

Disinformation in Côte d'Ivoire

Case Study 1

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Introduction

This short report presents findings of the first of three case studies carried out over the course of the Ivorian election in 2020. This report covers April 1 to July 8, 2020, including the voter registration period from June 10 to July 5, 2020. It was prepared by the Center for the Analysis of Social Media (CASM) Consulting LLP and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) in partnership with the Ivorian Human Rights Observatory (*Observatoire Ivoirien des droits de l'homme* - OIHD).

Given the penetration of social media platforms in the country, our focus is on Facebook as the major social media platform in the country. The analysis is primarily of Francophone posts by page administrators in the country, with additional data indicating levels of engagement by Ivorian Facebook users.

The report presents an overall judgement of the public Facebook political media ecosystem in the country during the period, before examining specific themes and incidents understood by the report's authors to be linked to the spread of disinformation in the country.

Summary

The report finds:

- A range of unofficial political pages (not official party pages) are dominating the political debate in Côte d'Ivoire.
- Politically-themed posts tend to circulate within aligned Facebook pages, while generalist news-sharing and civil society messaging has a broader readership.
- Gender-based disinformation is frequently used on social media to attack and intimidate women politicians online.
- Vaccine scepticism is being shared on public Facebook pages in the Côte d'Ivoire. Two of the most widely circulated posts during the data collection period raise alarm at the prospect of unsafe vaccines being 'tested' on African citizens.
- Analysts identified several key disinformation narratives, including:
 - Claims that Guillaume Soro is planning the assassination of Alassane Ouattara.
 - Disinformation about COVID-19, with claims that the government is spreading the virus and that Chinese masks are contaminated. Posts denouncing attempts to treat Africa like a testing ground for COVID-19 vaccines.
 - Allegations of fraud focusing on allegations of non-Ivorian citizens registered on the lists during the period of revision of the electoral list.
- Fraud allegations mostly targeted the RHPD, especially government officials such as president Alassane Ouattara or president of national assembly Amadou Soumahoro. Allegations of fraud were observed for both registrations centres in Cote d'Ivoire and also in Ivorian embassies abroad. At a national level, fraud in registration centers in

Yamoussoukro and Aboisso were particularly discussed, in addition to suspicions of fraud in several embassies and consulates including the embassy of Côte d'Ivoire in the United States.

Potential Policy Implications

This first case study on online disinformation identified trends reflecting the Ivorian socio-political situation. It suggests the political consequences of this phenomenon, which in recent years has experienced a particular boom in Côte d'Ivoire due to the development of social networks. These consequences include the impact of disinformation about COVID on the population and more specifically the voters, then the impact of allegations of fraud during the revision of the electoral list, raising fears of challenges to the electoral process and a challenge to the integrity of the October 31, 2020 presidential election.

Disinformation articulated around COVID-19 initially led all Ivoirians to question the capacity of Côte d'Ivoire to respond effectively to the challenges posed by the fight against the pandemic. The false information relayed about this disease and the prevarication of the authorities at the beginning of the management of this health crisis led to strong criticism of the public authorities by certain populations. However, the public's perception of the quality of the management of the health crisis is probably one of the factors that will influence voters' choices, which will reflect either their satisfaction or their disapproval of the public authorities' management of the health crisis.

The false information relayed on social networks around the phase of the revision of the electoral list accentuated the lack of trust between part of the population and the institution in charge of organizing the elections, more specifically the Independent Electoral Commission (*la Commission électorale indépendante* - CEI). At this level, disinformation consisted of alleged collusion between the CEI and the ruling party. These two entities were suspected of illegal maneuvers aimed at registering certain segments of the population on the electoral list when they were not entitled to do so.

These allegations of fraud have consequently fostered on social networks a hostile rhetoric against populations from some of Côte d'Ivoire's neighboring countries suspected, rightly or wrongly, of wanting to influence the outcome of the upcoming elections in favor of a political camp. They have momentarily revived the issue of nationality and accentuated the social tensions perceptible in the various forums of discussion. They also motivated the opposition to demand an audit of the electoral list, even though it was already denouncing the current CEI and the lack of consensus around the electoral process.

But beyond that, this crisis of confidence between part of the population and the CEI can be analyzed as an extension of the lack of confidence in institutions in general. This state of affairs prolongs the debate on the concerns expressed by opposition actors at the end of the political dialogue held at the beginning of 2020 at the initiative of the Government. In short, online disinformation related to the electoral process is contributing to the growth of political and social tensions. This situation, which could worsen as the October 31, 2020 election date

approaches, is not likely to reassure the population that the next presidential election will be held in peaceful conditions.

Background

This first data collection centres on the first phase of the 2020 Ivorian elections: the revision of the electoral list which was originally scheduled from the 10th to the 24th of June, and was later [extended by the government](#) until the 5th of July 2020.¹ This sensitive but essential operation posed a series of challenges.

The Commission Electorale Indépendante (CEI or Independent Electoral Commission) set up over [10,800 registration centers](#) for new voters across (and in addition to new voters, people already on the electoral list and wishing to update their data Côte d'Ivoire and abroad for the Ivorian diaspora.² Prior to the process, [according to the CEI](#), there were 6,595,790 million registered voters, with an estimated 5 million who were eligible to vote and unregistered.³

The main challenge of the revision process is the registration of young people, who account for a significant proportion of the Ivorian population but remain under-registered. The revision of the electoral list is a key process to legitimize and ensure the outcome of the election reflects the choice of the majority of the Ivorian population.

The revision of the electoral list takes place under the authority of the CEI. The CEI is an independent administrative institution (“autorité administrative indépendante”) and has been in charge of presidential, legislative and local elections as well as referendums. In previous electoral cycles, key challenges have emerged due to the complexity of administrative processes and calls to boycott the revision of electoral lists by certain parties (this was the case of [the FPI](#) in 2015).⁴ During this 2020 revision, a number of fraud allegations emerged in relation to the process.

