	15	6
July 2004	5	7	6	10	3	2	17	6	23	16	6
Aug 2004	4	5	6	8	2	2	19	7	22	17	7
Nov 2005	5	6	5	7	3	2	19	6	20	16	7
Mar 2006	4	9	6	10	4	2	22	9	24	22	8

KEY	ABBREV.
Trade Union	TU
Professional association	PA
Kaifong	KAI
Mutual Aid Committee	MAC
Clan Association	CA
Political/pressure group	POL
Charitable Association	CHA
Recreational & cultural group	REC
Religious group or church	REL
Owner's corporation	OWC
Environmental group	EVG

<sup>9</sup> Based on HKTP observational research in the elections of 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003, and 2004. See project website and publications list at <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp>



**Chart Have you attended any meetings or activities of one of the following groups in the last six months?**



Reported levels of support or membership in a political party or advocacy group are also not out of line with actions taken to contact various formal governmental and societal groups for help or to express concern, as the table below indicates. The most crucial corroborating data concerns donations to a political party or group in the previous 12 months and participation in a protest or march or rally. (KEY is with chart on next page).


**Trend Table 98 Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups in the past 12 months? (% Yes responses only)**

	GOV	DEL	FEL	DC	NPC	MED	KAI	POL	PRO	SIGN	SURV	DONR
July 1996	8	7	1		-	5	6	2	8	44	32	11
June 1997	10	6	1		1	5	7	2	7	43	33	16
Jan 1998	13	3	--		-	6	8	2	5	41	37	18
Oct 1998	12	5	1		1	6	11	3	4	52	48	20
July 1999	10	6	2		1	5	8	3	6	45	40	15
Nov 1999	12	4	3		1	6	10	3	5	51	47	17
Apr 2000	17	5	3		1	6	10	5	5	49	46	17
Nov 2000	12	6	3		--	5	3	1	4	47	46	12
Apr 2001	11	6	3		1	3	2	2	3	36	39	15
Nov 2001	11	4	1	6	1	3	3	1	3	37	37	14

Apr 2002	10	3	1	6	--	4	2	2	2	25	36	14
Nov 2003	10	3	1	7	--	5	2	1	26	45	40	16
June 2004	11	4	2	8	1	3	3	1	25	42	43	15
Nov 2005	11	5	2	10	1	5	4	3	14	47	53	17
Mar 2006	8	4	2	6	--	3	2	1	13	44	48	14

KEY	ABBREVIATION
Contact Government Dept.	GOV
Contact Direct Elected Legco rep.	DEL
Contact Legco Funct Rep.	FEL
Contact District Council/Dist officer	DC
Contact Xinhua/China Adviser, NPC	NPC
Contact Mass Media	MED
Contact local group/Kaifong	KAI
Contact pressure/pol. group	POL
Demonstrate/protest	PRO
Signature Campaign	SIGN
Opinion survey	SURV
Donate to pol. party	DONR

**Chart Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups in the past 12 months?**



**2. Performance: Effects on satisfaction with party performance of the constitutional reform dispute**


The first table in this section shows the levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the performance of the various parties in September 2004 just before the Legco elections. The column on the far right of the table computes the difference between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, showing a negative sign if dissatisfaction is higher or a positive sign if satisfaction is higher. The table shows that every one of the pro-government parties, indicated in red, ranked below all pro-democracy parties in satisfaction levels in 2004.

**Table 99 Satisfaction with performance/DK out (5 Sept 2004)** Ranked by dissatisfaction

Party	Dissatisfied with performance	Satisfied with performance	Difference Sept 2004
<b>DAB</b>	79	21	<b>-58</b>
<b>Federation of Trade Unions</b>	62	38	<b>-24</b>
<b>Liberal Party</b>	49	51	<b>+2</b>
<b>Democratic Party</b>	48	52	<b>+4</b>
<b>Frontier</b>	47	53	<b>+6</b>
<b>Confed. of Trade Unions</b>	34	66	<b>+32</b>
<b>ADPL</b>	28	72	<b>+44</b>
<b>Article 45 Concern Group</b>	24	76	<b>+52</b>

RED: Government friendly parties

BLUE: Pro-democracy parties



The next table below represents satisfaction levels with the parties about three weeks before the constitutional reform package was defeated in Legco on 20 December 2005. Already


dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party had risen significantly from September 2004, and in fact it scored the lowest level of satisfaction among all parties. Two pro-democracy groups ranked below three of the four pro-government groups. Effectively in statistical terms the DAB and DP tied for bottom.

**Table 100 Satisfaction with performance/DK out (Nov 2005)** Ranked by dissatisfaction

Party	Dissatisfied with performance	Satisfied with performance	Difference Nov 2005
Democratic Party	59	41	-18
DAB	58	42	-16
Frontier	54	46	-8
The Alliance	54	46	-8
Liberal Party	51	49	-2
Fed of Trade Unions	36	64	+28
Confed. of Trade Unions	32	68	+36
ADPL	29	71	+42
Article 45	27	73	+46

RED: Government friendly parties

BLUE: Pro-democracy parties




By the March 2006 survey, after the defeat of the package, satisfaction with the Democratic Party and its allies had plummeted, falling well below the DAB for the first time, ever. All pro-democracy parties either fell significantly in satisfaction or scored negatively in

satisfaction, while the DAB took 6 points off its negative score, the Liberal Party moved into positive territory, and the FTU held on to its firmly positive level of November 2005.

**Table 101 Satisfaction with performance/DK out (MAR 2006)** Ranked by dissatisfaction

Party	Dissatisfied with performance	Satisfied with performance	Difference Nov 2005
Democratic Party	68	32	-36
DAB	55	45	-10
Frontier	52	48	-4
The Alliance	54	46	-8
Liberal Party	47	53	+6
FTU	37	63	+26
Confed. of Trade Unions	39	61	+22
ADPL	37	63	+26
Civic Party (Article 45)	31	69	+38




The comparative table below shows clearly that the constitutional reform dispute has seen all pro-democracy parties decline from their 2004 levels, particularly the Democratic Party which has seen a 40 point swing from positive deep into negative territory hitherto inhabited only by the DAB. Even the Civic Party, once the Article 45 Concern group, has dropped from the heights of overwhelming satisfaction, though it still outranks all the other parties in satisfaction.

