Background and Political Context

Slovakia’s highly anticipated parliamentary elections on September 30 saw the return of three-time former Prime Minister Robert Fico, as his party, SMER-SSD (Direction - Slovak Social Democracy), ran away with nearly 23 percent of the vote and 42 of the 150 available seats. SMER’s victory, while not entirely unexpected, raises questions about the posture of the country vis a vis the West, the European Union, and Ukraine. 

These elections were called early, following the collapse of a coalition between the populist Ordinary People (OĽaNO) party and its conservative, pro-business partners in December 2022. Slovakia had been under a caretaker government since that time. International eyes were fixed on this election - perhaps more than ever before - due to the unusually high stakes as Fico and SMER promised an end to military assistance to Ukraine. Throughout his campaign, his pro-Russian, EU-skeptic rhetoric set Western observers on edge and raised concerns of a sharp turn away from Slovakia’s current posture. 

Although Fico appeared to be the favorite going into the election, the large pool of undecided voters (an estimated 22 percent, according to the National Democratic Institute’s (NDI’s) July 2023 public opinion research) left the door open for unexpected upsets. Eyes were also on liberal Progressive Slovakia (PS), a party that won Slovakia’s 2019 European Parliament election in coalition with the Together party, but failed to win parliamentary seats in 2020. Hlas (Voice), a SMER offshoot led by Peter Pellegrini, Fico’s former deputy, was also expected to play a key role. Republika (the Republic), a group led by former members of an openly neo-Nazi party, and the Slovak National Party (SNS) rounded out the frontrunners on the far right. Other potential spoilers included the Christian Democrats (KDH) and the conservative populist Sme Rodina (We are Family). 

With neither SMER nor PS expected to secure an outright majority, which of the 25 competing parties and movements would pass the required 5 percent threshold to win seats (or 7 percent for coalitions, such as OL’aNO) was crucially important. Throughout the campaign, five or six parties consistently hovered at the threshold, and the aforementioned undecided voters made the results, including potential coalitions, highly unpredictable. 

Going into the election, Fico continuously promised voters that he would oppose sanctions on Russia and continued military aid for Ukraine. He powered his return to the campaign stage, focusing on populist politics - including domestic issues that traditionally pack a punch, such as migration and border protection. NDI’s public opinion research found that SMER’s focus on NATO expansion and Ukraine generated fear and promoted engagement in political dialogue among its base but drove apathy among the undecided. At the same time, findings showed that voters’ decision-making could have been influenced by more focus on the past performance of the incumbent and previously governing coalitions - arguably a key weak point for Fico, who was forced out of office in 2018 amid a national backlash over the murders of an investigative journalist and his girlfriend.

Results

The clear winner of the elections was SMER-SSD, with almost 23 percent of the vote and 42 of the 150 seats. PS came second, reaching almost 18 percent with 32 seats, followed by Peter Pellegrini’s Hlas, with almost 15 percent and 27 seats. Igor Matovic's OL’aNO exceeded expectations, reaching almost nine percent and 16 seats. After eight years, KDH will enter parliament again with almost seven percent of the vote and 12 seats. Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), led by Richard Sulik, received 6 percent of the votes and secured 11 seats. The last party above the threshold was SNS, winning 5.6 percent and 10 seats. SNS was able to unify smaller nationalist groups to secure sufficient support. However, all but one person elected on the SNS ticket are not party members and may act as free agents once in office. 

Key Observations

The elections saw a relatively high turnout rate of 68.5 percent, one of the highest in recent years. The significant turnout was surprising given the high voter apathy and frustration rates, as observed in NDI research. Findings consistently pointed to the performance of previous governments and the leading political class as a key sticking point for voters, particularly women, who seemed both disengaged and disappointed. According to NDI’s survey, about one in four voters were undecided going into the election. Of those undecided voters, approximately 15 percent leaned democratic, and the majority were women (67 percent). Turnout among voters in the 18-25 age group was also up. In May 2023, research conducted by the Slovak agency FOCUS indicated that 52 percent of respondents in this age group planned to vote; 69 percent came to polling stations (up from 65 percent in 2020). The high turnout, particularly among young voters, indicates that mobilization campaigns were effective.

SMER grasped the chance to win the elections and did not lose its grip. The party’s success demonstrates that its aggressive campaigns, marked by disinformation and pro-Russian propaganda and targeting disoriented and frustrated voters, worked well. SMER also effectively leveraged its well-established local and regional structures. Many voters of the radically nationalist, far-right party Republika, which did not clear the threshold to enter parliament, were lured by Fico in the last moments of the campaign, as Republika’s voters saw in Fico someone representing their interests. Notably, after 12 years, the parliament will be without a fascist political party represented in the legislature; however, there will still be members  of parliament (MPs) aligned with that ideology who were elected under the cover of SNS or SMER. 