¹ http://www.gouv.ci/_actualite-article.php?recordID=11312

²

https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/06/11/en-cote-d-ivoire-les-electeurs-appelles-a-s-enroler_6042481_3212.html

³ *ibid.*

⁴ ivoirebusiness.net/photos/revision-de-la-liste-électorale-le-fpi-maintient-son-mot-d'ordre-de-boycott

Methodology

This case study focuses on data gathered from public Facebook pages and groups through the CrowdTangle application programme interface (API). Researchers worked with a local partner, the ODH to identify public Facebook pages that were influential or known to be a potential source of political information in the country, including those aligned with political actors and the wider media ecosystem. This list was supplemented with pages identified through interviews with experts at ISD and expanded programmatically through keyword searches and by identifying similar or linked pages. This list was reviewed by ODH to remove pages that were subsequently not deemed relevant. This seed list of groups and pages contained 237 Facebook pages and groups. Of these pages, 129 were active during the collection period.

1.2 million posts shared by these pages between April 1 and July 8 were collected. These were categorised by ODH by:

- Nature of the Page (for instance, media, political support group, cyberactivism)
- Any political affiliations of the Page (for instance, PDCI, RHDP)
- Purported geographical reach of the Page (for instance, Abidjan, national)
- How partisan the Page was (either generalist, partisan, or hyper-partisan)

Posts were subjected to a range of supervised and unsupervised algorithmic analyses, including comparative frequency analysis, as well as analyst-led supervised classification of posts gauging relevance to the election and relating to electoral fraud and gender.

Prior to analysis, posts were classified for relevancy. Page-based data collection invariably produces noise, requiring analysts to remove irrelevant posts. Analysts trained a natural language processing (NLP) classifier to identify posts not related to the election. The classifier performed well, with an overall accuracy of 70% and an accuracy of 78% on relevant posts. Irrelevant posts included those about music, soccer, sales material, advertising and posts primarily concerning news in other countries such as the US and UK. The final dataset underpinning this case study contained 731,000 posts (60 percent of the original data collected).⁵ A summary of the classification and data architecture is presented for clarity.




Fig 1: Methodology flowchart

⁵ This methodology can be referred to as 'peeling the onion', whereby categories of data are sequentially removed from the dataset and either discarded or analysed separately. Reducing the number of posts increases the ability of computational techniques to identify further relevant categories. To use an analogy, halving the size of the haystack increases how effectively you can find the needle.

Analysis

Pages and Groups

The research team began by characterising the Ivorian information space captured in the data collection to better understand the networks pages responsible for sharing the most influential content.

Analysts began by comparing the relative interactions of pages contained in the dataset to identify the most active and most widely interacted with outlets. There is a wide disparity in the levels of interaction by page, with some sharing tens of thousands of posts to large audiences during the collection period and others sharing just a handful. Those pages sharing at least ten thousand posts during the period are shown in the table below.

Page Name	# Posts	# Shares	# Comments
OBSERVATOIRE LIBRE DE LA CÔTE D'IVOIRE	73296	439552	1411531
OBSERVATOIRE DÉMOCRATIQUE EN CÔTE D'IVOIRE(VERSION ORIGINALE)	56260	77808	304731
RÉPUBLIQUE-PATRIE-NATION (RPN)	52020	60939	397794
A+ IVOIRE Fan Club: On se dit les GBÊ	47362	93249	1025620
OBSERVATOIRE DEMOCRATIQUE EN COTE D'IVOIRE (RELAIS)	40103	233553	1353211
LMP-RHDP-UNIFIE-PDCI-LIDER MOTS POUR MAUX	34430	31268	200691
CPI & CI: LIBEREZ GBAGBO, BLE ET LES PRISONNIERS POLITIQUES	27902	51085	254308
ON_DJINZIN_TOUT 	19296	43623	180246
GKS TEAM	18839	28464	40513
Ivoirien d'abord	15833	78595	152402

Fig 2: Top Pages/groups posting during the data collection period, shares and comments

The most active pages show that a range of unofficial political entities are dominating political discussions in Côte d'Ivoire. A number of pages, including OBSERVATOIRE DÉMOCRATIQUE EN CÔTE D'IVOIRE (VERSION ORIGINALE) are posting anti-RHDP content.

With the help of our local partner, OIDH, pages were categorised by whether they fell into one of three possible categories: generalist, partisan or hyper partisan. These categories were loosely defined as:

- **Generalist (48 pages):** A page with no obvious political affiliation, including news websites, civil society organisations not operating on behalf of a party or coalition, and discussion forums.
- **Partisan (73 pages):** A page with a political affiliation that on review was not judged to be dedicated to sharing content that was inflammatory, disinformation, or false.
- **Hyperpartisan (10 pages):** A page judged to be frequently sharing content that was inflammatory, disinformative, or false.

It should be noted that expert opinion, including that of OIDH, was that disinformation in the Ivorian information space was frequently being shared by major political organs, including official pages. Focusing only on hyper partisan pages risked missing this content.

Category	# Posts	# Shares	# Comments
Generalist	388511	1442411	5358928
Partisan	263897	1539903	2130121
Hyperpartisan	59657	180503	223874

Fig 3: Page categorisation, Posts, Shares and Comments

Category	% Pages	% Posts	% Shares	% Comments
Generalist	37	55	46	69
Partisan	56	37	49	28
Hyperpartisan	8	8	6	3

Fig 4: Page categorisation, Proportional Posts, Shares and Comments

Partisan pages make up more than half (56 percent) the pages we collected data from, with hyper-partisan making up less than 10 percent of pages and posts. It is noticeable that generalist pages were significantly more active than the partisan and hyperpartisan pages: the 48 generalist pages contributed over half (55 percent) the total posts in the dataset and received disproportionately high levels of engagement. This is consistent with the categorisation, with news and broader civil society groups able to appeal to a broader section of society than partisan political groups. This theme is reflected further in network analyses below.

Top Posts (Published)

Analysts looked to identify trends in the nature and types of content shared by these pages to understand the themes, types of posts and external sites most frequently appearing on Facebook in Côte d'Ivoire. These are the posts most frequently shared by page administrators and members of the groups in question. Analysed pages shared 731 thousand posts during the collection period. Posting levels were broadly consistent, averaging at just over 7,000 posts per day and peaking on the July 7 (10,504 posts). There is no clear spike related to an offline incident during this time.




Fig 5: Volume of Posts over Time

Posts were most commonly shared with photos: 44 percent of posts contained a photo, compared with 27 percent sharing a video. This underlines the importance of local partners in analysing content that a machine-learning algorithm trained on text may struggle to categorise, though Facebook's captions allowed the team to categorise based on additional text included in the post. Around one in ten posts shared a link to a third-party site.