**Table 102 Ranked according to March 2006 most negative to most positive**

	Difference +/- September 2004	Difference +/- November 2005	Difference +/- March 2006
Democratic Party led by Lee Wing-tat	+4	-18	-36
DAB led by Tsang Yok-sing	-58	-16	-10
Frontier led by Emily Lau	+6	-8	-4
LP led by James Tien	+2	-2	+6
CTU led by Lau Chin-shek	+32	+36	+22
FTU led by Cheng Yiu Tong	-24	+28	+26
HKADPL led by Fredrick Fung	+44	+42	+26
Article 45 Concern group	+52	+46	+38

Blue: positive level of satisfaction

Red: negative level of satisfaction



The constitutional reform dispute has lowered satisfaction, not with the government or its supporters, but those who rejected the package as bad for Hong Kong. What then is the image residents of Hong Kong hold of the major parties?

### 3. Perceptions: Comparative Images of the Big Four Parties

First off, the survey findings from the mid-1980s by Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi that parties have a very negative association in the minds of Hong Kongers certainly no longer holds for most. The group that scored very highly as a concern group, the Article 45 Concern group, which was instrumental in leading the massive marches against Article 23 related legislation in 2003, shows little damage from its transformation into a political party.

**Table 103 Do you think the Article 45 Concern Group setting up a new party called the Civic Party will improve or damage its image?**


	Count	%
Greatly improve	39	5
Improve	259	32
No change	202	25
Damage	70	9
Greatly damage	13	2
Don't Know	223	28

The survey then specifically asked respondents about their comparative images of the four largest parties as measured by their number of representatives in Legco. The Key shows the abbreviations used in the next set of tables and color codes them Red for pro-government parties and Blue as pro-democracy parties.

In general terms the profiles of the DAB as the leading pro-government party and the DP as the leading anti-government party are clear among the overwhelming majority of respondents. The two smaller parties often tend toward the middle, and their profile as less strident supporters or opponents of the government shows in the results.

**Table 104 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Government**

Party	More anti-Government	More pro-Government	Don't Know
DAB	8	69	23
LP	11	51	38
DP	70	7	23
CP	40	13	47




<sup>10</sup>Key: **DAB:** Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong  
**LP:** Liberal Party  
**DP:** Democratic Party of Hong Kong  
**CP:** Civic Party

<sup>10</sup> DAB/LP: Part of pro-government coalition. Other pro-government include FTU: Federation of Trade Unions, NCF: New Century Forum, The Alliance. In RED.  
 DP/CP: Part of pro-democracy movement. Other pro-democracy groups include the Frontier, ADPL: Association for Democracy and Peoples Livelihood, NWSC: Neighborhood and Workers Service Center, April Fifth Action Group. In BLUE.

The pro-government parties argue that they support democracy but the respondents appear much more divided on this point, especially about the DAB.

**Table 105 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Democracy**


Party	Opposes Democracy	Supports Democracy	Don't Know
DAB	36	37	27
LP	17	48	35
DP	8	73	19
CP	6	62	32



When it comes to pro or anti business, the Liberal Party's emphasis comes across clearly to most, and most appear uncertain about the business-related stance of the Civic Party.

**Table 106 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Business**

Party	Anti-business	Pro-business	Don't Know
DAB	25	42	33
LP	7	68	25
DP	53	16	31
CP	30	20	50






The next table shows that respondents see most of the big three as more interested in Legco and government affairs than in local issues, except in the case of the DAB. This image has been one reason why the DAB has done so well in the District Council elections. The Citizens Party has yet to establish a clear image on this aspect, but so far it appears close to that of the Liberals, who have had less success in the local level elections.

**Table 107 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward district vs center**


Party	More interested in District matters	More interested in Legco & Government matters	Don't Know
DAB	44	26	30
LP	13	51	36
DP	23	45	32
CP	14	43	42



While the DAB may have a stronger district affairs related image, the next table shows they are neck and neck with the Democrats in terms of who is seen as more pro-grassroots. The LP clearly appears to come across as an elite focused party.

**Table 108 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward Grassroots**


Party	More anti-grassroots	More pro-grassroots	Don't Know
DAB	19	60	21
LP	51	21	27
DP	14	62	24
CP	18	41	41



The next variable has traditionally been seen as crucial in Hong Kong politics by political science researchers. Legitimacy has long been described not as the result of elections but of performance. In this case, no party shows a majority deemed as more effective in solving problems. Indeed, the advantage of the pro-government parties on this factor are marginal, though the DP clearly is seen as less effective in solving problems than any other party. This may also be a factor in the high levels of dissatisfaction expressed toward the DP and with the next least effective party, the DAB, which has the next highest levels of dissatisfaction with its performance.

**Table 109 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward effectiveness solving problems**

Party	Less effective solving problems	More effective solving problems	Don't Know
DAB	34	36	29
LP	27	37	35
DP	44	28	28
CP	27	31	42




In the final party comparative question, the three older parties are clearly seen as more interested in political power than in solving respondents' problems. Between a fourth and a third of respondents are unsure. These results indicate that in terms of defining politics as helping people solve their problems, the parties have a long way to go.

**Table 110 What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward power & problems**

Party	More interested in political power	More interested in solving your problems	Don't Know
DAB	49	27	24
LP	50	17	32
DP	46	28	26
CP	34	27	39

**Chart What is your image of Big Four parties by: Attitude toward power & problems**




The issue of the instrumentality of politics, that is, its effectiveness in identifying and solving problems or addressing issues of concern, has recurred as a key aspect throughout this briefing. The final section of this briefing (except for the demographic details of the surveys) directly considers the issues surrounding parties and government as problem-solving entities.

**4. Problems and parties**

The next table shows clearly that a majority has not yet decided that parties in general have a good rather than bad effect on solving problems in Hong Kong.

**Table 111 In general, do you think political parties in Hong Kong are having a good effect or bad effect on solving problems in Hong Kong?**


	Count	%
Very good effect	20	2
Good effect	340	42
No difference	234	29
Bad effect	111	14
Very bad effect	22	3
Don't Know	79	10



With don't knows removed, a bare majority, 50 percent, say parties are having a good effect.

**Table 112 Reclassified good or bad effect, don't knows dropped**

	Count	%
Good effect	360	50
No difference	234	32
Bad effect	133	18




As the next table shows, those who believe parties have a good effect are more supportive of direct elections of the Chief Executive (C.E.) than those who think they have a bad effect. Current law forbids the C.E. to be a member of a party.

