This document is intended to assess the status of democratization in Cambodia since the United Nations-sponsored elections in 1993 and to address concerns over upcoming local and national elections officially expected in 1997 and 1998.

It is in the interests of the United States and other signatories of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement to remain engaged in Cambodia to guarantee that the basic provisions of the accords are fulfilled. Cambodians and the international community believed that the May 1993 elections, which cost $2 to $3 billion, heralded a new era, but many new democratic institutions have failed to function or have simply never been established. The international community must continue to support the gains that have been made and prevent reversions to conflict. The rule of law, an independent judiciary and a government accountable through elections are essential to maintaining peace and facilitating social and economic development.

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is working to assist Cambodian efforts to promote and protect the integrity of proposed elections and to address the climate of intimidation. NDI is assisting two coalitions of nongovernmental organizations, the Committee for Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL) and the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (COFFEL), to organize national civic education and election monitoring efforts. The NGOs have made considerable progress despite the political, financial and organizational obstacles that they have confronted during the past year.

Less progress, however, has been made in ensuring an environment conducive to fair elections and advancing the democratic reforms that began four years ago. Tensions between the two ruling coalition partners, the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), are widely regarded as being at their highest level since 1993. On March 30, an apparent assassination attempt against opposition leader Sam Rainsy killed 19 people and seriously injured more than 100. In late April, a dozen members of the National Assembly ostensibly defected from FUNCINPEC to CPP in the coalition government; within a week eight had defected back. A week later, an apparent agreement between the two parties on the election framework broke down. In recent weeks, both coalition partners have mobilized and positioned their troops in and around the capital, and rumors of imminent armed conflict are prevalent. An eight-member Reconciliation Council has met to resolve the crisis. Yet, even if a large-scale confrontation is avoided the democratization process is likely to remain stalled.

The following briefly reviews developments in Cambodia since the UN-sponsored elections and proposes new policy initiatives for the international community. These proposals are designed to break the current impasse by addressing some of the underlying political issues that have led to the present stalemate.

1. As the four-year anniversary of the UN-sponsored election has passed (the polls were held on May 23-28, 1993), it is time to reassess Cambodia's progress toward democratic development. Over an 18-month period in 1992-93, the UN conducted one of its most extensive peacekeeping operations involving more than 15,000 military troops and 7,000 foreign civilian personnel and reportedly costing $2 to $3 billion. The operation, carried out by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), was largely considered a success. It resulted in the end of a full-scale civil war (though skirmishes with the Khmer Rouge continued), the repatriation of over 375,000 refugees and an election in which 90 percent of eligible voters cast ballots. UNTAC's legacy also includes a multiparty National Assembly, a burgeoning civil society of NGOs (several of which are focused on promoting human rights), several newspapers operating free of direct government controls and the adoption of a new constitution that guarantees a democratic form of government and fundamental freedoms.

2. The UNTAC operation, however, failed to achieve important objectives. Attempts to intimidate voters were widespread, and violence marred the campaign period. Despite the presence of UN peacekeeping troops, there were more than 100 violent incidents in the two weeks preceding the election, resulting in 200 deaths and more than 300 injuries. UNTAC was unsuccessful in disarming the former warring factions. It also failed to "ensure a neutral political environment," as required by the UN mandate. CPP -- formerly the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, which ruled Cambodia from 1979 to 1991 -- was in control of the nation's civil bureaucracy, judiciary, police and much of the military before and after the election.

   The election resulted in a power-sharing agreement that did not mirror the results of the poll but reflected political realities. As a result of the voting, four parties won seats in the 120-member Constituent Assembly, which would be transformed into a new parliament: FUNCINPEC won 58 seats; CPP, 51; the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), 10; and MOLINAKA (founded by Prum Neakareach, a former military officer during the Lon Nol period), one. Under the negotiated power-sharing agreement, however, the CPP joined the government coalition with more positions than were proportionate to its vote totals. Twenty-two members of the 50 member Council of Ministers, for example, were appointed by the CPP.

