By an Anonymous Journalist

In Iran, the president’s term is four years, and he can be reelected for a consecutive four-year term. Out of six presidents in Iran, three – Ali Khamenei, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Seyed Mohammad Khatami – held power for eight years; Abolhassan Banisadr was impeached by the parliament, and Mohammad-Ali Radjaei was killed in a terrorist attack. Considering this history, presidents have a significant chance for reelection to a second term. However, the coming June presidential election, which takes place in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s first term, is gearing up to be more competitive and sensitive as compared to similar past elections.

According to his counselors, the current president will be nominated a second time in June 2009.  Seyed Mohammad Khatami, the former Iranian President (1997-2005), and Mehdi Karoubi, the former Speaker of the House, have announced their nominations on behalf of the reformist camp. While the rumors of Mirhossein Mousavi’s nomination, Iranian Prime Minister during the first decade of the revolution (Iran-Iraq war era), have increased, there have been no nominations from the conservative camps yet.  Conventional political wisdom is that with the candidacy of Khatami, who based on public opinion polls has a much higher chance of defeating Ahmadinejad compared to other nominees, the conservatives, regardless of their criticisms of Ahmadinejad, will support him to prevent a transfer of power to the reformists.  However, as the election nears, conservative unity, in the face of the failings of the current administration and a potential for Ahmadinejad to lose, might dissolve, and they might urge others from within the conservative camp to compete against him.

There are already rumors of a project to bypass Ahmadinejad in which conservatives are actively attracting support from within their coalition for an alternative nominee. Proposed names include Ali Akbar Velayati, the former Foreign Minister of Iran, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Tehran’s Mayor and a 2005 presidential nominee, or perhaps a dark-horse nominee who will be unexpectedly announced later. Although some of the president’s supporting parties deny the existence of a project called “bypassing Ahmadinejad,” others do not deny it, implicitly stating that the conservative nominee might be both a more acceptable and more powerful individual—even preferably a mullah.

This is the first time that the Iranian president is facing such a fragile and challenging situation in a second-term election in his own party. Although Khatami faced criticisms in his second term election by his own friends, there was not a single competing reformist among all nine nominees. In contrast, even during his presidency, Ahmadinejad’s conservative supporters do not hesitate to criticize him. No other presidential nominee has faced such a strong rival after his first term. Even Mirhossein Mousavi, whose supporters include conservatives, has a better chance of attracting votes from villagers and the lower classes of society, the very segments of the electorate that Ahmadinejad has relied upon.  In addition, some former ministers and supporters of the current president have stated their intentions to compete for the presidential office.

In addition to internal conservative rivalries, another element which promises a hotter election in Iran is the tension between reformists and conservatives in the framework of an election duel between Khatami and Ahmadinejad. Once the conservatives felt Khatami’s candidacy was serious – even before he officially announced his nomination on February 6th – they began to claim that his presence is somehow a political measuring against Ahmadinejad – an indicator of the people’s tendency toward reform or conservatism.  Ahmadinejad’s administration has intensely criticized “The Construction Era” of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, “The Reform Era” of Khatami’s presidency and the last 16 years of technocrats’ and reformists’ demonstrations. Therefore, they consider the coming election an indicator of the people’s final interest toward development (Rafsanjani), though Rafsanjani is among the silent supporters of Khatami; democracy (Khatami) and justice (Ahmadinejad).  They have set the stage for a final and decisive battle – a political Armageddon.

In this political Armageddon, the health of the election, avoiding any corruption and confidence in the results will be vital. In the last election, both Rafsanjani and Karoubi criticized the election and its vote-counting process.  Reformists are concerned about the partiality of an election in which the president’s supporters are the only ones managing the election.  They believe that if the election takes place in a healthy manner, Khatami’s victory is guaranteed. Proponents of both reformist candidates – Khatami and Karoubi – believe that support from military entities, including the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards, and other power centers in Iran prop up Ahmadinejad.  They are confident that the reformists’ power to mobilize voters will result in a change in the balance of power in Iran.

To ascertain this election’s importance and the potential for either the conservatives or reformists to win, we should examine the legacies of Ahmadinejad.  The livelihood of the people has been challenged; inflation has increased; because of the international sanctions, foreign investment has declined; and even unprecedented oil price increases have not been able to save the economic situation.  The international financial meltdown has reached Iranian economic shores and even tougher situations are bound to happen. In foreign relations, some taboos have been broken, as Ahmadinejad is the first among his Iranian predecessors to have announced his willingness to engage in debate with his American counterpart and the first since the revolution to send a letter congratulating an incoming US president. However, his calls for the destruction of Israel and his denial of the Holocaust have practically left foreign politics in a dead-end situation.

Critics have also appraised Ahmadinejad’s nuclear approaches as unsuccessful. They believe despite the Iranian consensus regarding the right to peaceful nuclear technology, the president’s policies and conduct have seriously aided the referral of Iran to the UN Security Council.  The issuance of four separate resolutions against Iran and the installation of more international sanctions have demonstrated how Ahmadinejad has failed to build trust with the West. Contrary to initial announcements that the primary diplomatic activities of the Ahmadinejad administration would create friendly relationships with Iran’s neighbors, the relations between Iran and the region’s Arab nations and the Persian Gulf coast have not been without tension. Restrictions on freedom of the press, human rights activists, non-governmental organizations, university students and women have also intensified during these four years.

To counter criticisms, Ahmadinejad and his cabinet have made an unprecedented number of trips to the provinces and made never-ending promises to the people of these regions.  His claim to populist policies is among the ways the president may try to attract votes. In addition, support from the leader of the Islamic Republic may bolster Ahmadinejad, and there is speculation that the core of Iran’s power pyramid agrees with the extension of Ahmadinejad’s term. Having said that, the leader of Islamic Republic of Iran has never implicitly supported a specific candidate in any election, and some of the more traditional conservatives believe that the Supreme Leader actually seeks a more powerful administration compared to the current administration.

Although the reformists have not announced any specific plan, they all emphasize an agenda that includes creating a stabilized economy; renovating the economic regime; reviving the office of management and planning, which was dissolved by Ahmadinejad; deescalating foreign relations policies and building trust; and hiring experienced managers and experts who were pushed aside during Ahmadinejad’s presidency. On the contrary, Ahmadinejad emphasizes that he will end governmental subsidies and give the people cash hand outs – policies which experts have warned will have negative economic effects. As a result, the presidential election in Iran is shaping up to be a political Armageddon and a duel among the official blocks of the Islamic Republic’s conservative and managerial doctrines.

« Read the rest of this issue of the Bulletin

Note: The names of the authors of the Voices from Iran series have been redacted at the authors’ request. The articles are translated from Farsi. The opinions expressed reflect those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the National Democratic Institute or The Century Foundation.

–

Published on Feb. 26, 2009