**Table 113 Support Direct Election of C.E. by Attitude toward party effect MAR**

	Good effect	No difference	Bad effect	total
Strongly support	26	19	17	22
Support	52	54	39	50
Oppose	17	19	33	21
Neutral/DK	4	8	11	7
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 28.04 with 6 df p ≤ 0.0001




The table below shows that in the Legco, where party affiliation is clearly permitted, those who see parties as having a bad effect tend more to oppose direct elections. However, a majority even of those who see parties as having a bad effect on problem solving support directly electing all members of Legco.

**Table 114 Support Direct Election of all Legco members by Attitude toward party effect MAR**

	Good effect	No difference	Bad effect	total
Strongly support	23	18	13	19
Support	53	45	40	48
Oppose	15	20	34	20
Neutral/DK	9	17	14	13
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 33.91 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$




The table below indicates that both those believing parties are having a good effect and bad effect support Tsang to run again in nearly equal degrees. The exception? Those who think parties make no difference in solving problems. Nearly a third, far larger than the other groups, respond neutral or don't know whether they want Tsang to run or not.

**Table 115 Want or don't want Tsang to run for CE in 2007 by Attitude toward party effect MAR**

	Good effect	No difference	Bad effect	total
Definitely not want	2	1	1	2
Would not want	5	2	4	4
Neutral/Don't Know	17	31	19	22
Would want	60	54	58	58
Definitely would want	16	12	19	15
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 28.51 with 10 df  $p = 0.0015$

**Chart Want or not want Tsang to run for CE in 2007 by Attitude toward party effect**



Clearly, affiliation with a party has a fair degree of impact on perceptions. Those who see parties having a good effect logically should seek out or be more open to affiliating with a party while those seeing no difference or a bad effect would not. The rise in willingness to identify oneself as a supporter of a party should rise as the portion of the populace concluding parties have a good effect rises. This already seems the case compared with surveys conducted in the mid-1980s by Lau Siu-kai, for example.


The next table shows that while most of those who say they voted in the Legco elections of September 2004 clearly like having their representative associated with various groups. Those who did not vote, including those registered to vote but who chose not to, are much less likely to like their representative associated with organized groups of various kinds.

**Table 116: Would you like or not like your Legco Representative affiliated with the following groups, by voted in September 2004 or not: (Ranked by voter's like affiliation)**

	Voter			Non-voter		
	Like	Not like	Don't Know	Like	Not like	Don't Know
Pro-environmental group	72	19	9	58	27	15
Labor union	63	26	12	46	36	18
Kai-fong	61	27	12	50	36	15
Pressure group/social concern group	60	28	11	43	37	21
Mutual Aid Committee	58	29	13	46	36	18
Completely independent/no affiliation	55	31	14	40	36	25
Pro-democracy party or group	53	34	14	36	42	22
NPC/CPPCC other patriotic group	51	37	12	37	42	21
Pro-government party or group	50	36	14	30	47	23
Chamber of Commerce/pro-business group	47	40	13	33	45	22


Civil service/Government appointee	46	41	14	33	45	22
Heung Yee Kuk (rural committee)	41	40	19	33	45	22

**Chart: Like or not like Legco representative affiliated with group by VOTER\***



\*Don't Knows not charted

**Chart: Like or not like Legco representative affiliated with group by NON-VOTER\***



\*Don't Knows not charted

The results above clearly show that among voters in September, no group association polled higher in “not like” than “like” association, meaning that voters prefer group affiliations and endorsements, including those of parties, while among non-voters, half of the 12 types of affiliation show greater dislike than like in terms of association. While a majority of voters liked group affiliation in 8 of 12 cases, only 2 of 12 responses among non-voters show a majority liking the association. Oddly, even “independence, no affiliation” shows a majority among voters (perhaps this means they like people to be associated with a group but nevertheless to maintain some independence from it?) and this category showed divided support among non-voters who would have been thought keen to support such a stance given their other responses. These results and those of the image set of questions above raise clearly the issue of what the Hong Kong political system is for. Is it to represent groups and



their interests, prominent individuals in their individual capacity, or is it to be an instrument meant to solve residents' and voters' problems?

### 5. Conclusion: If Politics is about solving problems, is it? If not, why not?

The next set of questions and responses are divided into questions on who best stands up for classes or groups, those who stand up best on selected issues, and those who stand up best on system aspects related to the "one country, two systems" structure of Hong Kong as the Special Administrative Region of China.

**Table 117 Do you think there is a political party or person in Hong Kong that stands up best for:**

	DAB	LP	FTU	AL	IND (PG)	IND (PD)	DP	CP	FR	CTU	AD PL	Apr5	NW SC	All	Other	None	DK
Working Class	5	0.4	12	0.2	-	-	5	2	1	23	1	-	2	4	1	23	19
Middle Class	1	12	1	-	-	-	3	6	0.2	1	0.4	-	-	1	-	43	31
Business interests	2	36	-	0.2	0.1	-	1	0.2	0.4	0.1	-	-	-	1	1	21	35
Women's interests	1	0.1	1	-	-	0.2	1	1	4	0.1	-	-	-	0.4	4 <sup>11</sup>	41	45
Retirees	2	0.4	1	-	-	0.1	1	0.4	-	2	0.5	-	0.1	-	1	50	42
Human rights	2	2	0.2	1	-	0.5	18	11	1	0.2	0.4	1	0.1	1	5	30	28
Environmental protection	2	1	0.2	0.2	-	-	3	1	1	0.2	0.1	-	-	-	12 <sup>12</sup>	39	41
Housing problems	4	0.5	0.5	0.1	-	0.4	6	0.2	-	1	5	-	0.4	-	4	39	39
Education problem	1	1	0.5	0.1	-	0.1	12	1	0.3	-	0.3	-	-	-	7 <sup>13</sup>	39	37
HK's autonomy	1	1	0.1	0.3	-	0.3	22	7	0.4	-	0.1	-	-	-	5	33	31
Protect rule of law	2	1	0.1	1	0.1	0.1	8	22	1	0.1	-	-	-	-	4	33	28
Protect freedom of the press	1	1	0.1	1	-	0.1	13	8	3	-	0.3	-	-	-	5	33	34
HK's prosperity & stability	7	4	0.1	0.4	-	-	5	2	0.3	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	8	38	34
Good relations with Beijing	45	3	1	-	0.1	-	2	1	-	0.1	0.4	-	-	-	5	17	25

BROWN: Groups

GREEN: Issues

Red: System

KEY:	
DAB	Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong
LP	Liberal Party
FTU	Federation of Trade Unions
AL	The Alliance
IND (PG)	Independent (Pro-government)
IND (PD)	Independent (Pro-democracy)
DP	Democratic Party of Hong Kong
CP	Civic Party (Formerly Article 45 Concern Group)
FR	The Frontier
CTU	Confederation of Trade Unions
ADPL	Association for Democracy and Peoples Livelihood
Apr5	April Fifth Action Group (Long-hair Leung Kwok-hung)
NWSC	Neighborhood and Worker's Service Center

<sup>11</sup> Half named the Hong Kong Women's Development Association then scattered others.