   According to the negotiated agreement, the two co-prime ministers -- FUNCINPEC's Prince Norodom Ranariddh (King Sihanouk's son) and the CPP's Hun Sen -- would preside over the government. Ministries would be run by co-ministers, and the high-ranking ministry posts such as deputy minister and secretary of state would be split among the winning parties. Similarly, at the provincial level, the offices of governor and vice-governor would be divided among the three major parties. An agreement to share district chief positions was made but not implemented.

   The negotiated power-sharing agreement was not entirely the result of a willing compromise. In the days following the election, King (then Prince) Sihanouk proposed an interim government that entirely ignored the election results and would have included the Khmer Rouge, who did not participate in the election. Receiving little or no support from the international community, the idea was dropped. However, a secession attempt -- led by CPP members Sin Song and Sin Sen and by Prince Chakrapong (King Sihanouk's half-brother) -- in eight eastern provinces bordering on Vietnam created new pressures to negotiate. Moreover, Hun Sen indicated that he would not accept the results of the election because, he alleged, the UN had fraudulently deprived the CPP of victory. Rumors of a possible CPP coup were prevalent even as the votes of the 1993 election were being counted. The new government, then, was as much a product of the threat of coercion as it was of a bargain freely entered into by the key political actors.

3. Since UNTAC's mandate expired in September 1993 the international community has continued to support Cambodia's economic development and democratization efforts. Collectively, international donors supply approximately one half of the government's budget. According to figures released by the International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), Cambodia received $518 million in assistance from the international community in 1996, compared to $473 million in 1995. The Asian Development Bank, with its 1996 pledge of $117 million, is the largest multilateral donor. The largest bilateral donors, and their 1996 pledges, are Japan ($80 million), France ($50 million) and the US ($36.5 million).

   According to the US Agency for International Development, the US has provided $1.3 billion for humanitarian relief and development projects for Cambodians since the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime. In addition to support for UNTAC, this sum includes more than $50 million for democratic initiatives since 1992. Clearly, the US and other donor nations have a strong interest in ensuring that the progress of 1993 is not lost.

4. Despite UNTAC's accomplishments, many important obstacles to democratization remain, and the Cambodian government and political leaders have done little to promote genuine democratic reform since the UNTAC period. Indeed, the progress that has been made is largely the result of the 1993 election itself. This would include the emergence of domestic NGOs (initially established and funded during the UNTAC period), the existence of multiple political parties and the marginalization of the Khmer Rouge. Democratic advances since 1993, such as the strengthening of domestic human rights NGOs, are the result of international assistance rather than of initiatives undertaken or encouraged by the Cambodian government or political parties. The major institutions of governance, such as the civil bureaucracy, army, police and courts operate much as they did when UNTAC's mandate expired.

   Some of the nation's key governing institutions provided for in the Constitution, such as the Constitutional Council and Supreme Council of Magistracy, discussed below, have never been convened. The National Assembly often fails to attain a quorum. Several of its members reside in other countries. While the Assembly, during the past four years, has passed laws on matters such as illegal drugs, nationality, immigration, investment, the press and labor, it has failed to adopt a legal framework for an election. Concerns have been raised that some of the legislation that has been enacted, such as the drug and press laws, may be used to punish the government's political opponents.

   The gains that the government has made are largely economic. A liberal investment law has led to a needed infusion of private capital from other countries, including Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Infrastructure improvements are reflected in new roads, hospitals and schools. In the areas of democracy and governance, however, the development process is essentially stalled.

   The following outlines some key obstacles to further democratization:

   Human rights abuses persist. Since the 1993 elections, newspapers linked to the opposition have been closed down and editors imprisoned for at least brief periods. Since 1994, four journalists have been killed and more injured, apparently as a result of politically inspired violence. The offices of opposition political parties have been attacked (e.g., the grenade attack in September 1995 on BLDP headquarters, injuring at least 30 people), and party workers have been threatened and harassed. For example, the Khmer Nation Party (KNP), established in late 1995 by former FUNCINPEC Finance Minister Sam Rainsy, has had its provincial offices forcibly closed, and during the past year two KNP workers were slain in apparently politically motivated killings. No one has been prosecuted for these crimes.

