
**PRE-ELECTION SURVEY MISSION
TO ESTONIA**

September 7-11, 1992

**NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**



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PREFACE

This pre-election report prepared under the auspices of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is designed to assist international observers who will be in Estonia for the September 20, 1992 elections. The report describes the election system and procedures that will be used on September 20 and also discusses various issues that have emerged regarding the Estonian transition process.

The report is based on the work of NDI in Estonia since October 1991, and particularly on the findings of an international delegation that visited Estonia from September 7-11, 1992. The September delegation included:

- * SHLOMO AVINERI, professor of Political Science at Hebrew University; former Director-General of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; participant in NDI-sponsored international observer delegations to the 1990 Hungarian and Czechoslovak elections; and an author of many books and articles, including several relating to the issue of nationalities in the former Soviet Union;
- * MARY COUGHLAN, a member of parliament in the Republic of Ireland since 1987, representing Fianna Fail (The Republican Party);
- * LARRY GARBER, NDI Senior Associate for Electoral Processes, the author of *Guidelines for International Election Observing* (1984) and co-editor of *The New Democratic Frontier: A Country-by-Country Review of Elections in Central and Eastern Europe* (1992); and
- * DMITRI IVANOV, a journalist, civic leader and vice-president of the Bulgarian Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights (BAFECCR).

Accompanying the delegation were NDI staff: Gerald Mitchell, Kathryn Stevens, and Megan McLean. On two previous visits to Estonia in April and June 1992, Mitchell laid the groundwork for the September pre-election mission. Also assisting NDI in organizing the delegation was Eva Tarm, an Estonian journalist.

The delegation assumed the following tasks: 1) to review the administrative preparations for the elections and to identify any potential administrative impediments to the conduct of free and fair elections; 2) to evaluate political conditions in Estonia and particularly the extent to which all political groups are extended an opportunity to participate effectively in the elections; 3) to evaluate procedures for Estonians living abroad to vote; 4) to consider the opinions of residents in Estonia who are non-citizens, and therefore, do not have the opportunity to participate in the electoral process; and 5) to identify opportunities for post-election political development and civic education programs.

During its visit to Estonia, the delegation met in Tallinn, Narva and Tartu with central government officials, municipal and election officials, political party leaders, civic activists and media representatives. On Friday, September 11, NDI hosted a roundtable discussion, at which members of the delegation offered their preliminary impressions of the Estonian transition

process and also discussed specific issues relevant to the monitoring of the elections by Estonian political parties and the reporting of the election results by the Estonian media.

I. OVERVIEW

On September 20, 1992, Estonia will hold its post-independence elections. Those who are citizens and properly registered to vote will elect 101 members of a new National Assembly (the Riigikogu). This single chamber body will replace the traditional Supreme Council, whose members were elected to form a transitional government in March 1990. The voters will also choose among four candidates for the office of president. Should no single candidate win the majority on the first ballot, the newly elected parliament will decide among the two candidates who won the most votes. These elections are important because they are the first to be held in any of the countries that have either regained their independence following fifty years of Soviet domination or become new states following the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Estonia has succeeded in accomplishing a peaceful transition to independence after 50 years of foreign occupation. The fact that there has been no violence during this transition serves as a testament to the wisdom and courage of all Estonian parties and groups concerned. While the story has been different in other East European countries and other republics of the former Soviet Union, Estonians have shared a fundamental consensus on avoiding violence.

When considering post-communist societies that have the greatest chance for a smooth transition to a pluralistic and open society, one must consider the pre-communist history of the country concerned, and identify those that have exhibited democratic, tolerant, and pluralistic instincts in the past. Estonia has had a tradition of pluralism during the period of independence that lasted from 1918 to 1940.

Estonia has conducted a full debate on the drafting of the new constitution, and despite deep disagreements, has drafted a constitution that protects human rights and establishes a pluralistic and competitive political system. The parties contending for seats in the new parliament are in agreement that the election preparations are being conducted in a manner satisfactory to all parties.

However, in the post-election period, elected officials will have to contend with contentious issues, even though there is the general perception that some of these problems have already been solved. The delegation would like to identify these issues, while recognizing that there are no immediate and easy solutions.

A. Citizenship

The delegation met with Estonian political parties and coalitions, as well as representatives of the Russian-speaking community to review the citizenship issue, which will be the most urgent and problematic situation that will face the newly elected parliament. The

delegation is aware of the point that the constitutional continuity of Estonia's pre-Soviet republic should be respected, and the difficulty in coming to terms with the legacy of a half century of Soviet occupation. But at issue is not just a historical/legal debate, but the political and social rights of the Russian-speaking minority who comprise 40 percent of the population, and many of whom themselves were victims of history.

The delegation recognizes that many Estonians view this community as colonizers, and is aware of the debate over whether human rights translates into civil and political rights for this community. Although some Estonians believe the issue of citizenship has been properly addressed in constitutional and legal terms, this issue is certain to remain central to post-election Estonian society, and important for Estonian-Russian relations.

Specific regulations governing the language requirement for citizenship have not yet been decided. The delegation is also aware that the Russian-speaking community is worried about more restrictive changes to the citizenship law, and economic and social rights linked to political rights. The delegation believes that the existence of a large body of residents without citizenship will remain a political problem for Estonia for some time to come.

Therefore, it is in the interests of all residents of Estonia, citizens and non-citizens alike, that a compromise be reached. This is a deep problem at the human level, and one that runs deeper than purely legal and constitutional questions. The delegation is aware that some Western governments will look carefully at how Estonians deal with this sensitive issue. (Note: for a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Appendix I, a statement prepared by Shlomo Avineri.)

B. Political Parties

The current coalition and party system is still in a fluid stage, and party alignments and internal party regulations have not yet been institutionalized. In order for Estonia's political parties to support a functioning democracy after the initial stages of the transition, they should institutionalize clear rules regulating internal party decision-making and structures.

The establishment of democratic party rules and procedure is the most effective way to combat the fear and suspicion of political parties. This is especially true for people in post-Soviet societies who have lived in fear of the omnipresent Communist Party. Political parties will best serve themselves and their constituents with well-articulated positions on their political programs and ideology.

In the present election campaign no procedures have been promulgated that govern party financing or financial disclosure. The present campaign is rife with accusations that right-wing parties are being heavily funded by Western Estonian emigre communities, while the left wing is accused of being funded by the *nomenklatura* and old factory managers. The issue of establishing financial disclosure rules for future election campaigns should be addressed, as these types of charges and counter charges are not healthy for a nascent democracy.

C. Emergence of Independent Media

The delegation was satisfied that the electronic media has given fair access to all parties and candidates in the election campaign. However, this balanced coverage is largely due to the responsible conduct of the directors of Estonian television, who in lieu of a political agreement governing media access, determined a fair schedule to media access for large and small parties and independent candidates. The establishment of a larger number of channels would of course enable the media as a whole to provide a more thorough coverage of the campaigns.

It is also desirable that more newspapers, independent of control by government or other groups, be established. The delegation was not convinced of the present viability of the print media in Estonia, and the further development of a self-financing, responsible press, could only further strengthen Estonia's transition to democracy. However, the delegation realizes that this may not be realistic at this stage in Estonia's transition, and this could be a longer term goal for Estonian democracy.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ESTONIA

A. Historical Background

Excepting the interwar period of 1918 to 1940, Estonia has been controlled by various foreign powers since the 13th century. Throughout this period, despite the fact that Estonia passed into the hands of different states, Estonia had always been administered by a ruling German elite. However, from the second half of the 16th century until the first half of the 18th century, Estonia was a territorial possession of Sweden.