Post Type	# Posts	# Shares	# Comments
photo	320784	1609931	4243998
video	194507	1463549	976085
status	118607	244657	2674778
link	96862	187509	356162

Fig 6: Post Type, Posts, Shares and Comments

Central to this analysis is the identification of posts shared by multiple pages to identify messages spreading across the ecosystem rather than being pushed by a single page. The table below shows those messages that were shared by the greatest number of pages. Identifying these pages allows us to understand the networks in which messaging is circulating.

Post Text	# Times Posted	# Pages Posted To
CORONAVIRUS URGENT 🤖⚠️ LA GUERRE EST DÉCLARÉE.. NE PASSER PAS DEVANT CETTE VIDÉO SANS PARTAGER !! Ramous	364	64
No comment !	205	45
NON AU VACCIN C-19 EN AFRIQUE NOUS NE SOMMES PAS DES COBAYES	176	45
IVOIRIEN ECOUTEZ TRES BIEN	150	43
Jeudi, c'est Koulibaly! «Une ordonnance, 1700 milliards de fcfa et des factures d'électricité ...» MamKoul2020 décortique l'actualité et pose les vraies questions. #PasVuALaRti #SoyonsKoul ❤️	115	42
Le docteur congolais qui a découvert l'artemisia Gérôme Muyangi, fait des déclarations qui donnent froid dans le dos dans cette vidéo. À regarder absolument. Africains ouvrent les yeux. 🤔🤔🤔🤔🤔🤔🤔	111	42

Fig 7: Most frequently shared posts among page administrators

These posts vary widely, but contain some concerning content. Most notable is a video about coronavirus by YouTuber Ramous.⁶ The video, shared on 64 pages, is a reaction to a TV debate in France during which two leading doctors suggested that COVID-19 vaccine tests should be done in Africa to check if they are effective. The video criticises French colonial attitudes and the French government's handling of COVID. In the video, the YouTuber then calls on the African people to “not give in” and let themselves be experimented on (“You're not lab rats”).

This theme is echoed in another of the top posts: a video of a woman identified as Lise Manzabi saying that Africa is not a testing ground for COVID-19 vaccines.⁷ “If you want to

⁶ [Ramous - CORONAVIRUS URGENT 🤖⚠️ LA GUERRE EST DÉCLARÉE.....](#)

⁷ [casarhema - SAUVONS L'AFRIQUE](#)

conduct tests on someone, do it on your cats and dogs”. The speaker then goes on to denounce European attitudes towards Africa and the handling of the migration crisis (i.e. treatment of African migrants by European coastguards).

The video then calls on the African people to “not fear the virus” and get rid of the politicians who have been in power for a long time in Africa. The video is somewhat ambiguous as the speaker says that millions of people die in Africa everyday from other causes than COVID-19 (famine, violence...etc.) and that governments try to scare the population with the pandemic.

These two posts were shared by 72 of the pages in the dataset, over half the active pages during the collection period. Although the videos are not explicitly anti-vaccination or conspiratorial, they play heavily into the narrative that a future COVID vaccination may not be safe.

A further review of the data gathered allowed the team to identify key topics of discussion.

Strong polarisation around allegations that defence minister Hamed Bakayoko was involved in drug trafficking.

The most linked piece of content is a [video](#) by preacher Camille Makosso alleging that the terror attack on Côte d’Ivoire’s borders in June and allegations of drug trafficking involving Hamed Bakayoko are a conspiracy to undermine the government.



In the video, Makosso claims that every Ivoirian is free to support any candidate he/she likes before adding: “The plot that is currently being fomented against Minister Hamed Bayayoko is a programme, a plan, a strategy in a broader *coup d’Etat*.”

Hamed Bakayoko’s drug trafficking story (with the hashtag #cocainegate) has been referenced in pro and anti-government messages. The post below by anti-RHDP activist Souley de Paris is an example of popular content that was shared in response to the drug trafficking allegations. Some Internet users believe that Hamed Bakayoko was involved, in some way or another, in

the attack in Kafalo in order to turn public attention away from the drug-related allegations being launched against him.



The terrorist attack of Kafalo which occurred in June 2020

Some posts share an alarmist point of view for Cote d’Ivoire in the aftermath of these attacks, one of the most shared posts blames the government for letting the attack happen.

This post was one of the most shared links, it is a 20 minute video accusing the government of letting the Kafalo attacks happen.



COVID-19-related disinformation

Posts about COVID-19 were aimed at sowing confusion. This included allegations that authorities are deliberately spreading the virus and that Chinese masks are infected with the virus, or that Coronavirus was being spread deliberately to destabilise African states, Côte d’Ivoire included. In the following [post](#), the Ivorian government is accused of helping to spread the virus.

“MA RÉPONSE CINGLANTE A DOUMBIA MAJOR GRIOT DU RHPD. DES MÉDECINS IVOIRIENS CONTAMINÉ DES MILITAIRES DES GENDARMES

POURQUOI LE GOUVERNEMENT IVOIRIEN VEUT FORCÉMENT QUE LE CORONA VIRUS S'INSTALLE EN CA"

In this post, the contamination of masks made in China is questioned, this post encourages the fabrication of masks in Côte d'Ivoire.

"LES MASQUES CHINOIS SONT ILS CONTAMINÉS ? L'ITALIE A DÉCIDÉ DE FABRIQUER SES PROPRES MASQUES. NOUS SOMMES EN GUERRE DONC NOUS DEMANDONS A TOUS LES COUTURIERS DE CÔTE D'IVOIRE DE CONFECTIONNER"

A [video](#) by Mwazulu Diyabanza Siwa Lemba Official for the protection of Africa which received over 850 interactions and 131 comments titled "CORONAVIRUS SCANDAL SCANDAL: THE ATTACK STRATEGY OF AFRICA'S ENEMIES" shows Diyabanza argue that there is a concerted plan to "systematically eradicate" part of the population's globe by not taking care of illness which have ravaged Africa (including malaria).⁸ He then urges viewers to "refuse vaccines" and claims that Western nations want COVID-19 to spread close to the Equator as it is a prime spot to launch rockets for spatial exploration.

CORONAVIRUS SCANDALE SCANDALE : LA STRATÉGIE D'ATTAQUE DES ENNEMIS DE L'AFRIQUE.

