

Local Elections, Long Term Effects?

The Hong Kong District Council Elections of 2011



A Hong Kong Transition Project Report for
The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
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Background to the principals

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization working to support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and accountability in government. Since 1997, NDI has conducted a series of assessment missions to Hong Kong to consider the development of the HKSAR's "post-reversion" election framework, the status of autonomy, rule of law and civil liberties under Chinese sovereignty, and the prospects for democratization beyond the 10-year transition period set forth in the Basic Law. In conjunction with the assessment missions, NDI has published an ongoing series entitled, "The Promise of Democratization in Hong Kong," that assesses the prospects for the development of a democratic electoral framework and identifies the obstacles that impede further democratization in Hong Kong.

NDI works with political parties and civil society organizations to encourage public discussion and debate on political reform. The Institute shares information with and provides technical assistance to Hong Kong political parties, political groups, and civil society organizations seeking to increase their ability to increase citizen participation in the HKSAR's political life. NDI has sponsored professional public opinion polls to determine public perceptions about political parties and various political issues in the HKSAR. NDI also actively supports civil society efforts to address good governance.

The Hong Kong Transition Project¹ is a long-term study of Hong Kong people's transition from British subjects to SAR citizens. Citizenship requires citizens have the power to elect their leaders and amend or approve their constitutional documents. The project focuses on the period beginning in 1982, when negotiations for Hong Kong's return commenced without Hong Kong people's participation as British colonial subjects, until when under the Basic Law, elections under new election rules decided by Hong Kong people themselves are scheduled to take place. This is expected to be 2017 for Chief Executive and 2020 for all members of the Legislative Council. This is the first report by the Hong Kong Transition Project since the approval of constitutional reform in June 2010. This is the first amendment of the Basic Law by vote of the representatives of the people of Hong Kong.

Community Development Initiative (CDI) is a nonprofit organization that incubates ventures facilitating community and social development. It provides a platform for NGOs, think-tanks and activist groups to collaborate for a common purpose of enhancing the well-being of citizens in the community. CDI engages in both research and education, by designing, hosting, and facilitating creative programs to support its community partners with the training, tools and resources necessary to facilitate the social development process in Hong Kong. CDI has provided ongoing funding for the Hong Kong Transition Project since 2009.



¹ The Hong Kong Transition Project, established in 1988, (<http://www.hktp.org>) has been funded via competitive grants from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government and is currently funded by the Community Development Initiative (<http://www.cdiorg.hk>) and by commissioned research with various NGOs and foundations. It is a founding member of the Comparative Governance and Policy Research Centre in the

Executive Summary

The local level District Council elections of 2011 take on new significance following the first constitutional reforms passed in 2010. From the directly elected members of the District Councils 117 will sit on the expanded Chief Executive Election Committee, vastly outnumbering the 30 directly elected members from Legco who will also vote on that committee. From the members directly elected in this District Council election, five will go on to be elected in the first at-large elections in Hong Kong, in which across all Hong Kong every registered voter not entitled to vote already in a Functional Constituency will get to vote. In effect, the framework for “referendum” style voting and policy mandate campaigning have been put in place in Hong Kong for the first time. These at large elections also provide a possible platform for candidates who plan to run in the direct elections for Chief Executive promised in 2017. Certainly these DC candidates who total up hundreds of thousands of votes in the Legco elections of 2012, and who harbor hopes of running for Chief Executive in 2017, will push vigorously in Legco during the next negotiations over constitutional reforms for steps implementing such direct elections in which they have already demonstrated their abilities. In sum, these elections are just the start of a process that may, and likely will, fundamentally alter the dynamics of elections in Hong Kong, and thus vastly strengthen the impetus toward democracy in this part of China.

But the significance and future impact of these elections is yet, for most involved, still not recognized. There are even indications that the significance of these elections is being downplayed by government and pro-government parties in order to ensure local dynamics which usually prevail at this level continue to do so. Usually the pro-government DAB and FTU and allied independents do very well in these first past the post, very small constituencies. The pan-democratic alliance has shattered over these reforms, with those who demanded an uncompromising insistence on full direct elections now running candidates against the Democratic Party and allies who proposed the reforms the Central and local Hong Kong governments accepted only with great reluctance, and at the last minute.

Turnout is likely to be lower than usual due to the low emphasis by government and high conflict by democrats. In the past, when an institution received more power, it got higher turnout. Every time the appointed proportion of Legco lessened, voter turnout rose, for example, until all appointees were abolished. Turnout will likely be higher in the 2012 election with the expansion of Legco and with the increased power given to voters by the 5 new directly elected DC seats being counted among the elite, small, special franchise functional seats despite these new seats in actual nature being mass franchise and directly elected at large seats. But voters in this election now appear less than happy with parties, even while they are less happy with both the Hong Kong and Central governments than in 2007, the last time DC elections were held. Normally, unhappiness with government performance translates into higher vote totals for pro-democracy candidates. This time, the fractious democrats have thrown that advantage away. So turnout is likely to be between 38 and 44 percent, the turnout in the previous two DC elections, with the likeliest turnout toward the lower end of that range. Independents are likely to do unusually well as voters spurn both pro-government and pro-democracy candidates. Hong Kong voters, like so many voters across the world, are unhappy with both their government and their party choices. They, like voters elsewhere, want more effective, more accountable and more responsive government that actually makes things better. These elections will likely not do that, but they may be starting a process which will lead to fundamental change in governance, and if that turns out to be the case, these could be the elections with the most impact in Hong Kong’s long and arduous history of political development.

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1. The Context of the 2011 District Council Elections

The District Council elections of 2011 are the first elections following the enactment of constitutional reform in July 2010. In those reforms, the Legislative Council (Legco) was expanded from 60 to 70 seats, with 5 seats added to the directly elected geographic constituencies (GC), and five to the functional constituencies (FC). The five new FC seats, instead of being like the previous 30 FC seats in which small, sometimes tiny groups of voters were entitled to a representative, were given over to the District Councils (DC).² DC directly elected members were empowered by the 2010 reforms to nominate from among members directly elected to the DCs, and then those nominees will run in Legco elections held September 2012 in which all voters in Hong Kong not currently allotted an FC seat will have a vote.³

In effect, for the first time in Hong Kong history, most voters from every part of Hong Kong will be able to cast a ballot for the one person they think represents or protects their interests best. For the first time, Hong Kong voters will be able to hand a mandate from all sectors and locations to a candidate who will campaign across all of Hong Kong. In effect, candidates and parties could conduct campaigns for these so-called “super” seats in which a vote could be interpreted as a referendum on policies and a mandate for action on issues. Further, Beijing officials have approved potential reforms for direct election of the Chief Executive in 2017, if the Chief Executive elected in March 2012 proposes them and the Legco elected in September 2012 approves them. Presumably these would be at-large elections which would give a Chief Executive, for the first time, a mandate from voters. The Legco elections of 2012 for these at-large elections from among the DC winners in 2011 would give one or all of the five DC super seat electees a leg up in contesting the Chief Executive elections of 2017. These at large elections could also form mandates concerning the nature of Chief Executive election proposals voters might support, if the parties choose to make these elections a clear means for voters to express such sentiments. There have been many attempts to hold referendums in Hong Kong before; now, the system makes a provision for elections that could form, in effect, just such referendums on issues and candidates.

The 2010 reforms also increased the size of the Chief Executive Election Committee (CEEC) from 800 members to 1200. Previously, the only directly elected members representative of general voters on this committee which elects Hong Kong’s Chief Executive were the 30 directly elected Legco members. About 600 of the 800 were returned from elections held for the roughly 200,000 FC

² The total franchise for FC seats prior to the reforms was barely over 200,000 voters, with 8 of the FC seats elected by secretive corporate votes, and with 80 percent of all FC voters crammed into just 6 of the 30 seats. In effect, fewer than 20,000 voters could elect enough members to form a legislative veto of actions desired by over 4 million other voters. The two-house rule requires that any amendment to legislation or a private member bill pass both the FC bloc of 30 and the GC bloc of 30 with a majority of each bloc. Thus 16 FC members elected by less than 20,000 voters could block amendments or bills supported by representatives elected by millions of voters. Many of the FC seats have not been contested since they were first filled and even more are seldom contested in the rare event that a representative retires, in effect depriving those FC voters from even voting at all. In 2008, due to uncontested seats, just 4,000 actual voters were needed to return a veto block of 16 seats in the FC sector. See previous reports for NDI from the Hong Kong Transition Project (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).

³ Abolished by the last British Governor Chris Patten, but restarted after the 1997 reunification with China, the Chief Executive appoints about a fifth of DC seats. The Hong Kong government proposes to abolish appointees to the DCs, cutting appointees by a third in 2011, another third in 2015 and eliminating all appointees in 2019.

voters only.⁴ The final 200 seats were ex officio filled by 60 Legco members and people generally appointed by the Hong Kong and Beijing governments from among their appointees to such bodies as the National Peoples Congress and the Executive Council. As a result, the CEEC could be relied upon to support any candidate Beijing favored. Despite this, pro-democracy groups ran a candidate for Chief Executive in 2007, Alan Leong, who gained 123 votes. The main benefit of the lopsided contest were debates in which a sure to win Chief Executive candidate favored by Beijing officials debated policies with a pro-democracy representative. In the 2010 reforms, the 300 seats from the government sector will include 100 members from the directly elected members of the DCs. In effect, the directly elected members on the CEEC will increase from 30 in 2007 to 147 in 2012.⁵ This is proportionately a much greater increase of directly elected representatives than the 50 percent increase of membership among the CEEC as a whole.