Sweden eventually lost Estonia to Russia, which maintained control over Estonia from 1710 to 1918. Russia formally controlled Estonia during the 19th century when Europe witnessed the awakening of nationalism; however, the German ruling class played a strong counterbalance to Russian influence. The prominent Estonian writer, Jan Kross, feels that the struggle for influence between Russia and Germany actually allowed for a protective cover under which Estonians were able to preserve their own identity.

In sum, the Estonian people have emerged from a patchwork of influences as a non-Slavic people with long political, economic and cultural ties to the West. In 1918, Estonia became independent until 1939 when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact resulted in Soviet domination.

In 1940, Estonia was illegally annexed by the Soviet Union. Estonia lost 20% of its population at this time through deportations and executions. The Soviet Union sought to permanently link the individual republics, and secure Russian dominance in the Union by exporting Russian workers to support the newly established military-industrial complexes in other republics. In the case of Estonia five million people were rotated in during the occupation from other areas of the Soviet Union to support industries.

This was more than just a demographic shock to Estonia, as newly arriving Russians formed a new ruling elite, and were given preference in housing (only 20% of new housing went to Estonians), and in employment. Russian became the dominant language, and all Estonian school children were required to learn Russian. The Russian speaking population, on the other hand, were given little incentive to learn the Estonian language and adopt its culture.

Although 4.5 million of these workers returned to their native regions, roughly 500,000 remain to make up the bulk of today's existing non-Estonian population. Whereas Estonia had only a 10% non-Estonian population prior to 1940, today that figure is 40%. To complicate further today's situation, Estonia's industrial base is situated in northeast Estonia which is heavily populated by the Russian speaking community, and thus industry is predominantly manned by non-Estonians. Sixty percent of Estonia's energy supplies come from this region.

B. Political Developments in Estonia 1990-1992

In March 1990, in response to calls for free elections, Estonia held its first multiparty, competitive parliamentary elections since 1940. In relatively free and open elections, Estonia chose a parliament with non-communist, pro-independence majorities. However, following the vote on September 20, Estonia's 105-member Supreme Council will cease to exist. It will be replaced by a new National Assembly, the Riigikogu.

The Supreme Council was considered by many Estonians to be a legacy from the communist past. To many Estonians last years elections for this Council could not be considered valid since they were held under the voting system of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, which among other anomalies allowed for 30,000 Soviet troops to cast their ballots.

Although most members of the Supreme Council agreed on the need to establish Estonia's independence, there was a divergence in opinion on how to restore independence. The Popular Front, and early independence movement that has lately developed into one of the major coalitions in the upcoming elections, believed that Estonia should base its new independence on the foundations of the former Soviet Republic. This view was that it was possible to achieve change through the Supreme Council, and upon the foundation of the Estonian SSR. However, Pro-Patria and the Estonian National Independence Party, two other movements taking part in the upcoming elections wanted to base Estonia's new independence in historical continuity with the pre-Soviet republic, and refused to accept the Supreme Council as a vehicle for authentic change. The Moderates, another political coalition, tried to encourage cooperation between these two bodies of opinion.

The Estonian National Independence Party refused to participate in the 1990 elections, and organized private elections to a parallel Congress of Estonia. Only citizens of Estonia in 1940 and their descendants could cast ballots for this body. The establishment of the Congress of Estonia cast a shadow on the legitimacy of the Supreme Council, and its influence was sufficient to convince the Supreme Council to agree to grant the Congress equal representation on the 40-member committee drafting the new Estonian constitution. However, the 1990 election for the Supreme Council largely marked the end of Estonia's struggle to remove old-line communists from power. The present election campaign, however, has not been free of the

communist legacy. The *nomenklatura* continues its struggle to preserve its political and economic power, as evidenced by their earlier efforts to delay the election.

In March 1990, the Estonian parliament voted to declare Soviet law invalid in Estonia and declared a period of transition from Soviet control to independence. Although this was not as dramatic as Lithuania's declaration of independence earlier in the month, Estonia viewed its declaration as essentially as a restoration of the pre-1940 republic. Following the harsh Soviet repression of political activists in Latvia and Lithuania in early 1991, on March 4, 1991, a referendum was held in which 78 percent of Estonians voted to support a declaration of independence.

On August 20, 1991, immediately following the Soviet coup attempt, the Supreme Council declared Estonia's full and immediate independence from the Soviet Union. The government quickly moved to limit the Communist Party and seized its property, arresting those who had supported the Soviet coup. Negotiations began with Soviet officials about removal of Soviet forces.

The failure of the August 1991 coup and the subsequent international recognition of Estonia's independence marked a turning point in the democratization process. Since then, Estonia and the other Baltic states have had to grapple with the difficult transition to democracy as they shed the totalitarian structures of the past and work to build and sustain new civil societies and democratic institutions.

Estonia is having difficulty defining the criteria necessary for Estonian citizenship. The new ethnic diversity of Estonia, a situation shared with Latvia in particular, has complicated the independence question. Of Estonia's 1.5 million residents, 60 percent are ethnic Estonian and approximately 40 percent are non-Estonian (Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian).

During the secession debate, Moscow attempted to generate opposition to Estonian independence among the ethnic Russian population. They warned the Russians that a future of minority oppression would await them if the Baltic states were to secede. However, one-third of the Russian speaking community voted in support of Estonian independence in the March 1991 referendum.

On June 28, 1992, Estonia held a constitutional referendum in which Estonian voters were asked whether to allow individuals who had submitted applications for Estonian citizenship by June 5, to vote in the September 20 elections. This measure was narrowly defeated, with 54 percent of Estonians voting against it. However, it is believed that many Estonians misunderstood the ballot question as designed by the Supreme Council, and thought that they were being asked if the Russian speaking community should be given citizenship, not voting rights. Given the fact that only 5,000 ethnic Russians had submitted applications by the cut-off date, the vote has a greater symbolic rather than practical effect, as while it would have applied to a rather insignificant proportion of the population, it would have indicated a willingness on the part of the Estonian citizens to accept the Russians as full members in Estonian society. Out of the total population of 1.5 million residents (Estonians and non-citizens), only 650,000-700,000 will be eligible to vote on September 20.

In Estonia's first year of independence, laws governing elections, citizenship, and a new constitution have been approved. Estonia has also had to contend with the transition to a market economy and a drastically altered relationship to the emerging economic structures in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and in the international marketplace. The transitional government has had to contend as well with building new security arrangements, including the formation of defense and police forces and a redefinition of civil-military relations -- all within the context of a continued, sizeable Russian military presence.

Under the present system, the Republic of Estonia government is the state body with executive powers. The prime minister is nominated by the Supreme Council. The prime minister presents ministerial candidates to the Supreme Council for approval. The government comprises a prime minister and 21 ministers. There are 19 ministries; two members of the government are ministers without portfolio. In order to handle functions within the state authority, but that are outside the power of the various ministries, appropriate departments have been formed.

