Last updated on December 17, 2013

By the late 1990s, 95 percent of voters were using voting machines. Voters were generally familiar with the machines that had been used for many years, so local authorities did not need to provide much additional voter education. Local authorities were responsible for ensuring accessible voting facilities were provided for persons with disabilities. Polling staff (many of whom were from political parties) received training from local authorities on the procedures and functioning of voting machines. Only minor problems were encountered on Election Day – local authorities had spare machines in case of machine break down, as well as batteries in case of power failure. Technical staff was distributed throughout the country with back-up equipment. They could be reached via telephone if their support was needed.

Because the voting machines were widely seen to work well, few questions were ever raised about their security or compliance with international standards. Still, concerns were raised on several occasions, particularly by the Electoral Council and in Parliament. 

The Electoral Council’s concerns focused on the lack of any kind of testing or certification for the tabulation software, as well as the Integral Voting System (Integraal Stem Systeem⁵⁰) that was offered as a package to local authorities by NEDAP/Groendaal. While the Electoral Council advised the responsible minister on several occasions to introduce a certification procedure for the tabulation software, no action was ever taken by the MOIKR, as it was not considered a priority. In March 2003, the Electoral Council wrote a letter to the minister detailing certain mistakes in the tabulation software that had been discovered during elections in 2002 and 2003 and emphasized the lack of control mechanisms.

Questions were first raised in Parliament in March 1998, after some issues had arisen regarding tabulation and recounting during the local elections. Then, the media raised questions during the May 1998 parliamentary election about the lack of a recount using electronic voting machines. The State Secretary requested an opinion of the Electoral Council on the issues of tabulation and recounts, and expressed his concern about the near monopoly position of NEDAP/Groendaal in the tabulation process. The Electoral Council recommended a review, and, as a result, the ministry created a sub-commission, which included representatives of the HEC, the Electoral Council and the MOIKR. The sub-commission published its report, written by the HEC, in May 1999. The report stressed that calculation errors sometimes appeared in the tabulation software and that only the supplier had access to the source code. It recommended that a certification procedure be created for the tabulation software. While the minister addressed these issues to the Parliament in September 1999, and his proposals received initial support from political parties, no action was taken to follow up on the issues by the Parliament or the MOIKR.

Questions again were raised in 2004 in Parliament because of concerns in Ireland regarding the reliability and security of the NEDAP machines purchased there. The Minister responded that “In the Netherlands, a lot of attention has always been paid to the reliability of these voting machines.”⁵¹ The Irish government subsequently decided not to use the machines for the 2004 European Parliamentary elections, but the Dutch Parliament did not take any further action. Questions raised in Parliament in August 2005 regarding the lack of a possibility for a recount were similarly discounted.

^{50 This system supports the voting machine software and contains a complete set of all political parties and lists of candidates. It also calculates and tabulates the results.}

^{51 TK 2003-2004, Aanhangsel van de Handelingen, nr. 1453}

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Netherlands: Opposition to Electronic Voting