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NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE'S
PRE-ELECTION REPORT ON THE OCTOBER 31, 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN UKRAINE |
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I.
INTRODUCTION Since his election in 1994, the incumbent president Leonid Kuchma has negotiated a series of political land mines - relations with Russia, constitutional crises, a post-Soviet constitution, and modest economic reform regulations. Though political parties have been slow to develop, eight parties garnered enough votes in the 1998 parliamentary elections to achieve the 4 percent threshold required for proportional representation in the new legislative assembly. Parliamentary factions have formed and have begun participating in decisions affecting domestic policy. Notwithstanding these accomplishments, the foundations of reform in Ukraine are fragile. The country remains beset with severe economic problems. Privatization has been sporadic. Declining living standards, coupled with the exposure of corruption by public officials, have led many Ukrainians to lose faith in government. Though a number of presidential candidates are appealing to the public's nostalgia for the "simpler" times before independence, there is no leading candidate advocating far reaching economic and political reforms.
II.
THE PRESIDENCY Under the 1996 constitution, Ukraine's president serves not more than two consecutive terms of five years each and directly appoints the entire presidential administrative apparatus without the approval of parliament. The president appoints a full cabinet of ministers, with only the prime minister requiring confirmation by the legislature. Other ministerial appointments require the co-signature of the prime minister. For each of the country's 27 regions, the president also appoints a presidential representative and head of regional administration, as well as the heads of city administrations. In all, the president has direct power of appointment for more than 2,000 positions in the government. In recent years, the image of the presidency has been tarnished by allegations of corrupt practices by government officials. By virtue of the strong constitutional powers of the office, the victor in the 1999 presidential election will, in large measure, bear the responsibility for either perpetuating or reversing this image. The election also holds great significance for the future of Ukraine's economy and its position in the world, as the policies implemented by the president - who will have a relatively free hand in both domestic and foreign affairs - will largely determine the pace and shape of economic reforms, as well as Ukraine's strength and self-reliance within its region. Calls for a closer relationship to Russia, a severing of ties with the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, and breaking relations with NATO, would likely weaken Ukraine's international standing and further weaken the country's ailing economy. As the most decisive voice in Ukraine, the president will play a critical role in determining what happens in and to Ukraine over the next five years. The
Presidential Election Law The new election law seeks to prevent election abuses by a sitting president or other government officials and also provides for greater oversight by the legislature and election observers. The law prohibits government officials or state-owned organizations (including state media organizations) from endorsing a specific candidate. It prohibits candidates from using the personnel or resources of their current political or government offices in the furtherance of their campaigns. It also prohibits the use of inducements in the form of goods or services in connection with campaign publicity. The new law requires that prospective candidates collect at least one million voter signatures on a nomination petition (rather than 100,000 as under the old law) in order to register for the election. Notably, the law also abolishes the voter turnout threshold, which previously required that at least 50 percent of registered voters cast a ballot in order for the election to be valid. To win the 1999 contest, a candidate must poll more than 50 percent of ballots cast. In the event that no candidate achieves a majority vote, the race will be decided in a runoff election on November 14. Candidates may withdraw from the race at any time until October 28. The law divides the country into 225 election districts, rather than relying on the 27 regional administrative divisions. This provision is designed to prevent an incumbent president from using executive branch representatives in the regions to interfere with the election process. According to the law, each candidate has the right to nominate representatives to the various commissions. The distribution of candidates' representatives was announced at the end of August (see Appendix B). The new law attempts to minimize the risk of election fraud by allowing representatives of presidential candidates to attend sessions of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and to be present during voting and tabulation of results. The
Pre-Election Environment In
media coverage of the election, President Kuchma has
received disproportionate attention in comparison with
other candidates, both in state-controlled and privately
owned media. The constitution prohibits state-owned
organizations from endorsing a particular candidate
for election. Nevertheless, a recent survey conducted
by Ukraine's National Council for TV and Broadcasting
shows that the incumbent has received more exposure
on state-controlled television than all challengers
combined. A number of newspaper publishers and television
stations have complained of government pressure to force
them to limit their coverage of President While
President Kuchma has faced allegations of misuse of
his power as incumbent to secure his re-election, the
legislature has demonstrated its independence. During
the summer, the parliament rejected the president's
proposal to establish additional layers of election
commissions at the local and regional levels on the
grounds that the amendments would have allowed an incumbent
In October, the parliament overrode President Kuchma's veto of a further amendment to the election law requiring that each member of the local and territorial election commissions receive an official copy of the vote tallies from polling places. The change was made in part to reduce the likelihood that the vote count could be manipulated by local election commissions. Accusations that President Kuchma has used his office to influence media coverage and the election process have raised concerns that Ukraine may be returning to election tactics that marred the integrity of the last presidential elections. Violations cited during that election in 1994 included theft of ballot boxes, intimidation of voters, and widespread instances of multiple voting by individuals. However, displays of independence by the legislature and Supreme Court during the 1999 campaign give cause to hope that a sitting president's power to influence the election process has diminished in the past five years.