   A campaign of intimidation against prominent political figures has also taken place. Prince Norodom Sirivudh (King Sihanouk's half-brother), now in exile, was tried in absentia and convicted of plotting to kill CO-Prime Minister Hun Sen. International observers and human rights groups declared that the trial was unfair and failed to meet minimum standards of due process. On Easter Sunday, assailants threw grenades into a crowd at a lawful and peaceful KNP demonstration. The attack, an apparent assassination attempt on KNP leader Sam Rainsy, killed at least 19 persons and injured over 100. Earlier in the year, CPP police officials made a crude attempt to implicate Rainsy in the slaying of a Ministry of Interior official, the brother-in-law of Hun Sen's wife.

   The Cambodian government has been receptive to human rights training programs for the military, police, prison officials and teachers. However, NGO personnel in the outlying provinces increasingly report instances of official intimidation and fear for their personal safety.

   Reconciliation among the former warring factions remains an elusive goal. In late 1996 fighting broke out between CPP and FUNCINPEC troops in Battambang province. Although the incident turned out to be a brief skirmish, it served as a reminder that the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) is not a truly national army. The tension between FUNCINPEC and CPP political and military officials was especially apparent in their competition to recruit defecting Khmer Rouge soldiers to their respective sides.

   At the divisional and regimental levels, military officers are frequently aligned with political parties. This situation not only leads to political tension, it also can impede the effectiveness of military operations. It was recently reported, for example, that troops loyal to FUNCINPEC (the 48th Regiment of Military Region 4) could not be mobilized for an assault against the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng province because their salaries and equipment had been withheld by CPP divisional officials.

   In the political arena reconciliation has also broken down. Agreements on sharing district chief positions and on holding elections, for example, have collapsed. The CPP appears to be actively involved in internally dividing its opposition. It has supported one faction in a split within the BLDP and more recently appears to have engineered a fracture within FUNCINPEC. In April, a dozen FUNCINPEC MPs defected to the CPP; within a week, eight had returned to FUNCINPEC. But this move still appears to have given the CPP an effective majority (control of 61 seats) in the National Assembly. FUNCINPEC and CPP accused each other of intimidating the defectors. Representatives of other parties have referred to this as a "constitutional coup" and have asked that the international community refrain from recognizing the legal existence and effect of these defections until the situation has been clarified.

   This political maneuvering might be considered the daily routine of politics in many countries. In the context of Cambodia's power-sharing agreement, however, it has created a highly unstable governing coalition, has generated political tensions that threaten violence and at times has paralyzed the civil bureaucracy.

   The judiciary is not independent, and key institutions needed to ensure democratic rights are not in place. An independent judiciary is needed to protect human rights, settle election-related disputes and resolve important constitutional conflicts that affect the functions of government. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the Constitutional Council (which would resolve constitutional and election-related issues) and the Supreme Council of the Magistracy (which would appoint and discipline judges) required by the constitution have not been formed. The nation's judges were all appointed by the pre-UNTAC regime, the precursor of the CPP. Several members of the nation's political leadership have clearly indicated their lack of confidence in the courts. FUNCINPEC's leadership and the KNP's Sam Rainsy, for instance, have stated that if accused of a crime they would not submit to legal processes carried out by Cambodia's legal system. In the wake of the Easter Sunday grenade attack, KNP, FUNCINPEC, BLDP and the CO-Ministers of Interior have requested international assistance in the investigation. Several political leaders have stated their concern that the investigation undertaken by the government cannot be impartial or credible.

   The civil bureaucracy, like the judiciary, is effectively controlled by one political party and is not adequately trained to perform routine tasks. In addition, salaries are low and corruption is rampant. Even elementary school teachers demand bribes from parents to advance their children to the next grade and frequently sell students school supplies at highly inflated prices. Corruption appears to affect the press as well. It was recently reported in the English language Cambodian press that other newspaper reporters were given $100 to attend a press conference of a government official and the news releases are often accompanied by cash.