The second-place performance of Progressive Slovakia could be a sign of bigger things to come for the party. Given that PS failed to win any parliamentary seats in 2020, there are reasons to believe that their supporters should be optimistic following the results of this election. Winning 18 percent of the vote is by no means a disappointing performance, particularly since PS advocates for a vision that, for more traditional facets of society, may still be a bit of a reach. In the future, if PS can find ways to appeal to voters outside urban areas - especially in eastern Slovakia - the party has the potential to continue its upward trajectory.

The fragmented party landscape resulted in five parties, which hovered at the threshold, failing to pass it. In addition to Republika, this included Demokrati (Democrats), a party led by individuals who left OL’aNO, including former Prime Minister Eduard Heger. Shortly before elections, polls indicated that the party was on the rise and would reach the threshold, increasing chances for a pro-democratic coalition. However, many voters decided at the last moment to vote for stronger parties for fear of forfeiting their votes. Sme Rodina, a right-wing, populist party led by Boris Kollar, who was surrounded by scandals centered on accusations of domestic violence, was unable to consolidate its base.

Aliancia, an ethnic Hungarian party that failed to pass the threshold, enhanced its reach in many parts of southern Slovakia, and its result is promising for future elections. After Most-Hid, an inter-ethnic party that advocated for greater cooperation with Slovakia’s Hungarian minority collapsed four years ago, Hungarian parties fragmented and were absorbed by other mainstream parties. Aliancia is openly financially supported by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban; its success indicates that Orban is increasing his influence in southern Slovakia.

Six Roma candidates won seats in parliament, a notable increase from the three who won in 2020. Two Roma women, Ingrid Kosova and Irena Bihariova, were elected on the PS candidate list. All four Roma candidates on the OL’aNO list, led by Peter Pollak, Jr. (who received 53,005 votes), were elected. The other Roma candidates elected on the OL’aNO list are Viliam Tanko (an NDI program alumnus), Lukas Buzo, and Anezka Skopova. These four Roma candidates conducted massive, direct contact campaigns supported by excellent social media presence. Election data reveals that, without Romani votes, OL’aNO would not have reached the 7 percent threshold: Roma voters secured almost 2 percent of the party’s votes. 

Women remain underrepresented. Of the 1,650 candidates across political parties aspiring for parliamentary seats, there were 377 women (23 percent).1 Only 33 women were elected (22% representation). Almost half (16) were elected on the PS list. (The breakdown of women candidates by political party is as follows: PS: 76, OLaNO: 35, SaS: 26, Sme rodina: 44, SNS: 36, SMER: 20, Hlas: 28, Aliancia: 21, Demokrati: 33, KDH: 27, and Republika: 31.)

Coalition Formation

Speculation about potential coalitions immediately followed the announcement of results. As neither SMER nor PS secured an outright majority (76 mandates), the future direction of Slovakia rested firmly in the hands of Hlas and Peter Pellegrini. On October 2, President Zuzana Caputova officially requested that Fico, as the leader of the highest vote-earning party, form a government within two weeks. On October 10, Pellegrini announced he would end negotiations with other parties in favor of a coalition between Hlas, SMER, and SNS (collectively 79 mandates), with Fico again as Prime Minister and Pellegrini as Speaker of Parliament. 

Before the elections, Pellegrini signaled his interest in the role of Prime Minister and appeared open to a possible PS-KDH coalition in this event, but ultimately decided that cooperation between the liberal and conservative parties would be conflictual. Further, KDH’s Majersky had already announced LGBTI+ and gender issues as a red line, among other conditions, for cooperating with PS. 

Given their shared history, there are many natural links between Hlas and SMER, and at first sight, this coalition was the most natural choice for all three parties. Yet it also presents risks to Pellegrini and Hlas, as the party could be subsumed by a stronger SMER and disband. As Pellegrini himself has said, it is difficult for two “social democracies” to be in one coalition. At the same time, most Hlas party board members openly stated that they were in favor of the coalition with SMER, and Pellegrini risked MPs leaving the party if he entered into coalition with PS.

[1] The parties’ opposing geo-political orientations are a key difference they will have to navigate now that Hlas has signed on to the coalition. Pellegrini is openly pro-European and pro-Atlantic in his priorities. With only four MPs above the simple majority, a SMER-Hlas-SNS coalition of 79 mandates is not very strong, especially when MPs of SNS may be unpredictable. However, Fico has shown himself to be a strong leader with many tools to “discipline” potential renegades. Forthcoming government minister appointments may further indicate Slovakia’s future geopolitical orientation.

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