Taken together, this is worrying evidence of the speed at which COVID misinformation and disinformation is spread on the platform. Two of the most widely-shared posts are sharing vaccine skepticism, and a number of widely-followed mouthpieces are posting content supporting this narrative.

Top Posts (interaction)

Analysts explored the posts receiving the most interactions: shares, likes and comments. The most widely shared piece of content across our dataset was a lengthy video titled "The Hamed Bakayoko affair: why so much hate and meanness". Bakayoko is Côte d'Ivoire's defence minister and has been recently implicated in a case of drug trafficking. The video lasts 1.5 hours and features evangelical preacher Camille Makosso. In the video, Makosso denounces the alleged 'conspiracy' to bring down Bakayoko and destabilise the government. Makosso describes the [jihadist attack](#) that took place on the border with Burkina Faso on June 11 as a fake attempt to destabilise the government.⁹

Out of the 15 most shared pieces of content, 11 were produced by "Souley de Paris". Souley de Paris is an Ivorian opposition influencer with over 125k followers on his Facebook page. He describes himself as the "RHDP's worst nightmare" and appears to be a supporter of Guillaume Soro, former PM of Côte d'Ivoire (2007-2012), who was recently [sentenced](#) to 20

⁸ <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=209615113796177>

⁹ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/ivory-coast-creates-northern-military-zone-deadly-attack-200714063028703.html>

years in prison for embezzlement of public funds.¹⁰ Soro, once an ally of current president Alassane Ouattara, has recently been accused of plotting against the president. In his videos, Souley de Paris attacks the government's handling of various events, including the June terror attack. Another widely shared video is an anti-RHDP clip produced by DJVolcano showing a mash-up of Alassane Ouattara's declarations with satirical commentary in the background attacking the government's record.

The fact that 11 of Souley de Paris's videos feature in the top 15 pieces of content receiving the most interactions shows that anti-government content is performing well in political discussions. While Mokosso's conspiratorial video argues that there are attempts to destabilise Côte d'Ivoire, he does not explicitly endorse the government in place.

Post Themes

Of the remaining messages shared at least 10 times which included a dataset of 67 posts, analysts identified several key disinformation narratives, including:

- [Claims](#) that Guillaume Soro is planning the assassination of Alassane Ouattara
- Disinformation about COVID-19, with claims that the government is spreading the virus and that Chinese masks are contaminated
- Claims that the terror attack in June was an attempt to destabilize the regime (including Mokosso's video)
- Posts denouncing attempts to treat Africa like a testing ground for COVID-19 vaccines

One [post](#) which highlighted past political events in Cote d'Ivoire (i.e Soro and Ouattara not respecting the outcome in previous elections referencing the 2010 events).

"HIER 11 AVRIL 2020 CELA FAIT 9 ANS QUE SORO GUILLAUME ET OUATTARA ALASSANE DRAMANE ONT MASSACRÉ LE PEUPLE IVOIRIEN N'ONT PAS RESPECTÉ LES URNES MAIS ONT PRÉFÉRÉ LA FORCE DES ARMES"

The post above accuses Soro and current president Ouattara of slaughtering the Ivorian people, as they dismissed the outcome of the election using force.

¹⁰ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-52457131>

Page Network

By identifying pages that have shared similar content, we are able to characterize the dataset as a whole, providing a new window into the Ivorian Facebook information environment. These network graphs show the extent to which Facebook pages reshared content from one another, showing the influential nodes for the spread of information.

An overall network map is shown below. Key areas are highlighted in the map below, followed by a closer look at some important parts of the network. Nodes are colored by the page categorisation: green nodes are generalist, yellow are partisan and red are hyperpartisan. Nodes are connected by posts they have in common, shown on the map in grey.




Fig 8: Overall network

The overall network shows a broad split between a generalist center and a partisan fringe. At the heart of the network, the two accounts associated with the Observatoire Democratique are by some distance the largest nodes in the network. Posts shared by these nodes tended to be shared across the network of Facebook accounts. By contrast, a range of different partisan groups are clustered on the fringes of the network. Their affiliations are indicated in the graph below.





Fig 9: Overall network, clusters by political affiliation


Pages tended to cluster around political groupings. Specifically, clusters supporting the RHDP, PDCI, FPI and GPS tended to share similar posts to one another. There is a notable proximity between pages affiliated with the RHDP and those of the civil society and other generalist pages: this indicates that the RHDP-affiliated pages are more likely to be sharing similar content to general news reporting. We believe this is likely a function of being the ruling coalition, as news reportage of everyday Ivorian politics will bleed into coalition- and party-political discourse.

Images showing each cluster are presented below.


PDCI




FPI




Civil Society



RHDP



GPS/GKS



Figs 10-14: Page clusters in the overall network reflecting political affiliation

This map presents a secondary layer of understanding influential pages in our network. We find that civil society organizations and media classed by ODH as generalists do in fact offer a gateway into the wider political community, with messaging shared in these groups able to penetrate the partisan fringes of Ivorian Facebook political chatter. However, there are clear partisan groupings that have formed around political parties and coalitions where messaging is more contained and distinct: posts shared by these pages tend to be shared by pages with similar political leanings, the so-called echo chamber effect. We find no evidence at this stage of hyper-partisan groups operating across non-political axes.

Top Links

Analysts extracted the URLs linked to by posts during the collection period. The table below identifies those third-party sites most frequently linked to by pages in the dataset, as well as showing the relative number of shares and comments those posts received.

Site	Description	# Posts	# Shares	# Comments
www.facebook.com	Social Media	543497	3078358	5335281
www.afriksoir.net	News	5327	20623	33166
www.operanewsapp.com	News, Low Quality	5303	793	1546
buff.ly	Web Routing	4486	7899	4884
www.afrique-sur7.fr	News	4331	11044	25211
ivoiremessagers.com	News	3389	1961	455
aip.ci	News	3332	1900	724
www.koaci.com	News	2737	49354	26149
youtu.be	Social Media	2586	5371	5496
www.actualiteivoire.info	News	2522	9891	17577
ivoirnews24.net	News	1605	177	256
www.yeclo.com	News	1343	1879	2890
www.africanewsquick.net	News	1319	702	457
www.ivoirematin.com	News	1308	540	601
www.linfodrome.com	News	868	1136	1535
www.lecourrierquotidien.com	News, Low Quality	748	1673	2997
news.abidjan.net	News	711	18572	53267
businessactuality.com	News	690	333	396
apr-news.fr	News	643	541	780
cdn-af.feednews.com	News, Low Quality*	532	113	441

Fig 15: Top links, posts, shares and comments

*This link returns to operanewsapp.com

The vast majority of links are to news websites. At this time, three of the links connect through to low quality news websites, including two separate links to the operanewsapp.com, identified by OIHD as a place where disinformation is frequently found. In the past, however, state disinformation has turned on reposting government propaganda through sites that look similar to the sites in this list.¹¹ Further investigation would be required to identify whether or not these sites represent a similar effort.