On January 23, 1992, Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar, who had led the government since the March 1990 elections that put the Popular Front in power, resigned due to the parliament's refusal to give him special powers to cope with Estonia's deteriorating economic situation. He was replaced by Tiit Vahi, who had served as transportation minister under Savisaar as well as under the previous communist government. At that point, four Soviet military officers who had voting rights in the Supreme Council, and who supported Savisaar, were removed as sitting members of the Supreme Council.

Estonian moderates and radicals alike have pressed hard for holding new elections as soon as possible. The upcoming elections were felt by many to have been delayed by presently privileged *nomenklatura* who feared they would not get reelected to the parliament and thus wanted to preserve their privileges of office for as long as possible. In particular, the Estonian Congress, supported by the hard-line independence movement, rejects the legitimacy of the power of former communist officials such as Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Council, and has insisted on early elections.

III. POLITICAL ACTORS

The last day for registering candidates was August 6. At this point, four major election coalitions have been established, plus a number of minor ones. A few political parties will run separately. No single party is expected to obtain a majority in parliament. In addition, four presidential candidates have been announced. In order to qualify to run for the presidency, a prospective candidate had to obtain the signatures of at least 10,000 citizens by August 11.

Former Communist Party members or KGB informers are ineligible to hold a political office in Estonia. The election committee has decided to enforce this decree by providing that candidates for public office must sign an oath saying that they had no such connections. This is deemed by many to be an insufficient mechanism to disqualify any former KGB or party

officials who wish to seek office, as the language is vague and will do little to deter those who seek to maintain their positions.

A. The Four Major Coalitions

1. *Pro-Patria (Fatherland)*

The head of the coalition's council is 32-year-old Mart Laar. The presidential candidate is 62 year-old Lennart Meri. Meri was previously the Estonian foreign minister, and has most recently served as ambassador to Finland. The coalition comprises: the Christian Democratic Party (chairman Aivar Kala), Christian Democratic Union (chairman Illar Hallaste), Republican Coalition Party (chairman Matti Pats), Liberal-Democratic Party (chairman Paul - Eerik Rummo), and the Conservative People's Party.

As evidenced by its name, this coalition has a strong nationalist sentiment. Pro-Patria advocates a free market economy, supporting rapid privatization. It includes many young politicians, not yet well-known by the general public, and appeals more to better educated voters. The most active coalition, it has built up a strong election campaign and fielded a list of 101 candidates. Their slate includes 88 men, 13 women, and several students. The average age of the candidates is 40 years. Ten are members of the Supreme Council and several hold high level government positions, particularly in the ministry for foreign affairs.

2. *Moderates*

The chairman of the coalition is Liia Hanni (Rural Center Party), born in 1946, and a deputy in the Supreme Council. The coalition comprises the Social-Democratic Party (chairman Marju Lauristin), and the Rural Center Party (chairman Ivar Raig).

The Moderates espouse traditional social democratic and liberal values, and see their program as a compromise between the individual and society. The Moderates advocate strong support for a market economy, with the state taking responsibility for regulating social policies. The moderates believe in privatization through vouchers, and want a wide participation of the population in ownership. Vouchers would be distributed depending on the number of years an individual has worked.

The Coalitions' election list includes 49 candidates -- 38 men and 11 women. Approximately 25 percent of them are nationally well-known, including seven members of the Supreme Council. Three are university students. Their average age is 45 years, with the oldest being Estonia's most celebrated writer, Jan Kross. The moderates have financed their campaign with funds from their fellow Social Democratic parties in Western Europe, and from economic entities in Estonia such as the Farmers' Central Union. They have no presidential candidate of their own, but support Lennart Meri (Pro-Patria) for the presidency.

3. *Secure Home*

Election coalition chairman Heido Vitsur, an economist and former Minister of Economics, was born in 1944. The presidential candidate is Arnold Ruutel, born in 1928. The coalition parties include the Coalition Party (chairman Peeter Lorents), the Rural Union (chairman Arvo Sirendi), and the Pensioners Association (chairman Endel Eero.)

This coalition could be described as a grouping of state technocrats, who believe they are best qualified to tackle the problems facing Estonia. Secure Home makes a distinction between Communist Party nomenklatura, with which they claim not to identify, and the economic/managerial nomenklatura which make up their coalition's membership. They believe in an economic program of foreign investment and a voucher program.

The Secure Home list has fielded 73 candidates, 70 men and three women, whose average age is 49 years. Only seven candidates are under age 35. There are 29 who hold senior management positions in state and private enterprises in addition to several cabinet members and six Supreme Council members. One of the last to announce its slate, the Secure Home coalition has run a low-profile campaign. Their funding comes from traditional state-owned businesses.

4. *The Popular Front*

The coalition leader, Edgar Savisaar (born in 1950), is the former prime minister. The presidential candidate is Estonian-Canadian, Rein Taagepera, born in 1933. Taagepera was a prominent advisor in the election law debate. Coalition parties: People's Center Party (chairman Edgar Savisaar), Popular Front (chairman Heinz Valk), Women's League (chairman Krista Kilvet), Association of Nationalities (chairman Hagi Shein).

The Popular Front is a very different coalition today than the Popular Front movement that pushed for Estonian independence. The Popular Front movement was originally established to act as an umbrella organization that united many groups working for independence. Once independence was achieved, members had different agendas, and in order to pursue them formed separate parties.

Leaders of the Popular Front feel they are the most moderate and realistic in dealing with the problem of the Russian speaking minority. They believe in reintegrating this community through citizenship and a language requirement. The Popular Front also advocates privatization and foreign investment, but is concerned that former communists/nomenklatura will end up with the economic power in the country.

There are 90 men and 15 women, with an average age of 46 years, on the Popular Front's candidate list. Senior and mid-level managers are on the list as well as many teachers and doctors. The slate also includes many mid-level bureaucrats from the Estonian SSR and Republic of Estonia ministries, 13 Supreme Council members and former Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar. Funding for the Popular Front's campaign comes from Savisaar's Center Fund, which Savisaar reportedly pooled together when he was prime minister.

In addition to the four coalitions, one independent party, *The Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP)*, has gained substantial support. Founded in 1987 by the underground opposition, the ERSP boycotted the last Soviet style elections, which were held in 1990, and therefore has no representation in the Estonian Supreme Council. The ERSP is the dominant force in the Congress of Estonia, the unofficially elected representative body.

The Party believes in a modern national state, since Estonia was on the verge of losing its cultural identity after 50 years of Soviet occupation. The ERSP advocates in agricultural reform, privatization of state property, and the restoration of land and property to their pre-1940 owners. The ERSP feels that Estonia must be strongly bound to the economy of Western Europe. The ERSP would like to remove from power the *nomenklatura* and the present leadership of the country through these elections.

The chairman of the party, Lagle Parek, was born in 1941. She is also running for the presidency. The ERSP election list includes 81 men and 16 women and 15 candidates under the age of 35. The ERSP list includes independent candidates and members of the clergy. ERSP has the most Estonians living abroad on its slate of candidates. Funding comes mostly from donations from the Estonian communities in the West.

B. Other Political Movements

Apart from the five large political movements described above, there are three other coalitions participating in the elections:

1. *Greens* - Coalition chairman Valdur Lahtvee. This coalition unites three green movements.
2. *Democrats* - Coalition chairman Miina Hint. She is also running for the presidency. This coalition unites the Democratic Union with four fairly unknown groups.
3. *Royalists* - Coalition chairman Kalle Kulbok. The Royalists seek to make Estonia a state monarchy, with Swedish royalty serving as the head of state.

