By Geneive Abdo
Middle East analyst, The Century Foundation

The key political players in Iran’s conservative faction, who have been permanent fixtures since the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, are often assumed to be interchangeable. Outside observers may question whether there is really a difference between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani, the former nuclear negotiator, or Mohsen Rezai, secretary of the Expediency Council and former commander of the Revolutionary Guards. However, during the presidential campaign underway, the complexities and rivalries among conservative political elites are becoming much more apparent than at any other time in Iran’s post-revolutionary history.

The conservatives – perhaps even more so than the reformers – are having difficulty appearing united as the election draws near. A well-defined faction of pragmatic conservatives has emerged over the last few years that is more moderate than Ahmadinejad and wants to bring Iran out of worldwide isolation. They do not want another Ahmadinejad term and are facing the question of how to counter the incumbent without strengthening the reformists. The election of reformist former-president Mohammad Khatami is still worse in their eyes than another four years of Ahmadinejad, and they risk splitting the conservative faction if they run rival candidates against Ahmadinejad.

However, it seems they are willing to take that risk. In early March, Mohammed Baqer Ghalibaf, the current mayor of Tehran, all but declared his candidacy for president. Ghalibaf presents a stark alternative to the president among conservatives, while still remaining in ideological agreement with other revolutionary elites on core issues, ranging from foreign policy to the economy. Unlike Ahmadinejad, who is 52 years old, Ghalibaf appears significantly younger at 47 and is popular among Iran’s young electorate. He has also built a reputation for concrete action over inflammatory rhetoric, addressing problems from Tehran’s potholes to the capital’s life-threatening pollution.

Despite his differences from Ahmadinejad, Ghalibaf is able to appeal to the same working class voters who have been a constituency solidly behind Ahmadinejad, and one that the conservatives hope to keep on their side. Ghalibaf comes from humble roots – his father was a grocer in the northeastern city of Masshad – which appeals to the underclass. Qalibaf also has demonstrated his revolutionary credentials. As a young military commander, he helped lead the 1982 liberation of Khorramshahr, which had been Iran’s main commercial port city until its capture by the Iraqi army in 1980. The reclamation of Khorramshahr, which is celebrated each year in Iran, is viewed by many Iranian historians as the turning point in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.

Ghalibaf – and if not him, another like-minded candidate – could solve the conservatives’ problem of running an alternative to Ahmadinejad who would not split the conservative vote in favor of the reformists. He satisfies some of the key concerns of voters and political leaders who normally would support a conservative candidate but are against Ahmadinejad.

Surprisingly, the pros and cons of a serious rival to the president are appearing in public discussion. Amir Mohebbian, an editor of the most influential conservative daily newspaper Resalat, commented on whether conservatives should encourage more than one candidate to run for president. In his analysis, conservatives give Ahmadinejad high marks for his vigorous defense of Iran’s right to a nuclear program and for his bellicose, anti-Israel rhetoric. But according to Mohebbian, conservatives do not approve of the way the president has run the government, particularly Ahmadinejad’s replacement of qualified cabinet members and other government appointments with his personal political cronies.

One of the many important by-products of Ahmadinejad’s tenure has been the emergence of a bloc of pragmatic conservatives, and the divide between pragmatic conservatives and hard-line conservative supporters of Ahmadinejad is growing. Figures such as Larijani, Ghalibaf, Rezai and others believe that Ahmadinejad’s lack of diplomatic finesse – whether over Iran’s nuclear program or its policy toward Israel – has damaged conservatives at home and abroad. They, along with others in Iran’s conservative establishment, want to bring worldwide legitimacy and credibility to the Iranian state. While some are not on the best terms with the United States, they want to appear moderate, compared with Ahmadinejad. They do not recognize the state of Israel, but unlike Ahmadinejad, they would not go as far as to publicly deny the Holocaust. And they do not identify with Third Worldists, such as Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, and other Trotsky-like icons in the non-aligned movement. They understand the economic and political power of the First World and, while they remain uncompromising on many issues, they believe engagement is in Iran’s economic and political interest.

The pragmatic conservatives also differ with Ahmadinejad in the use of religious rhetoric. They do not invoke Shiite martyrdom by trying to convince Iranians that sacrifice is a religious obligation. They advocate, instead, temporal remedies to fix the crippled economy and encourage better lives on earth for the common man. In contrast, Ahmadinejad has alienated not only many ordinary Iranians, but also much of the clerical establishment by insisting that the Twelfth Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, whose return on earth at the end of time is eagerly awaited by all Shiites, watches over the day-to-day affairs of the Iranian nation. Invoking such a holy figure for political advantage has offended many in this deeply pious society.