<sup>12</sup> Half named Greenpeace, 0.5 percent Greenpower, 1 percent Society for Protection of the Harbour, then others.


<sup>13</sup> One third named the Professional Teacher's Union, usually affiliated with the Democratic Party.

Out of 14 aspects asked, five on group interests, four on major issue areas, and five aspects of the “one country, two systems” basics, *no party on any single issue scored a majority of responses*. In fact, of the 14 aspects, a majority responded “None of the above” and “Don’t Know” on all but two issues. The DAB scored above single digits on only one, standing up best for good relations with Beijing (45%). The Liberal Party also only scored once above single digits, representing business interests (36%). The Federation of Trade Unions scored once above single digits, on representing the working class (12%). Its rival, the Confederation of trade union also only scored above single digits once, on the same issue as the FTU (23%). The Civic Party, though brand new, scored twice in double digits, on human rights (11%) and protecting rule of law (22%). The Democratic Party scored most in double digits, four times, on human rights (18%), education problems (12%), protecting freedom of the press (13%) and its best score on protecting Hong Kong’s autonomy at 22%.

However, in general terms, just over half of respondents identified one of the four main parties as representing or protecting their interests best, as shown in the table below.

**Table 118 Of the four biggest political parties in Legco (DAB, DP, LP and CP), which party if any do you feel represents or protects your interests best?**

	Count	%
Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong	118	15
Democratic Party	110	14
Liberal Party	48	3
Civic Party	147	18
All of them	24	3
None of them	260	32
Don't Know	99	12




But before party members and supporters of party development take too much comfort from this, the final set of tables shows that politics as problem solving has a very long way to go in Hong Kong. But this also includes the government. First, the table and chart setting out the results of open-ended questions to respondents about the problem causing them the most personal concern currently.

**Trend Table 119 Which problem of Hong Kong are you most concerned about now personally?\***

	Jan 98	Apr 98	Apr 00	Apr 01	Apr 02	Mar 03	Apr 04	Aug 04	May 05	Mar 06
Economic growth rate	38	32	13	12	14	17	23	9	12	7
Affordable housing	8	4	1	2	--	1		1	--	1
Unemployment	11	27	31	40	53	40	26	35	26	28
Salary cuts, welfare cuts			6	4	3	7	5	4	4	3
Property, stock markets			3	3	1	1	1	2	2	2
Int'l competitiveness			3	2	2	3	1	4	1	1
Other econ.				1	2	1	--	--	1	1
<b>Economic Issues total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>43</b>
Education	4	3	6	7	6	3	6	4	9	8
Elderly	5	5	3	4	2	1	1	2	4	3
Crime	6	5	6	3	1	2	2	3	1	2
Medical	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	5
Pollution/overpopulation	1	1	10	4	2	2	2	3	7	11
<b>Social Issues total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>29</b>
Corruption	1	1	1	1	--	1	1	--	1	1
Political stability	5	4	4	2	2	2	15	12	10	5
Freedom of press/speech	2	2	2	1	--	1	1	8	1	1
Freedom to demonstrate	2	1	1	1	--	1	1	1	--	1
Autonomy of HK	2	1	2	1	--	--	1	1	--	1
Fair judges/freedom to travel	3	3	1	--	--	1	--	1	1	1
Competence of Tung (98-04)	-	-	1	--	1	1	1	1	--	1
Tsang (05-) & civil servants										
Constitutional development						--		3	3	1
<b>Political Issues total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>12</b>


\*None, other, don't know responses dropped



When asked about their satisfaction with the government's performance, the results show a majority unsatisfied.

**Trend Table 120 Are you satisfied/dissatisfied with Government's performance on this problem?**

	Nov 2001	April 2002	Mar 2003	April 2004	Aug 2004	May 2005	Mar 2006
Very satisfied	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Satisfied	9	11	8	15	13	20	28
Dissatisfied	46	44	38	36	43	43	44
Very dissatisfied	32	31	41	32	31	22	20
Don't know	8	9	9	12	8	11	5
Not a government problem	4	5	3	4	4	3	2



However, only tiny portions of respondents identify parties as involved in trying to solve their problems.

**Table 121 Is there any political party or political leader who seems most concerned or most involved in solving this problem of most concern to you?**

5	<b>Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong</b>
2	<b>Liberal Party</b>
2	<b>Federation of Trade Unions</b>
--	<b>The Alliance</b>
--	<b>Independent (Pro-government)</b>
0.1	<b>Independent (Pro-democracy)</b>
6	<b>Democratic Party of Hong Kong</b>
3	<b>Civic Party (Formerly Article 45 Concern Group)</b>
0.3	<b>The Frontier</b>
3	<b>Confederation of Trade Unions</b>
0.1	<b>Association for Democracy and Peoples Livelihood</b>
--	<b>April Fifth Action Group (Long-hair Leung Kwok-hung)</b>
0.3	<b>Neighborhood and Worker's Service Center</b>
6	<b>Others</b>
21	<b>None of the Above</b>
49	<b>Don't Know</b>

And as the final table shows, about as many respondents identify parties as making their problems worse instead of better.