Two more political parties are running separately:

1. *The Entrepreneurs Party* - (chairman Tiit Made)

2. ***The Communist Party*** - (chairman Enn-Arno Sillari).

So far, three more groups have announced they are taking part in the elections:

1. ***Citizens of Estonia*** - The chairman is Juri Toomepuu, an Estonian-American, who was a member of Restitution. This was a movement that opposed the constitutional referendum on the basis that the adoption of the new constitution would break legal continuity of the Estonian state.
2. ***Mercy*** - This a little-known group which in its election list presented some quite well known personalities who are not politicians.)
3. ***The Association for the Disabled*** - This group has also announced its participation in the elections.

The Estonian election coalitions have only been formed recently. Although it is difficult to analyze Estonian politics on a classical left-right spectrum (as in all post-communist countries), it is helpful to try to place the pre-coalition parties along the unclassical "post communist" political spectrum. On the far left is the Estonian Communist Party (which did not support independence), then the Russian Democratic Movement, the People's Center Party, the Rural Union, the Social Democratic Party, the Rural Center Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Coalition Party, Pro-Patria (an alliance of the two Christian Democratic Parties, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats and the New Republican Party), the Estonian National Independence Party, and the Royalist Party.

IV. NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE

The National Election Committee (NEC) is chaired by Eric Truuvali. Truuvali has met with NDI representatives before the June referendum and prior to the September 20 elections. One concern Truuvali had was registering all eligible voters in time for the elections. The number of registered voters, based on the number of people who voted in June referendum, was 680,000. However, it is expected that the number of eligible voters could exceed this figure by some 70,000. Truuvali explained that there was a concerted effort underway to get as many of those eligible voters registered in time to vote. However, this is an issue that election observers would be advised to follow up on.

Truuvali explained the process for proving citizenship. The citizenship process has been based on the applicants own documents or oral data. The main criteria is for one to have lived in Estonia prior to June 30, 1940, or for the applicant's parents or grandparents to have done so. The applicant can produce documents or affidavits, and can give oral data, which then requires the applicants signature. The applicant can be taken to court if their testimony is proven false.

One issue that proved to be a problem during the June 28 referendum is that non-Estonian women married to Estonian men do have the right to vote. During the voting on the

referendum, many of these women who were eligible to vote were turned away from their polling place. The NEC says that this problem has been solved, but members of the delegation did hear ongoing reports of non-Estonian women married to Estonian men who were having problems in attempting to register to vote. It should be noted that non-Estonian men married to Estonian women are not eligible for immediate citizenship.

The National Election Committee held two seminars to explain the complicated voting system to the media. The NEC has also conducted training sessions for officials on the local election committees. For several days prior to the elections, the NEC has aired a 10-minute voter education program every evening on Estonian television. However, the NEC, as well as many of the parties, are concerned that voters may not understand the implications of voting for an individual candidate in what is essentially a proportional system.

Twenty three percent of Estonia's registered voters who qualify under the new citizenship law are from the Russian-speaking community. In voting districts with Russian-speaking populations, all notices will be posted in Russian as well as Estonian, although the ballots will be printed only in Estonian.

It is estimated that up to 10 percent of eligible voters are emigre Estonians who are eligible to vote overseas in Estonian Embassies and Consulates. However, given the fact that less than 10,000 Estonian emigres voted in the June 28 referendum, it is predicted that only 10,000-15,000 will vote in the upcoming election. The results of absentee emigre votes will be included in the district of Estonia where the family lived before emigration.

Among the expatriate Estonian communities, the largest are in Canada, Sweden, Russia, the United States, and Australia. Those people who could provide the proper documentation to prove their Estonian citizenship will be allowed to vote. In Sweden, many centers have been established for Estonians resident in Sweden to vote, and in the United States 30 centers have been established.

Those Estonians who live across the northeast border at Narva and across the southeast border at Petseri live in territories still claimed by Estonia. Estonians who live in those districts will be able to come across the border and vote in the district immediately adjoining the border. Apparently this was also the case in the June referendum, when many Estonians were stopped at the border by Russian border guards and not allowed to cross. Those Estonians who live in other parts of Russia must go to vote at the Estonian Embassy in Moscow.

Some Estonian emigres will choose to return to Estonia and vote in person. There will be one polling place in each district for those Estonians who wish to return from abroad to vote.

V. MEDIA

There are no official written regulations on access to the media during the election campaign. Nevertheless, Estonian television has acted in a responsible manner by devising their own media access rules. Eight discussion/debates were organized lasting one hour and 30

minutes each. Large parties or coalitions could participate in all of these broadcasts, while smaller parties could take part in two to four debates depending on the number of candidates on their lists. In addition, candidates from larger parties have had five minutes each to introduce themselves, while independent candidates have had three minutes. Parties can also buy air time, with the restrictions that only one ad a day can be purchased with 75 seconds allocated to party ads and one minute for presidential candidate ads.

Although the state still controls Estonia's one T.V. channel, independent, commercial radio stations do exist. Early fears that psychological pressure that could not be countered by fair access to the media might be applied to voters seem not to have been realized.

VI. ELECTION FRAMEWORK

A. Background: Prior Estonian Experience

The election system in the inter-war period was a proportional system, but with weak party participation. In 1934, a nationalist movement caused an uprising that did not succeed, but which resulted in a more authoritarian government as President Constantine Pats took more power to deal with the crisis.

Elections to the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic were for the most part showcase elections. Candidates were chosen for election by the Communist Party hierarchy. Voters received a ballot with one name. The Communist Party candidate always won 99.9 percent of the vote.

B. Current Election System

The legal framework governing the September 20 elections is characterized by several unique aspects. Public pressure, a desire to encourage a high turnout among eligible voters and a willingness to experiment explain the choices of those responsible for devising the system. Because the system is uncommon, the consequences of the choices made on the election outcomes are difficult to anticipate, particularly since electoral engineering in a transition situation is not a precise science.

Estonia's new constitution provides for a 101-member single chamber parliament -- the Riigikogu -- and an indirectly elected president. However, for this election only, it was agreed that the president would be directly elected. Consequently, the public and the media appear more interested in the presidential election than the legislative elections, despite the fact that the president's powers under the constitution will be quite limited.

To be elected president on September 20, a candidate must obtain more than 50 percent of the popular vote. If no candidate receives the requisite percentage, the new legislature will elect the new president from among the two candidates receiving the largest number of popular votes. With four candidates contesting the election, many Estonians expect that the legislature will decide the matter.

The 101 legislators are elected using a complicated form of proportional representation, based loosely on the Finnish model. The country is divided into 12 electoral districts, ranging in size from 24 seats for the capital city of Tallinn to five seats for Ida-Viruuna and the industrial towns of the northeast. Political parties and coalitions submit lists at the district and national levels, and provision also is made for independents to contest elections at the district level.

The number of seats is accorded as follows: Tallinn, 24 seats; the districts of Harju and Rapla, 10; the islands off the western coast 8; Ida-Virumaa and the industrial towns of the Northeast 5; Laane-Virumaa and Jarva, 8; Jogeva and Viljandi districts, 11; Tartu and the surrounding district, 13; Polva, Valga and the Voru districts in the South, 11 and Parnu together with the surrounding district, 9 seats.

