By Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji
Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford
Since 2004, reformists have fared poorly in executive and legislative elections in Iran. The common orthodoxy in Iranian studies suggests that these repeated electoral failures are a product of institutional barriers to entry posed by unelected elements of the regime. Primarily citing the 2004 majles election, analysts have argued that the conservative-dominated Guardian Council, the appointed body that approves candidates for elections, disproportionately targets reformists during the candidate vetting process, which prevents them from competing effectively in national elections.
While heavy vetting has undeniably taken a toll on reformist efforts in the past, widespread societal backlash—including student protests, calls for boycotts and the casting of spoilt ballots—has dissuaded the Ministry of Interior and the Guardian Council from conducting mass disqualifications to the same degree since 2004. Indeed, three notable reformists were allowed to participate in the 2005 presidential race (Mostafa Moin, Mehdi Karroubi and Mohsen Mehralizadeh) and it seems at least two reformists, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, will compete in the upcoming June 2009 poll. It is highly unlikely that the Guardian Council will disqualify Mousavi or Karroubi. Doing so would deprive the June election of its legitimacy, indicate that the reformists pose a formidable threat to conservatives and perhaps even stir public unrest.
As notable reformists have competed in national elections since 2004, citing Guardian Council vetting does not accurately account for their failure to secure substantive votes. This is not to suggest that other external factors—such as persistent media attacks, forced newspaper closures, and imprisonment of intellectuals—do not disadvantage the movement. Rather, it suggests the roots of the reformists’ persistent electoral shortcomings lie within the internal machinations of the movement itself.
Two internal vulnerabilities continue to hinder the reformists’ efforts to remain politically viable. Their past failures are primarily a product of internal dissent and disorganization coupled with an incoherent platform. If the reform movement hopes to succeed in the June poll, it must strive to resolve these issues rather than lament its past misfortunes.
From 1997 to 2005, Mohammad Khatami was undoubtedly the flag bearer of the reform movement. His tenure as president prevented the explicit emergence of internal discord in the movement. Though some members in the rank and file became disillusioned with the pace of reform, Khatami maintained unity among the leadership. However, following his departure from the political limelight in 2005, no single reformist successfully assumed leadership of the movement, producing internal dissent as various personalities vied for Khatami’s position. As the leadership began to splinter, so did the reformist base. Without a focal point for reformist voters to unite behind, their votes have often been diluted among several candidates, none of whom is able to win a majority.
Many believed that Khatami’s candidacy in this year’s election would help restore order in the movement. However, Karroubi’s and Mousavi’s subsequent nomination announcements dispelled these hopes. Recognizing the importance of presenting a united front, Khatami later withdrew his candidacy in favor of consolidating support behind Mousavii—the candidate most reformist leaders believe has the best chance of winning. While most other reformists, such as Abdollah Nouri and Mohammad-Reza Aref, have either refrained from announcing their candidacy or withdrawn from the race, Karroubi insists that he will compete in the 2009 election.
Unlike the division in conservative ranks that emerged in early 2008 as a response to growing opposition to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s policies, reformist disunity has largely been a product of a few individuals vying to increase their personal political power. Karroubi has been one of the most divisive personalities in the movement, establishing his own distinct party, National Trust Party, which was a failed platform for his 2005 presidential bid. Despite his poor performance in 2005 and his inability to recruit substantive candidates for his parliamentary list in 2008, Karroubi is once again vying for the presidency, and in so doing, prolonging reformist disunity.
Members of Iran’s various reformist organizations have recognized this weakness and are reorienting their campaign strategy to unite the divided voter base. The most influential reformist factions, including Executives of Construction, Association of Combatant Clerics, Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIRO) and the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), have already endorsed Mousavi and are calling for Karroubi’s withdrawal. Even Khatami has openly called for Karroubi’s withdrawal from the race, but these efforts have proven futile. Karroubi’s presence on the ballot will surely divide the reformist base and dilute the vote margins, potentially depriving Mousavi of a majority that could give him a first round victory, or a place in a possible second round run-off.
Even if the reformists are able to overcome internal dissent and present a unified front, they still need to articulate more concrete and realistic solutions to Iran's current problems. The slow pace of reform during Khatami’s eight years in office, despite lofty rhetoric, resulted in widespread apathy and disillusionment with the movement. A reformist victory in June depends on Karroubi’s or Mousavi’s ability to persuade the electorate that their agenda is comprised of realistic goals that can be achieved within the current political context of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This would help secure support from the established reformist base—including Iran’s diverse ethnic minority groups, women and youth—and moreover expand their base, attracting moderate-leaning voters more concerned with economic growth than social issues.
In the past few weeks Mousavi and Karroubi have begun articulating specific policies on the campaign trail to re-energize the middle-class reformist base—primarily targeting women and youth. Mousavi has proposed the full privatization of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Corporation (IRIB) and the dismantling of the “moral police” as part of his attempts to expand social freedoms to alleviate urban middle-class grievances. Karroubi has also focused on the expansion of civil liberties as part of his three-pronged campaign agenda, promising the “revival and institutionalization of citizenship rights” by revising the 1989 constitution. Neither candidate, however, has directly addressed the needs of the peripheral ethno-linguistic minority groups that comprise roughly 51 percent of Iran’s total population—a voting bloc that has traditionally supported reformists.
While these policies are an improvement from the candidates’ previous reliance on rhetoric to secure votes, the proposals have already come under scrutiny by conservatives and moderates alike for being too drastic under the current political system. Reformists are once again overstepping the realm of possibility with their campaign promises, the opponents say. This time however, it is unlikely that these promises will resonate with the electorate, who may instead vote for the pragmatic conservative coalition—headed by Mohsen Rezai, Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf—who they perceive will implement actual change, albeit to a much lesser degree.
The present realities are such that Iran’s population—roughly 10 million of whom live below the poverty line—is largely concerned with the threat of unemployment and starvation. To become competitive, reformists must successfully address these basic needs by emphasizing structural development in the economic and political sectors, and moderating their attention on social liberties.
Neither Karroubi nor Mousavi have proposed specific policies to create jobs and stimulate positive economic growth. The policies they have thus far proposed will not be sufficient to attract votes from other social groups, such as the rural or urban poor and the bazar—swing voters who have cast ballots according to economic interests in the past. Karroubi continues to expound a populist message. When he stood for election in 2005 he offered $50 handouts and he has once again promised to offer shares to the public in Iran’s state oil and gas industry if he is elected. However, this populist approach has lost its broad appeal among the urban and rural poor as a result of Ahmadinejad's redistribution policies that have contributed to sky-rocketing inflation.
In contrast, Mousavi disagrees with giving “alms” to the public, an indication of his opposition to Ahmadinejad and Karroubi’s populist economic policies. But his recent comments on the campaign trail cast a shadow of doubt on his economic expertise, which may raise concerns among his more moderate fiscally-oriented supporters. Although an alleged proponent of privatization, Mousavi recently stated that the government should increase not only regulation but also pursue a protectionist policy on imports and increase its involvement in major industries that are at risk of failing—policies that seemingly contradict free-market principles.
In sum, if the various reformist factions fail to learn from their mistakes and address their internal vulnerabilities, it is unlikely that Mousavi or Karroubi will secure the presidency this June. And even if the reformists address these past failures, unite their base and begin articulating more realistic and appropriate policies, the final outcome still depends on what the pragmatic conservative coalition, which could pull voters from the center-left, does in the coming weeks.
–
Published on April 24, 2009
