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The October 31, 1999 Parliamentary Elections in Georgia: A Pre-Elections Report |
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PREFACE
The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit organization working to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide. NDI works with democrats in every region of the world to build political and civic organizations, safeguard elections, and promote citizen participation, openness and accountability in government. Since 1994, NDI has worked with Georgia’s leading political parties to help them build and expand their party organizations. NDI also has sought to assist the Parliament in its efforts to establish its legislative and representative functions and increase its accessibility to the public. In addition, NDI has worked with citizen groups and local council members to help them develop efficient working procedures and introduce democratic principles of government. Over the last four years, NDI also has provided support to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), a nonpartisan organization that promotes government accountability and popular political participation. ISFED has mounted major voter education and monitoring programs for the last two elections and will conduct a comprehensive election observation effort this year as well. The material in this report was compiled by NDI-Georgia field representatives. NDI programs in Georgia have been funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy. On October 31, 1999, Georgia will hold its third round of parliamentary elections since achieving independence in 1990. The elections take place as part of a transformation in which civil war and chaos have gradually given way to normal governmental structures. Competitive political parties and active civic groups have flourished in recent years. Economic progress accompanied political reforms as Georgia enjoyed an economic growth rate of more than 11 percent in 1996 and 1997. In 1998, Georgia held its first local government elections under a post-Soviet constitution and election law. Earlier this year, Georgia was granted full membership in the Council of Europe. Parliamentary and presidential elections held in November 1995 focused on issues related to security and stability. Georgians voted en masse for respected leader Eduard Shevardnadze, who received 74 percent of the presidential vote. The Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG), a coalition formed around Shevardnadze, won a parliamentary plurality and over 20 percent of the popular vote. Of the 54 parties competing in the 1995 elections, only three -- the CUG, the Revival Party, and the National Democratic Party -- overcame the five percent threshold required to win seats in the Parliament. Two-thirds of the popular vote went to parties that failed to gain parliamentary representation. In contrast to the previous round of parliamentary elections, the 1999 campaign has focused largely on economic and social issues. Although Georgian voters remain concerned about the long-term security and stability of their nation, economic hardship has moved to the forefront of their concerns. The Georgian economy has suffered following the Russian financial crisis of 1998, and badly needed improvements to power, water and heat supply, schools, and roads have not materialized. Pensions often have not been paid for several months at a time and monthly salaries average less than $50. Corruption remains a serious impediment to economic growth and the delivery of public services. The government’s inability to collect tax revenue is but one example of where reform has been unable to take root. Participation in the parliamentary elections is expected to be high. Approximately two-thirds of all Georgians will go to the polls in October. At stake is the future of Georgia, a country that has traveled quickly towards democracy, but on a course that is not irreversible. The orientation and efficiency of Parliament can have major consequences for the direction and pace of future reform efforts. The election results will be an important indicator of how Georgia intends to face future challenges and will set the stage for next April’s presidential election. Georgia has a presidential system of government that vests significant power in the legislative branch. The President must sign or veto all laws passed by Parliament, but Parliament may override a presidential veto. The President may not dissolve Parliament, but the Parliament can hold a vote of no-confidence in the President or impeach him. The Parliament of Georgia is a unicameral body that serves a four-year term. One hundred and fifty deputies are chosen from a proportional party list ballot, and 85 MPs represent single-mandate districts and are elected on a first-past-the-post basis. Parliamentary elections are held on the basis of universal, direct suffrage. Elected in 1995, the current Parliament has enjoyed a clear constitutional mandate and public legitimacy. The strong leadership of Chairman Zurab Zhvania has helped transform the Parliament into a forum for open debate and legislative action. Committees and factions play an important role in organizing and completing legislative business, and the restructured legislative staff has become efficient and professional. Over the last four