Voters mark the ballot by writing on the ballot a number corresponding to a particular candidate. The candidate may be competing as an individual or on a party list. Following the elections, the votes are counted at the polling site. The record of the vote tally is then taken to the electoral district, where the results are cumulated.

The first allocation of seats is determined by dividing the total number of seats in a district by the total number of votes cast. The coefficient is the quota for the district. Any candidate, including independents, whose vote total surpasses the quota is automatically elected.

The second allocation of seats is determined on a party basis. The quota is the same as above and parties are awarded seats based on the number of times their vote totals (i.e. the sum of votes cast for all candidates competing on the same party list) exceed the district quota, less those seats already awarded to individual candidates based on the first allocation. Party lists are reordered in accordance with voter preferences for the purpose of assigning seats to individual candidates.

A third allocation occurs at the national level, involving the distribution of seats not already allocated at the district level. Only parties that obtain more than 5 percent of the total national vote or have won at least three seats at the district level may be awarded seats at the national level. The d'Hondt method is used for allocating the national seats based on a cumulation of the remainder votes obtained by each party at the district level. The list at the national level is pre-determined by each party, except to the extent that individuals who are listed have already been awarded seats at the district level.

The rationales for adopting this system were several. There was interest in maintaining the tradition of casting ballots for individual candidate rather than closed party lists. At the same time, there was a desire to move away from majority-oriented single-member constituencies and to adopt a more European type election system based on proportional representation. In addition, the use of regional lists and thresholds at the national level was designed to encourage party coalitions and to prevent small splinter parties from being elected to the legislature.

The goal of promoting coalitions seems to have been achieved. As described earlier in this report, there are four major coalitions contesting the elections, cumulatively comprising 14 parties and associations.

The relative importance of the national and district lists is unclear. One group of Estonian analysts has predicted that 58 of the 101 seats would be distributed at the national level. Given the novelty of the election system and the lack of relevant Estonian election history, however, this prediction seems quite speculative.

The actual effect of this election system on the apportionment of seats among parties in the legislature also is a matter of conjecture. Nonetheless, several parties have criticized the system, believing that it will favor particular parties.

Leaders of some parties, for example, expressed the concern that the system will benefit parties presenting one or two well-regarded individual candidates but are otherwise not very popular. Voters will cast their ballots for the popular individuals, which will result in the vote totals for these candidates far exceeding the district quotas. Their votes in excess of the district quota will then elect other candidates on the party list.

While this scenario is certainly possible, it is by no means inevitable. Voters often prove more sophisticated and more willing to vote strategically than political party leaders assume. Moreover, virtually all the political parties have been emphasizing the strengths of individual personalities rather than party platforms, suggesting to voters that they should cast their ballots for a preferred candidate. Nonetheless, some parties have sought to blame the election commission for failing to explain the precise operation and implication of the election system to voters.

C. Nominating Candidates and Registering Voters

Several aspects of the law governing the nomination of candidates are worth noting. First, individuals must be nominated on a district list before they can be placed on a national list. Second, a designated candidate may be affiliated only with a single party. Third, a candidate must provide proof that she or he has a sufficient command of the Estonian language. Fourth, to discourage nuisance candidacies, a deposit must be submitted for each candidate nominated; the deposit is refunded if the candidate received votes equalling one-half the district quota or if a party or coalition participates in the distribution of the national seats.

Seemingly, the most controversial provision affecting the nomination process is the requirement that candidates swear an oath to the effect that they have never been members of the Soviet Communist Party or informers for the KGB or other internal security units. Reportedly, no individual candidate has been challenged for submitting a fraudulent affirmation. This relative lack of concern with the past, at least as far as the campaign has developed to date, is attributed to the fact that many secret files are still unavailable. It remains to be seen whether this issue will reemerge following the elections, particularly if those parties most interested in implementing major personnel changes in government ministries are successful in the elections.

Estonian citizens (see section V for a discussion of the contentious citizenship issue in the context of these elections) were automatically included in voter registries prior to the referendum in June. Those individuals mistakenly excluded from the registries could present themselves on election day and, assuming the prospective voters eligibility was not challenged, would be entered in the registry and allowed to vote. Provisions also were made to ensure that Estonians living abroad could participate in the referendum by casting ballots at Estonian diplomatic missions.

The registration lists generated for the referendum will be used again for the September elections. Again, voters not included in the registries will be afforded the opportunity to register on election day. However, voters are restricted to voting in the polling station corresponding to their place of residence.

D. Balloting Procedures

A unique aspect of the Estonian election process is that balloting begins, in effect, 15 days prior to September 20. This procedure apparently is designed to allow voters temporarily outside their place of residence on election day to cast their ballots before the election. In practice, any voter who wants to vote before the official election day may do so simply by appearing at his or her assigned polling site commission, which have been in place and operational since September 6.

The use of the extended voting period should increase voter turnout. Nonetheless, some parties objected to this procedure, citing the expense involved in assigning personnel to administer the polling sites and the fact that some Estonians would be casting ballots before the campaign concluded. Ironically, parties expressed less concern that the extended voting period might lead to electoral fraud than might otherwise have been expected.

The procedure at the polling site works as follows. Upon being identified as a registered voter, an individual is given two ballots: one for president and one for the legislature. The ballots are stamped by the polling site officials. The voter is then directed to an enclosed booth, where he or she marks the ballots by writing the number corresponding to the chosen candidate in the appropriate space on the ballot. The names of the candidates, their party affiliations and their assigned numbers are all included on the ballots (see Appendix II).

The polls close at 8 p.m. on election night. The ballot boxes are opened and the ballots counted at the polling site. The number of votes received by each candidate is recorded on a tally form and the ballot boxes with the ballots are then transported to the district election committee, where the ballots are recounted and then tabulated. The totals are then sent to the National Election Committee, which announces the official results.

The election law explicitly provides that the counting of ballots is public. Several coalitions apparently will be working together to monitor the counting process, although the overall impression is that electoral fraud is not a major concern of most parties. The television and radio media will broadcast the results as they become available, but to date have declined

to organize an exit poll or a independent vote tabulation, which could project results with a high degree of accuracy prior to the release of the official results.

VII. CITIZENSHIP

Whereas the total non-Estonian population prior to 1940 was approximately 10%, today this figure is approximately 40%. The pre-1940 Russian population was about 6%, with other minority communities such as the Jewish, German, and Swedish communities making up the other 4%. These minority communities did have citizenship rights based on residency requirements, not on ethnicity.

As in the constitutional referendum in June, only legal citizens of Estonia are able to vote in the September 20 elections. Although this includes an estimated 10 percent non-ethnic Estonians who have citizenship from the pre-war republic, most of the 600,000 Russian-speaking people (themselves a legacy of the Kremlin's colonization policy) will not be voting. Non-citizens will have the franchise in local elections, but they cannot run as candidates.

This is a considerable disappointment for the Russian speaking community, especially those who chose to support the successful Estonian claim for independence in the March 1991 referendum. While most political groupings in Estonia envisage a gradual return of much of the Russian speaking community to Russia, many of whom supported Estonian independence, those remaining may be the ones that choose to make Estonia one more place where nationalism is the last refuge of communism.