The pragmatists, however, face not only the question of whether presenting more than one candidate will diminish their electoral chances, but they also must contend with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Guardian Council. The 12 Guardians will review all the presidential candidates and then approve a final slate of contenders after candidate registration closes on May 9th. Compared with past election seasons, when the Guardians generally announced their decision in March, the May deadline comes very late. Khamenei, who appoints and wields great influence over the Guardian Council’s decisions, is assumed to prefer Ahmadinejad, but there is mounting doubt.

As political commentator Dr. Alireza Nourizadeh wrote in early March on his website A Week In the News: “If the Supreme Leader feels or gathers that Ahmadinejad is unlikely to win, he would prefer to give Ghalibaf the green light to go ahead so that he would somehow rest assured that the conservatives would have a chance of winning.” The relatively late review of candidates may provide Khamenei more time to assess the conservatives’ election prospects.

Should the conservatives risk splitting alliances within their faction, they will not be alone. As the campaign heats up, reformers supporting presidential candidate Mohammad Khatami are dismayed by the bitter conflict unfolding within their own ranks. Mehdi Karroubi, a former speaker of parliament, has thrown himself into the contest against Khatami and convinced a powerful reformer and former mayor of Tehran Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi to be his campaign manager. In 1997, Karbaschi’s centrist Servants of Construction faction joined forces with Khatami’s campaign. His support gave Khatami vital financial and administrative resources to complement his political base, comprised primarily of students, clerics and seminarians, and brought in votes from a broader segment of Iranian society. He also gave Khatami, then a dark-horse candidate, legitimacy within the political establishment. The defection of Karbaschi to the Karroubi campaign is attracting widespread attention in Iran.

Adding to the internal strife among reformers, former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi has declared he will run against Khatami. Mousavi, who does not have a strong following among the reformers, has in previous elections hinted at a candidacy but ultimately declined to run. Some conservatives are excited by the prospect of Mousavi as the spoiler. Even though he would unlikely draw a significant number of voters, conservatives believe that the more reformers who enter the race, the more divided they will appear to the electorate. Hassan Rowhani, a powerful hard-line cleric appointed by Khamenei to serve on the Supreme National Security Council, told reporters at a press briefing in March that “[i]t is positive and worthy of praise that a person with such experience as Mousavi, who has many times stood behind others dutifully, should enter the elections and it will be in the interests of the people.”

Factional squabbling aside, many outside observers may question whether it matters who is elected president of Iran, particularly as the last president to challenge the status quo Mohammad Khatami failed to achieve any of his reforms. Indeed, one of the most confusing aspects of Iranian politics is trying to figure out who ultimately runs the state. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini led the Islamic revolution in 1979, he established that ultimate religious authority would be given to a single supreme jurist under the valayat-e faqih (rule of the jurisprudent) in opposition to most traditionalist clerics who argued this ignored the sovereignty of the people and opened the way for religious despotism. In 1989, after Khomeini’s death and the appointment of Khamenei as supreme leader, amendments to the Iranian constitution gave Khamenei additional powers. In addition to having ultimate religious authority, he gained control over nearly every aspect and institution of the state from the Revolutionary Guards to the judiciary. Since that time, Khamenei has consolidated his power further, and the Revolutionary Guards have penetrated nearly every aspect of Iranian life.

• Related: Iranian balance of power chart | View chart »

Another unusual characteristic of Iranian politics is that, despite their electoral performance, individuals and factions generally retain influence within the Islamic political system whether they win or lose. Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, president from 1989 until 1997, is a prime example of this phenomenon; despite his defeat against Ahmadinejad in 2005, he is clearly one of a handful running the state. Karroubi, who like Rafsanjani has held many government posts, has remained powerful, no matter whether he is inside or outside public office. And even Khatami has continued to be a significant player since he left the presidency in 2005.

So while the election of a president matters, the degree depends upon the constellation of actors also running the country. Where the president does make a difference is in applying pressure to the political system. Both Khatami and Ahmadinejad’s presidencies shook up the establishment, albeit in vastly different ways. Khatami’s supporters, particularly university students, tested the red lines of debate and public dissent, holding demonstrations until they were imprisoned. Ahmadinejad, for his part, has shown there are limits to revolutionary ideology: when his public remarks regarding the Twelfth Imam, Israel, and the United States became too extreme, he was harshly criticized not only by his fellow hardliners in parliament, but also by Ayatollah Khamenei. Whoever is elected president in June, he will have, if no other influence, the power to pull the strings that alter the balance of power in Iran. And depending upon the person, this imbalance could cause either a few tremors or a full-blown earthquake.

Pictured above:  Mohammed Baqer Ghalibaf, the current mayor of Tehran.

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Published on March 12, 2009