   The legal framework for elections has not been established. There is neither a communal nor a national election law, nor is there a law on the registration of political parties. While agreement on these matters appeared to be close at hand in April 1997, the possible return of Prince Sirivudh and the splintering within FUNCINPEC led to a delay in convening the scheduled session of the National Assembly, and therefore consideration of election-related matters may be postponed.

   The nation's major political parties (CPP, FUNCINPEC, BLDP and KNP) have experienced serious factional disputes, and none of the parties is internally democratic. The CPP alone has a strong provincial structure. The CPP, however, relies heavily on patronage and the distribution of material perquisites to sustain its support. The CPP reportedly has substantial domestic business holdings. The other parties rely on Cambodians residing abroad as a major source of financial support. The lack of a party registration law, in conjunction with intimidation directed at provincial party workers and supporters, has effectively prevented opposition parties, especially the KNP, from developing a nationwide network.

   Most Cambodian citizens continue to fear their government and doubt its commitment to democracy. The euphoria generated by the Peace Agreements, repatriation and the 1993 elections has vanished over the course of four years of often violent political wrangling. Many Cambodians still do not understand why the coalition government exists, and the four years that have passed since the elections have not been long enough to erase the memory of the grisly Khmer Rouge genocide or the iron-fisted totalitarianism of Vietnamese occupation. The Khmer Rouge murdered almost two million people, about one fifth of Cambodia's population. Cambodian society was destroyed, and the country was left with few educated citizens or potential new leaders in virtually all sectors of society.

   Cambodians have largely lost faith in the democratic process and doubt that upcoming elections will be democratic. Focus groups conducted by NDI in 1996 showed that many Cambodians lack confidence in the country's political leadership. Yet because of the climate of intimidation, few Cambodians are willing to criticize the government publicly. The focus groups also indicated overwhelming support for the international community's involvement in the 1993 election. Without significant reassurance from the international community, therefore, it will be difficult to convince Cambodians that future elections will be meaningful.

5. Cambodian political leaders and governmental authorities must clearly and publicly commit themselves to elections that are democratic, including establishing an environment conducive to open and free political competition. Elections, as NDI has found consistently from its experiences around the world, are not simply a technical process. Elections are part of a political process that to be successful requires public confidence. Sound electoral laws and procedures are necessary but alone are not enough. The public, including the political contestants, must believe that the electoral authorities are free from intimidation and the perception of partisanship.

   In a situation as in Cambodia's, where there is no tradition of genuine elections and where violent political conflict has been the norm, confidence in the process is all the more important. Particularly in highly polarized political environments, it is important for the government and the electoral authorities to take action beyond minimum administrative measures to create expectations that fairness will prevail.

   If Cambodians are unwilling to create an independent election commission and, instead, rely on the Interior Ministry to administer elections, extraordinary steps will be required to demonstrate openness and impartiality. Such steps could include political party, civic and international adjuncts to the Ministry. These nonvoting members could be allowed to attend all meetings, advise election administrators and raise issues of concern.

6. The signatories of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements have a special obligation to ensure that the basic purposes of the accords are fulfilled. These purposes, as expressly stated in the Agreements, are ". . . to promote national reconciliation, and to ensure the right to self-determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair elections . . . ." Both goals are in jeopardy. Several of the signatories of the Paris Agreements, such as Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, are also major donors. These countries have a multibillion dollar investment in the Cambodian peace process and have sufficient leverage to ensure that the reconciliation process and the transition to democracy remain on track. All 18 signatory countries of the Agreements could reconvene to assess the lack of progress since 1991. The upcoming ICORC donors' meeting should also reexamine the status of human rights and democracy in Cambodia and the performance of the Cambodian government. This group should then articulate specific expectations of the international community.

   During the past four years, the US and many other donor nations have exhibited strong support for democratization. More, however, needs to be done. In particular, the following initiatives should be considered.