years, the Parliament has passed numerous laws that have contributed to Georgia’s new economic and political foundations. The Parliament also has become more accessible to the public and regularly posts a clear legislative calendar, opens its doors for tours, and televises floor debates. The 1995 Constitution explicitly stipulated that political parties must obtain a minimum five percent vote threshold to enter the Parliament. This provision was intended to minimize the number of parties that would gain parliamentary seats, which was desirable after the 1992 elections produced a disorderly legislature in which 24 parties vied for influence. In July 1999, the Constitution was amended by Parliament to raise the threshold from five to seven percent. This measure, introduced by conservative opposition leader Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia and strongly supported by the CUG, was an effort to limit further the number of parties in Parliament. Many opposition parties were incensed by what they perceived as an attempt to shut them out of the new Parliament. Parliamentary candidates from single-member districts were required to submit nomination petitions with 1,000 signatures from residents of their districts by September 25. Each party must have filed a party candidate list with the Central Election Commission by September 25, containing a minimum of 100 names in order of priority, plus the number of candidates that the party is sponsoring in majoritarian races. Parties represented in the Parliament automatically qualified for the ballot; parties not represented in the Parliament were required to obtain 50,000 voter signatures. Dozens of unaffiliated members of the current Parliament joined with smaller parties, allowing these parties to register automatically for the proportional ballot. Candidates may run both as single-mandate candidates and on their party’s list. If the candidate wins the majoritarian race, he or she will be removed from the proportional list, and the next candidate on the list will move into that slot. The 150 party list seats will be allocated according to parties’ performance in relation to each other. Votes cast for parties that fail to meet the seven percent threshold do not figure in the distribution of seats. The election law also contains certain voting turnout requirements. One-third of Georgia's eligible voters must participate in the party list balloting for those elections to be considered valid. One-third of the voters in the district must participate in the majoritarian balloting for the majoritarian election to be considered valid in that district. A winning majoritarian candidate must receive at least one-third of the ballots cast. If fewer than one-third of voters participate in the national party list balloting, or in balloting for single-mandate seats in any particular district, new elections will be organized by the CEC. In the event that no majoritarian candidate receives more than one-third of the ballots cast in that district, a run-off will be held between the top two candidates on a date to be scheduled by the CEC. According to a report issued on September 9 by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Georgian elections, fundamental freedoms appear to be respected and the essential political preconditions for an election process in line with OSCE standards appear to exist. However, the report also indicates that the transparency of electoral procedures needs to be increased in order to enhance the confidence of the electorate and the political parties in the election process. Domestic and international observers charged that gaps and inconsistencies within the election law create confusion and possibilities for manipulation. They recommended the creation of a new election code that would unify the three existing laws (for local, presidential and parliamentary elections) into a single, omnibus law. Instead, the Parliament decided to amend the parliamentary election law with transitional provisions in force for the upcoming elections. Opposition parties were critical of the amendment process and noted that none of their significant proposals was included in the amended final version. During voting for each of the law’s three readings, opposition parties left the hall in protest, and the votes for the amendments’ passage came exclusively from the CUG majority. Critics have raised concerns that the amendments increase the possibility for fraud and decrease electoral transparency. Specific concerns include the new procedures for establishing election commissions, which now are weighted heavily in favor of the governing CUG, and the cumbersome steps for lodging complaints about election violations. The amendments also have broadened the powers of the CEC, which, combined with substantial gaps in the current election law, allow the CEC wide discretion in determining electoral procedure. The following are some of the most important changes to the law:
The original 1995 election law provided for multipartisan election commissions: each party registered for the elections could appoint a member to the central, district, and precinct election commissions. Under the amended law, the CEC comprises 19 members. Five members are appointed by Parliament, five members including the chair are appointed by the President, each of the seven parties with the best results in the 1998 local elections appoints one member, and the authorities of the two autonomous republics (Adjara and Abkhazia) each appoint one member. The 75 district election commissions each comprise 14 members. The CEC appoints seven members, including the chair; the other seven members are nominated by the regional governor or citizens’ interest groups. The precinct commissions also are comprised of 14 members, including a chair and six members appointed by the DECs and seven members appointed by parties. IV. PRE-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT AND THE MEDIA Political ideology has played less of a role in these elections than in any of Georgia’s previous rounds of post-independence elections. Facing obsolescence if they are unable to gain parliamentary seats, parties have sought to gather sufficient voter support to carry them into the new Parliament. To this end, political alliances have been formed according to the electoral resources each group brings to the table popular leaders, regional support, name recognition, funding rather than ideological convergence. Many groups that have registered for the elections would find it difficult to govern together if elected since they combine left- and right-wing political philosophies, pro-Russian sentiment and Georgian nationalist movements. Many groups have coalesced merely in order to overcome the seven percent threshold. Most Georgian political election analysts agree that the main two competitors in the upcoming elections are the Citizens’ Union of Georgia, led by President Shevardnadze and Parliament Chairman Zurab Zhvania, and the electoral bloc Georgia’s Revival, led by Adjaran leader Aslan Abashidze. If voters find Abashidze’s pro-Russian rhetoric unpalatable, they may turn instead to opposition parties such as the Laborist Party, Industry Will Save Georgia or the National Democratic Alliance. The results of the elections are difficult to predict, as are the possible factions that could subsequently form in the new Parliament. In contrast to most other groups, both the CUG and Georgia’s Revival have sufficient resources to run national campaigns. The CUG has a strong national network as well as the support of government-appointed governors. The Revival Party, previously largely confined to Adjara, expanded its base during last year’s local elections, and Abashidze has poured large financial resources into the rest of the country. During the last few weeks the campaign rhetoric and actions of both the CUG and Georgia’s Revival have intensified. This has led to concerns that the upcoming elections could be marred by serious election violations. In the Abashidze-controlled region of Adjara, CUG election commissioners and activists have been threatened by local officials. In Eastern Georgia, governors and mayors have refused to allow Revival campaign buses and vans to enter their cities. The election law provides for equal media access for political parties and majoritarian candidates on state-owned radio and television. The CEC determines the specific amount of national airtime and print space allocated to parties and candidates. Candidates also are to receive free print space in state-owned regional newspapers. There have been no significant problems reported with regard to time allocation in the media. However, opposition parties have argued that election coverage on news programs is biased in favor of the ruling party. Private media are not subject to the election law provisions. Private media time can be purchased by parties and candidates without restriction. Thus, the better-financed political parties have produced advertisements that air continually on private stations. A total of 51 political groups submitted applications to the CEC for registration. Many of these groups were formed immediately before the registration deadline. Only 32 groups remain on the ballot because of some contestants’ failure to submit complete candidate lists or decision to withdraw from the race. Candidates and parties currently registered may withdraw from the race at any time until October 28. A recent Georgian poll indicates that not more than six groups will surpass the seven percent threshold and gain seats in the Parliament. The groups likely to gain the highest percentage of votes are the Citizens’ Union of Georgia and Georgia’s Revival. Groups that may surpass the seven percent threshold are the Laborist Party, Industry Will Save Georgia, the National Democratic Alliance, and People's Party - Didgori. Brief information about each of these groups follows in the order that they will appear on the ballot. Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG) The CUG, founded in 1993 under the leadership of the current Chairman of Parliament, Zurab Zhvania, exists as a unified faction composed of different political groups supporting President Eduard Shevardnadze. One group, occupying most of the executive branch and ministerial positions, consists of former Soviet-era officials. The other group consists of young, Western-oriented reformers who hold high-level positions in the Parliament. The divergence in background and ideology has at times strained relations between the two groups competing for the President's attention and support. The 1995 parliamentary elections secured the CUG an absolute parliamentary majority. In 1998, the CUG faced its first national electoral test since coming to power and Georgia’s first local elections since it became an independent state. The CUG increased its vote total by over 160,000 votes from 1995. Despite the increase in votes for the CUG, the media and public viewed the 1998 elections as a setback for the ruling party due to the number of votes for opposition parties. In recent months the CUG has emphasized its regeneration as a party. On the party list for the elections, the CUG replaced 49 current MPs with new faces, many of whom are young and Western-educated. The CUG’s message for these elections, from stability to prosperity, represents the party’s shift of focus from security to economic and social issues. The CUG has indicated that it plans to improve tax collection and use these revenues to fund pensions. Analysts expect the party to poll between 20 - 30 percent in the parliamentary elections. Georgia’s Revival Georgia’s Revival is an electoral bloc created in early 1999 through an agreement signed in Batumi, the capital of Adjara, an autonomous region ruled by Aslan Abashidze. The group, also referred to as the Batumi Alliance, comprises disparate elements, including Abashidze’s Revival Party, the Socialist Party of Georgia, the Union of Georgian Traditionalists, former Communist Party leader Jumber Patiashvili and supporters of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. In 1995, the leading force of the bloc, the Revival Party, received just over seven percent of the vote and 31 seats. The 1995 polls in Adjara were marked by major irregularities, with domestic and international observers barred by the Abashidze regime from monitoring the electoral process. Within Adjara, the Revival Party received over 90 percent of the vote and won all of the single- mandate seats. During the 1998 local elections many of the same irregularities occurred. Most notably, the Revival Party won with 98 percent of the vote and gained all the local council seats, and no opposition campaigns in Adjara were permitted to be critical of Abashidze. Following the local elections, Abashidze began building a coalition of ideologically varied opposition parties with the goal of defeating Shevardnadze’s CUG. The group has campaigned for change and promised to restore public services and eliminate corruption. Georgia’s Revival is expected to surpass the threshold by garnering over 90 percent of the vote in Abashidze-controlled Adjara, which would constitute approximately 10 percent of the national vote. Support for the bloc in other regions could amount to 10 - 15 percent; which could then result in a total vote of 20 - 25 percent nationally. Laborist Party of Georgia In the 1995 elections, the Laborists failed to meet the five percent threshold, but did win eight single-mandate seats in the Parliament. The party is opposed to both the domestic and international policies of the President and the CUG. The party supports Georgia's membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). During the 1998 local elections, the Laborists received nine percent of the vote with the support of the Communist Party of Georgia. Their third place finish in the local elections raised the Laborists from obscurity to national standing overnight. The Laborists discussed the possibility of forming a coalition with Revival to compete in the upcoming elections, but ultimately decided to run alone. The Laborist campaign is based on populist themes and espouses a return to state-sponsored health care, payment of wages and back pensions, and restoration of the power supply. Critics charge that the Laborists have no plan to pay for the party’s proposals, but the message has resonated with segments of the population. National Democratic Alliance (NDA) National Democratic Party Chair Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia has tried to gather the conservative opposition by creating the NDA as an alternative to the CUG and Georgia’s Revival. The NDA, also referred to as the Third Way, is an amalgamation of the National Democratic Party, the Republican Party and the National Party of Enterpreneurs. The strongest of these parties is the National Democratic Party, one of the oldest parties in Georgia which was revived in 1989 at the height of the Soviet-era national independence movement. In 1992, the NDP won 14 seats in the Parliament and the Republican Party won 10 seats. In the 1995 elections, the NDP won 23 seats in the Parliament, while the Republican Party failed to pass the five percent threshold. Although the NDP was diminished by a 1996 split, the party retains a core of voter support around the country. In the 1998 local elections, the NDP won almost eight percent of the vote. The Republican Party did not participate in the 1998 local election, believing that the new laws did not provide sufficiently for self-government, were biased against smaller parties, and were vulnerable to fraud. The third party in the National Democratic Alliance, the Union of Entrepreneurs, was created earlier this year. The National Democratic Alliance’s ideology is Christian Democratic. The group opposes the government’s domestic policies on the grounds that they preserve too much state power in economic and social life, and accuses the government of not fighting corruption with sufficient zeal. In terms of foreign policy, the Alliance supports the CUG's orientation