In all of the non-Russian, former Soviet Republics, the status of the Russian minority is an issue. In many of the Republics, the Russian minority feels threatened by new national majorities that are imposing residency requirements or language proficiency tests on their former Russian comrades. This is an especially important issue in Estonia, where the native ethnic Estonian population is 60 percent, with Slavic peoples making up the majority of the remaining population (mostly Russian and Ukrainian). One of the major reasons that the scheduling of the upcoming elections was delayed, was that along with independence for Estonians came the need to determine who is an Estonian citizen.

In February 1992, the Supreme Council adopted a resolution renewing Estonia's 1938 citizenship law. Accordingly, those who were citizens in 1940 and their descendants are citizens now. Those who moved to Estonia subsequently can become citizens in three years (two years of residency retroactive to March 30, 1990 plus a one-year waiting period) and by demonstrating a knowledge (1,500 words has been proposed) of the Estonian language. Marju Lauristan, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party believes that the election law is a very liberal law that satisfies the compromise between the zero option of allowing all non-Estonian residents who apply for Estonian citizenship to become immediately eligible to vote, and some Estonian parties who want to place more restrictions on Estonian citizenship eligibility.

However, when the 1938 citizenship law was renewed, about 950,000 residents of Estonia were considered citizens, and 600,000 residents of Estonia were considered foreigners.

The new resolution brings into force the "Law on Citizenship" as it existed on June 16, 1940, the day the Red Army entered Estonia. If left unchanged, some believe, it would have been overly favorable to future immigrants to Estonia. Everyone applying for Estonian citizenship will be able to apply after only two years of residency. And if citizenship requirements are not changed by the new parliament, one year after submitting their application they will be examined on their knowledge of the republic's language, history and culture.

The law takes a strict line, however, on people who have been living in Estonia for many years. They must now go through a two-year qualification period all over again followed by a one-year waiting period, and then must pass an examination. As noted above, the two year residency requirement is retroactive to March 30, 1990. The newly elected parliament will prove the decisive determinant on the citizenship regulations, as it will be up to the parliament to finally determine how long the residency requirement will be, and how stringent the Estonian language examination will be designed.

This systems has various significant implications for residents of Estonia who are not yet citizens. Under current law, virtually the entire ethnic minority population was unable to take part in the June 28 constitutional referendum. Because a narrow majority voted against the proposal to allow would-be citizens who had submitted their applications by June 5, they will be excluded from participating in the September 20 elections as well. Since parliamentarians hold office for five years, the Russian and Ukrainian minority are effectively excluded from representation in the National Assembly for a significant period of time.

Beyond voting rights, many economic and social problems have still not been resolved. Privatization is looming, as is the reorganization of higher and secondary schools. And there is a concern that most economic rewards will be limited to citizens. The law on land that has been adopted stipulates that while non-citizens can own property, only citizens may acquire land. So election rights are not the only concern to non-citizens. Moreover, non-citizens are not entitled to form political organizations. In order to represent the interests of the Russian speaking community, there is talk amongst non-Estonians about founding an assembly of Non-Citizens. This would probably be designed along the lines of the Congress of Estonia (a non-governmental representative body). Among the potential organizers are the Russian Democratic Movement, an organization which claims a membership of one third of the Russian speaking population.

In defense of the Estonian government's decision not to grant immediate citizenship to all residents of Estonia, a high ranking government official explained that this would deny the political rights of the Russian speaking population. Just as all Estonians did not want to become Soviet citizens in 1940, all non-Estonian residents may not want to take Estonian citizenship. Such action could have negative implications for those people who may want to return to the nation of their ethnic origin, as 50,000 Russians have already done this year.

VIII. FORMER SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE

Although the pre-election campaign period seems to be progressing normally, there are many factors which could influence the process. Of these factors, the presence of the former Soviet army, which Russia has taken responsibility for, constitutes the biggest concern.

However, until now the former Soviet military presence has not physically impeded election preparations, some parties do warn of the psychological influence that the presence of 16,000 Russian troops may have on voters.

Estonia emphatically maintains that former Soviet troop withdrawals remain its highest priority and that its resolution will help to speed up Estonia's economic and political transition. Estonia had wanted troops out by the end of this year, but so far only 60 percent has left. It is estimated that troop strengths have been reduced from 50,000 to 16,000 men by natural processes of attrition. This process has been speeded up by the introduction of Estonia's own currency, the *kroon*, which makes keeping Russian troops on Estonian soil more costly to Moscow. Estonia demands total withdrawal before the end of 1992. Russia initially sought a protracted withdrawal concluding under international observation as late as the year 2000, but has shifted its position to withdrawal by 1994. Protracted negotiations are being conducted between Russian and Estonian military officials, but the recent breakthrough in talks between Russian and Lithuania on this very issue, gives reason to expect that Russia may withdraw its troops sooner.

IX. NDI ACTIVITIES IN ESTONIA

In October 1991, NDI sent a technical mission to the Baltic republics to: assess democratic political developments following the recognition of independence; expand NDI contacts with democratic activists and political leaders; and initiate a program in civic education funded by the Agency for International Development (AID). In support of the democratization process, the NDI program focuses on issues relating to civic education, legislative training, political party building and elections.

Last June, NDI conducted in Riga a regional training conference entitled "The Baltic Transition to Democratic Governance." Eight international trainers from Europe and the United States shared their knowledge of democratic political institutions and their expertise in the practical workings of democratic government. In preparation for that mission, NDI staff members in April met with leaders and members of the Baltic legislatures, governments, political parties and movements, civic organizations, and the media. They received very positive reactions to the proposed conference agenda, which covered topics ranging from election process to political party organization to consolidation of a democratic transition at the local level of government.

Estonian participants at the June conference included policymakers, current and prospective members of the National Assembly, journalists and civic activists. Following the conference, NDI staff members visited Estonia to meet with government officials, political party representatives and media representatives to assess the situation in Estonia. Based on the information gathered from these consultations and the conference, NDI decided to hold a pre-election civic education program with political party leaders, media representatives and civic activists before the parliamentary elections about how elections can accelerate (or retard) the development of democratic political culture.

APPENDIX I

THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP IN ESTONIA

by Professor Shlomo Avineri

The citizenship issue is undoubtedly the most contentious and problematic in the process of Estonia's transition to democracy. It is also fraught with possible dangers to the future stability of the Estonian polity.

The way citizenship has been handled in post-Soviet Estonia is a corollary of the Estonian premise that their re-gained independence from Soviet rule is a restitution of the Republic of Estonia as it had existed prior to its forced incorporation into the USSR on June 16, 1940. In this the Estonians contend that they and the two other Baltic republics are in a different position, legally, constitutionally and in terms of international law, from the other former Soviet republics. Within this framework of legal continuity, the Supreme Council of Estonia passed on February 26, 1992, a resolution (Resolution on the Application of the Law on Citizenship) re-instituting the validity of the 1938 Estonian Law of Citizenship. According to this resolution, only people who were Estonian citizens prior to 1940, or their direct descendants, have who been granted Estonian citizenship and are therefore eligible to vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections to be held on September 20, 1992.