¹¹ For instance, Sudan Daily, which according to the Stanford Internet Observatory was a front for Russian-backed Sputnik news, <https://imgur.com/a/znihCif>

Analysts also filtered the data to known state-sponsored media outlets, focusing on Russia and China. Only two such websites appear in the data: Sputnik.fr was the most frequently linked, appearing 57 times on 29 pages (and shared 67 times by Facebook users). Français.rt.com appeared 21 times on 12 pages (and shared 13 times by Facebook users). No links to CGTN or CCTV were found. Seven pages, shown in the table below, shared links to both.

Page Name	Sputnik	RT
GBAGBO ET GOUDÉ	4	1
LMP-RHDP-UNIFIE-PDCI-LIDER MOTS POUR MAUX	5	1
OBSERVATOIRE DEMOCRATIQUE EN CÔTE D'IVOIRE (RELAIS)	4	1
OBSERVATOIRE DÉMOCRATIQUE EN CÔTE D'IVOIRE (VERSION ORIGINALE)	34	4
OBSERVATOIRE LIBRE DE LA CÔTE D'IVOIRE	18	3
RENAISSANCE AFRICAINE LUTTE POUR L'INDÉPENDANCE	20	4
RÉPUBLIQUE-PATRIE-NATION (RPN)	8	2

Fig 16: Pages linking to both RT and Sputnik (# Posts)

In general, the numbers are low. However, given that the Observatoire Democratique en Côte d'Ivoire is a widely used discussion forum, it may be useful to recommend that it carry out fact-checking before publishing links to these information sites. These sites are linked to the Russian state and are known to spread disinformation.

Finally, effort was made to identify efforts to move discussions into closed platforms. 237 posts by 47 pages shared links to WhatsApp conversations, some of which explicitly did so around the spread of COVID misinformation. One example, shared by the Ligue de Defense Noire Africaine, is shown below.

● #FLASHINFO Dr Muyembe (le pion de l'impérialisme états-unien) sous la pression du peuple africain , Se rétracte: "Mon intention en parlant de vaccin Covid-19 n'était pas d'affirmer que nous allons commencer la vaccination en RDC, sans qu'il soit testé auparavant en Amérique et ailleurs...Je suis moi-même congolais et ne permettrais jamais d'utiliser les congolais comme cobayes"

LA LDNA

Pour Nous, par Nous Pour l'Afrique !

Snapchat : 🤖 Ldnaofficiel

Twitter:ldnaofficiel

▶ "Adhérez à la LDNA en participant à nos différentes action."Inscrivez-vous En cliquant sur le lien de contact pour devenir adhérent.
<https://liguededefensenoireafricaine.com/contact/>

.....
○ Pour soutenir la LDNA
👉 <https://www.paypal.me/LDNA>

.....
i Signalement@negrophobie.fr
Rejoint-nous sur Whatsapp :
+xxx

✗ Utilisez ce lien pour intégrer notre groupe WhatsApp Agir ensemble pour l'intérêt commun de l'Afrique en Afrique :
<https://chat.whatsapp.com/Ga1SSxQaWj22VK4KJkm3fd>

Abonne toi et reste connecté avec ta communauté !
.....

#Covid19 #Vaccin #Ldna #IAfriqueNestPasUnlaboratoire #Congo.

It is likely that some monitoring efforts to explore the content on these pages will provide a valuable window into COVIS misinformation circulating on closed platforms in the country.

Keyword Comparison by Category

Prior to a deeper thematic analysis, analysts ran a computational comparison across the three categories of page to better understand the differences in language used by each page. Posts were tokenised into monograms and a comparative frequency analysis was run across the three categories of generalist, partisan and hyperpartisan to identify words that, on average, were more likely to be used by those pages. The results of this comparison are shown in the table below.

Generalist		Partisan		Hyperpartisan	
Keyword	Freq	Keyword	Freq	Keyword	Freq
#aip	+7%	président	+18%	gbagbo	+32%
drogba	+6%	2020	+15%	président	+26%
fif	+6%	soro	+14%	laurent	+22%
#civ	+4%	ouattara	+13%	soro	+20%
souscrire	+4%	ministre	+12%	guillaume	+18%
24h24	+4%	guillaume	+11%	ouattara	+15%
l'info	+4%	rhdp	+11%	d'ivoire	+12%
notifications	+4%	rdcp	+11%	nous	+11%
n'hésite	+4%	votre	+10%	notre	+11%
koaci	+4%	politique	+10%	ivoiriens	+10%

Fig 17: Most surprising keywords by page category

The comparison supports the conclusion that the generalist pages are, for the most part, sharing news. The news that Didier Drogba, perhaps Côte d'Ivoire's most well-known soccer player, was running for president of the Ivorian Football Federation was widely reported by news agencies in the country but not reported by partisan and hyper-partisan groups.¹² The appearance of news-specific monograms, such as *24h24* and *notifications* further strengthens this case.

Partisan and hyper-partisan pages, by contrast, are significantly more political in the words that appear more frequently in their posts. Of the twenty words identified, 14 are overtly political, and the remainder are strongly connected with politics and campaigning.

¹² It is worth noting that although the relevancy classifier did a reasonably good job of removing football-related content, the presence of the monogram *president* in the story about Didier Drogba's election campaign is likely to have swung the classifier towards categorising it as of relevance to the country's 2020 election.

The presence of *nous*, *notre*¹³ and *ivoiriens* in the hyperpartisan column speaks to the use of a political language not found in the more mainstream pages. References to key political figures in Côte d’Ivoire, including Guillaume Soro, Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara are explored further in analyses below, but the results of the comparative frequency analysis places these topics firmly in the court of partisan and hyper-partisan political pages.