**Table 122 Is there any political party or political leader who seems to be making the problem of most concern to you worse instead of better?**

5	<b>Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong</b>
3	<b>Liberal Party</b>
1	<b>Federation of Trade Unions</b>
--	<b>The Alliance</b>
--	<b>Independent (Pro-government)</b>
0.4	<b>Independent (Pro-democracy)</b>
11	<b>Democratic Party of Hong Kong</b>
0.4	<b>Civic Party (Formerly Article 45 Concern Group)</b>
0.1	<b>The Frontier</b>
1	<b>Confederation of Trade Unions</b>
0.1	<b>Association for Democracy and Peoples Livelihood</b>
1	<b>April Fifth Action Group (Long-hair Leung Kwok-hung)</b>
0.1	<b>Neighborhood and Worker's Service Center</b>
4	<b>Others</b>
52	<b>None of the Above</b>
22	<b>Don't Know</b>

In conclusion, that “none of the above” is the majority response to the question of who is making their major problem of personal concern worse indicates that few can link performance on a policy or issue with the responsible person or party or department. Strong governance requires clear lines of responsibility to the public as well as clear lines of command authority from the executive. That don't know and none of the above is together 70 percent response on whether any party is helping solve respondents' biggest problem, that 32 percent of people feel none of the parties represents them or protects interests best, that people can't identify parties with any of the interests set out from working class, environmental protection, freedom of press, or stability is incredibly damning of the weakness of the parties in the present circumstances. A strong party system, with parties running on clear policy proposals, would benefit strong governance by giving voters clear choices. Those party choices, once made at the polls, then would hand a party friendly or party dominated government the mandate to make decisions and the legitimacy to see them through. This is not the case in the present system. Its failings and weaknesses come through in this report.

In the case of politics in Hong Kong, as the case of politics elsewhere, problems cannot be solved by parties alone, or by government alone. A system must be constructed which integrates the civil society and voluntary resources of parties with the tax-funded civil service resources and procedures of the governmental bureaucracy. The current system is barely functional under a very experienced hand, but the structural flaws remain unrepaired, and this keeps anxieties and worries up. The government and the parties need each other if they are to solve people's problems. And if they do not solve their problems, the consequences for Hong Kong could be large indeed.

## VII Analytical variables, profile of each variable, compared by survey

Each survey of about 800 individuals has a range of error at the 95% confidence level of 4 points +/- . Variance between the samples falls within these ranges. Numbers are percentages unless otherwise designated. All numbers are rounded to the nearest whole number unless otherwise designated following WAPOR guidelines for opinion surveys. If the percentage is less than 0.49, this will be rounded to 0.5 or nearest 10<sup>th</sup> of a percent. All percentages are percent of column. Totals vary across demographic factors since not all respondents answered all questions, either refusing to give an answer or giving unclassifiable answers. FEB refers to the post-budget survey conducted 25 February to 5 March. MARCH refers to the NDI sponsored survey conducted 19-31 March.

### A. Demographics

These are the standard independent variables normally associated with variance in responses and largely involuntary, cumulative, or of high and lengthy impact (such as education, housing, occupation).

Birthplace:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Hong Kong	592	74	571	71
Mainland China	188	23	206	26
Other	24	3	27	3

### Years residence in Hong Kong (for non-Hong Kong born residents)

	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
1-15	45	6	42	5
16-30	69	9	96	12
31-45	48	6	51	6
46-80	48	6	45	6
HKBorn	593	74	572	71

Gender:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Male	395	49	417	52
Female	410	51	389	48

Age:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
18-19	55	7	51	7
20-29	130	17	103	13
30-39	135	17	137	18
40-49	227	29	230	30
50-59	141	18	146	19
60-69	61	8	62	8
70-89	38	5	48	6

**Marital status:****FEB****MARCH**

Group	Count	%	Count	%
Never married	256	32	251	31
Married	527	65	543	67
Widowed/Divorced	22	3	12	2

**Children:****FEB****(Reclassified)****MARCH****(Reclassified)**

	Count	%	%	Count	%	%
Married, no children	59	7	7	76	9	9
1 child	176	22		152	19	
2 children	218	27		211	26	
3 children	64	8		66	8	
4 children	16	2		30	4	
5 children	8	1		11	1	
6 children	2	.25		4	0.5	
7 children	--	--		--	--	
8 children	--	--		1		
9 children	--	--		1		
Total % with children			61			59
Not married/no children	256	32	32	251	31	31

\*Reclassified into Married no children, married with children, and not married no children.

**Education:****FEB****MARCH**

	Count	%	Count	%
None	32	4	22	3
Primary 1	16	2	4	0.5
Primary 2	5	1	4	0.5
Primary 3	9	1	4	0.5
Primary 4	3	0.4	4	0.5
Primary 5	5	1	10	1
Primary 6	42	5	52	6
Form 1	8	1	13	2
Form 2	10	1	9	1
Form 3	77	10	96	12
Form 4/Tech Institute 1 <sup>st</sup> year	19	2	20	2
Form 5/Tech Institute graduate	185	23	194	24
Form 6 Tech Institute F5 1st yr	20	3	19	2
Form 7 Tech college grad/US 1	85	11	71	9
University 1st year/US 2	18	2	17	2
University 2 <sup>nd</sup> year/US 3	20	3	11	1
University graduate	210	26	222	28
Masters/PhD.	29	4	30	4

Education Reclassified	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
<b>0-6</b>	112	14	100	12
<b>F1-F4</b>	114	14	138	17
<b>F5</b>	185	23	194	24
<b>F6-Univ2/US3</b>	143	18	118	15
<b>Univ grad</b>	210	26	222	28
<b>Univ Post-grad</b>	33	4	31	4

Work sector:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
<b>Civil servant/Quasi-public</b>	77	10	73	9
<b>Private sector</b>	388	49	382	48
<b>Non-governmental Organization</b>	12	2	20	3
<b>Non-workforce</b>	314	40	323	40

Occupation:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
<b>Manager/Admin</b>	113	14	88	12
<b>Professionals</b>	54	7	61	8
<b>Assoc/cert professionals</b>	18	2	23	3
<b>Clerks/Secretaries</b>	91	11	110	14
<b>Service/sales/police/fire</b>	85	11	65	8
<b>Skilled agri &amp; fisheries</b>	2	.25	3	.4
<b>Craft &amp; performers</b>	10	1	13	2
<b>Plant &amp; machine operators</b>	46	6	29	4
<b>Elementary occupations</b>	20	3	27	4
<b>Housewives</b>	100	13	103	13
<b>Retired</b>	94	12	114	15
<b>Unemployed</b>	28	4	33	4
<b>Student</b>	92	12	72	9
<b>Teachers/principals incl univ</b>	25	3	21	3
<b>Other</b>	14	2	7	1

Occupation Reclassified:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
<b>Manager/administrators</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Professionals/associate prof.</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Service workers</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Manual workers</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Housewives</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Retirees</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Students</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>10</b>

\*Unemployed and other dropped. Teachers grouped with professionals and associate professionals. Clerks and secretaries grouped as service workers. All others as manual workers.