   The international community must work to break the political impasse that plagues the ruling coalition. There is no effective informal agreement between the two parties as to the "rules of the game." In addition, institutions -- such as an independent judiciary -- needed to implement and enforce the formal rules are missing or undeveloped. The problem is not that the situation has deteriorated; rather it has failed to substantially progress beyond the situation that prevailed in May 1993. Consequently, what is needed is a renewed commitment to peacefully and lawfully resolve political conflicts between the coalition members, establish a "level playing field" for the upcoming constitutionally required national elections and ensure that human rights are protected continuously, not just during the election period.

   The US, as the most influential donor, should take the lead in organizing the other principal international donors in forging a new agreement among the parties as to how power is to be shared until the upcoming national elections. This should include an agreement that the parties jointly control the disposition of all military forces, perhaps -- with the agreement of the parties -- under international supervision. A procedure could be adopted, for instance, requiring that FUNCINPEC and CPP commanders jointly approve any order to mobilize or deploy forces. Within Phnom Penh and the provincial capitals, troops and weapons should be cantoned and the disposition of forces should be closely monitored. The parties should also agree to establish the constitutionally required mechanisms (the Constitutional Council, Supreme Council of Magistracy), or alternative institutions acceptable to the Cambodian people, for resolving disputes.

   The international community should clearly state its benchmarks for what constitutes a free and fair election. The Cambodian government should be asked to prepare a timetable for the completion of various election-related tasks and regularly report to the donors on the progress made. While the political parties had tentatively agreed on November 1998 as a date for a national election, no date has formally been announced, and it is unclear whether agreement on election-related issues has been reached.

   Since the political leadership is responsible for the delay, representatives of the donors should address their concerns directly to the CO-prime minsters. Meetings are now taking place between the donors and members of the election law drafting committee of the Interior Ministry and other Ministry officials. The Cambodian officials who attend the meetings held under the auspices of the UNDP, however, are technocrats who lack authority to make fundamental political and policy decisions.

   If the government is unwilling or unable to provide a reasonable level of security for all candidates and parties, or otherwise make timely preparations for a free and fair election, the international donors should withdraw their offers of election-related support to the government (but not to NGOs) and re-channel their democracy-related assistance.

   These efforts could be reinforced by sending high-level delegations, including, for example, multinational assessment missions organized by institutes such as NDI, to review developments, meet with the nation's highest officials and issue status reports on the progress being made. Special efforts should be made to obtain agreement from the party leaders to respect the results of an election that domestic monitoring groups and international observers consider to be acceptable under international standards.

   The international community, with US support, should offer to provide a substantial international observer program to monitor the entire election period, for both national and communal elections. Observer teams should be assigned to each of the provinces and be present to observe the election process from registration to the counting of the ballots.

   The international observers should work in conjunction with the two domestic observer organizations, COMFREL and COFFEL. These election observer coalitions should be ensured adequate funding to fully perform their monitoring tasks.

   Cambodia's constitution requires that, following national elections, the new government must receive a two-thirds vote of confidence by the National Assembly. Thus, it is likely that the new government that is formed will include the participation of opposition parties. It is especially important that international observers remain in Cambodia after the election to closely monitor whatever negotiations take place. The parties should be strongly discouraged from negotiating agreements that effectively nullify the results of the poll.

   Donor assistance to the Cambodian government for further democracy and governance should be contingent on its progress in meeting well-defined goals. If this form of external pressure is to be effective, it should identify specific requirements (e.g., the adoption of a legal framework for the election), timetables and benchmarks for meeting the goals. Some appropriate benchmarks for government action could include:

   • enacting a party registration law allowing all parties meeting reasonable, objective standards, including the KNP, to be recognized and to compete freely and fairly in the electoral process;

   • adopting measures to ensure that the development of an electoral framework will be transparent at every level (e.g., when under consideration by the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly) and that the public has the opportunity to participate in the process;

   • formulating a plan to provide effective security measures for candidates, party workers and voters and ensuring that the armed forces and police are neutral; and

   • developing a plan that guarantees that all candidates and parties have fair access to government-owned media during the campaign period.