Hyper-partisan pages are more likely to reference political outsiders such as Soro and Gbagbo as opposed to the RHDP in power, suggesting oppositional content.

Fraud




Fig 18: Fraud-related posts over time

Allegations of fraud were identified as a central narrative in the dataset, with mostly allegations of non-Ivorian citizens registered on the lists during the period of revision of the electoral list. Fraud allegations mostly targeted the RHPD, especially government officials such as president Alassane Ouattara or president of national assembly Amadou Soumahoro. Allegations of fraud were observed for both registrations centres in Côte d’Ivoire and also in Ivorian embassies abroad.

At a national level, fraud in registration centres in Yamoussoukro and Aboisso were particularly discussed, in addition to suspicions of fraud in several embassies and consulates. In a group called “FPI GBAGBO” a post mentioned an alleged employee from the Ivorian consulate Washington DC consulate who claimed to have witnessed the registration of non-nationals on the electoral lists. The reactions to the fraud allegations

¹³ *Nous* and *notre* mean *we* and *our*, respectively.

were polarized, with some questioning the electoral process and encouraging voters to reject the electoral process altogether. Examples are shown below.

Fraud allegation against president of National Assembly Amadou Soumahoro, and a fraud allegation in Aboisso:

Konan Herve Dje shared a post.
15 June

La Guépe
14 June

Amadou soumahoro pris en flagrant délit a cet instant T de fraude électorale a Séguéla. Établissement des fausses cartes d'identité pour les étrangers et procède à leur inscription sur la liste électorale.

Amadou Soumahoro caught in the act at this moment T of election fraud in Séguéla. Preparation of fake identity cards for foreigners and register them on the electoral list.

Sangare24.com
14 June

● RÉSEAU DE FRAUDE À ABOISSO

LE JEUNE HOMME auprès des doyens répond au Nom de #YALA_NASSIROU, BURKINABE de père et de mère.

par stupéfaction, ces derniers temps le petit vivant dans la commune de Port-Bouet chez son Oncle a regagné sur ABOISSO où vie ses deux parents biologiques de nationalité burkinabé tous deux sans jamais renoncer à leur nationalité.

Le hic dans cette affaire, est que le petit YALA NASSIROU s'est trouvé un réseau de constitution de bétail électoral à ABOISSO qu'il a intégré pour avoir un certificat de nationalité tout en gardant son même Nom YALA NASSIROU.

L'information à notre possession est que son réseau lui aurait attaché une autre mère de nationalité ivoirienne.

YALA NASSIROU s'est s'inscrit sur la liste électorale dans la commune de PORT BOUET avec des documents obtenus de façons frauduleuses.

Il attend maintenant sa carte NATIONALE d'identité qui sortira dans quelques jours.

Voilà ce qu'est devenu mon cher pays la CÔTE D'IVOIRE.

Sangare24.com

● fraud network in ABOISSO

THE YOUNG MAN with the Elders answers the name of #s _ NASSIROU, father and mother.

In surprise, recently, the little living in the commune of Port-Bouet at his uncle has returned to ABOISSO where his two biological parents of Burkina Faso both live without ever giving up their nationality.

The problem in this case is that little's NASSIROU has found himself an electoral cattle constitution network in ABOISSO which he integrated to have a certificate of nationality while keeping his same name's NASSIROU.

The information to our possession is that his network would have attached another mother of Ivorian nationality.

's NASSIROU has joined the electoral list in the municipality of PORT BOUET with documents obtained in fraudulent ways.

He is now waiting for his NATIONAL ID card coming out in a few days.

This is what my dear country has become.

Example of a comment under one of the most shared videos of Afrique Media TV on RHDP fraud allegations which calls to reject the outcome of the elections:

[Orpi Presi](#) : DRAMANE N'EST PAS DANS LA LOGIQUE DE DISCUTER AVEC QUELQU'UN ON PERD NOTRE TEMPS. ORGANISATION NOUS. GBAGBO A DIT: LA MORT VAUT MIEUX QUE LE DÉSHONNEUR

A final example of a fraud allegation targeting the Washington consulate.

Pro-RHDP voices have rejected fraud allegations targeting the government. For instance, under a video of Afrique Media Tv reporting on allegations of fraud by RHDP, the party's supporters accused the opposition of paying the media to spread false narratives. Mostly, pro-RHDP voices emphasize that fraud narratives were used in previous electoral cycles in Cote d'Ivoire to destabilize and undermine the electoral process.

These accounts claim that opposition parties are already preparing Ivorian citizens to dismiss the results of the elections and fuel an insurrection in October. Some of these posts claim that allegations of fraud could lead to violence. For example, this post rejecting allegations of fraud targeting the RHDP.

 Loraine Kpalou
12 June

**URGENT URGENT !!!!DAME
AKALE RELEVÉE DE SON
POSTE DU SERVICE
CONSULAIRE
(WASHINGTON) POUR
REFUS DE PARTICIPER A
UNE FRAUDE ELECTORALE
400 VOTES TRUQUES
DEJAS A L'AMBASSADE**

 Marc Alain Gbane Depleya
16 June

**GBAGBO A ACCUSÉ F.H. BOIGNY DE
FRAUDES EN 90, GUEI EN 2000, LE
RHDP 2010... IL A DÉJÀ COMMENCÉ
POUR 2020. ET C EST TOUJOURS SA
MÊME STRATÉGIE....les fronts
préparent toujours l'esprit des
populations à l'insurrection.**

Gbagbo has the ACCUSED of FRAUD in 90, GUEI in 2000, the rhdp 2010... He has already started for 2020. and it's still his same strategy.... the fronts are still preparing the spirit of people at the uprising.

Fraud allegations have led to xenophobic comments, with non-ivorians stigmatized online. The registration of non-Ivorians who have received an Ivorian nationality card (necessary to get registered on the lists) is a key polarising narrative. Comments frequently target nationals from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea.

Tu es étranger et tu connais pas ta place. Tu es toujours dans les histoires de fraudes à l'identité. C'est quel modèle d'étranger ça ??

Disinformation targeting the CEI (commission électorale indépendante or independent electoral commission) has also been observed throughout the registration process. Several fraud allegations were found including the CEI granting the authority to handle the electoral list database to Fabrice Sawegnon's organization even though he has been previously accused of committing fraud in favour of RHDP candidates.

