By Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji
Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford

Nearing the end of his term, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues to face criticism over his political, economic and social agenda. In the past four years, his policies have increased dissatisfaction not only among segments of Iranian society but also among members of the ruling establishment. As a result, Ahmadinejad's support base has become increasingly fragile. Indeed, some view the upcoming election as a referendum on both his presidency and the increasingly marginalized radical, populist-Islamic conservative approach.

The past four years can be characterized by Ahmadinejad’s efforts to export the revolution, establish Iran as a regional power and pursue a confrontational nuclear policy. He has framed the sixth administration’s politics in combative terms. The majority of his speeches, contrary to those of former president Mohammad Khatami, have focused on a continued challenge against Iran's “oppressors” and “enemies,” both internal and external, who intend to dominate the Persian Gulf and deny Iran’s right to sovereignty and self-determination. These speeches are filled with revolutionary rhetoric intended to justify his administration’s bellicosity toward the West within the context of the formative period of the Islamic Republic and the policy of exporting the Islamic revolution.

One of the main slogans of Ahmadinejad’s 2005 electoral campaign was implementing economic justice (edalat). His time in office, however, has been marked by a period of stagflation—characterized by the simultaneous existence of hyperinflation and recessionary conditions, including the persistence of high rates of unemployment and the lack of growth—causing a deterioration in living conditions.

Ahmadinejad’s economic policies may have directly fueled inflation, resulting in a spike in the price of basic commodities such as flour, milk, eggs, meat and rice. Rather than capitalize on the rapid rise in liquidity from record oil prices by investing in long-term structural development, Ahmadinejad’s administration has injected large amounts of cash into the economy to provide need-based loans for families and small businesses, fund small-scale local infrastructure projects, and subsidize domestic energy consumption. Although official figures are seldom released, in April 2008 the Central Bank of Iran reported that the country’s year-on-year inflation rate reached 24.2 percent. These unrealistic appropriations have overextended the government. Rather than replenish the country’s Oil Stabilization Fund—a fund designed as a safety net to shore up the government when oil prices fall below the amount assigned in the national budget—Ahmadinejad has depleted this fund since 2005 to supplement his spending. In light of the global economic downturn, falling oil prices that have reached lows of $30.28 per barrel and increasing international isolation, Iran is now facing a liquidity crisis and the threat of a prolonged recession.

Economic mismanagement has amplified domestic criticism of the incumbent administration, with reformists and moderate conservatives speaking out against Ahmadinejad. Even the Supreme Leader, who has throughout Ahmadinejad’s presidency remained a silent supporter of his policies, rebuffed the President for his handling of the worsening crisis created by gas shortages in the winter of 2006-07. This criticism from conservatives and reformists alike indicates a mutual understanding among the political elite of the potential threat that continued economic grievances pose. With rising inflation, widespread unemployment and persistent negative growth, the danger of popular unrest—as previewed during the fuel-rationing riots in June 2007 and more recently in October 2008 during the country-wide bazaar strike over the introduction of a 3 percent sales tax—has certainly alarmed the clerical establishment.

This economic upheaval has dove-tailed with a far-reaching clampdown on freedom of expression, evidenced by the closure of newspapers, arrests of student protesters and the crackdown on those who do not wear full hejab (Islamic dress code). While these actions can be interpreted in a variety of ways, they can most plausibly be explained as Ahmadinejad and his radical allies feeling politically vulnerable.

In an attempt to reduce the negative impact of the increasing criticism Ahmadinejad faces, the government has pursued an active campaign through the press courts to censor the most outspoken and critical newsprint and Internet outlets. Historically, journalists close to the regime’s conservative leadership have been allowed to criticize presidential administrations. However, reflective of the insecurity that broad dissatisfaction with the incumbent administration has produced, the closures have not only affected reformist outlets but also conservative ones. This insecurity has also adversely affected Iran’s ethnic minorities who are increasingly accused of undermining national security by stirring separatist sentiments, which has resulted in the arrests and executions of various prominent journalists from Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchestan, and other peripheral non-Persian provinces.

Ahmadinejad’s administration has simultaneously reinforced strict social controls, particularly concerning attire, originally introduced following the establishment of the Islamic Republic. In April 2007, Iranian law enforcement agents launched a campaign to confront women who did not observe hejab. IRNA, the official state news agency, reported that women wearing short overcoats, tight outer garments and head scarves that did not conceal hair would be ‘notified’ by police patrol officers, oftentimes leading to public harassment and imprisonment. Although the degree of enforcement of such cultural measures wavers in Iran and tightening of social restrictions became apparent in 2002-2003 prior to the current administration, under Ahmadinejad’s administration there has been an increasing emphasis on ensuring moral security in society.

This tightening of social restrictions has resulted in a notable increase in socio-cultural grievances among the urban middle-class that is particularly evident among women and youth. While socio-cultural grievances have traditionally existed among Iran’s ethno-linguistic minorities, despite Ahmadinejad’s much-publicized provincial tours, these grievances have been aggravated by the issue of autonomous control over local councils that Tehran has been reluctant to provide. In sum, since 2005 Ahmadinejad has turned back many of the reforms that placated segments of the middle-class and ethno-linguistic minority populations, producing widespread societal frustration.

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Published on April 10, 2009