IV.
CANDIDATES AND PARTIES
By way of contrast with presidential elections in the United States, Russia, and other countries, it is notable that the leading candidates for the Ukrainian presidency are virtually all influential members of parliament, rather than regional leaders or private citizens. The only exceptions to this rule are President Kuchma, Oleksandr Bazylyuk, and Cherkassy Mayor Volodymyr Oliynyk. The following profiles examine the individual candidates in greater detail. Leonid
Kuchma: no party affiliation Kuchma's
base of support is the industrial center of Dnipropetrovsk
in the predominantly Russian-speaking eastern half of
Ukraine. He In
the 1994 presidential race, Kuchma was the chief opponent
of Leonid Kravchuk. Throughout his first national campaign,
Kuchma advanced a pro-Russian agenda. Kuchma came in
second in the first round of elections with 31.3 percent
of the vote and won the presidency in the second round
with 52.2 percent, in part with the second round support
of the Communist Party. Within a year of his election,
however, Kuchma lost the support of left-wing forces
and gained the backing of the more centrist parties
for his talk of Kuchma's presidency has been unremarkable on the domestic front. His policies have not resulted in economic growth, and months of federal wages and pensions remain unpaid. Corruption has increased at all levels of Ukrainian society, despite Kuchma's earlier vows to eliminate it. Kuchma distinguished himself in foreign affairs, however, by resolving a heated dispute with Russia over the status of the Crimean peninsula, bringing Ukraine into the Council of Europe, and achieving working relations with NATO. In the 1999 election, Kuchma has cast himself as a strong opponent of Communist and leftist forces, but his platform statements have been vague. In a press conference announcing his campaign platform, he stated: "I am in the center, but in every special situation I move either left or right." He has vowed, however, to continue what he has called his "current reforms" into his second term. His stated goals include boosting the efficiency and reducing the size of the government apparatus, introducing a bicameral legislature, continuing to fight systemic corruption, and increasing the independence of local government. On the economic front he has vowed to balance the federal budget, improve the country's rate of development, and protect national savings from inflation. He has also promised to reduce poverty, reform the pension system, and increase the amount of affordable housing. A number of political groups have endorsed Kuchma's campaign. His current prime minister, Valery Pustovoitenko, assembled 20 political parties and around 80 civic organizations into a union of political forces known as "Zlagoda" for the express purpose of supporting Kuchma's campaign. The People's Democratic Party, known as the "party of power" due to the number of highly placed government officials among its members, has long been one of Kuchma's most powerful backers among established political parties. A new and important supporter of Kuchma's campaign is the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (United), or SDPU(U). This party, formed in 1996 following a split in the Social Democratic Party, joined three left-centrist parties in common cause. Among the leaders of this party are Viktor Medvechuk and Grigory Surkis, whose connection to the business community has helped the party to raise funds. Medvechuk and Surkis shifted the party's support to Kuchma, which led to Medvechuk's election as deputy speaker of the parliament. Natalia
Vitrenko: Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine Vitrenko has made a name for herself as an orthodox Leninist. Her party grew quickly in 1997, capitalizing on general discontent among older voters and the dissatisfaction of some Socialists with their party's perceived shift to the right. While the Progressive Socialist faction has the fewest members of any faction in parliament, it is highly visible, and Vitrenko's presidential candidacy has enjoyed consistent popularity when judged by opinion polls. It was speculated that sympathy for her might grow in the wake of a recent assassination attempt, in which Vitrenko suffered superficial injuries when grenades were thrown at her at a campaign event on October 2. However, opinion polls conducted since the event have not shown a significant change in her support. Vitrenko is perhaps Ukraine's most charismatic politician. Her strident rhetoric portrays Ukraine as a country on the edge of a catastrophe from which only Vitrenko and her party's program can rescue it. Her platform calls for an immediate reversal of reforms and the imposition of total state regulation of the economy, including a state monopoly on foreign trade and the renewal of entitlements such as free education and health care. She has demanded a complete freeze on external debt payments, the severing of relations with the International Monetary Fund, and the re-acquisition of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal as a defense against a possible NATO invasion. Petro
Symonenko: Communist Party of Ukraine Petro Symonenko joined the Soviet Communist party apparatus in 1982. After independence he was drafted by the renascent Ukrainian Communist Party to serve as the party's head. He was elected to parliament in 1994 and again in 1998. Symonenko's public image reflects the collective policies and decisions of his party rather than his personal leadership style; critics speculate that Symonenko would have difficulty in defeating Kuchma in a runoff ballot. The Communist campaign appeals to retirees and state-salaried workers who are collectively owed months of back wages and pensions. Pensioners, in particular, make up more than a quarter of the country's population. The party platform includes policies that advocate a return to central economic planning, elimination of monetarist economic policies, an end to the privatization process, and closer national ties with Russia and Belarus. On foreign policy, Symonenko has declared that Ukraine must remain non-aligned and must not pursue membership in NATO. Oleksandr