“Ce grave délit d'initié est largement suffisant pour jeter le discrédit sur tout le processus d'enrôlement en cours . Tous les partis de l'opposition significative doivent faire bloc pour exiger la suspension du recensement électoral”

“Cette révélation doit être un échantillon de la vaste fraude électorale que préparait ce régime.”

Gender





Fig 19: Gender-related posts over Time, showing the spike in posts related to Yasmina Ouégnin

The team analysed the database of relevant messages to identify narratives pertinent to the question of gendered disinformation and violence, using keywords identified by ODH. We queried our dataset with the following keywords: Yasmina Ouégnin, pute, bordelle, #Yasmina Ouégnin, vox populi bordelle and ibiekisse.

The youngest member of Côte d'Ivoire's Parliament, Yasmina Ouégnin was identified as a key target of gendered disinformation. In early July, Ouégnin's office in Cocody was targeted with abusive graffiti. An analysis of most popular content in our dataset showed that posts were overwhelmingly supportive of Ouégnin and denounced the abuse. This is one example of such a post.




The number of crossposts was extremely limited, which suggests close to no networked disinformation around this candidate.



In addition to reviewing most popular content, we qualitatively reviewed all mentions of Yasmina Ouégnin (using “Yasmina” as a keyword) in our dataset. The vast majority of posts were favourable to Ms Ouégnin and condemned the abuse.

Posts have expressed concerns about how this type of attack could influence the pre-election climate. Yasmina Ouégnin’s proposal to hold primaries for the PDCI has attracted a lot of criticism and is believed to be at the origin of the attack against her offices. One example is this Post expressing concerns that misogynistic attacks against Ouegnin could influence the climate of the elections.



While we could not identify any posts that promoted clear disinformation about Ouegnin or hateful misogynistic content targeting, this does not mean that this content does not exist. The absence of abusive posts could be due to the type of Facebook content we were able to source via commercial tools.

The team reanalysed the database of relevant messages to identify narratives pertinent to the question of gendered disinformation and violence, using keywords identified by ODH. We queried our dataset with around 40 keywords¹⁴ gathered by the team at NDI and ODH and supplemented by keywords submitted by the ISD and CASM. This increased the number of posts identified as gender-related from 851 to 2,165 (0.3% of the total dataset). An evaluation of the keywords was carried out to identify both the most frequently-used terms identified by the lexicon and to identify where keywords may be bringing in irrelevant (non-gender-related) posts. The frequency of posts by keywords are shown below.

Gendered Keywords and their Respective # Posts			
nulle	752	Gouassou	21
ronde	287	chienne	20
Yasmina Ouegnin	217	bordelle	17
sèche	148	cuisinière	16
maman bulldozer	135	tchatcholi	12
mercon	120	femme blanche	11
vilaine	114	#YasminaOuegnin	8
kanga	98	griote	4
cafard	90	prostitution politique	4
djandjou	41	babié	2
babiè	32	escadron de mort	2
Ibièkissé	32	djantra mouso	1
pute	29	vagabondage politique	1

Fig 20: Gender-related keywords with associated post frequency

¹⁴ pute, bordelle, Yasmina Ouegnin, #YasminaOuegnin, vox populi bordelle, Ibièkissé, kandiarousse / kandialarousse, fologa, escadron de mort, djandjou, djantra mouso, chienne, fille de pute, batarde, mercon, babiè, babié, vilaine, nyàmogo déni, sèche, ronde, griote, femme qui pisse par derrière, femme blanche, cuisinière, kanga, Gouassou, Boussouman / boussoumani, kafri, cohbala, poupeé barby, poupeé barbie, maîtresse de Houphouët, tchatcholi, maîtresse de photocopie, femme wouya wouya, maman bulldozer, nulle, cafard, vendeuse de banane, attardée, prostitution politique, vagabondage politique, politicienne sans conviction.

Four keywords stand out: *nulle*, *ronde*, *sèche* and Yasmina Ouegnin, the subject of the majority of the previous gender analysis. However, the frequency of keywords like *nulle* and *ronde* may be attributable to these words being used in multiple contexts, or with multiple meanings. For the purposes of this analysis, analysts ignored posts containing *nulle*, *ronde*, *sèche* because these words are too generic and we are unable to isolate the specific uses of these words which constitute gender-based disinformation. Overall, the majority of posts still referenced Yasmina Ouegnin, and the spikes in the data above relate to two-widely shared messages by the politician. To explore the data, analysts examined the keywords that had more than 30 posts. Overall, the data we've gathered suggests that *maman bulldozer*, *mercon*, *babiè / babièrè*, *vilaine*, *lbièkissè* and *djandou* are problematic words and phrases that can be used to harass women online. One potential effect of these words is to discourage women from participating in politics. A more detailed analysis of each word or phrase is presented below.¹⁵

Maman bulldozer (135 posts)

Maman bulldozer is an expression frequently used by the media in Côte d'Ivoire to refer to Health Minister Anne-Désirée Ouloto. Much of the conversation mentioning 'maman bulldozer' focuses on a song by artists Yodé et Siro, whose recently released album contains several anti-government and anti-Ouattara songs. One of the songs reads: "Beware the people who no longer speak, because when things heat up, no fence will be left to take down because maman bulldozer will have destroyed everything." The song has been negatively received by the government.

Pro-RHDP politician Doumbia Major allegedly requested that the singers be tried for slander. Many posts using the keyword "maman bulldozer" are critical of the government - alleging that the government wants to silence critical voices or praising the song. While the use of *maman bulldozer* is limited to Anne-Désirée Ouloto, it is nonetheless an example of gender-based disinformation because this type of aggressive attack can discourage other women from participating in politics.

Mercon (120 posts)

The term *mercon* - an insult frequently used to express contempt, was used in 120 messages, many of which targeted Laurent Gbagbo, his supporters, as well as other politicians. The word was also used in generalist content to refer to men and women who are not involved in Ivorian politics. When used to target women, the word "*mercon*" should be considered an example of gender-based disinformation because the word has a sexually degrading connotation.

¹⁵ We note that the word "kanga," while appearing 98 times in the data, is not necessarily an example of gender-based disinformation because this word also refers to a common surname in Côte d'Ivoire.



