By Ramin Jahanbegloo
The unrest in Iran, which began as a protest against the June 12 election, caught the Iranian authorities by surprise. These protests have presented serious challenges not only to the political credibility of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the future president of Iran, but also to the moral status of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his legitimacy as the Supreme Leader of the Revolution. The protests have been the most serious challenge to Iran's clerical regime since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 that saw the downfall of the Shah. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a moderate challenger to Iran's clerical establishment, has frequently appeared to be following the protestors rather than leading them, and it is not clear that he can satisfy them if he opts to try to compromise rather than challenge the present political structure.
Today, more than a month after the presidential elections, no one can be certain about the outcome of this unrest. But what is more or less certain is that Iran will never be the same again. Whatever happens in the weeks and months that follow, for sure the events of the past 30 days have shaken the Islamic Republic. However, as the days pass, the intensified crackdowns on journalists, intellectuals, students and women activists indicate how determined the Iranian regime is to secure its political future.
The country is often described as the biggest jail for journalists in the Middle East and harassment of activists is a routine part of the political scene. Yet in recent weeks, state pressure on protesting activists and dissidents has reached new heights. The dominant methods of the regime to quell the unrest are intimidation, censorship, arrests, forced confessions and, of course, warnings to other nations not to interfere in Iran's "internal affairs." The same tone was part of the standard rhetoric of all communist dictatorships and the military dictatorships in Latin America back in 1970s.
More than 240 prominent Iranian lawyers, activists, journalists, professors, human rights defenders and students have been arrested without warrants at their homes or places of work by unidentified agents and taken to undisclosed locations. These detainees, who are mostly charged with “endangering national security,” are being held incommunicado and the authorities have refused to provide their families with any information regarding charges against them or their condition. Apart from Evin prison, those arrested are often taken to very old prisons that have been out of use. Due to a serious lack of space in the prisons, many of the interrogations take place in cells or corridors and not in an interrogation room. Prisoners are beaten and tortured at the time of their interrogation. They are also now facing poor food and health conditions.
The authorities in Iran have been trying very hard to drive protestors from the streets by deploying police and basij militia in almost every major square in Tehran and other cities. The violent interventions of the militia – one of the regime's bases of brute force armed with bicycle chains, batons and Kalashnikovs and dressed in a mixture of civilian clothes and fatigues - is a significant factor in the increase of repression and militancy. The popular demonstrations in Iran have confirmed people’s great bravery as they confronted the basij militia. They have also shown the willingness and capability of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the security forces to crack down violently on peaceful protesters.
The emerging power dynamics leave protestors with tough choices. If they continue informing the Iranian rulers of their lawful rights through nonviolent demonstrations, they would certainly increase the influence of the military and security forces and risk bloodshed. But if they put an end to their movement of civil disobedience because of the harsh repression, they might lose the support and sympathy of the outside world. For the Iranian authorities the question is whether a huge crackdown would succeed in putting an end to the popular quest for democracy or provoke a wider challenge to their rule. For Mousavi and fellow reformist Mehdi Karoubi the choice is whether to accept a humiliating deal that would greatly diminish their moral and political stature. In short, the competing factions are hesitating before they make irrevocable choices that could change their political destiny or the future framework of Iranian politics.
Meanwhile, the potential for a far broader struggle for democracy is apparent. The recent protests commemorating the 10th anniversary of attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University clearly showed that Iran's turmoil is not over and that many are still serious about their objection to the authoritarian turn they think the country has taken since the disputed election. The fact that so many people came to the streets – despite the crackdown – indicates that the protests are not going to be easily controlled by the establishment. However, since Khamenei's June 19 speech, there has been a significant drop in the number of protesters and, even more alarming for the anti-regime opposition groups, an even sharper drop since Mousavi announced that he will pursue his case through legal means and not on the streets. Assuredly, the diminishing number of protestors could indicate that the protest movement could fade away if opposition leaders lose steam.
While low key protests and efforts to revive the demonstrations continue and as the number of arrested students, activists and intellectuals increases daily, the European Union and the United States have declared that the door is open for negotiations with Iran over its nuclear ambitions. Political leaders in Europe have responded more critically than those in the United States to the continually evolving situation. In contrast to President Barack Obama’s measured tones, European leaders have forcefully condemned the violence in Iran, openly questioned the legitimacy of the election, and called for a full recount of the disputed results.
In other words, President Obama faces a particularly fraught series of decisions as his previous policy of engagement confronts violent repression in the streets of Tehran. President Obama’s cautious tone in referring to the protesters could be to leave the door open to seeking Iran’s help to solve the supply chain problem that the United States and its NATO allies have been facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Any settlement between the United States and Iran will also involve an understanding regarding Iranian interests in West Asia and in the Arab Middle East. Just as Iran’s proxies in Iraq worked with the United States to forge a post-Saddam Iraq, Iranian allies in Afghanistan worked with Washington to shape a post-Taliban Afghanistan. It goes without saying that a judiciously pursued dialogue would enhance the chances of internal change in Iran.
The majority of the Iranian population would welcome the restoration of friendly relations with the United States, which is certainly better liked in Iran than in any other Middle Eastern country. As such, the Iranian regime’s ideologically-driven hatred of the United States and Israel finds more traction outside Iran than within the Iranian population. Iranian politicians are acutely aware that there is no support for a government in Iran that is forever at odds with the United States. That is to say, Iranian observers agree that it is time for Iran to step beyond the stereotypes and misinterpretations that have characterized U.S.-Iranian relations, especially because they realize that the candidate that can bring an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States would be certain to have support from the Iranian population.
Improved relations between the two countries would have immediate consequences for the United States, Iran, the Middle East and the international community, but they certainly need to take into consideration the immediate interests of Iranian civil society by emphasizing human rights in Iran. On the American side, there will be ardent voices in Washington arguing against any compromise with Iran and some even arguing for military action. A U.S. or Israeli attack would undermine moderate and pragmatic voices and revive Iranian nationalism. It would also produce a wave of patriotic solidarity with the regime in Iran, even among those young Iranians who are fiercely critical of Ahmadinejad’s government, and provide incentives for the Iranian government to continue violating human rights.
What role, then, can the EU and the United States play in regard to the recent crackdowns in Iran? Most analysts agree that the process of democratization there is likely to be long-term and gradual. Even if outsiders cannot and should not play a role, they can show solidarity in different ways.
First, they can condemn the violence used against the protesters without cutting off all chances of talks with Iran should Ahmadinejad remain in power. Second, President Obama should have an integrative approach toward Iran that addresses on the same level the nuclear situation and the violation of human rights. This dialogue should be structured to encourage constructive Iranian involvement in solving the nuclear enrichment crisis while protesting the crackdown on dissidents. This is not interventionism but merely a modicum of solidarity in support of human rights. Last but not least, a political boycott of the Iranian government in order to stop the crackdown might be helpful, but without a broad international effort that includes Russia and China it will do little to halt the repression.
During 30 years of Islamic revolutionary rule, Iran has changed and continues to change. Change might be a slow and often uncertain process, but it can be done only by Iranians themselves. As such, perhaps the first step to help Iran’s quest for democracy is to acknowledge and encourage dissident voices inside and outside Iran while keeping human rights issues high on the agenda.
Ramin Jahanbegloo, one of Iran's best-known dissidents, headed the contemporary philosophy department of the Cultural Research Center in Tehran until his arrest in April 2006. He was released that August and now lives in exile in Canada, where he teaches at the University of Toronto.
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Published on July 17, 2009
