By Geneive Abdo
Iran Analyst, The Century Foundation

The basij militias may have crushed the historic street protests against Iran’s election results, but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei now faces a more pressing problem: how to prevent a potent coalition of political elites arrayed against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from destabilizing the entire Islamic political system – and undercutting his own power, too.

Western journalists, politicians and pundits have largely focused on the unrest in the streets of Tehran – the worst in the history of the Islamic republic – usually with the underlying, if unjustified, assumption that popular rebellion against clerical rule is at last at hand.  However, the real battle is taking place inside the closed world of Iran’s clerical caste, particularly among the relatively confined circle of the “political mullahs” and their lay allies – all of whom have eschewed traditional Shi’ite teachings against direct involvement in political affairs.

A “coalition of the concerned,” formed in 2006 to challenge Ahmadinejad’s presidency, now includes some of the most influential revolutionary figures in Iran:  former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, both mid-level clerics; Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani, an interlocutor with the West on nuclear issues and the son and son-in-law of leading ayatollahs; and Mohsen Rezai, former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, a contingent whose role in domestic politics has expanded rapidly in recent years.

All of these figures now stand firmly behind Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s defeated challenger, as part of a broad effort to change the direction of Iran’s domestic and foreign policies – even if it means contravening Khamenei’s authority as Supreme Leader.

So far, Khamenei’s efforts to quash the rebellion within the ruling circles have not been effective, although the final outcome remains far from certain. In the past, Iran’s revolutionary elites have always set aside their deep differences in the name of “expediency.” This time, however, things may have gone too far.

Even after Khamenei delivered a decisive speech on June 19, declaring Ahmadinejad had won in a free and fair election and saying the protests were illegal, Mousavi encouraged Iranians to continue their demonstrations to protest the “lies” of the election outcome. It is unlikely that he would have done so without at least implicit support from his powerful backers.

Over the weekend, Rafsanjani’s high-profile daughter, Faezeh Hashemi, was briefly detained, along with four other family members, by the security forces in what appears to have been a warning to the former president. They were later released, and the powerful Rafsanjani clan, which commands enormous financial resources and associated large patronage networks, so far remains defiant.

Other coalition members also challenged Khamenei’s authority. On June 20, Larijani, who has been close to Khamenei in the past, accused the Guardian Council, the body of six clerics and six jurists allied with Khamenei that oversees the electoral process, of being biased toward Ahmadinejad. “Although the Guardian Council is made up of religious individuals, I wish certain members would not side with a certain presidential candidate,” Larijani told the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

Larijani was trying to apply pressure on the Guardian Council because the Supreme Leader told the losing candidates they could take their demands for a new election to the Guardians – a move viewed as pointless because the Guardians are primarily under Khamenei’s control. On June 22, the Guardian Council ruled that in some cities the number of votes cast exceeded the number of eligible voters, but did not overturn the election result, saying any discrepancies would not have changed the outcome of the election.

By casting doubt on Ahmadinejad’s victory, Larijani not only challenged Khamenei and the Guardian Council but also the Foreign Ministry, which historically has been something of a moderating force, though it has so far cast its lot with Ahmadinejad. Addressing foreign diplomats on June 21, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki denied any voting irregularities: “The possibility of organized and comprehensive disruption and irregularities in this election is almost close to zero given the composition of the people who are holding the election.”

At the center of the coalition’s fight against President Ahmadinejad and, by extension, against Khamenei, sits the powerful figure of Rafsanjani, a man of the system who helped establish the Islamic republic. Apparently anticipating a rigged poll, Rafsanjani publicly warned Khamenei in a letter before the election that the counting of the ballots must be “clean.” Rafsanjani in 1997 played a similar role in safeguarding the election of Mohammad Khatami over his more conservative opponents.

A former close aide to Ayatollah Khomenei with unassailable revolutionary credentials, Rafsanjani cannot be dismissed lightly. In addition to huge wealth and great organizational skill, he sits on two powerful state bodies that give him significant leverage within Iran’s Islamic system.

As head of the powerful Expediency Council, which mediates differences among competing political institutions, Rafsanjani enjoys considerable behind-the-scenes influence. He also chairs the Assembly of Experts, a body of clerics formally charged with overseeing the performance of the leader that – at least in theory –has the power to dismiss him and to name a successor. In the past, the body has served merely as a rubber stamp for Khamenei, but Rafsanjani’s long-standing interest in the post of Supreme Leader for himself is an open secret in the corridors of clerical power.

All of these weapons at Rafsanjani’s disposal, in addition to the actions taken by others in the new-found coalition of conservatives and self-declared reformers, could dramatically alter the political dynamic within Iran. Already, Khamenei’s power base in the Islamic basij militias has come under open attack.  In the days after the disputed polls, Larijani, for example, condemned the militias for attacking students in their dormitories at Tehran University, a hot bed of anti-Ahmadinejad activism. Reports said four students were killed. “What does it mean that in the middle of the night students are attacked in their dormitories?” asked Larijani, in a statement condemning the violence.  

Meanwhile, some senior clerical figures, already working behind the scenes against Ahmadinejad, have gone public with their criticism of the election. Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, for many years Iran’s most influential dissident and an idol of Iranians of all generations, issued a statement on his website that denounced the election as rigged – an opinion that is likely shared among the thousands of clerics and seminarians who behind the scenes are no doubt weighing in on the battle for power inside Iran.

“Our youth, hoping to see their rightful will fulfilled, came on the scene and waited patiently,” Montazeri wrote. “This was the greatest occasion for the government's officials to bond with their people. However, unfortunately, they used it in the worst way possible. Declaring results that no one in their right mind can believe, and despite all the evidence of crafted results ... And now they are attempting a purge, arresting intellectuals, political opponents and scientists.”

Clerics such as Montazeri oppose Ahmadinejad not only for his repressive policies against the Iranian people, but because the president believes that the return of the 12th Imam can come only after a world war in which Islam triumphs over all other faiths. For Montazeri and other mainstream clerics, this is heresy.

The fact that some major centers of power are effectively pitted against Khamenei and his frontman, President Ahmadinejad, shows that the state is more vulnerable than at any time since the 1979 Islamic revolution.  In unprecedented ways, the “coalition of the concerned,” backed by hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, could dramatically shift the balance of power inside the regime.

This could force Khamenei to curtail Ahmadinejad’s powers in his second term. For example, he could require Ahmadinejad to abandon his bellicose rhetoric and encourage warmer relations with Western states. Although it is unclear whether concerns among Mousavi’s supporters included Iran’s relationship with the United States, one of the coalition’s main complaints is that Ahmadinejad has isolated Iran from the world because of his confrontational rhetoric against the United States, Israel and Great Britain.

Now, the confrontation between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei against the “coalition of the concerned” has approached a breaking point. So far, Khamenei has been forced to rely on the basij militias and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to maintain public order. That tactic has bought him some valuable time, but it may not prove a strategy for long-term political survival.

The basij are a useful weapon of terror, with no real organizational muscle for the long haul, while the IRGC cadres – increasingly part of the ruling elite – may ultimately decide that their interests lie elsewhere. After all, its former commander, Rezai, has already allied himself with the anti-Ahmedinejad faction. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani and his coalition of conservative and moderate leaders will likely continue to make progress from the inside as they work for reform – not revolution – within the Islamic system of government.

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Published on June 26, 2009