The role and influence of the DCs has clearly been increased significantly in Hong Kong's Legco and Chief Executive elections. However, one more repercussion from the 2010 reforms could have even greater significance. The founding and largest party among pro-democracy parties in Hong Kong, the Democratic Party, proposed the DC reforms which were, among great controversy and some mystery, accepted at the last minute by the Beijing and Hong Kong governments. The Democratic Party's votes put the reforms over the top of the two thirds of votes in Legco needed to approve them. In 2005, reforms had failed to be enacted because pro-democracy legislators stood firm for reforms greater than the Hong Kong or Beijing governments would approve. This time the Democratic Party proposed, and the governments involved accepted, something less and something more respectively than either side wanted.

The compromise upset pro-Beijing groups like the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) who had supported much less accommodative reform proposals presented by the governments. It also infuriated some former allies of the Democratic Party among the pro-democracy groups, leading to a split of one party, the League of Social Democrats, and the founding of another party, People's Power, which has chosen to run DC candidates against Democratic Party candidates, specifically and vocally in the hopes that they will be able to split the pro-democracy vote in these electoral districts and cost the Democratic Party these DC seats. This campaign by People's Power candidates who have little to no hope of winning the seats has been characterized by political commentators as a form of political "kamikaze" attack on fellow democrats. The infighting and bitterness among pro-democracy groups, and the feelings of betrayal evidenced by some supporters in the pro-Beijing camp, has, as this report shows below, clearly had effects on public support for and satisfaction with political parties in general and some parties specifically.

Besides the after effects of the July 2010 reform vote on political parties, what other aspects affect voters in this election? This election will be the final one held during the Donald Tsang

⁴ Disclosure: the main author of this report is a member of the Chief Executive Election Committee of 2007-2012 elected by voters from the higher education subsector of the education sector. The CEEC continues and enhances the distorted voting power handed to tiny blocks in the FCs. For example, the over 80,000 primary through tertiary educators were entitled to elect 40 representatives, and the 200 or so corporate voters of the agriculture and fisheries FC were entitled to elect 40 representatives. Thus the votes of tens of thousands of educators could be countered by a few dozen ballots from nearly defunct fishery unions and companies which among them employ the few hundred remaining fishermen and farmers. Hong Kong has very few farmers and fishing vessels remaining, producing less than one percent of its food within its territory.

⁵ Since the Chief Executive election is in March 2012 and the Legco election is in September that year, the added 10 seats which becomes operative in September 2012 will not be filled by directly elected members.

administration. In 2012 power will shift in Hong Kong and over the same year power will change across mainland China as President Hu Jintao reaches the end of his term as well. But only in Hong Kong will voters be able to freely express their views toward those associated with the outgoing regimes. Those parties perceived as pro-government (the DAB, Federation of Trade Unions or FTU, and arguably, the Democratic Party because of its compromise with government on reform) will likely be affected by attitudes toward Tsang, the Hong Kong government, and the Beijing government. All the parties will also be affected by concerns and worries of the voters and how they feel the government and parties have handled or responded to those concerns. The data below lays out the broad context of such public views and concerns.

Chart/Table 1 shows that while satisfaction with life in Hong Kong generally fared better under Tsang than under the first Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, it seldom matched that reported in the colonial era. But the long decline of satisfaction from the Olympic year of 2008 which reached its lowest in April this year may have ended.

Chart of Table 1: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your current life in Hong Kong?





Table 1 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
<i>Nov 1991</i>	84	15	1
Feb 1993	85	13	2
Aug 1993	88	10	2
Feb 1994	88	10	2
Aug 1994	87	10	3
Feb 1995	86	9	5
Sept 1995	80	18	2
Feb 1996	85	13	2
July 1996	88	10	2
Feb 1997	90	9	1
June 1997	86	12	2
Jan 1998	81	16	3
Apr 1998	71	26	3
July 1998	74	25	1
Oct 1998	70	27	3
Apr 1999	72	24	3
July 1999	73	26	1
Nov 1999	72	26	2
Apr 2000	65	33	2
Aug 2000	65	31	4
Nov 2000	67	30	3
Apr 2001	61	34	5
June 2001	71	25	4
Nov 2001	64	33	3
Apr 2002	66	31	3
Aug 2002	62	34	4
Nov 2002	66	31	3
June 2003	60	37	3
Nov 2003	51	44	4
Dec 2003	57	39	5
Apr 2004	67	27	5
July 2004	55	39	6
Aug 2004	63	32	4
Nov 2004	65	32	4
May 2005	78	20	2
July 2005	78	20	2
Nov 2005	73	23	4
Feb 2006	76	22	2
Mar 2006	75	20	4
Nov 2006	80	19	1
Apr 2007	75	22	3
May 2008	77	20	3
June 2008	84	13	2
July 2008	80	18	2
Aug 2008	74	23	3
Sept 2008	75	24	1
May 2009	72	26	2
Aug 2010	75	24	1
Dec 2010	69	27	4
April 2011	66	33	2
Oct 2011	72	26	2

Chart/Table 2 shows the dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong government may also have peaked in April, but Chart/Table 3 shows that dissatisfaction with Tsang himself showed a continued rise. Tsang restored satisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong government to its pre-handover levels, and even improved on those levels in general terms for the first three years of his tenure. However, since late 2008 when charges of collusion of the government with business increased in frequency, dissatisfaction began to grow, and continues to outpace satisfaction.

Chart/Table 2 Are you currently satisfied with the general performance of Hong Kong Government?



Tsang's own rates of satisfaction with performance, as Chart/Table 3 shows (below), continued to sink, and dissatisfaction both increased overall and in intensity, with a rise in those very dissatisfied with his performance from one in six in April 2011 to one in four in October, just before the Policy Address.

The Policy Address in early October, in which Tsang finally announced some moves by government to address pressing concerns on housing with a restart of the Home Ownership Scheme of subsidized sales of starter flats, also included an increase in public housing supply and land supply (government owns all land and leases it for fixed terms to in a competitive bid procedure). These measures appear to have further increased satisfaction with government performance, but seems to have had little effect on attitudes toward Tsang himself, who is blamed for the long delay in taking actions nearly everyone was pressing him to take for several years.


Chart/Table 2 Satisfaction with performance of Hong Kong Government

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 1993	60	31	9
Aug 1993	57	28	15
Feb 1994	58	28	14
Aug 1994	56	30	14
Feb 1995	43	35	22
Sep 1995	46	45	9
Feb 1996	60	26	15
July 1996	67	21	11
Feb 1997	73	20	7
June 1997	66	27	7
Jan 1998	51	35	4
Apr 1998	48	41	12
June 1998	37	56	7
Oct 1998	42	48	10
April 1999	46	43	11
July 1999	40	52	7
Nov 1999	41	51	8
Apr 2000	39	53	8
Aug 2000	30	61	4
Oct 2000	31	62	6
Apr 2001	32	58	10
July 2001	35	59	5
Nov 2001	24	68	7
Apr 2002	31	60	9
Aug 2002	22	72	6
Nov 2002	23	69	9
June 2003	23	69	8
Dec 2003	16	79	6
Apr 2004	23	67	10
July 2004	20	72	8
Aug 2004	25	67	8
Nov 2004	33	61	6
May 2005	46	48	7
July 2005	56	34	10
Nov 2005	65	27	4
Feb 2006	61	32	2
Mar 2006	63	33	5
Nov 2006	62	34	4
April 2007	64	31	6
May 2008	64	31	5
June 2008	67	27	6
July 2008	54	42	5
Aug 2008	50	43	7
Sept 2008	43	51	6
May 2009	41	53	5
Aug 2010	40	56	4
Dec 2010	43	51	6
April 2011	33	60	5
Oct 2011	37	55	7

The continued decline in satisfaction with Tsang's performance also appears in satisfaction with the performance of the PRC Government in handling Hong Kong affairs (Chart/Table 4 below).

Dissatisfaction began rising during the long confrontation over constitutional reform in 2010, and while the Central Government eventually compromised with the Democratic Party on reform, the manner of its last minute concession led many on both sides of the issue to become disgruntled. Since then, various mainland officials have pronounced about issues in Hong Kong, even urging the Hong Kong government at one point to act on housing, an issue everyone was pressing it to act on, but an issue seen as wholly an internal affair which Beijing should leave completely up to Hong Kong people themselves.


Chart/Table 3 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with performance of C. E. Donald Tsang?



	Very Dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Very Satisfied	DK
May 2005	1	9	67	9	15
July 2005	1	8	52	6	33
Nov 2005	1	8	72	10	9
Mar 2006	2	11	69	9	7
Nov 2006	4	21	66	6	4
April 2007	2	13	71	9	6
May 2008	3	18	68	6	4
June 2008	4	15	65	7	8
July 2008	11	25	54	5	6
Aug 2008	14	35	43	2	6
Sept 2008	15	37	40	3	4
May 2009	14	37	41	2	6
Aug 2010	21	35	35	3	5
April 2011	17	42	32	3	6
Oct 2011	25	37	30	2	6

For the first time in Tsang's administration dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong Government's dealing with the Central Government exceeds satisfaction. Early in Tsang's administration his handling of Beijing had achieved the highest levels of satisfaction recorded since 1995. While levels of dissatisfaction are not above those experienced under his predecessor (reaching at one point nearly two thirds dissatisfied), they are now at 46 percent dissatisfied.

Chart/Table 4 Satisfaction with performance of the SAR government in dealing with the PRC government




Dissatisfaction with the SAR Government shot up during 2010 with the ongoing and rising dispute over constitutional reform. The Hong Kong government strongly objected to the resignation and running again of 5 pro-democracy Legco members who did so to trigger, as they called it, a referendum on the proposed reforms. Tsang announced that he would not be voting in the by-elections, and the Central Government apparently put pressure on pro-government parties not to run candidates in the by-election. Officials of the Central Government strongly objected to the term referendum being applied to the process. Clearly many Hong Kong people felt this episode demonstrated far too much deference to Beijing by the Hong Kong Government and Tsang, and felt the Central Government had intervened too much and too overtly in Hong Kong affairs for comfort. Nevertheless, most respondents also supported some revisions to the by-election process, as may be seen below in this report. The main results are a majority want to retain by-elections if the seats are vacated involuntarily and most feel that if a legislator resigns, they should not be permitted to run again until the next regular election.