Living quarters:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Villa/Bungalow	6	1	6	1
Private residential block (Own)	358	44	343	43
Private residential block (rent)	44	5	65	8
Gov. Home Ownership Scheme (subsidized)	148	18	118	15
Public Housing Block	196	24	230	28
Modern Village House	19	2	13	2
Traditional Village House	14	2	10	1
Temporary housing			3	0.4
Employer provided	12	1	12	1
Other	8	1	6	1

Living quarters Reclassified:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Villa/village houses	39	5	29	4
Private residential block (Own)	358	45	343	43
Private residential block/employer provided (rent)	56	7	77	10
Gov. Home Ownership Scheme (subsidized)	148	19	118	15
Public Housing Block	196	25	230	29

\*Other and temporary housing dropped

Religion:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
None	380	48	438	55
Catholic	43	5	51	6
Protestant	137	17	104	13
Buddhist/Taoist	81	10	66	8
Ancestor/Chinese Folk belief	157	20	144	18

Right of abode:	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
ROA abroad	88	11	80	10
No	711	89	721	90

**APPROX MONTHLY FAMILY INCOME\* FEB****MARCH**

	Count	%		Count	%
None	35	5		55	8
Under \$5000	14	2		21	3
\$5,000-9,999	71	10		46	7
\$10,000-14,999	91	13		94	14
\$15,000-19,999	78	11		82	12
\$20,000-24,999	85	12		79	12
\$25,000-29,999	41	6		37	6
\$30,000-34,999	62	9		58	9
\$35,000-39,999	34	5		27	4
\$40,000-49,999**	58	8		49	7
\$50,000-59,999	46	7		49	7
\$60,000-69,999	16	2		11	2
\$70,000-79,999	12	2		12	2
\$80,000-89,999	12	2		8	1
\$90,000-99,999	9	1		5	1
100,000 and up	41	6		30	5

\*13% in Feb and 18% in March refused to give an income. These have been excluded in the table above.

\*\*Note change in increments from 5,000 to 10,000 at this point.

Mean \$24,000

Median \$20,000-24,999

**INCOME REGROUPED\* FEB****MARCH**

	Count	%		Count	%
Less than 5,000	49	7		76	11
\$5,000-9,999	71	10		46	7
\$10,000-14,999	91	13		94	14
\$15,000-19,999	78	11		82	12
20,000-29,999**	126	18		116	17
30,000-39,999	96	14		85	13
\$40,000-49,999	58	8		49	7
\$50,000-59,999	46	7		49	7
60,000-99,999***	49	7		36	5
100,000+	41	6		30	5

\*Regrouped to regularize size of income groupings as much as possible to increase accuracy of analysis when this variable is tested against others.

\*\*Note increase from increments of 5,000 to increments of 10,000

\*\*\*Note change in increment

†Regrouped into 0-19,999, 20,000-49,999 and 50,000+ for some cross tabulations

**B. Associational variables**

These are voluntary and self-ascribed variables associated with changed attitudes in many of the dependent variables examined above. Demographic variables, such as gender, birth and age, are involuntary, or like education, occupation, and income, rarely change with speed and then require great and/or extended effort. Associational variables are more voluntary, such as living abroad, trips to the mainland, and less directly influential, such as having family on the mainland or family living abroad with right of abode there. Identity is included in this category, though arguably it is no less changeable for many than demographic variables.

**Lived abroad 1 Year+: FEB**

**MARCH**

	Count	%		Count	%
Yes	185	23		182	23
No	616	77		623	77

**Where?**

**FEB**

**MARCH**

	Count	%		Count	%
UK	20	2		23	3
US	24	3		14	2
Australia	13	2		10	1
Canada	26	3		28	3
New Zealand	4	0.5		2	0.3
Singapore	3	0.4		1	0.1
Mainland China	62	8		65	8
Taiwan	4	0.5		3	0.4
Macau	2	0.3		8	1
Other	25	3		21	3
Not lived abroad	620	77		622	77

**Where Regrouped:**

**FEB**

**MARCH**

	Count	%		Count	%
Western	87	11		77	10
Other	34	4		33	4
Mainland China	62	8		65	8
Not lived abroad	620	77		622	78

\*Regrouped for testing as Western (top 5 table above), Mainland China, Other and Not lived abroad

**Identity 1: Global Identity\***

**FEB**

	Count	%
Expatriate	21	3
Chinese mainland migrant	32	4
Mainland professional working in Hong Kong	4	0.5
Grew up in HK, returned to HK after 1997	35	4
Hong Konger	706	88
Other (usually Macanese or Taiwanese)	7	1

\*Question asked: "Which of the following categories do you think you fall in?"

\*\*Expat and Returnees grouped together; both mainland categories grouped together, other category dropped in the analysis in order to form groups large enough to analyze statistically

The table below shows how years living in Hong Kong affects identity. Those with 30 years or more living here tend to identify themselves as Hong Kongers as much as those born here.

**FEB**

**Years living in Hong Kong**

**Born in HK**

	1-15	16-30	31-45	46-70	HK Born	total
Expat/Returnees to HK	14	4	6	4	7	7
Mainlander	55	13	0	2	0.5	5
Hong Konger	31	82	94	94	92	88
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents:

Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 291.7 with 8 df p ≤ 0.0001

**Identity 2: National Identity: FEB MARCH**

	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Hong Kong Chinese	248	31	208	26
Chinese	185	23	242	30
Hong Kong person	328	41	322	40
Hong Kong British	17	2	10	1
Overseas Chinese	4	1	7	1
Other	23	3	17	2

\*Question: "The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is the most appropriate description of you?"