The rest of the country's residents - about 600,000 people, mainly Russian-speakers who came in 1940 or after 1945 and now make up about 40% of the overall population - have not been granted citizenship. As a consequence they do not have the right to vote in Estonia's first democratic, post-independence elections. In the political parlance of the public discourse in Estonia, these Russian-speakers are considered colonizers, an outgrowth of the Soviet Empire. The psychological mind-set of most Estonians views them as part of the Soviet and communist imposed legacy on their country.

The Supreme Council Resolution on the Application of the Law of Citizenship does, however, include provisions for non-citizens to apply for naturalization. These provision are, basically, not much more than a declaration of intent (in this Estonia exemplifies traits similar to other post-communist societies, where laws are in many cases mere declarations, with the operative clauses left out). According to the Resolution, it is stipulated that after March 30, 1992, all people who by then would have resided in the country for 2 years would be eligible to apply for citizenship. After a one-year waiting period following submission of application, i.e. in 1993, and on meeting a number of qualifying conditions, they may be granted citizenship.

The qualifying conditions have not yet been promulgated, but it is already clear from the language of the Resolution that they will entail proof of knowledge of the Estonian language. Article 17 (1) of the Resolution stipulates that these conditions should be specified in a bill to be presented by the government within one month after the passing of the Resolution, i.e. by the end of March, 1992. But no bill has yet been passed or officially presented. There are a number of drafts: one speaks about proof of knowledge of 1500 words, though the basic vocabulary has not been specified; others mention knowledge of poetry, or an exam in Estonian culture and history. Some of the political parties speak about re-opening the citizenship issue after the elections and imposing even more stringent conditions (i.e. a waiting period of 5 to 10 years before being qualified to apply; an annual quota of applicants, etc.). Be this as it may, it is clear that the issue is far from closed, and it is the details of the language requirement and how it is going to be administered that will ultimately affect the political and social status of 40% of Estonia's residents who are currently non-citizens. While the language requirement may be itself seem reasonable, it has been pointed out that the lack of teachers, especially in almost pure Russian-speaking areas like Narva, the fact that many of the residents are pensioners, the possibility of unemployment, all make this a much more complicated issue than just learning the language.

Two further points should be added: First, all the Estonians emigres currently in the West who were either citizens prior to 1940 or are their descendants, have been granted citizenship and are entitled to vote, even if they continue to reside abroad and possess also another citizenship (American, Canadian, etc.) While exact figures are not available, these ex-patriate voters may make up around 10% of the whole electorate. Since no one party will probably receive a majority and the elections may be close, this is a very powerful segment of the electorate.

Second: about 5,000 non-citizens who applied for citizenship between March and June 1992 were denied the right to vote in the referendum held June 28, 1992, which also included a specific question on this issue. While the figure is insignificant, its political message (and possible motivation) was clear.

In our numerous meetings with Estonian political leaders and candidates of the various parties as well as with representatives of various Russian-speaking groups (in the capital Tallinn, where they make up around 53% of the population, and in Narva, where they are almost 96% of the inhabitants), we realized how deeply emotions run on both sides of this issue of equal political rights and the disenfranchisement that follows the status of not being a citizen. Stripped of the legal arguments which both sides use quite liberally and indiscriminately, the basic attitude on both sides is quite simple: it is obvious that in their heart, most Estonians would like to see the Russian-speakers "go-home," realizing that this possibly will not be the case. Committed to maintaining their distinct culture and identity, they would like to construct their

newly-independent republic as much as possible as a nation-state and minimize the number of ethnic Russians who will eventually become citizens and have voting rights.

The Russians, on the other hand, many of whom opposed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, feel themselves victimized, disenfranchised and discriminated against. They also feel that after having been denied the right to vote in Estonia's first post-independence parliamentary elections, they may experience discriminatory legislation and practices in questions of privatization rights, employment opportunities, housing, unemployment benefits, etc. While some of these fears may be unjustified, they are contributing to a feeling of bitterness and uncertainty among the Russian population.

It should be added that in the struggle for Estonian independence, about 100,000 Russian-speakers voted in the March 1990 referendum for Estonian independence. Most of them are now non-citizens according to the new legislation, and many of them feel hurt and betrayed.

While one can well understand the Estonians' feeling of having been victimized and besieged in their own country by Soviet power and masses of Russian immigrants, it seems to us that these past injustices have made many Estonians (except for members of the Popular Front Coalition) less sensitive than perhaps they might be to the moral and political consequences of what it would mean to construct a democratic society where 40% of the population is currently disenfranchised and where many of these may remain disenfranchised for some time to come. When asked about this, most Estonians to whom we spoke spoke of the many injustices they suffered during nearly fifty years of Soviet rule. Even otherwise sophisticated leaders appeared to us not to grasp the implications for the smooth running of a democratic system under such conditions. It is not our impression that this lack of sensitivity is necessarily racist in character; but there is a degree of ethnocentricity that currently affects Estonian public life, clearly caused by decades of fighting against difficult odds to maintain their identity and national existence.

The Russian community remains basically confused. Many of them are still obviously shell-shocked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and at finding themselves stranded as an ethnic minority in a country they used to consider part of their former homeland, and where they had enjoyed, under the old communist system, many of the advantages of belonging to the majority ethnic group. Some may not have given up some vague hope of a Soviet restoration, but it is our impression that most are realistic and know that they have to make the best of what to them must be a rather difficult situation. Their sense, however, is that the Estonian majority is doing everything possible to follow a path of exclusion, not inclusion.

Leaders of the Russian Democratic Movement with whom we talked came up with various ideas about how to redress the situation.

Their main contention is still that Russian residents should be able to obtain citizenship without having to go through complicated application procedures. Moreover, they fear that the language requirement may be construed in such a way as to make it difficult for most of them to qualify and they will as a result remain non-citizens. To deal with this possible eventuality, some have come up with the idea of setting up an Assembly of Non-Citizens (modelled on the Congress of Estonia which was crucial in the drive for independence), to serve as a consultative, representative body to the parliament and government. They are vague about what powers such an Assembly would have, and it is our impression that the idea will not be acceptable to the Estonian parties who may, justifiably, see this as a nucleus of a parallel parliament or even an alternative source of sovereignty.

Other Russian-speaking leaders warned that if a humane and equitable solution is not found, radical and extremist elements among the Russian population may provoke violent clashes. Strikes in the industrial centers of the Northeast (Narva) are a distinct possibility, especially if there is massive unemployment. Another danger is that the problems of the Russian minority in Estonia could be easily used by chauvinistic leaders and movements within Russian itself, calling for intervention from Mother Russia to save her abandoned children stranded in foreign parts. Some of this is already happening and has had already some impact on official Russian statements, which reflect pressure from Russian nationalist groups within Russia proper. A major crisis in Estonia-Russian ethnic relations within Estonia might also undermine the withdrawal of Russian troops already underway, or at least be used as a convenient excuse to delay further withdrawals. If violence breaks out, especially along the border areas, some intervention (not necessarily by the Russian army: Cossack units could be willing to volunteer, as in Moldova) cannot be totally ruled out.