Babiè/babière (32 posts)

This word was commonly used in conjunction with mercon as a general insult as shown in the examples below. In most cases, the word was used in a general sense rather than as a means of attacking women. However, because of the sexualized nature of the word, any use of the term to attack women can be considered a form of gender-based disinformation.


*Tout ceux qui sont ivoiriens que côté maman leur
babière et mercon de leur ancêtres*

Les gors moi Gbagbo je dis votre babière mercon matin midi soir


*On va se voir dans ce pays après le départ du rhdp, babière la
espèce de petit voyou d'abobo. mercon encore*

Vilaine (114 posts)

The word "vilaine" was used in a variety of posts referring to women, including women in politics. The term was frequently used to describe Marie-Odetta Lourougnon Gnbry, a pro-Gbagbo activist, as shown in the post below.



The term is used to describe immoral and corrupt behavior. It has also appeared in articles that sexually degrade women or denigrate their appearance. Overall, the word “vilaine” is a commonly used form of gender-based disinformation that can have the effect of discouraging women from participating in politics. Examples are provided below:

- *Les filles coûte et Vilaine là de la manière leurs bouche est kplê kplê kplê kplê.*

- *Tu es vilaine je te drague tu fais malin hummm femme dès*
- *Pourquoi les jolies filles aiment se promener avec les vilaine fille même ??*
- *Tu est vilaine c'est toi qui cherche jolie garçon ma chéri clé de gbaka peux pas démarre ranger rover*

Ibièkissè (32 posts)

Ibiekessè appears to be used in a gendered context to refer to women, including prominent women in politics and Ivorian life. We identified a widely-shared post attacking Marie-Odette Lourougnon Gnabry, a member of the FPI, including the post below (which is no longer available on Facebook). The post claims that Lourougnon-Gnabry had an affair with a politician a few years ago and goes on calling her a prostitute.

#MARIE_ODETTE_LOROUGNON_GNABRY ibiekissè...ibièkissè encore ibièkissè...
Voici une coiffeuse de profession qui avait son salon de coiffure à la cité Fairmont qui entretenait une relation amoureuse avec un Refondateur à l'époque et qui grâce à la médiocrité du régime GBAGBO à l'époque se croit outillée depuis cet époque pour la politique. Voici une traite qui partait prendre son salaire de député avec SORO GUILLAUME à l'époque président de l'Assemblée nationale pendant les comptes bancaires de ses collègues du FPI était gelé. Voici une ingrate qui a empoché la baguette somme en chèque de 12.500.000 FCFA qui lui a été remis par président ADO le 11 août 2011 quand elle est allée lui rendre visite au palais présidentielle lui exprimant ses difficultés financières. Voici une haineuse qui n'aime pas les Dioula alors sa fille est mariée à un dioula pire ce dernier est le père de sa première petite fille en plus c'est celui ci même qui l'a aidé en 2011 à sortir du pays et filer vers le Ghana. J'aimerais donc dire à cette ordure de prostitués des refondateurs que ce n'est pas le comportement immoral et la haine qui vous aideront à reconquérir le Pouvoir. Encore IBIEKISSÈ...

Djandjou (41 posts)

The term “djanjou” has also been used in posts attacking Lorougnon. One post which received 89 reactions features a picture of Lorougnon alongside misogynistic insults, including an alternative spelling of mercon (mère con).



Conclusion

Overall, there is worrying evidence of a combination of forces driving disinformation and misinformation in the country. We present a view of civil society and news organisations sharing misinformation, particularly around COVID, from low quality news sources and reaching a political audience. Within these political clusters, a further layer of political commentary focusing on fraud and electoral malpractice is circulating. Narratives, like the use of Côte d'Ivoire as a testing ground for unsafe COVID vaccines, cross this boundary, and circulate freely among both our generalist pages and those classified as partisan or hyper-partisan: this messaging cuts across traditional coalition- and party-political affiliations.

Recommendations:

These are addressed to key stakeholders who can mitigate the impact of online disinformation through their decisions and actions.

❖ To the Ivorian government

- Strengthen communication around the health crisis of COVID-19 in order to prevent or mitigate false information related to the pandemic and aimed at manipulating public opinion in Côte d'Ivoire;
- Communicate regularly about the management of the COVID-19 pandemic in order to restore the confidence of the population in the public policies implemented to fight this pandemic;
- Maintain political dialogue with all stakeholders in the electoral process in order to address the pitfalls and challenges related to the electoral

process and to mitigate the impact of disinformation that could undermine the socio-political climate;

- Consider punitive measures to protect women involved in politics who could be the target of disinformation campaigns on social networks that humiliate them or undermine their dignity and reputation;
- Guarantee equitable access by the public media to all political views in the country;

❖ **To political actors**

- Refrain from speeches and actions likely to weaken social cohesion or deteriorate the socio-political climate;
- Refrain from speeches and publications (texts or videos, etc.) calling for violence, hatred or xenophobia;
- Take the necessary measures to avoid the propagation or dissemination of false sensitive information by pages or accounts under their responsibility;
- Sensitize and train their activists and followers on good democratic practices and on a gender-sensitive democratic culture;

❖ **To the administrators of the platforms or discussion forums of a political nature and proximity pages**

- Prioritize content that has a credible source;
- Develop a common charter including sanctions against the authors of hate speech, xenophobic, racist, sexist or false information likely to disturb public order;
- Mitigate false information about COVID-19 by making official national or international (WHO) sources accessible to users seeking information;
- Cooperate with public health authorities to report and remove erroneous publications relating to COVID-19;
- Scrupulously ensure rigorous moderation of the content published on discussion forums in order to identify and censor publications calling for hatred, xenophobia or of a nature to disturb public order;
- Raise awareness among the members of their groups or fora on the legal provisions punishing the dissemination of fake news;

❖ **To the public media and online information sites actors**

- Cover the socio-political and electoral current events by scrupulously observing ethical journalistic principles;
- Contribute to the strengthening of social cohesion and a peaceful electoral climate;
- Contribute to the training and education of the population in democratic culture and peace;

❖ **To civil society actors**

- Promote media and information literacy;
- Contribute to the education of social network users by making them aware of the harmful effects of electoral disinformation and democratic culture;
- Create forums for citizen exchanges on social networks to raise awareness of democratic culture;

- Create a synergy of action between civil society actors working on the issue of disinformation.