Moroz: Socialist Party of Ukraine In 1994, following his re-election to the parliament, Moroz was selected as speaker and used that position to become a leading force of the left alliance in parliament and to strengthen his party's infrastructure in the regions. Although he failed to unite the Socialist Party with the renascent Communist Party of Ukraine and Peasant Party into a left-wing coalition, he did manage to bring the Peasant Party into a single parliamentary faction with the Socialists and other leftist groups. Moroz was re-elected to his parliamentary seat in 1998 as head of the Socialist-Peasant faction but failed in his re-election bid for speaker. The subsequent split between the Socialist and Peasant parties further weakened Moroz's political position. The Socialist Party continues to struggle in search of an identity distinct from the Communist Party, and much of its strength is derived from Moroz's continuing leadership. Moroz has made efforts to portray himself as an honest and politically moderate candidate, despite his party's decided left-wing orientation. In broad terms, he seems to have resigned himself to a market economy for Ukraine so long as it has strong social welfare components. Moroz has spoken in favor of government controls in the agricultural sector and against land privatization. He advocates a leading role for the state in organizing land use and supporting farmers through cheap loans, tax breaks, and minimum price levels for basic agricultural goods. Moroz has voiced his support for attracting increased foreign investment to Ukraine and has vowed to focus much of his energy on alleviating the country's persistent unemployment. His message resonates most strongly with voters across the political spectrum who are displeased with Ukraine's current social and economic plight and who see Moroz as a "clean" candidate without a history of corruption. Oleksandr
Tkachenko: Peasants' Party Born in 1939, Tkachenko graduated from the Agrarian Institute and worked as an agricultural specialist before proceeding to the High Party School in his native Cherkassy and entering the ranks of the Communist apparat. He rose to become first secretary of the Party organization of the Tarashchanskyi district in the Kyiv region. In 1981 he joined the Communist Party Central Committee and became head of the Ternopil regional administration in western Ukraine. From 1985 until Ukraine's independence he served as Minister of Agriculture, as a deputy in Soviet Ukraine's last parliament, and as Deputy Prime Minister. In 1995, Tkachenko was under investigation by the prosecutor general for misusing state funds borrowed by an agricultural association that he controlled. Though the money was never returned, charges were dropped the day after he was elected speaker, fueling speculation that Kuchma had backed his speakership in order to lower the profile of Moroz and to control the parliament. As speaker, Tkachenko is one of the country's most powerful politicians, second in stature only to the president, and his candidacy serves as a strong counterpoint to Kuchma's administrative power. As an advocate of enhanced independence for local legislative councils, Tkachenko is possibly the only Ukrainian politician to rival Kuchma's control at the local and regional level. Thus, many believe, his opposition to Kuchma could help prevent possible manipulation of the voting process by the incumbent. Hennadyi
Udovenko: Rukh-U A
career diplomat, Udovenko served as Ukraine's representative
to the United Nations (1977-1980) and as Minister of
Foreign Affairs (1992-1994). Udovenko entered the political
arena in 1997 when the late Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil
offered him the third position on the party list. Udovenko
accepted this position and in 1998 was elected to parliament.
Less than a year later, disagreements within the party
became public, and Chornovil's support for Udovenko
as Rukh's presidential candidate led to the party's
split. Udovenko Besides the backing of his own party, Udovenko has the endorsement of Reforms and Order, a liberal party founded in 1997 by a reformist bloc of parliamentary deputies led by former Vice Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk. Although Reforms and Order failed to gain the 4 percent of votes needed in the 1998 elections for proportional representation in parliament, the party joined with several independent deputies to form a faction which has grown substantially over the last year and is now the ideological home to 25 members of parliament. Reforms and Order was associated with Rukh before that party split and has chosen to remain loyal to Udovenko's faction. The two parties have committed to working together following the presidential election to develop a common legislative agenda. In
the first public statement of his platform on September
6, Udovenko declared that, if elected, he would address
the country's continuing economic crisis and would work
to expand the influence of the Ukrainian language and
culture in the country, while protecting the rights
of Russian speakers. Udovenko has asserted that he is
not seeking political partners or coalitions.
Yuri
Kostenko: Rukh-K Kostenko
left his ministerial post in 1998 when new legislation
made it illegal for him to hold simultaneous positions
in the administration and parliament. Although he won
re-election to the parliament as part of Rukh's party
list in 1998, he lost his bid to become speaker of the
assembly. In the winter of 1998-99, when internal conflict
split Rukh, Kostenko assumed leadership of the new The "new" Rukh, under Kostenko's direction, has tended to attract younger reformists who seek to participate actively in government. The party's program calls for cooperation between the legislative and executive branches and proposes the formation of a coalition government to institute radical reforms of the tax, economic, and pension systems. Kostenko's reformist platform calls for specific numeric targets for Ukrainian economic performance. It advocates private land ownership and the removal of government limitations on business. Citing Ukraine's high per-capita energy consumption, Kostenko favors the development of more energy-efficient industry and new domestic energy sources. Kostenko also seeks to integrate Ukraine into European political, economic, and military institutions. Yevhen
Marchuk: Social Democratic Union In 1995, the same year that President Kuchma appointed him prime minister, Marchuk was also elected to parliament. At that time, Ukrainian law permitted individuals simultaneously to occupy posts in the legislature and the government, and Marchuk served as an MP concurrently with his position as premier. After his election to parliament, Marchuk grew apart from the president, and eventually Kuchma dismissed him because of his increasing criticisms of the administration. Marchuk won re-election to the parliament in 1998 as a member of the Social Democratic Party (United) and led the party's faction in parliament. When he failed to gain the party's support for his presidential bid, however, he left the faction in late 1998 and formed the Social Democratic Union. Through his new party, Marchuk gained the support of a number of right and far-right parties with his campaign platform, which has focused on calls for strong measures to combat corruption and organized crime. He has presented himself as a personal guarantor of law and order in Ukraine and has promised to resign his presidency in one year if his proposed reforms are unsuccessful. Vasyl
Onopenko: Ukrainian Social Democratic Party SDPU(U) (see discussion of Leonid Kuchma) was a political amalgam that resulted from a split in the former Social Democratic Party of Ukraine. Following the 1998 legislative elections, when party leaders Viktor Medvechuk and Grigoriy Sirkis threw their support to President Kuchma, Onopenko split from SDPU(U) to form a new party called the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party. He heads a parliamentary faction, known as the Independent faction, which is composed largely of politically non-aligned deputies. Vitaliy
Kononov: Party of Greens Volodymyr
Oliynyk: no party affiliation Although
not formally affiliated with any political party, Oliynyk
is endorsed by a number of political groups, most notably
the Ukrainian Yuri
Karmazin: Defenders of the Motherland Karmazin is a member of parliament and head of the Parliamentary Committee on Organized Crime. He came to the parliament in 1994 from the Odessa City Council. He is also a former member of Hromada, an opposition political party founded in 1993 by a group of former Communists.
Mykola Haber: Patriotic Party of Ukraine Oleksandr
Rzhavsky: United Family Union Oleksandr
Bazylyuk: Slavic Party of Ukraine
V.
CONCLUSION Over the last five years the lives of average Ukrainians have not improved, and the wave of discontent that swept Kuchma into office has yet to recede. President Kuchma attributes Ukraine's domestic problems to the country's inability to attract foreign capital, confront corruption, and enact real economic reform. The candidates most likely to oppose the president in the November runoff charge that these problems stem from an incompetent administration and the abandonment of centralized economic planning. Only a return to a more regulated economy, Kuchma's opponents argue, will improve conditions within the country. Seasoned
observers have long marveled at the capacity of Ukraine's
citizenry to weather increasing levels of dissatisfaction
and economic hardship. It remains to be seen whether
the 1999 elections will produce a grudging embrace of
the status quo, or the status quo ante. Whatever the
outcome, it seems clear that the prospects for fundamental
change in Ukraine remain part of a future too uncertain
for most Ukrainians to envision, let alone embrace.
Moreover, Ukraine's advocates of far-reaching reforms
still face a
APPENDIX:
CANDIDATE REPRESENTATIVES ON DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS
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