The situation appears to be fraught with dangers: both communities are burdened by memories and history. One feels deeply the injustices of the past; the other is apprehensive about what it considers present injustices and the prospect of worse ones in the future. There is very little trust between the two communities -- and both have good reasons to be skeptical about the goodwill of the other. At the moment, it seems to us that a major problem is the Estonians' incomprehension of the fact that regardless of their feeling of having been victimized, and regardless of the carefully crafted arguments they are using to justify the exclusion of the Russian-speakers from citizenship and voting rights, they should be made aware of the fact that the political problem of the status of these 40% of their population who are currently non-citizens will not go away. It will have to be addressed by them actively, since no nation - or body politic - can in the long run remain one part free and one part unfree. By the same token, the Russian-speaking residents of Estonia will have to realize that if they decide to apply for Estonian citizenship, they will have to reorientate their political and cultural allegiances accordingly.

VALIMISSEDELI

Eesti Vabariigi Riigikogu
valimisel

20. septembril 1992

VALIMISRINGKOND NR.11
(PÕLVA-, VALGA- JA VÕRUMAA)

EESTI ETTEVÕTJATE FRAKONID

nr. 115 ANDO HAGEL

VALIMISLIIT "MÕÕDUKAD"

(EESTI VABARIIGI
EESTI SOOTSIAALDEMOKRATILISE PARTII)

nr. 158 MARJU LAURISTIN

nr. 159 JÜRI-KARL SEIM

nr. 160 TOIVO JULLINEN

nr. 161 ÜLO-ARNO LAUK

VALIMISLIIT "ISAMAA"

(EESTI KONSERVATIIVNE RAHVAAERAKOND,
EESTI KRISTLIK-DEMOKRATILISE FRAKONID,
EESTI KRISTLIK-DEMOKRATILISE LIIKE,
EESTI JUURVALDFRAKTSIONAALNE PARTII,
VÄRMIKLAASE KÜNDERAKOND)

nr. 249 KAIDO KAMA

nr. 250 VILLU JÜRJO

nr. 251 ENN TUPP

nr. 252 HEINO KOSTABI

nr. 253 AARE HÖRN

nr. 254 TOIVO PÜNGA

nr. 255 LEO VIJARD

nr. 256 JAAN PULK

nr. 257 PEETER KUDU

nr. 258 LEIDA JURTSENKO

nr. 259 ARNO LETNER

EESTI PENSIONÄRIDELIIDE

nr. 287 OLEV TOOMET

nr. 288 HEINO KALLAS

VALIMISLIIT "DEMOKRAADID"

(EESTI DEMONSTRATIIVNE LIIKE,
KODANIKU ÜHENDUS "GRATIA",
RAVITAJAKARSEKATE RAMMORPESITSELIIDE,
SOOTSIAALDEMOKRATILISE "PÕLVIK",
SOOTSIAALDEMOKRATILISE "SÕBRADE KIHIN",
SOOTSIAALDEMOKRATILISE "LOODES")

nr. 335 TÖNU-REINHOLD SALO

ÕIGUSVASTASELI REPRÉSENTEERITUIE

RAHVUSLIK FRAKONID

nr. 355 ELMUT LAANE

nr. 356 PEETER PIRN

nr. 357 VILJAT LEESALU

nr. 358 ALEKSANDER LONDON

nr. 359 JAAN ERSTO

PÕLJUMEESE KOGU

nr. 377 ELTUR PARDER

nr. 378 MADIS KAING

nr. 379 LEMBIT SAARNITS

nr. 380 PRIIT UUSMA

nr. 381 ALEKSEI PETERSON

VALIMISLIIT "KINDEL KODU"

(EESTI KODANIKUD FRAKONID,
KODANIKU ÜHENDUS,
EESTI DEMOKRATILISE ÜHENDUS)

nr. 447 JAAN EILART

nr. 448 VELLO LUIK

nr. 449 LAUR KARU

nr. 450 MARGIT AEDLA

nr. 451 UNO KIUDSOO

VALIMISLIIT "RAHVARINNE"

(EESTIMAA RAHVARINNE,
EESTI RAHVAAERAKOND,
EESTI RAHVAAERAKONNI
EESTI RAHVAAERAKONNI ÜHENDUS)

nr. 543 IGNAF FJUK

nr. 544 EINAR RANNIT

nr. 545 HELE OIDERMAA

nr. 546 JAAN TOBRELUITS

nr. 547 JUHAN KALBUS

nr. 548 TOOMAS PUURA

nr. 549 VAMBOLA SIPELGAS

nr. 550 JÜRI KALAMEES

nr. 551 TIIT TÕNTS

nr. 552 VOLDEMAR ÖÖVEL

nr. 553 TÕNIS KURG

VALIMISLIIT "ROHELISED"

(EESTI ERGIVÄRMIKUMINE,
ERAKOND "EESTI ROHELISED",
KESKKONNAKAITSE- JA NOORUKIÜHENDUS
"ERIKOOL", POORTE NIITSAAKTSIOON EESTIS",
ÜHENDUS "ROHELINE MAARDI",
KOHELINE RÜGEMENT)

nr. 576 EGE HIRV

EESTI RAHVUSLIKU SOULI- MATTUSE PARTII (ERSP)

nr. 657 JÜRI ADAMS

nr. 658 JAANUS RAIDAL

nr. 659 EVE PÄRNASTE

nr. 660 JÜRI PERTMANN

nr. 661 EPP HAABSAAR

nr. 662 MAIMOR VILL

nr. 663 LEMBIT LUIK

nr. 664 ENE KORNET

nr. 665 LEMBIT SAVI

VALIMISLIIT "EESTI KODANIK"

(EESTI VABARIIGI PARTII,
NOORUKIÜHENDUS "EESTI ÜHENDUS")

nr. 697 JÜRI TOOMEPUU

nr. 698 PAUL-OLEV MÕTSKÜLA

nr. 699 TOIVO UUSTALO

VALIMISLIIT "SÕLTUMATIID KUNINGRIIKLASED"

(EESTI KONSERVATIIVNE RAHVAAERAKOND,
EESTI KONSERVATIIVNE RAHVAAERAKONNI
EESTI KONSERVATIIVNE RAHVAAERAKONNI ÜHENDUS)

nr. 728 TÖNU KÕRDA

nr. 729 VILJA LAANARU

nr. 730 RAIVO PAAS

nr. 731 MATI UNT

ÜKSIKANDIDAADID

nr. 308 VELLO-TAIVO DENKS

HÄÄLETAN KANDIDAADI

NR. 512 POOLT

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- 2) проставлено сразу два или более номеров, или
- 3) проставлен какой-либо иной номер, чем те, которыми на избирательном бюллетене обозначены кандидаты на пост президента, или
- 4) проставленный номер зачеркнут, переправлен или испорчен иным образом.

Избирательная комиссия Эстонской Республики

VABARIIGI PRESIDENDI VALIMISSEDELI TÄITMISEST

Austatud valija! Kirjutage valimisedelil punktiirjoonele pärast sõnu "Hääletan kandidaadi nr. ..." see number, millega on tähistatud presidendikandidaadi nimi, kelle poolt Teie hääletate.
Kasutage ainult araabia numbreid.

Kehtetuks tunnistatakse valimisedel, kus punktiirjoonele:

- 1) pole märgitud ühtegi numbrit või
- 2) on märgitud korraka kaks või enam numbrit või
- 3) on märgitud mõni teine number kui need, millega sedelil on tähistatud presidendikandidaadid või
- 4) märgitud number on läbi kriipsutatud, üle kirjutatud või mõnel teisel viisil rikutud.

Eesti Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon