Post-election Audits

Last updated on December 17, 2013

There are two methods through which audits were supposed to have been conducted. However, both methods were not implemented sufficiently to allow for a credible check on the publicly-reported voting results. The first was through public positing of precinct-level results on the COMELEC’s website, which was not implemented, as explained in the Transmission and Tabulation section.

The second was through a random manual audit (RMA), which by law was required to be conducted in five randomly-selected precincts per congressional district (a total of 1,145 precincts) after the closure of the voting process. The Random Manual Audit Committee, which included members of PPCRV, was responsible for conducting the RMA. In the pre-election period, election observation groups pressed PPCRV and COMELEC to prepare for the RMA early, and provided COMELEC with RMA guidelines prepared by the Management Association of the Philippines. However, COMELEC staff and PPCRV representatives acknowledge that appropriate advance preparations were not made. 

The RMA sample drawing was conducted transparently on Election Day in front of the media. However, the sample was not representative, as precincts in difficult-to-reach communities (the least accessible barangays) were excluded from the sample. Many BEIs were not informed they were selected for the RMA until late in the day, in some cases, after the precincts had already moved the ballots to higher-level tabulation centers. BEIs were not well-informed on RMA procedures. The RMA was not completed until more than two months after Election Day. Further, independent observers were not able to monitor the process in most locations. NAMFREL observers noted that in many of the locations it attempted to observe the RMA, no parties or PPCRV representatives were present. 

When finally completed, the RMA demonstrated a 99.6 percent accuracy rating of the election results. This fell below the COMELEC’s requirement of 99.995 percent accuracy in the RFP for the automated system. This result is subject to questions, given the delayed process, bias in the sample, lack of independent observation and inconsistent implementation. 

Challenges and Recounts

Electoral dispute resolution in the Philippines is handled by several different adjudicative bodies, depending on the type of dispute and the type of election. Prior to the May 2010 elections, expectations were that the move to electronic counting technology would reduce the number of electoral complaints filed. However, the opposite occurred. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal received a record number of cases, 65, in 2010 – a significant increase from the 35 filed in 2007.⁷⁹ The COMELEC also received more cases filed by losing candidates, 98, in 2010 – compared to 73 in the 2007 elections. Some election protests were related to the behavior of candidates, election officials and others, while a portion of the protests were related to the electronic technology used in the elections. Some of the most common technology-related protests were: erroneous counting of votes or misreading of ballots by the PCOS machines; errors in the initialization of PCOS machines; errors in transmission and consolidation of results; erroneous rejection of ballots; non-implementation of security measures; and manipulation of PCOS machines and/or compact flash cards.

In the case of recounts, paper ballots are to be used. Scanned images of the ballots (scanned on Election Day) are only to be used in cases where the integrity of the ballot box has been compromised. This was a hotly-debated issue. One point of controversy was that, unless there was evidence that ballot box integrity was compromised, scanned images could not be used in cases where there was a significant difference between the physical count of the ballots (excluding rejected ballots) and the number of votes cast as reported in the official election results. 

Some party representatives and candidates interviewed noted the courts did not have the IT capacity to effectively rule on technology-related cases. Others noted the full cost of protests increased as a result of the move to electronic technology, since they have to hire more specialized legal and IT expertise; they need to educate themselves in more detail about the technology; and collecting evidence is more difficult under an electronic system. 

Evaluation of the System

Several post-election assessments of the AES were conducted by the COMELEC and other stakeholders, including one conducted by IFES for the commission, which involved the commissioners, senior staff, regional directors, election officers and representatives of civil society and political parties. Additionally, the CAC submitted a comprehensive report on the implementation of the AES to the COMELEC, which contained an evaluation and recommendations for improvement. Several civil society organizations also evaluated the AES. Many of these evaluations were presented in final reports, public forums and discussions. In addition, a local survey group, the Social Weather Stations, conducted a survey after the 2010 elections. Approximately 75 percent of respondents rated the results of the May 10 elections to be “satisfactory,” a marked improvement compared to the 2004 and 2007 elections, which registered a satisfactory ratings of only 53 percent and 51 percent, respectively.⁸⁰

Media Coverage

Media coverage surrounding the elections focused primarily on the electoral races and results, not as much on the new technology. Journalists and editors interviewed noted the main coverage of the technology focused on a few major problems before Election Day, such as the replacement of compact flash cards, and on the speed with which preliminary results were announced in comparison to past elections. Generally, the media did not cover electoral protests, with the exception of the protest filed by vice presidential candidate Manuel “Mar” Roxas III. In interviews, several journalists attributed some of this lack of coverage to the difficulty in discerning whether the claims were credible or not, because editors and journalists were not familiar enough with the technology. Some media organizations had in-house workshops on the AES system, and some civil society groups engaged with media to educate them on the technology or express their concerns. However, media organizations and staff mentioned they were often confused about the technology and felt ill-equipped to report on it.

^{79 Issues and Challenges to Dispute Resolution under the PSCOS AES, Libertas.}

^{80 People’s Evaluation of the May 2010 Automated Elections, SWS (10 July 2010).}

NEXT:

Philippines: Lessons Learned