toward Western countries, but criticizes the government for not withdrawing from CIS membership and allowing Russian military bases to remain in Georgia. People's Party - Didgori The political ideology of the People's Party, the leading party in the bloc, is similar to that of the NDP from which it split in 1996. The People’s Party is more socially and economically conservative than the CUG and strongly criticizes the government for its failure to resolve the dilemma of the breakaway province of Abkhazia and resulting refugee crisis. The People’s Party partially supports Shevardnadze's foreign policy as it relates to strengthening ties to the West, but like the NDP, remonstrates the government for its decision to remain in the CIS and allow Russian bases and troops on Georgian soil. The People’s Party faction in Parliament has cooperated with the CUG from time to time in enacting major legislation. This cooperation ended, however, over a disagreement concerning the distribution of council seats following the 1998 local elections. The People’s Party also discussed coalition possibilities with the Revival party, ultimately agreeing to run separately but not against each other. Less than two days before the party registration deadline, the People's Party created an electoral bloc with the nationalist group Didgori, which can provide little in the way of volunteers or votes. Although the People's Party has skilled grassroots organizers, they still suffer from a lack of name recognition and do not have a nationally recognized leader. People's Party - Didgori will find it difficult to overcome the seven percent threshold and may only achieve parliamentary representation through a handful of majoritarian candidates. Industry Will Save Georgia Giorgi Topadze, a new face in Georgian politics, is a well-known businessman who is the founder and owner of the successful Kazbegi/Castel brewery. During the last year, Topadze has been engaged in several highly public battles against what he considers unfair tax legislation instituted in Georgia at the request of the International Monetary Fund. Topadze believes that the current tax laws prevent Georgian businesses from competing against cheap imports and therefore force Georgia’s dependence on foreign aid. He believes Georgian businesses should receive tax breaks and import protection until a stable economy is established in Georgia. To this end, Topadze recently formed his own political movement and called on other Georgian businessmen to join his movement and cause. The party united with two other newly created political movements, the Movement for Georgian Statehood, led by two members of Parliament, and the ultra-nationalist Georgia First led by Guram Sharadze. Topadze’s decision to ally with Guram Sharadze drew internal fire as more moderate Topadze supporters threatened to withdraw. Topadze appears to be using Sharadze to deliver the nationalist vote and thereby cross the seven percent threshold. Topadze’s party could be a dark horse in the parliamentary race, especially given Topadze’s considerable financial resources. The October parliamentary elections are viewed by many analysts as a referendum on the performance of the CUG government over the last four years. A major question is how much support the CUG will be able to retain and which parties will most benefit from any erosion of that support. The 1999 parliamentary elections also highlight the tenuous state of Georgian democratization. The gains of recent years are imperiled by the continuing uncertainty over the territorial borders of Georgia and by unresolved internal struggles for power within the country. There are still forces inside Georgia that are unwilling to commit to achieving their goals through the ballot box or the rule of law. The composition of the new Georgian Parliament will determine whether it can continue to play a pivotal role in Georgia’s democratization by being a forum for policy debate, peaceful expression of views, and representation of diverse interests. A deadlocked or fractious Parliament could reverse many of Georgia’s accomplishments over the last four years and lead the country back to the chaos it has recently escaped. These elections are also a forerunner to the next Georgian presidential elections, which are scheduled for April 2000. Success for the CUG on October 31 will put President Shevardnadze in a good position to win a second five-year term, for which he has already announced his intention to run. A poor showing for the governing CUG, in contrast, may foreshadow a difficult campaign for Shevardnadze next April. APPENDIX: POLITICAL GROUPS COMPETING IN THE 1999 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS (Listed According to Number on Ballot*)
* Missing numbers denote the parties that registered and received ballot numbers, but have since withdrawn or been removed from the ballot for incomplete registration. Copyright © National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). All rights reserved. Portions of this work may be reproduced and/or translated for non-commercial purposes provided that NDI is acknowledged as the source of the material and is sent copies of any translation. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1717 Massachusets Avenue, 5th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20036, Tel.: 202-328-3136, Fax: 202-939-3166 |