By Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji
Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford

Since President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, the same factionalism that has increasingly divided conservative ranks has also created rifts in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the basij militias under its control. The divisions have intensified in the run-up to the hotly contested 2009 presidential election, particularly as the less hard-line elements of the IRGC and basij have abandoned support for incumbent Ahmadinejad and realigned behind presidential contenders Mohsen Rezai and Mir-Hossein Mousavi.

The IRGC proved integral in the conservative effort – particularly from 2003 to 2005 – to resist former president Mohammad Khatami’s reform agenda, oust the reformists from power during the 2004 parliamentary and later 2005 presidential elections and ultimately consolidate conservative political power. However, much as competition among the formerly united conservatives has intensified, Ahmadinejad’s controversial tenure has caused disunity within the IRGC and basij. The President’s confrontational foreign policy stance, which has increasingly isolated Iran, coupled with his economic mismanagement have proven the most significant factors in creating disunity. Two distinct groupings – hardliners and pragmatists – have emerged within IRGC and basij elements.

The hardliners form Ahmadinejad’s hardcore, though increasingly marginalized, constituency.  They share his view that the Islamic Republic is engaged in an eternal fight against the “foreign enemy,” oftentimes portrayed as the West and Israel. Although hardliners in both the IRGC and basij support Ahmadinejad vehemently, their allegiance is more to the revolutionary and religious ideals Ahmadinejad espouses than to the president himself. He has won their support thus far because he most closely represents their anti-capitalist, anti-Western attitudes and adherence to a modest lifestyle as led by the Prophet Mohammad and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces Seyyed Hassan Firouzabadi recently stated in Raja News, “Ahmadinejad’s phenomenon” is that he “has revived Imam (Khomeini’s) discourse and differed from traditional politicians.”

The very actions and rhetoric that have endeared Ahmadinejad to the hardliners have put him at odds with the pragmatists. The IRGC is not only a security force, but also a corporate entity, and the pragmatists believe they can best maximize the profitability of their investments when Iran enjoys domestic and regional stability – conditions they claim Ahmadinejad’s fiery rhetoric constantly undermines. In addition to significant stagflation produced by Ahmadinejad’s economic mismanagement, Iran’s increasing international isolation has limited much needed foreign direct investment and restricted international trade. Although the IRGC has profited in the last four years from, for example, preferential construction contracts and the operation of illegal jetties in the South, the pragmatists believe they have not realized their full revenue potential.

Although the pragmatists have withdrawn their support from Ahmadinejad, they have not unified behind any one of his three rivals, Karroubi, Mousavi or Rezai. Many of the less hard-line principlist commanders have expressed support for Rezai because their mutual opposition to both Ahmadinejad and the reform movement leaves Rezai as the only suitable candidate.  Pragmatists among IRGC and basij elements also support Rezai because they believe his technocratic approach is best suited to revitalize Iran’s ailing economy and foster better international relations, while still upholding conservative principles. Ayatollah Movahedi Kermani, the former representative of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the IRGC, recently endorsed Rezai as a “capable, principlist, positive and innovative manager.”

More moderate pragmatists within the IRGC and basij support Mousavi as a centrist candidate with one foot in both the reformist and conservative camps. Last week Mihan Blog – published by Tehran University students – circulated an open letter from 59 former IRGC commanders endorsing Mousavi.  However, in contrast to Rezai, Mousavi’s support is concentrated more among basijis than the IRGC – perhaps due to his own background in the basij. In a recent speech to a group of basijis at the University of Shiraz, Mousavi repeatedly declared his admiration for the basij and promised to support its expansion once elected president, stating, “I myself am a basiji and still have not put away my uniform!” 

Several basij elements in Tehran and Khorramshahr, among other large cities, led by former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rashid, have established offices in support of Mousavi’s election campaign. Moreover, an Iranian blogger Naeim Karimi, reported that at a rally held on the anniversary of Khorramshahr’s liberation, war veterans, family members of soldiers martyred in the Iran-Iraq war and current basij members showed their support for Mousavi by honoring him with the trademark Palestinian resistance scarf that has also been adopted by the IRGC and basij.

The role the IRGC and basij will play in the elections – both in administering the elections and supporting the candidates – is still being debated.  The militias, who reformists accuse of rigging the 2005 elections in Ahmadinejad’s favor, could once again influence the outcome of the June 12 polls through behind the scenes manipulations.  However, the division between hardliners and pragmatists may decrease the potential for systematic interference on the national-level and, moreover, reduce Ahmadinejad’s share of the vote as compared to the 2005 presidential election. With at most 1.5 million IRGC and basij out of roughly 46 million eligible voters, their impact – at least as voters – on the final election outcome is unlikely to be decisive.

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Published on June 11, 2009