   Conditionality is most likely to succeed if it is linked to standards established by Cambodians themselves. Cambodians have called for all of the benchmarks identified above, and the benchmarks already articulated in existing or draft laws.

   All democracy assistance would not necessarily be withdrawn if the goals are not met. There could be a range of sanctions imposed. For example, new aid could be held in abeyance, existing assistance could be postponed or rescheduled, aid levels could be reduced or assistance could be rechanneled (for instance, from the government to domestic or international NGOs). Other measures, such as diplomatic pressure, and the concomitant fear of diplomatic isolation, as well as incentives -- such as commitments to increase aid levels -- might also be effective.

   External pressure for democratization could backfire. If not properly framed, it could, for example, hurt the general population. It could also strengthen the hand of those opposed to democracy. Two factors, however, suggest that conditionality would be effective in Cambodia. First, the government relies on international assistance to perform its routine functions. As mentioned earlier, approximately 50 percent of the government's budget is donor financed. Second, conditionality is most effective where there are internal divisions within the government, with one or more faction favoring reform. In these circumstances, external pressure can tip the balance in favor of reform. In Cambodia, such factions exist within both parties of the ruling coalition, and support for reform can also be found in the opposition parties.

   The democracy assistance that presently has promise for producing results is support for civic organizations' engagement in the political process. NGOs need to be further strengthened so that they can better monitor governmental performance and develop domestic constituencies for reform. The human rights NGOs, which monitor abuses nationwide, are conducting civic education programs and plan to observe the upcoming communal and national elections. Their efforts are impeded by security concerns, especially in the outlying provinces, and an inadequate institutional infrastructure. These organizations, for example, lack basic communication equipment, such as mobile telephones, and means of transportation. As a result, provincial offices are able to communicate with Phnom Penh only sporadically and are unable to reach the outlying districts within the provinces. They need technical advice and assistance to improve their institutional capacity, strengthen their advocacy efforts and enhance all of their activities. New structures, such as coalitions and nationwide NGO associations, might also provide these organizations with added security. Such umbrella organizations have the ability to shield individuals and particular organizations from government retaliation.

   Several steps can be taken to strengthen the capacity of political parties to perform their roles in democratic governance. These include:

   • developing a legal framework, including a party registration law and legislation on media access, ensuring that the parties can organize and compete fairly;

   • enhancing democratic procedures within the parties and improving the ability of some parties to expand their base of support so that they can operate on a truly nationwide basis;

   • severing the connection between the political parties and their military factions and ensuring that the military operates subject to law and civilian control; and

   • linking Cambodia's political parties to democratic international organizations, such as the large, transnational groupings of political parties (the Socialist International, Christian Democratic International, Liberal International and International Democrat Union) and strengthening the parties' ties with other democratic Asian parties through programs organized by international organizations such as NDI.

   Rule of law programs are also critical. The problem of impunity is pervasive. Politically motivated crimes remain unpunished, and Cambodian law itself prohibits the prosecution of high-ranking civil servants without prior Ministry approval (Article 51 of the Civil Service law). Programs that strengthen the independence of the judiciary are critical to other aspects of democratization. New electoral laws, legislation protecting free expression and the right of assembly, and other human rights guarantees will be of little avail if they are not effectively enforced.

   Areas that are currently not being adequately addressed are: (1) corruption within the judiciary and other law enforcement institutions; and (2) developing internal mechanisms within the military and police to ensure their nonpartisanship and decrease human rights abuses. Such internal mechanisms might include review boards, which could include civilians, to examine human rights complaints.

Conclusion

The Cambodian government and international community must continue to work for full implementation of the letter and spirit of the Paris Peace Accords. More specifically, the Cambodia's political leaders must clearly commit themselves to genuine democratization, the rule of law and a transparent, participatory political environment in the run-up to the 1998 elections. The international community, in turn, must insist that these commitments be fulfilled and must also establish clear benchmarks by which progress can be measured. Outside efforts to support NGO activity and the development of civil society must also continue. Only meaningful democracy, including leaders accountable to law and a population with a sense of personal security, will allow Cambodia to begin its recovery from a catastrophic past.