\*\*HK British, Overseas Chinese and Other collapsed into one category for analysis

**Family in mainland: (MARCH)**

	Count	%
Yes	501	62
No	303	38

**Family with right of abode abroad: (FEB)**

	Count	%
Yes	390	48
No	399	50
Don't Know	16	2

\*Excluding Mainland China, Macau, Taiwan

**Frequency of trips to mainland over previous two years:**

	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
0	141	18	95	19
1-2	185	23	110	22
3-4	131	16	81	16
5-6	94	12	38	8
7-10	95	12	68	14
11-29	66	8	47	9
30-700+	65	8	44	9
Refuse to say	28	3	18	4

Mean = 14

Median = 3

St. Dev. = 53.4 (Feb) 50.4 (March)

**Commitment to living in Hong Kong**

Group	Count	%
Yes	358	44
Would like to, cannot	33	4
No	374	46
Don't Know	40	5

### C. Participatory variables

#### Registration/voting in 2004 Legco election: FEB MARCH

Group	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Not registered to vote	92	12	149	19
Voted	489	61	505	64
Did not vote	215	27	139	18

#### Geographic constituency, voters' residency: FEB MARCH

	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
HK Island	123	25	166	33
Kowloon East	56	11	108	21
Kowloon West	60	12	68	13
New Territories East	115	24	91	18
New Territories West	135	28	72	14

#### 2004 Legco election: Geographic Constituency votes\*\*

Constituency	Valid Votes Counted	% of total votes cast
HKI	354,095	19.98
KE	293,702	16.57
KW	227,694	12.85
NTE	431,007	24.32
NTW	463,413	26.15

Total votes cast: 1,772,213

\*\*NOTE: Both surveys show respondents from Hong Kong Island reporting they voted in September 2004 at a higher rate than their proportion of votes cast reported by the SAR government's count in the table above. The February survey shows NT East voters sampled above turnout while the March survey shows a sample under-reported turnout. Telephone numbers in Hong Kong no longer reliably indicate location (numbers now follow subscribers wherever they move instead of change with location). Only a quota sample method by reported respondent geographic constituency would ensure a sample representative of 2004 voting characteristics in 2006. With above 10 percent of population moving house on an annual basis, such a quota sample now based on 2004 voting turnout would not necessarily indicate voter, and particularly resident, sentiment in the present geographic constituencies. In other demographic aspects, both samples appear representative. Geographic constituency may be the current geographic location of respondents and not necessarily that of their registration, so any geographic analysis should be discounted or treated carefully.

Have you attended any meetings or activities of one of the following groups in the last six months? (Percentage reporting membership/ attendance/doesn't add to 100)

	TU	PA	KAI	MAC	CA	POL	CHA	REC	REL	OWC	EVG
Feb 2006	5	9	5	8	2	2	20	7	24	18	5
Mar 2006	4	9	6	10	4	2	22	9	24	22	8

KEY	ABBREV.
Trade Union	TU
Professional association	PA
Kaifong	KAI
Mutual Aid Committee	MAC
Clan Association	CA
Political/pressure group	POL
Charitable Association	CHA
Recreational & cultural group	REC
Religious group or church	REL
Owner's corporation	OWC
Environmental group	EVG

Reading of newspapers: FEB MARCH

	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Daily	535	67	561	70
Several times a week	221	28	209	26
Never	47	6	34	4

Hours watching/hearing news & current affairs on radio, TV

	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
0	47	6	33	4
0.5	154	19	135	17
1	244	30	244	30
1-2	48	6	57	7
2	159	20	167	21
2-3	77	10	94	12
>3	76	9	76	9

Hours accessing news and current affairs websites

	FEB		MARCH	
Group	Count	%	Count	%
0	420	52	435	54
0.5	166	20	181	22
1	163	20	134	17
2 or more	56	7	56	7

**Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups in the past 12 months? (% Yes responses only)**

	GOV	DEL	FEL	DC	NPC	MED	KAI	POL	PRO	SIGN	SURV	DONR
Feb 2006	9	2	1	5	0.4	3	2	1	11	37	44	14
Mar 2006	8	4	2	6	0.2	3	2	0.5	13	44	48	14

KEY	ABBREVIATION
Contact Government Dept.	GOV
Contact Direct Elected Legco rep.	DEL
Contact Legco Funct Rep.	FEL
Contact District Council/Dist officer	DC
Contact Xinhua/China Adviser, NPC	NPC
Contact Mass Media	MED
Contact local group/Kaifong	KAI
Contact pressure/pol. group	POL
Demonstrate/protest	PRO
Signature Campaign	SIGN
Opinion survey	SURV
Donate to pol. party	DONR

**Do you consider yourself a supporter or member of a political party or advocacy group in Hong Kong? MARCH**

	Count	%
Yes	98	12
No	698	87
Maybe	6	1

**Which one?**

	Count	%
DAB	17	2
DP	34	4
LP	3	0.4
CP	20	2.5
Frontier	4	0.5
CTU	2	0.3
FTU	4	0.5
NWSC	1	--
The Alliance	3	0.4
Greenpeace	6	0.7
Other	4	0.5
Not a member/supporter	708	88

**Frequency of discussion of politics and public affairs with friends**

**FEB**

	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
Never	<b>206</b>	<b>26</b>
Occasionally	<b>488</b>	<b>61</b>
Frequently	<b>98</b>	<b>12</b>
Don't Know	<b>13</b>	<b>2</b>

**Note change of scale**

**MARCH**

	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
Never	<b>163</b>	<b>20</b>
Seldom (few times year)	<b>264</b>	<b>33</b>
Occasionally (once a month)	<b>241</b>	<b>30</b>
Often (one a week)	<b>123</b>	<b>15</b>
Nearly every day	<b>15</b>	<b>2</b>

**Frequency of discussion of politics and public affairs with family members**

**FEB**

**MARCH**

	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>		<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
Never	<b>244</b>	<b>30</b>		<b>216</b>	<b>27</b>
Seldom (few times year)	<b>239</b>	<b>30</b>		<b>268</b>	<b>33</b>
Occasionally (once a month)	<b>233</b>	<b>29</b>		<b>210</b>	<b>26</b>
Often (one a week)	<b>78</b>	<b>10</b>		<b>101</b>	<b>13</b>
Nearly every day	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>

**D. Key attitudinal variables**

**Patriotism: How does the celebration of 1<sup>st</sup> Oct National Day make you feel?**

**FEB**

**MARCH**

	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>		<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
Indifferent	<b>407</b>	<b>51</b>		<b>400</b>	<b>50</b>
Proud/Excited	<b>146</b>	<b>18</b>		<b>184</b>	<b>23</b>
Another holiday	<b>232</b>	<b>29</b>		<b>206</b>	<b>26</b>
Unhappy/Won't say	<b>20</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>16</b>	<b>2</b>

**Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong**

**FEB**

**MARCH**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>		<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
Very dissatisfied	<b>29</b>	<b>4</b>		<b>25</b>	<b>3</b>
Somewhat dissatisfied	<b>142</b>	<b>18</b>		<b>141</b>	<b>17</b>
Somewhat satisfied	<b>542</b>	<b>67</b>		<b>534</b>	<b>66</b>
Very satisfied	<b>76</b>	<b>9</b>		<b>74</b>	<b>9</b>
Don't know	<b>16</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>32</b>	<b>4</b>



**Reclassified Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong FEB MARCH**

Group	Count	%	Count	%
Dissatisfied	171	22	166	21
Satisfied	542	69	534	69
Very satisfied	76	10	74	10

**Support or opposition in principle to direct election of all members of Legco\***

Group	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Strongly support	150	19	147	18
Support	314	39	383	48
Oppose	123	15	126	16
Strongly oppose	22	3	25	3
Don't Know/Neutral	196	24	125	16

\*Recorded with strongly oppose and oppose combined in analysis

**Support or opposition in principle to direct election of the Chief Executive\***

Group	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Strongly support	184	23	171	21
Support	354	44	404	50
Oppose	122	15	140	17
Strongly oppose	17	2	22	3
Don't Know/Neutral	128	16	69	9

\*Recorded with strongly oppose and oppose combined in analysis

**Worry about free press FEB MARCH**

Group	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Not worried	459	57	445	55
Slightly worried	195	24	201	25
Somewhat worried	82	10	89	11
Very worried	56	7	64	8
Don't Know	13	2	7	1

\*Don't Know dropped in analysis

**Worry about employment FEB MARCH**

Group	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Not worried	447	56	439	54
Slightly worried	171	21	146	18
Somewhat worried	79	10	103	13
Very worried	84	10	89	11
Don't Know	24	3	29	4

\*Don't Know dropped in analysis

**Worry about aging of HK population FEB MARCH**

	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Not worried	175	22	200	25
Slightly worried	225	28	186	23
Somewhat worried	225	28	238	30
Very worried	160	20	172	21
Don't Know	20	2	10	1

\*Don't Know dropped in analysis

**Worry about social unrest and street protests**

	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Not worried	499	62	446	55
Slightly worried	192	24	154	19
Somewhat worried	65	8	117	15
Very worried	40	5	75	9
Don't Know	9	1	14	2

\*Don't Know dropped in analysis

**Worry about air and water pollution FEB MARCH**

	FEB		MARCH	
	Count	%	Count	%
Not worried	76	9	68	8
Slightly worried	159	20	112	14
Somewhat worried	255	32	234	29
Very worried	307	38	389	48
Don't Know	8	1	3	0.372

\*Don't Know dropped in analysis

**Worry about rule of law FEB MARCH\*\***

	FEB		MARCH**	
	Count	%	Count	%
Not worried	516	64	441	55
Slightly worried	156	19	162	20
Somewhat worried	71	9	103	13
Very worried	42	5	77	10
Don't Know	20	2	23	3

\*Don't Know dropped in analysis

\*\*Difference in worry about rule of law between late February and late March appears linked to the Tsoi "rogue cop" police shooting case

**In general, do you think political parties in Hong Kong are having a good effect or bad effect on solving problems in Hong Kong? MARCH**

	Count	%
Very good effect	20	2
Good effect	340	42
No difference	234	29
Bad effect	111	14
Very bad effect	22	3
Don't Know	79	10

Very good and good, as well as very bad and bad reclassified as good or bad in analysis; Don't Knows dropped for analysis.

## Reclassified Effect of Political Parties MARCH

	Count	%
Good	360	50
No Difference	234	32
Bad	133	18

## How do you feel currently about Hong Kong's future prospects as part of China? FEB

	Count	%
Very optimistic	54	7
Optimistic	356	44
Neither	280	35
Pessimistic	74	9
Very pessimistic	18	2
Don't Know	23	3

\*Pessimistic and Very pessimistic combined; Don't Know dropped in analysis

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Survey administration and Chinese translation: P.K. Cheung

At the 95% confidence level, range of error is plus or minus 3 points for surveys 900-1,000 respondents and 4 points for those 600-800. Completion rates for the surveys range from 28% to 32% of those contacted by telephone. Since the project uses a Kish table to randomly identify the correspondents desired and then schedules a callback if that specific respondent is not at home, the completion rate tends to be lower but the randomization of responses (needed for accurate statistics) tends to be higher than surveys which interview readily available respondents using the next birthday method. Older respondents with this method tend to use traditional Chinese calendar where all "birthdays" are celebrated on the second day of the lunar new year, thus degrading randomization dependent on this method (in lunar calendar using societies in Asia). Respondents are interviewed in Cantonese, Mandarin, English, Hakka and other languages or dialects as they prefer and as interviewers with the language skills needed are available. Other surveys referred to above are Hong Kong Transition Project surveys. The details of those surveys and reports of same may be found on the Hong Kong Transition Project website at <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp>

The number of respondents in the HKTP surveys:

N=	Nov 91	902						
	Feb 93	615	Aug 93	609				
	Feb 94	636	Aug 94	640				
	Feb 95	647	Aug 95	645				
	Feb 96	627	July 96	928			Dec 96	326
	Feb 97	546	June 97	1,129				
	Jan 98	700	April 98	852	June 98	625	July 98	647
	Apr 99	838	July 99	815			Oct 98	811
	Apr 00	704	Aug 00	625;	Aug 00	1059	Nov 99	813
	Apr 01	830	June 01	808	Jul (media )	831	Nov 00	801
	Apr 02	751	Aug 02	721	Jul (party)	1029	Nov 01	759
	Mar 03	790	June 03	776			Nov 02	814
	Apr 04	809	May 04	833	Nov 03	836	Dec 03	709
					June 04*	680	July 04 *	955
					July 04*		July 04*	695
					Sept 04*		Dec 04	800
					July 05	810	Aug 04*	781
	May 05	829	May FC**	376	Nov 04	773	Dec FC**	405 (365)
	Mar 06	805	Apr 06	807	Nov 05	859		

\*permanent residents, registered voters only (part of a special 2004 election series)

\*\*Functional constituency registered voters (voters in September 2004 Legco election)

†Not all surveys are referred to in trend series.

†All Figures are in percentages unless otherwise stated. The Hong Kong Transition Project is funded via a competitive grant from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government (HKBU 2168/04H) and is a participating research project with the David C. Lam Institute of East-West Studies. None of the institutions mentioned above is responsible for any of the views expressed herein.