Table 4 Satisfaction with performance of SAR Government in dealing with PRC Government

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 1995	21	46	33
Sept 1995	23	48	29
Feb 1996	30	41	29
July 1996	37	38	25
June 1997	44	41	15
Jan 1998	44	32	24
July 1998	61	25	14
Oct 1998	57	26	17
July 1999	43	42	15
Nov 1999	39	46	15
Apr 2000	42	43	15
Aug 2000	42	45	13
Nov 2000	44	43	13
Apr 2001	32	51	17
July 2001	45	42	13
Nov 2001	36	49	16
Apr 2002	46	40	14
Aug 2002	41	42	18
Nov 2002	46	42	11
Feb 2003	33	49	18
June 2003	36	49	15
Nov 2003	49	37	14
April 2004	33	53	14
May 2004	29	57	15
June 2004	30	64	7
July 2004	39	51	10
Aug 2004	46	43	10
Nov 2004	51	40	9
May 2005	64	24	12
Nov 2005	71	21	9
Mar 2006	67	21	12
Nov 2006	69	23	9
Apr 2007	69	22	10
May 2008	63	27	9
Sept 2008	59	33	8
May 2009	56	33	10
Aug 2010	49	43	7
Oct 2011	41	46	14

While dissatisfaction with the Central Government handling of Hong Kong affairs has yet to outweigh satisfaction, that it is approaching levels seen in 2004 when the Central Government was quite active in Hong Kong affairs following the massive demonstrations in 2003 when over half a million marched from a population of just over six million, indicates that the increased commentary and perceived interference by Central officials triggers sensitivities. There is also a steep rise in concerns over political freedoms (see Chart/Table 7 below).

Chart/Table 5 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC Gov dealing with HKSAR affairs?



Satisfaction with the performance of the PRC Government in ruling China has, for the first time since reunification in 1997, dropped below dissatisfaction. High levels of inflation, repeated issues of food and product safety, and a massive increase in mainland tourists into Hong Kong, driving up prices, emptying shelves and filling hospital beds, particularly in maternity wards, have raised levels of local dissatisfaction with the Central Government.


These issues are not particularly related to handling of Hong Kong affairs, but are seen as policies affecting Hong Kong. Mainland tourists pour into Hong Kong to buy products which Hong Kong’s much better inspection and customs processes guarantee are the real thing and safe to buy. Baby formula particularly is hard to get in Hong Kong in large part because of repeated problems with dilution and fakery in formulas on the mainland. The Hong Kong government took action recently to limit the proportion of maternity wards given over to pregnant mainland women, and substantially increased fees for them as well.

Chart/Table 5 Current satisfaction with performance of PRC Government dealing with Hong Kong affairs

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Aug 1993	25	54	22
Feb 1993	23	56	21
Aug 1994	21	63	16
Feb 1995	20	60	20
Sept 1995	17	62	22
Feb 1996	31	49	20
July 1996	27	58	15
June 1997	45	41	14
Jan 1998	61	22	18
Apr 1998	67	17	16
June 1998	68	17	15
July 1998	74	11	15
Oct 1998	67	15	17
Apr 1999	65	19	16
July 1999	60	25	16
Nov 1999	57	26	17
Apr 2000	55	31	13
Aug 2000	56	27	15
Nov 2000	50	36	14
Apr 2001	46	34	21
July 2001	57	29	14
Nov 2001	55	26	19
Apr 2002	59	25	17
Aug 2002	57	25	19
June 2003	57	28	16
Nov 2003	72	18	10
Apr 2004	47	37	17
May 2004	37	50	11
June 2004	38	53	9
July 2004	38	50	12
Aug 2004	47	40	12
Nov 2004	55	32	13
May 2005	64	24	11
July 2005	58	29	12
Nov 2005	64	25	10
Mar 2006	66	23	11
Nov 2006	67	23	10
Apr 2007	69	22	9
May 2008	71	21	8
June 2008	88	5	6
July 2008	89	5	5
Aug 2008	71	21	9
Sept 2008	70	22	8
May 2009	71	19	10
May 2010	57	33	9
Aug 2010	54	40	7
Dec 2010	54	35	11
April 2011	52	37	11
Oct 2011	45	39	16

According to a focus group of randomly selected respondents to the survey, held a week after the survey ended, problems still remain even after these actions, and resentments, particularly among Hong Kong women, toward the Central Government for the problems of food and product safety, inflation and massive shopping tourism which depletes basic necessities like baby formula, are high. There has also been a substantial increase in Hong Kong's air pollution, which many feel, rightly or wrongly, primarily comes from over the boundary from Guangdong. (See Chart/Table 7 below.)

Chart/Table 6 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the Chinese (PRC) Government in ruling China?



Concerns about inflation are down from April 2011 when inflation topped all other concerns, according to Chart/Table 6 below, but concern about the wealth gap between the richest and poorest continues high and may be rising. It also appears that the Hong Kong Government announced action on housing just as concern over high and rising housing prices was diminishing with the global economic slowdown. Despite that slowdown and rising concern with inflation and the wealth gap, concern with economic issues is at the lowest level in many years (see previous surveys in this series for results prior to January 2010).

Political concerns, on the other hand, have risen considerably, with a leap in concerns over freedom of the press and rights of assembly. (See Chart/Table 7).

Table 6 Satisfaction with performance of PRC Government in ruling China

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 1993	35	49	16
Aug 1993	26	55	19
Feb 1994	29	53	18
Aug 1994	24	64	12
Feb 1995	22	62	16
Sept 1995	15	62	24
Feb 1996	30	49	22
July 1996	28	56	16
Feb 1997	38	45	17
June 1997	34	51	15
Jan 1998	37	39	24
Apr 1998	43	34	23
June 1998	44	34	22
July 1998	52	24	24
Oct 1998	53	24	23
Apr 1999	49	31	20
July 1999	44	28	27
Nov 1999	49	31	20
Apr 2000	38	37	24
Aug 2000	47	31	22
Nov 2000	47	29	24
Apr 2001	41	33	26
July 2001	53	28	19
Nov 2001	57	20	24
April 2002	60	18	22
Aug 2002	60	18	22
June 2003	61	22	18
Nov 2003	68	15	17
Apr 2004	58	21	21
May 2004	54	25	19
June 2004	56	28	16
July 2004	59	21	20
Aug 2004	58	25	17
Nov 2004	56	25	19
May 2005	59	23	18
Nov 2005	51	29	19
Mar 2006	59	24	17
Nov 2006	57	29	14
Apr 2007	63	23	14
June 2008	74	14	12
July 2008	73	19	9
Aug 2008	68	22	10
Sept 2008	70	19	11
May 2009	68	20	13
May 2010	53	37	10
Aug 2010	56	34	11
Dec 2010	40	46	14
April 2011	43	43	14
Oct 2011	36	48	15

Political concerns, which have troubled barely one in ten most over the previous years since 2003-04, now concern about one in five. That these concerns have risen steeply since April 2011 stands as a public opinion indictment of the new Police Commissioner who has evidenced a much more confrontational stance with demonstrators. Several recent demonstrations have seen massive police presence, aggressive police reaction, and increased restrictions on demonstrators. Concern with the wealth gap has exceeded concern with employment/unemployment for 2011. Traditionally, and for decades, concerns with employment/unemployment have exceeded concerns with any other single issue.

Chart/Table 7 Which problem of Hong Kong are you most concerned about now personally?





Table 7 Which problem of Hong Kong are you most concerned about now personally?

	Jan 2010	May 2010	Dec 2010	Apr 2011	Oct 2011
No problem	2	3	6	7	5
Salary cuts	2	4	6	2	1
Employment/unemployment	27	15	21	9	13
Economic growth rate	9	3	4	4	4
Business closings	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0
Affordable housing/ property market	4	14	11	15	6
Hong Kong stock market	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.5
Hong Kong int'l competitiveness	1	2	2	1	0.4
Inflation	2	3	5	17	9
Wealth gap	14	14	10	15	17
Welfare cuts	1	2	1	1	1
Elderly welfare	3	8	3	4	5
All economic	63.7	68.7	63.3	68.3	56.9
Corruption	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.2
Political stability	9	6	4	5	9
Freedom of press, demonstration, travel	1	3	4	1	8
Autonomy of HK	1	0.4	2	0.4	1
Fair judiciary	0.4	1	1	0.2	0.1
Competence of civil servants	0.2	0.1	1	0.2	0.4
Competence of Donald Tsang	0.3	1	0.2	1	0.8
All Political	12	11.9	12.2	8	19.5
Good quality education	4	6	3	4	3
Crime	0.2	1	0.4	0.2	1
Public medical services	2	2	2	3	3
Pollution	1	1	6	2	4
Overpopulation			1	1	2
All social	7.2	10	12.4	10.2	13
Other issues/unclassified	14.9	8	8	5	7

*Rounded to nearest tenth of a point if less than 1, otherwise rounded to nearest whole number

Chart 8A selects and extends the data in Chart/Table 7, showing annual (except for 2011) changes in the categorical totals. That is, when the open ended responses are reclassified and then totaled by aspect, into economic, political or social issue categories, the results show swings in categorical concerns. For example, only once before have political issues cumulatively shown a higher total than social issues, and that was in April 2004, just before a second huge protest march on 1 July 2004.

Chart 8A Problem of greatest personal concern 1998-2011 Category Totals

Economic issues have never been below the greatest category total, but economic issues such as the wealth gap could be classified as either social or political, and in many cases when it concerns policy and criticisms of the government as being too close to business, are more political than economic in nature. The wealth gap only began to arise as a concern mentioned spontaneously in 2010. Reclassifying the wealth gap as a political issue shifts the long term results to those seen in Chart 8B.


Chart 8B Problem of greatest personal concern 1998-2011 Category Totals/Amended classification

Table 9 shows a possible drop in dissatisfaction with government performance in addressing these problems of greatest personal concern over 2011.⁶

⁶ The level of accuracy of these results of a random survey of this size (820 cases) varies +/- 4 points at the 95 percent confidence interval.

However, Chart/Table 10, which extends this data back to November 2001, shows that the proportion very dissatisfied with government performance on their problem of greatest personal concern is, during 2011, approaching that seen under Tung Chee-hwa, though it has some ways to go before achieving the level of 41 percent very dissatisfied with government performance seen in May 2003, just before the massive march of 500,000 on 1 July that year. However, clearly, the incoming administration faces a challenge in improving performance on these issues.

Table 9 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's performance on this problem?

	April 2011	Oct 2011
Very satisfied	2	3
Satisfied	12	15
Dissatisfied	45	41
Very dissatisfied	29	29
Don't Know	3	5
Not a government problem	3	3
Have no problems	7	5

Chart/Table 9 Are you satisfied/dissatisfied with Government's performance on this problem?





Table 10 Are you satisfied/dissatisfied with Government's performance on this problem?

	Nov 2001	April 2002	Mar 2003	April 2004	May 2005	Mar 2006	May 2008	May 2009	Oct 2011
Very satisfied	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3
Satisfied	9	11	8	15	20	28	26	20	15
Dissatisfied	46	44	38	36	43	44	40	47	41
Very dissatisfied	32	31	41	32	22	20	18	17	29
Don't know	8	9	9	12	11	5	6	4	5
Not a government problem/no problem	4	5	3	4	3	2	9	12	8

Chart/Table 11 shows that more people are willing to believe direct elections will improve performance of the government in addressing their problems now than just after the 2010

constitutional reforms were enacted. The level is roughly back to where it was prior to the extended dispute.


Table 11 Do you believe making the Chief Executive and Legco members more accountable to voters with direct elections would improve performance on solving your problems?



	January 2010	Aug 2010 (post-reform)	Oct 2011
Strongly believe	10	5	8
Somewhat believe	26	23	30
Don't Know/No effect	19	13	15
Somewhat disbelieve	26	32	27
Strongly disbelieve	13	17	14
Not a problem for government	3	4	2
Have no problems	2	6	5
total	100	100	100

However, the effects of the reform vote which included bitter recriminations among former allies in the pro-democracy camp, have taken a toll on sentiment toward parties, as Chart/Table 12 and Chart/Table 13 below show. In Chart/Table 12, those who think political parties have a good effect on solving their problem of greatest personal concern dropped in October from levels seen in 2010. The proportion of the survey who say parties are having a bad effect has never been higher, with 22 percent saying parties have a bad effect, up from 16 percent in May 2010 and an earlier peak of 19 percent in January 2010.


Chart/Table 12 In general, do you think political parties in Hong Kong are having a good effect or bad effect on this problem (of greatest personal concern)?



	Very good effect	Good effect	No difference	Bad effect	Very bad effect	Don't Know	No problems
May 2007	2	40	30	8	2	9	9
May 2008	3	45	31	5	1	8	6
Sept 2008	2	51	34	3	--	5	4
May 2009	1	23	45	14	3	5	9
Jan 2010	7	34	30	14	5	8	2
May 2010	3	35	33	13	3	10	3
Oct 2011	1	30	30	18	4	12	5

The negative effect of the splits and disputes also can be seen clearly in Chart/Table 11. All parties are down from 2009-2010 levels, with the lowest level since 2009 saying any one of the parties best represents them or protects their interests. Even the DAB and FTU, two parties with no formal splits, are down in support. These two parties, though still affiliated and still broadly aligned as pro-government, pro-Beijing parties, are running much more separate campaigns for DC seats than ever before. Only three of the candidates list themselves as joint DAB/FTU affiliates, with all the others listing either one or the other as their affiliation. Nor are there any DAB or FTU candidates standing against one another, unlike among the pro-democracy groups where dozens of DP candidates face opposition from another pro-democracy candidate. Meanwhile, about 30 of the DAB or FTU seats are being returned unopposed. This is the basis of charges by the DP that these pro-democracy forces are essentially a fifth column for Beijing, a charge, that as the next section shows, carries some sting.

Chart/Table 13 Of the political parties in Legco, which party, if any, do you feel represents or protects your interests best?



Party	May 2009	AUG 2010	May 2011	Oct 2011
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment & Progress of Hong Kong (DAB)	14	13	11	9
Democratic Party (DP)	15	16	9	9
League of Social Democrats (LSD)	5	5	2	2
Civic Party (CP)	10	19	11	9
People's Power (PP)	--	--	2	2
New People's Party (NPP)	--	--	4	3
Federation of Trade Unions (FTU)	--	--	4	2
Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU)	--	--	3	2
Liberal Party (LP)	3	3	2	1
None	39	39	39	40
Don't Know	12	5	12	20

2. The Players: The Voters

Voting is only one form of participation in governance, albeit a very important one and a crucial one for legitimating and informing the whole governance structure and process. While voting, considered as a form of feedback or signaling device, is seldom if ever motivated by a single cause, it

is affected by voter's experiences with government civil servants and offices, with parties and pressure groups and legislators, and with other members of the community either through direct activity as a member of an interest group or group affected by a policy or via the media. These experiences and the reactions to them are also mediated or interpreted through a voter's gender, education, occupation and other life circumstances. The complexity of motives behind voting often makes interpreting the message or messages voters are sending via their choices very hard, especially if the parties in the election do not have an overriding issue or leaders who demand a clear mandate. When parties do not run campaigns designed to deliver a mandate for action, they seldom get one. In this sense, simply winning at the polls is not enough to win a mandate to govern or act in a certain way. The DC elections might have been designed to obscure or even make impossible such a mandate. The districts are small, the issues are often intensely local and focused on things like condition of drains, air conditioning drips, trees, bus services, crosswalk placement and the like, and the candidates often depend more on a network of friends and families to turn out the voters. Many times in these small electoral districts, as few as a thousand votes can lead to a win in a first past the post contest.

The 2010 reforms, which put 100 DC members on the Chief Executive Election Committee and which will empower five DC electees to go on to campaign across Hong Kong for votes, introduces a very different element into these intensely local, usually non-issue driven elections. DC members will be voting not just on local issues; they (more than one in four) will be voting for CE of all Hong Kong and five will be campaigning in the Legco elections across all Hong Kong on issues that could not be more different from the usual drips and drains level of concerns often seen at the tiny sub-districts in DC elections. The only DC elections with a broad mandate were in 1982, with the first DC elections (then District Boards) in which the way forward in democratic development and relations with China were the major issues during the negotiations over Hong Kong's return to China, and then in 2003 when the DC elections were turned by pro-democrats into a "send them a message" election aimed at Tung Chee-hwa and Beijing as a follow up to the massive, half million person protest marches in July 2003. This election should be an opportunity to send the next Chief Executive a message about how Hong Kong people want more say on the nature of reforms going forward toward 2017 and 2020, and fellow democrats a message about whether compromise on reforms is acceptable. Instead, it may turn into an election which hands increased power over to representatives who are clueless about what to do with it, or what voters want them to do with it. This section looks at voter's characteristics in order to better understand their reactions as indicated in the first and following sections. Better understanding the messengers should help in understanding the messages they send at the polls. This electorate, first, shows more of males registered than females.

Chart/Table 14 Proportion registered to vote by Sex





Table 14 Proportion registered to vote by Sex

	Male	Female	total
Not registered to vote	23	33	29
Registered to vote	77	67	71
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 10.14 with 1 df p = 0.0015

However, because there are more women than men in Hong Kong, particularly among those who are older and who are more likely to be registered to vote, the proportions of all those registered to vote shows the opposite, with about 53 percent being women and 47 percent men.

Chart/Table 15 Sex of those registered to vote

	Registered to vote	Not registered	total
Male	47	35	43
Female	53	65	57
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 10.14 with 1 df p = 0.0015

Table 16 shows results of those who say they know who they would vote for. While women may outnumber men among registered voters, there are more men than women among registered voters who say they have already chosen for whom to vote. This means that most likely more men than women will turn up to vote, or that women's choices may more likely be influenced by the more decisive men in their families.

Table 16 Registered voters with choice on vote made, by gender

	Men	Women	total
Will vote	44	38	41
Don't Know/Will not vote	56	62	59
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 2.482 with 1 df p = 0.1152

Table 17 shows that FC voters are a tiny proportion of the whole adult population. Technically, in the coming Legco election, everyone registered to vote will be a GC voter, entitled to vote in a

geographic legislative district, and an FC voter, entitled to vote in one of the Functional Constituencies, including the one allotted to DC candidates which will return 5 seats out of the new total of 70 seats on the Legislative Council starting in September 2012. The allocation of two votes for every voter, however, will mask the disparity in voting power, with some FCs being of just a few hundred voters and others, such as the DC seats, holding millions of voters.

Nevertheless, those who vote in the new DC functional constituencies—and that is everyone who currently does not have a vote in an FC—will be able to cast their ballots from across all of Hong Kong, and thus all those votes will accumulate to top candidates. So, for example, if each pro-democracy party, Democratic Party, Civic Party, LSD, People Power and Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood ran one candidate each and lined up behind them, for the first time the accumulated votes of each party would be visible. On the other hand, the DAB and FTU have significant support across all districts, and they would likely be able to outpoll LSD, People Power and ADPL standing separately, so the seats would go 2 for Democratic Party and Civic Party, 2 for DAB and FTU, with the 5th seat a tossup among the smaller pro-democracy parties and smaller pro-Beijing groups, or possibly, a candidate from Regina Ip's New People's Party who also gathers up independent and pro-business voters in sufficient numbers. Chart/Table 19 shows these proportions of each party. But another strategy would be to unite all pro-democracy voters behind two candidates, one female, one male perhaps, or one from the pro-reform democrats, the DP, CTU and ADPL and the other from the anti-compromise democrats, the CP, LSD, and People's Power, and push for a mandate style vote between them, in hopes of securing a million or more votes for the top candidate who would run on a clear platform advocating either compromise for further democratic reform, or standing firm for full democracy, all at once, immediately.

Table 17 Voter registration by constituency

Group	Count	%
GC only	530	65
FC only	10	1
Both FC & GC	44	5
Not registered	199	24
Don't Know	37	5

In Table 18 those who would like to have their DC representative affiliated with a political party is marginally higher among those who have made a choice about who they want to vote for. But the proportion of those who do not like such an affiliation is also higher than among those who say they will not vote or who have not yet made up their mind.

Table 18 Would you like or not like your DC representative affiliated with: A Political Party, by choice of whom to vote for made or not


	Choice of vote made	Not vote/Don't Know/not registered	total
Like	42	39	40
Not like	37	32	34
Don't Know	21	30	26
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 5.685 with 2 df p = 0.0583

Party inclination is higher in general and considerably different by party among registered voters (See Chart/Table 19 below). The DAB, DP and DP have higher proportions among registered voters than among non registered while LP and NPP have lower levels among registered voters than among non-registered.

Chart/Table 19 Which party represents best, proportions of registered and unregistered



	Registered to vote	Not registered	total
DAB	11	5	9
DP	10	6	9
LSD	2	2	2
CP	10	8	9
PP	2	3	2
NPP	2	6	3
FTU	2	2	2
CTU	3	2	2
LP	1	3	1
None of them	41	39	40
Don't Know	18	25	20
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total
 Chi-square = 29.70 with 10 df p = 0.0010

KEY	ABBREVIATION
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment & Progress of HK	DAB
Democratic Party	DP
League of Social Democrats	LSD
Civic Party	CP
People's Power (split from LSD)	PP
New People's Party (Regina Ip's new party)	NPP
Federation of Trade Unions (pro-Beijing ally of DAB)	FTU
Confederation of Trade Unions (pro-democracy ally of DP)	CTU
Liberal Party (pro-business)	LP

While the associations in Tables 20 and 21 are weaker (Chi-square is over 0.1 instead of less than 0.1), the results may show that support for pan-democratic candidates is somewhat weaker than typical. About as many who have decided who they will vote for like their candidate associated with the camp (36 percent) as those who do not like such an affiliation (38 percent).

Table 20 Would you like or not like your DC representative affiliated with: Pan-democratic camp, by choice of vote made or not

	Choice of vote made	Not vote/Don't Know/not registered	total
Like	36	30	33
Not like	38	36	37
Don't Know	27	34	31
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 3.648 with 2 df p = 0.1614

But as Table 21 shows, just 23 percent of those who have made a choice like their candidate to be affiliated with the pro government camp versus 48 percent who dislike it. Associating an opponent with the government will hurt that candidate, but not quite among a majority, while associating an opponent with the pan democrats appears to help just a little more and hurt just a little less. In either case, neither association makes a clear difference with a clear majority. That is not the case with other associations, however, like the Heung Yee Kuk, which a majority dislike or an environmental group, with a strong majority like (see below).

Table 21 Would you like or not like your DC representative affiliated with: pro-government camp, by choice of vote made or not


	Choice of vote made	Not vote/Don't Know/not registered	total
Like	23	23	23
Not like	48	40	43
Don't Know	30	37	34
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 3.889 with 2 df p = 0.1431

Any candidate appealing to youngest voters is likely to be disappointed. Teenagers are disproportionately less among the registered to vote than among the whole sample and especially less than those who have not registered. Those registered to vote are considerably more likely to be 50 and up than among the unregistered. (See Chart/Table 22 below.)

Chart/Table 22 Registered to vote by Age groups



	Registered to vote	Not registered	total
18-19	4	9	5
20-29	13	13	13
30-39	12	11	12
40-49	19	25	21
50-59	25	21	24
60-69	16	14	15
70-86	12	7	10
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 16.27 with 6 df p = 0.0124

Business associated managers and administrators and professionals are more likely to be registered to vote, as are blue collar workers who are heavily unionized in Hong Kong.

Table 23 Occupations by registration to vote

	Registered to vote	Not registered	total
Managers & Administrators	7	4	6
Professionals & Educators	12	9	11
Service	10	10	10
Clerks	8	11	9
Blue collar	10	6	9
Housewife	17	17	17
Retired	18	17	18
Unemployed	4	4	4
Student	9	16	11
Other	4	7	5
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 17.64 with 9 df p = 0.0396

Those with right of abode outside Hong Kong are less likely to be registered to vote.

Table 24 Registration to vote by Right of Abode outside Hong Kong

	Registered to vote	Not registered	total
Right of Abode elsewhere	8	12	9
No ROA outside HK	92	88	91
total	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 3.966 with 1 df p = 0.0464

Those with less education are generally less likely to be registered to vote, as Table 25 shows. However, as Chart/Table 26 indicates, those with less than a university degree tend to have higher rates of having made a choice about whom they are going to vote for.

Table 25 Registration to vote by Years of Education

	Registered to vote	Not registered	total
0 None	5	8	6
1-6 Primary	13	11	13
7-8-9	12	18	14
10-11-12 (high school)	24	25	24
13-14-15 (some university)	16	14	15
16 (university graduates)	27	21	25
17-18 (post-graduate)	3	3	3
total	100	100	100

Chart/Table 26 Choice of whom to vote made by years of education**Table 26 Choice of whom to vote for made by years of education**

	0	1-6	7-8-9	10-11-12	13-14-15	16	17-18	total
Vote choice made	46	44	49	38	50	32	35	41
Not vote/Don't Know	54	56	51	62	51	68	65	59
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 11.15 with 6 df = 0.0838

Registered voters are more likely to contact a government department (13 percent contacted among registered voters versus 6 percent among non-registered) or directly elected member of Legco (9 percent of registered voters versus 5 percent of non-registered). Registered voters are also more likely to have attended an owner's corporation meeting during the previous six months, with 15 percent of registered voters attending such meetings versus 11 percent among non-registered. Otherwise, participation patterns among registered and non-registered are about the same, including whether or not they have donated to a political group in the previous 12 months (10 percent).

Chart/Table 27 Within the past year, did you express concern or seek help from the following:

	GOV	DEL	FEL	DC	MED	KAI	POL	PRO	SIGN	DONR
July 1996	8	7	1		5	6	2	8	44	11
June 1997	10	6	1		5	7	2	7	43	16
Jan 1998	13	3	--		6	8	2	5	41	18
Oct 1998	12	5	1		6	11	3	4	52	20
July 1999	10	6	2		5	8	3	6	45	15
Nov 1999	12	4	3		6	10	3	5	51	17
Apr 2000	17	5	3		6	10	5	5	49	17
Nov 2000	12	6	3		5	3	1	4	47	12
Apr 2001	11	6	3		3	2	2	3	36	15
Nov 2001	11	4	1	6	3	3	1	3	37	14
Apr 2002	10	3	1	6	4	2	2	2	25	14
Nov 2003	10	3	1	7	5	2	1	26	45	16
June 2004	11	4	2	8	3	3	1	25	42	15
Nov 2005	11	5	2	10	5	4	3	14	47	17
Mar 2006	8	4	2	6	3	2	1	13	44	14
Nov 2006	10	3	2	6	4	4	1	11	39	11
Apr 2007	13	4	1	8	3	2	1	8	40	13
June-Aug 2008	11	4	2		3		2	9	43	19
May 2009	12	5	NA	NA	3	NA	3	7	39	12
AUG 2010	9	4	2	NA	2	NA	2	14	33	NA
Dec 2010	13	4	NA	8	2	3	2	12	37	9
April 2011	11	5	NA	10	2	2	2	11	39	9
Oct 2011	11	8	NA	10	NA	NA	3	12	NA	10

KEY	ABBREVIATION
Contact Government Dept.	GOV
Contact Direct Elected Legco rep.	DEL
Contact Legco Funct Rep.	FEL
Contact District Council/Dist officer	DC
Contact Mass Media	MED
Contact local group/Kaifong	KAI
Contact pressure/pol. group	POL
Demonstrate/protest	PRO
Signature Campaign	SIGN
Donate to pol. party/pol group	DONR

About 36 percent of registered voters say they listen at least an hour or more to current affairs on radio everyday versus 27 percent of non-registered. While those who say the DAB or DP or no party best represents them show no significant differences with other registered voters (or non-registered for the no party group) in media use, those who say the Civic Party best represents them show an average of 43.2 minutes per day spent reading about current affairs in newspapers and 25.8 minutes a day on average listening to current affairs on radio.

Table 28 How often do you read about public affairs in a newspaper, on the radio, tv or internet?

Minutes on average	Registered voters	Non-registered
Newspaper	31	28
Radio	23	19
TV	40	46
Internet	22	22

Participation overall remains strong, with apparent growth since 1998 in those who say they have attended a political party or group meeting, charitable association or environmental group in the previous 6 months.

Table 29 Activity in previous 6 months in:


	TU	PA	KAI	MAC	POL	CHA	REL	OWC	EVG
Jan 1998	6	8	7	15	1	17	20	-	-
Oct 1998	5	5	8	10	1	16	20	12	5
July 1999	5	6	6	8	1	13	15	11	3
Nov 1999	6	6	5	8	1	16	16	12	4
Apr 2000	8	10	5	9	2	18	21	14	5
Nov 2000	6	6	5	6	2	16	19	14	5
Apr 2001	4	5	5	7	2	11	17	13	4
Nov 2001	5	6	4	6	2	15	18	12	5
Apr 2002	5	8	4	6	1	15	18	12	5
Feb 2003	4	8	6	8	3	21	20	15	6
Nov 2003	6	8	5	8	2	17	21	13	6
Apr 2004	6	8	4	7	1	16	20	15	6
July 2004	5	7	6	10	2	17	23	16	6
Aug 2004	4	5	6	8	2	19	22	17	7
Nov 2005	5	6	5	7	2	19	20	16	7
Mar 2006	4	9	6	10	2	22	24	22	8
Nov 2006	6	7	9	9	1	23	24	14	6
Apr 2007	7	8	8	9	2	25	26	17	7
Jun-Aug 2008	5	7	NA	10	3	30	25	20	10
Sept 2008	5	3	NA	9	2	26	23	20	9
May 2009	3	5	7	8	1	23	25	19	8
Aug 2010	4	6	5	6	2	20	22	16	8
Dec 2010	5	7	NA	6	3	27	24	18	9
April 2011	5	7	NA	7	3	23	24	15	7
Oct 2011	4	4	NA	5	3	23	18	14	7

KEY	ABBREV.
Trade Union	TU
Professional association	PA
Kaifong	KAI
Mutual Aid Committee	MAC
Political/pressure group	POL
Charitable Association	CHA
Religious group or church	REL
Owner's corporation	OWC
Environmental group	EVG

While those who attend a political party or group meeting may be small to the point of invisibility at 3 percent of the sample, those who say one of the parties represents them or protects their interests best is much larger, as Chart/Table 13 above indicated, and other charts on party affiliation show, affiliation with a party or either the pro-government or pro-democracy camps has an effect among a significant proportion of voters. This section probes how those affiliations line up with satisfaction with various aspects of government performance.

Chart/Table 30 shows that those who say the DAB represents them best tend to be much more satisfied with life in Hong Kong (or conversely, those who say they are more satisfied with life in Hong Kong are much more likely to say the DAB best represents them).

Chart/Table 30 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by who represents best: DAB




	All others	DAB best represents	total
Very dissatisfied	5	0	5
Somewhat dissatisfied	22	9	21
Somewhat satisfied	62	72	63
Very satisfied	8	17	9
Don't Know	3	2	2
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 14.53 with 4 df p = 0.0058

Chart/Table 31 indicates that those who cite the DAB as representing them best also are more likely to be satisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong Government than all others. However, a significantly larger proportion are dissatisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong Government than with life in Hong Kong, so even among these so-called “pro-government” party leaning voters, about a third are dissatisfied with the government. CP leaning respondents are the most dissatisfied, but there is less difference in dissatisfaction levels between those who say no party represents them best (47 percent of the sample) and the pro-democracy parties than with the DAB supporters.

Chart/Table 31 Comparison of DAB/DP/CP/No Party on Satisfaction with performance of the Hong Kong Government*




	DAB best represents	DP represents best	CP represents best	No party represents best	Average whole sample
Very dissatisfied	5	21	38	21	20
Somewhat dissatisfied	28	45	38	39	35
Somewhat satisfied	48	29	20	33	34
Very satisfied	9	5	2	--	3
Don't Know	9	0	2	6	7
total	100	100	100	100	100

*Samples too small for other parties for analysis

While satisfaction with the performance of Chief Executive Donald Tsang is higher among DAB leaning respondents, nevertheless almost half are dissatisfied. While DP leaning respondents are not as dissatisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong government as with the Chief Executive, the level is still significantly higher than the sample average in both cases. But while the DP leaning respondents are clearly more dissatisfied with government performance and the Chief Executive's performance than DAB leaning respondents, neither exceeds the levels of dissatisfaction found among those who cite the CP as best representing them. Nearly 9 in 10 such respondents are dissatisfied with Chief Executive Tsang, with a majority very dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong government is less than that with Chief Executive Tsang among CP leaning respondents, and the level of very dissatisfied is also much lower. Clearly CP leaning respondents put blame much more on the Chief Executive than on other government officials or government in general.

Chart/Table 32 Comparison of DAB/DP/CP/No Party on Satisfaction with performance of CE Tsang*




	DAB represents best	DP represents best	CP represents best	Average whole sample
Very dissatisfied	13	36	52	25
Somewhat dissatisfied	34	39	35	37
Somewhat satisfied	48	16	11	30
Very satisfied	5	2	2	2
Don't Know	0	7	0	6
total	100	100	100	100

*Samples too small for other parties for analysis. No significant difference from average for all with those saying no party represents them best

Chart/Table 33 shows that the Hong Kong Government's handling of PRC relations pleases most DAB leaning voters, but about one in five even of them are dissatisfied. Dissatisfaction is about the same among DP and CP favoring respondents, with both pro-democracy parties showing clear majorities dissatisfied with the SAR Government's handling of relations with the Central Government.

Chart/Table 33 Comparison of DAB/DP/CP/No Party on Satisfaction with performance of SAR Government dealing with PRC Government*




	DAB best represents	DP represents best	CivP represents best	No party represents best	Average whole sample
Very dissatisfied	3	21	21	14	13
Somewhat dissatisfied	19	43	43	37	33
Somewhat satisfied	61	25	27	32	38
Very satisfied	6	4	5	1	3
Don't Know	11	7	4	16	14
total	100	100	100	100	100

*Samples too small for other parties for analysis.

Those leaning toward the DAB are even more pleased with the way the PRC Government deals with the Hong Kong SAR Government. However, once again about one in five are not satisfied. Many of these folks were upset by the way the Central Government failed to consult the DAB before, abruptly, it announced a change in position to accept the Democratic Party's proposals on constitutional reform. Strikingly, DP leaning respondents are clearly more dissatisfied than CP leaning respondents, unlike their almost exact level of agreement about the Hong Kong Government's handling of this relationship. DP respondents have tended to be more critical of the central government than CP respondents, even though the CP took a strong opposition stance on constitutional reform and the DP was the party that proposed the deal that was eventually accepted by the Central Government.

Chart/Table 34 Comparison of DAB/DP/CP/No Party on Satisfaction with performance of PRC Government dealing with SAR Government*




	DAB best represents	DP represents best	CivP represents best	No party represents best	Average whole sample
Very dissatisfied	5	21	21	9	12
Somewhat dissatisfied	16	43	29	36	27
Somewhat satisfied	50	25	27	36	40
Very satisfied	13	4	5	4	5
Don't Know	17	7	18	15	16
total	100	100	100	100	100

*Samples too small for other parties for analysis.

Chart/Table 35 shows that a surprisingly large proportion of DAB oriented respondents (about one in four) indicated dissatisfaction with the PRC Government's rule of China. These pro-DAB respondents may not necessarily be as pro-Beijing as imagined, particularly in the sense that they are uncritical of Chinese Communist Party rule. While 70 percent of DP favoring respondents were dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC Government's rule of China, about 60 percent of pro-CP respondents felt the same. The DP favoring respondents usually have a somewhat more nationalist orientation than CP respondents, who tend to be higher educated, born in Hong Kong and with overseas experience and orientation rather than a nationalist bent.⁷

⁷ See earlier NDI reports in this series and <http://www.hktp.org> for more details in the various reports linked there.

Chart/Table 35 Comparison of DAB/DP/CP/No Party on Satisfaction with performance of PRC Government in ruling China*




	DAB best represents	DP represents best	CP represents best	Average whole sample
Very dissatisfied	8	27	25	17
Somewhat dissatisfied	20	43	36	32
Somewhat satisfied	53	25	25	34
Very satisfied	8	2	4	2
Don't Know	11	4	11	15
total	100	100	100	100

*Samples too small for other parties for analysis. No significant difference from average by those saying no party represents them best

A nationalist orientation and a “patriotic” orientation are not necessarily the same thing in Hong Kong politics. But neither is support for supposedly patriotic parties like the DAB necessarily unanimous support for the PRC’s rule of China, as seen above. However, patriotism and loyalty toward the PRC does have an affect on voting, and usually it translates into higher support at the polls for the DAB, FTU and other “pro-China” candidates. And as seen in Table 36, feeling proud and excited by China’s National Day correlates to having one’s mind made up about who one will vote for (or against) in larger proportions than among other groups who feel differently on the day. But this is not the only measure of patriotism that matters or affects voting and turnout, and this relationship is weak to the point of insignificance in terms of voter participation.

Chart/Table 36 How does the celebration of 1st October National Day make you feel by Vote choice made



	Indifferent	Proud/Excited	Another holiday	Uneasy/unhappy	total
Vote choice made	39	47	37	40	41
Don't Know, not vote	61	53	63	60	59
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 2.479 with 3 df p = 0.4792 NO SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION

The next set of four tables sets out a stepped series of questions designed to test and track changes in attitudes toward national or patriotic education. The first question was most innocuous and meant to elicit minimal resistance as having “political” or nationalistic overtones. However, in 2011 the government made proposals to include in civic education, which once focused on civic courtesies and the Basic Law, national lessons about China’s government and contemporary history. The proposed curriculum also included aspects some considered propagandistic in overtone.

Chart/Table 37 Do you support or oppose teaching civic education in the schools?





Table 37 Do you support or oppose teaching civic education in school

	Strongly oppose	Oppose	Neutral	Support	Strongly support	DK
Jan 1998	3	3	14	47	28	4
July 1998	2	3	5	49	39	3
Oct 1998	2	3	6	44	41	3
July 1999	1	2	8	50	35	4
Oct 2011	10	18	--	47	11	13

The proposed inclusion of lessons on one country two systems, the Chinese constitution and political history of recent China in civic education has generated some backlash as may be seen in the steep rise in opposition to teaching civic education in the schools., but the specific question on whether or not to teach the political history of China and Hong Kong does not generate the resistance it did shortly after the handover.


Chart/Table 38 Do you support or oppose the schools teaching political history of China and Hong Kong? (From Oct. 98 rephrased as Do you support or oppose the schools to teach the PRC's political history up to the present?)

	Strongly oppose	Somewhat oppose	Neutral	Somewhat support	Strongly support	Don't Know
Jan 1998	3	8	12	52	21	4
July 1998	4	6	7	48	33	2
Oct 1998	4	10	11	49	23	3
July 1999	2	11	13	52	19	3
Oct 2011	1	6	--	68	19	6

The next question raises the issue of patriotism and nationalism in the school curriculum directly, and while opposition has changed very little since the handover, support has grown into a clear majority of 57 percent, up from 52 percent two years after the 1 July reunification with the mainland. The level of opposition to this direct question about patriotic school plays and lessons, 28 percent, is exactly the same level as that in opposition to civic education, so the effect of injecting patriotism and nationalistic perspectives into the civic education curriculum is clear. At the same time, just as clearly, support has grown for such perspectives being in the schools. The final

question in this series of questions on nationalism and the schools shows a clear change of views (see below, Chart/Table 41).

Chart/Table 39 Do you support or oppose the schools to have patriotic school plays or lessons?




	Strongly oppose	Somewhat oppose	Neutral	Somewhat support	Strongly support	DK
Jan 1998	7	22	24	35	8	4
July 1998	6	20	19	37	16	2
Oct 1998	6	23	22	36	11	2
July 1999	6	18	20	40	12	4
Oct 2011	10	18	--	50	7	15

Table 40 and Chart/Table 41 show the results of questions aimed directly at having nationalistic expressions in the schools. Early after the handover, as Table 40 shows, a clear majority opposed flag raising ceremonies in the schools. In October 2011, after 11 National Day holidays in Hong Kong and after the government introduced the playing of the national anthem before the news (on the Chinese channels only), sentiments have clearly shifted to support, with 62 percent now in favor of such ceremonies being held in school every day.

Table 40 Should or should not school children sing the National Anthem and have a flag raising ceremony every day?

	Should	Should not	Don't Know
January 1998	18	61	21
July 1998	22	63	15

Chart/Table 41 Do you support or oppose the school children to sing National Anthem and have flag raising every day?



	Strongly oppose	Somewhat oppose	Neutral	Somewhat support	Strongly support	Don't Know
Oct 1998	17	37	23	16	4	2
July 1999	17	40	20	15	5	3
Oct 2011	7	18	--	53	9	13

Overall, it is clear that support for some expressions of nationalism or patriotism in the school have risen considerably since 1997. On the other hand, Chart/Table 44 below shows there has been little change in feelings toward China's national day celebrations, with an average of just under one in five feeling proud or excited on National Day in the first five years after the handover, to an average of just over one in five feeling proud or excited in the past five years.


Table 42 How does the celebration of 1st October National Day make you feel?

Group	Count	%
Indifferent	504	61
Proud	94	11
Excited	78	10
Just another holiday	106	13
Uneasy/Unhappy	12	1
Refuse/DK	26	3

Table 43 Recoded results for analysis (see below)

Group	Count	%
Indifferent	504	61
Proud/Excited	172	21
Another holiday	106	13
Uneasy/Unhappy	38	5

Chart/Table 44 How does the celebration of China's National day on 1 October make you feel?




	Indifferent	Proud	Excited	Another holiday	Uneasy /Unhappy	DK
July 1998	70	7	8	11	2	1
July 1999	58	12	7	20	1	2
Nov 1999	52	12	12	21	2	1
Nov 2000	51	9	8	30	2	-
Nov 2001	55	12	7	23	2	1
Nov 2004	59	12	8	17	2	2
Nov 2005	57	12	8	20	1	--
Nov 2006	47	13	8	31	1	2
April 2007	52	13	9	25	1	1
May 2008	49	14	11	25	1	1
June 2008	50	15	13	22	1	--
July 2008	55	14	9	21	1	--
Aug 2008	47	14	12	25	1	1
Sept 2008	51	13	12	22	1	1
May 2009	55	13	9	21	1	--
Aug 2010	47	13	9	21	1	--
Oct 2011	61	11	10	13	1	3

While patriotic feelings on average appear to have changed little since 1997, there is a clear correlation between feelings toward National Day and choice of which party represents the respondent best. Those who have the patriotic feelings of excitement or pride on National Day are far more likely to cite the DAB as best representing them than other groups. Those who are uneasy or unhappy (a tiny block, please note) are more likely to cite the DP or say no party best represents them.

There are other issues related to government performance in which these patriotic feelings do show significant correlation, as Tables 46 and following show.

Chart/Table 45 Feelings on National Day, by Which party represents you best



	Indifferent	Proud/Excited	Another holiday	Uneasy/unhappy	total
DAB	7	20	6	8	9
DP	9	5	10	13	9
LSD	2	2	1	0	2
CP	10	5	12	8	9
People's Power	2	2	5	3	2
New People's	2	4	5	0	3
FTU	1	2	5	0	2
CTU	3	1	2	0	2
LP	2	1	1	0	1
None	42	36	33	53	40
Don't Know	20	22	21	16	20
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total
 Chi-square = 59.89 with 30 df p = 0.0010

Those who say they are proud/excited on National Day tend to be more satisfied with life.

Table 46 Feelings on National Day by Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong

	Indifferent	Proud/Excited	Another holiday	Uneasy/unhappy	total
Dissatisfied	28	20	26	40	27
Satisfied	72	80	74	60	74
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total
 Chi-square = 6.838 with 3 df p = 0.0772

They also tend to be more satisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong Government, and as Table 48 indicates, with the performance of the Hong Kong Government dealing with the PRC Government.

Table 47 Feelings on National Day by Satisfaction with performance of Hong Kong Government

	Indifferent	Proud/Excited	Another holiday	Uneasy/unhappy	total
Dissatisfied	64	46	61	65	60
Satisfied	36	54	39	35	40
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 17.07 with 3 df p = 0.0007

Table 48 Feelings on National Day by Satisfaction with performance of the Hong Kong SAR Government dealing with the PRC Government

	Indifferent	Proud/Excited	Another holiday	Uneasy/unhappy	total
Dissatisfied	58	34	52	73	53
Satisfied	42	66	48	27	47
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 30.77 with 3 df p ≤ 0.0001

However, while those who felt proud and excited on National Day showed majorities satisfied with Hong Kong government performance, when it came to Donald Tsang, even those folks showed less than a majority satisfied.

Table 49 Feelings on National Day by Satisfaction with Tsang's performance

	Indifferent	Proud/Excited	Another holiday	Uneasy/unhappy	total
Dissatisfied	70	54	69	75	67
Satisfied	30	46	31	25	33
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 14.34 with 3 df p = 0.0025

But patriotic feeling respondents gave clear majority support to the performance of the PRC government's handling of Hong Kong affairs.

Table 50 Feelings on National Day by Satisfaction with performance of the PRC Government dealing with SAR affairs

	Indifferent	Proud/Excited	Another holiday	Uneasy/unhappy	total
Dissatisfied	44	22	37	42	38
Satisfied	40	60	51	40	46
Don't Know	16	19	12	18	16
total	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 31.11 with 6 df p ≤ 0.0001

On the PRC Government's rule of China a majority among the patriotic approved, but even there over a third were dissatisfied, versus a clear majority among all surveyed showing dissatisfaction. Clearly the Central Government has problems in Hong Kong when even among those who say National Day makes them proud or excited, so many feel dissatisfied. The focus groups conducted after the survey from a random sample of respondents indicated inflation and corruption were their

major concerns, as well as the wealth gap and mainland shoppers stripping the shelves of items such as baby formula. The food scandals and particularly the baby formula fakes and diluted products have driven mainland shoppers to purchase these goods in bulk while visiting Hong Kong, where they have more confidence in government food safety inspections. Local people thus have problems securing some items, and in the case of baby formula, irreplaceable items they need for their own families. So even the more patriotic are showing displeasure at both governments for this problem.

Chart/Table 51 Feelings on National Day by Satisfaction with PRC Government rule of China




	Indifferent	Proud/Excited	Another holiday	Uneasy/unhappy	total
Dissatisfied	62	39	58	65	57
Satisfied	38	61	42	36	43
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 25.28 with 3 df $p \leq 0.0001$

Patriotic feelings on National Day clearly have an effect on attitudes toward government and toward party orientation. Chart/Table 52 shows there is also a correlation between patriotic feelings and how one chooses to identify oneself. Those who choose to describe themselves as a Hong Kong person are much less likely to describe themselves as excited or proud on National Day than those who describe themselves as Chinese.

Chart/Table 52 Feelings on National Day by Self Identification




	Hong Kong Chinese	Chinese	Hong Kong person	Overseas Chinese/Hong Kong British	Chinese Hong Konger	total
Indifferent	61	55	69	61	56	62
Proud/Excited	20	34	12	10	26	21
Another holiday	17	10	13	19	13	13
Uneasy/unhappy	3	2	6	10	6	5
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 43.40 with 12 df $p \leq 0.0001$

However, there has clearly been a shift in identity starting to develop over the past year (2011). In previous years, Hong Kong Transition Project research showed that mainland Chinese who moved to Hong Kong and lived there for more than 10 years began, sometime after 12 to 15 years, to describe themselves differently than they did in earlier years. (See Chart/Table 59 below for this time/identity shift data for the mainland born.) About one in four to one in three would show such a shift of identity. The hypothesis developed from this data was that sometime 12 to 15 years after 1997, we should begin to see a shift in identity take place. The data in 2011, 13 years after the 1997 handover, shows just such a shift. Originally, "Chinese Hong Konger" was not read out from the list given to respondents. In 2011, in two separate random surveys (April and October), about one in four respondents named another, non listed category which was originally put under the "other" classification, as Chart/Table 53 shows. The project waited until a second survey confirmed these findings and used the same phrasing, again leaving out the "Chinese Hong Konger" response given in the April 2011 by nearly one in four respondents.

Chart/Table 53 The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is the most appropriate description of you? (Read list)



*For figures, see Table 53 below

Table 54 The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is the most appropriate description of you?

Group	Count	%
Hong Kong Chinese	107	13
Chinese	168	20
Hong Kong person	306	37
Hong Kong British	11	1
Overseas Chinese	9	1
Other	11	1
Chinese Hong Konger*	208	25

*From recoded responses classified as "other" primarily

Table 53 Which is the most appropriate description of you?

	Chinese	HK Chinese	HK person	HK British	Overseas Chinese	Other
Feb 1993	19	36	37	7		1
Aug 1993	20	34	35	10		1
Feb 1994	21	40	28	8		1
Aug 1994	19	38	32	10		1
Feb 1995	20	32	35	11		1
Aug 1995	22	32	36	8		1
Feb 1996	30	28	35	5		2
July 1996	30	20	45	3		2
Feb 1997	30	28	35	3	3	1
June 1997	25	24	44	4	2	1
Dec 1997	27	27	39	3	2	2
Apr 1998	30	24	41	2	2	2
July 1998	22	27	44	4	1	1
Oct 1998	25	27	43	4	1	1
Apr 1999	20	28	45	3	1	2
July 1999	21	27	46	4	1	1
Nov 1999	23	27	44	3	1	2
Apr 2000	24	30	39	4	1	2
Aug 2000	22	27	45	4	2	1
Nov 2000	24	28	42	3	2	2
Apr 2001	28	24	42	3	2	2
July 2001	26	26	43	3	1	2
Nov 2001	22	26	45	4	1	2
Apr 2002	27	24	43	3	1	2
Aug 2002	28	24	44	2	1	1
Nov 2002	24	25	44	2	1	3
Nov 2003	22	27	44	2	2	4
Dec 2003	25	25	45	3	1	2
Apr 2004	26	27	41	2	1	2
May 2005	25	29	42	1	1	1
July 2005	22	31	41	2	1	2
Nov 2005	29	27	39	2	2	2
Mar 2006	23	31	41	2	1	3
Nov 2006	21	30	44	2	1	2
Apr 2007	29	27	37	1	1	4
June 2008	34	33	28	1	1	2
Aug 2008	33	29	34	2	1	2
Sept 2008	30	32	33	1	1	3
May 2009	23	35	38	1	2	2
Aug 2010	22	28	42	3	2	3
Nov 2010	17	14	40	2	1	25*
Oct 2011	20	13	37	1	1	25*


*I'm a Chinese Hong Konger This phrase given without prompting both in November 2010 and October 2011. In Table 2, other includes Chinese Hong Konger. In the cross tabs below, Chinese Hong Konger is separated out and other includes HK British, Overseas Chinese and other responses

Table 55 Identity results recoded for analysis

Group	Count	%
Hong Kong Chinese	107	13
Chinese	168	20
Hong Kong person	306	37
Hong Kong British/Overseas Chinese	31	4
Chinese Hong Konger*	208	25

*Originally included in the "other" category and spontaneously given by respondents without prompting. The other categories read from list.

This shift in identity appears to be more pronounced among teenagers than among other ages, but every age group shows a significant proportion spontaneously giving this new kind of identity. Nearly half of teenagers gave this response while about one in five to one in four of the other age groups responded by describing themselves as Chinese Hong Konger rather than any of the other possibilities read out.

Chart/Table 56 Proportion within Age Groups of Identity Categories

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-86	total
Hong Kong Chinese	5	16	15	10	12	20	14	13
Chinese	15	17	17	17	19	26	31	20
Hong Kong person	25	35	41	45	43	27	31	38
Other*	8	4	3	4	2	6	2	4
Chinese Hong Konger	48	28	23	25	26	21	22	26
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 43.77 with 24 df p = 0.0081

*Other, Hong Kong British, Overseas Chinese collapsed together and Chinese Hong Konger separated out.

As Chart/Table 57 shows, the proportions of the identity categories by age group show that Chinese identity has more than the average over age 50 while Chinese Hong Konger has more than average under 30.

Chart/Table 57 Proportion of Identity Categories by Age groups



	HK Chinese	Chinese	HK Person	Other*	Chinese Hong Konger	total
18-19	2	4	3	11	9	5
20-29	15	11	12	14	14	13
30-39	13	10	13	11	10	12
40-49	15	17	25	21	20	21
50-59	21	22	27	11	23	24
60-69	23	20	11	25	12	15
70-86	11	16	8	7	9	10
total	100	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 43.77 with 24 df p = 0.0081

*Other, Hong Kong British, Overseas Chinese collapsed together and Chinese Hong Konger separated out.

Chart/Table 58 shows that about one in four of those born either in Hong Kong or in Mainland China chose the "Chinese Hong Konger" identity, indicating that birthplace has little to do with this identity choice while clearly, those who say they are Chinese are more likely to be born on mainland China and those who say they are Hong Kong person are more likely to be born in Hong Kong. So while birthplace clearly influences these other identity choices, Chinese Hong Konger is based on something else.

Chart/Table 58 Proportions of Birthplace by Identity Categories




	Hong Kong	Mainland China	Elsewhere	total
Hong Kong Chinese	12	14	21	13
Chinese	17	30	13	21
Hong Kong person	41	29	21	37
Other*	4	2	25	4
Chinese Hong Konger	26	25	21	25
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 55.23 with 8 df $p \leq 0.0001$

Chart/Table 59 shows that of those born on the mainland and who have lived in Hong Kong 15 years or less, more choose to identify themselves as Chinese than other categories. In prior surveys, this tendency was even more pronounced and the category of Chinese Hong Konger just did not come up in responses. After 15 years living in Hong Kong, identity shifted away from Chinese toward either Hong Kong Chinese or Hong Kong person, and this shift still shows up in the data below, but in a less pronounced manner than before since about one in four in the recent surveys gave this new categorization of Chinese Hong Konger. After living in Hong Kong over 30 years, most considered themselves Hong Kongers (again the Chinese Hong Konger category was not there, and most of those who now give this answer once answered Hong Kong Chinese or Hong Kong person).

Chart/Table 59 Identity choices of mainland born over time lived in Hong Kong compared to Hong Kong born respondents



	7-15	16-30	32-70	HKBorn	total
Hong Kong Chinese	9	19	15	12	13
Chinese	31	23	31	17	21
Hong Kong person	18	29	30	42	37
Hong Kong British	2	0	0	2	1
Overseas Chinese	2	3	2	1	1
Other	4	1	1	1	1
Chinese Hong Konger*	33	25	22	26	25
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total
 Chi-square = 38.68 with 18 df p = 0.0031

Identity choice appears unrelated to whether one has decided who to vote for, as Table 60 shows. But Table 62, which shows identity choosers by which party represents them best (and in which only those who say they have chosen to vote for someone already are included) does have an association.

Table 60 Choice of whom to vote for made, by Identity choice

	Hong Kong Chinese	Chinese	Hong Kong person	Other	Chinese Hong Konger	total
Vote choice made	46	41	40	46	38	41
Don't Know, not vote	54	59	60	54	62	59
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table content: Percent of Column Total
 Chi-square = 1.473 with 4 dfp = 0.8315** NO SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATION


Table 61 Reclassification of Which party represents best, for analysis

Group	Count	%
DAB/FTU	93	11
DP/CTU	90	11
LSD/PP	35	4
CP	74	9
NPP/LP	34	4
None	330	40
Don't Know	164	20

*DAB and FTU are allies as are DP and CTU. LSD and PP were same party until recent split. The Liberal Party has lost a number of members to NPP.

Table 61 shows the reclassification of which party represents best to increase the number of cases in each category to make analysis more reliable. Table Chart/Table 64 below shows the unreclassified results. In Chart/Table 62, those who say their identity is Chinese have overwhelmingly decided already how they are going to vote, with nearly two thirds already decided how they lean. Those saying Hong Kong person are much less likely to have decided, and those who gave Hong Kong British, Overseas Chinese and other as responses (other, below) are very much undecided, but of those who have they split between the CP and DP, with no DAB oriented respondents among them. Hong Kong Chinese and Chinese Hong Konger identities are nearly the same proportions who have made up their minds to vote, but those saying Chinese Hong Konger appear slightly more leaning toward the DAB and away from the DP than those saying their identity is Hong Kong Chinese.

Chart/Table 62 Identity by Which party represents best, among only those who have made a choice on their vote in the DC election



	Hong Kong Chinese	Chinese	Hong Kong person	Other	Chinese Hong Konger	total
DAB/FTU	13	31	10	0	17	16
DP/CTU	13	15	13	14	10	13
LSD/PP	3	6	4	0	3	4
CP	8	12	10	14	8	10
NPP/LP	8	4	1	0	3	3
None	47	23	44	14	37	37
Don't Know	8	10	19	57	22	17
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 33.88 with 24 df p = 0.0868