Last updated on December 17, 2013

The TSE’s feasibility committee crafted language to be included in legislation governing the 1996 municipal elections. Overall, the committee sought to create a system that would necessitate as few changes to existing law as possible. The legislature, with little debate, incorporated the legislative language into Articles 18, 19 and 20 of Law 9.100, which passed on September 29, 1995. The law authorized the TSE to use electronic voting, but did not specify in great detail how the system would work. The law required that voters choose a candidate by inputting their preferred candidate’s number, and that each mayoral candidate’s photo be displayed on the screen. The law also mandated that 120 days before the election, the TSE would allow political parties or companies hired by them to audit the code used in the machines. Finally, Law 9.100 mandated that a paper trail be created. A physical copy of the vote would be printed so the vote count produced by the machine could be checked using the hard copy. However, the law did not require that voters be able to verify the printed version of their vote with their selection on the machine.

Requirements for a voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) have undergone several reversals since the initial law governing electronic voting was passed. During this time, the TSE has been opposed to a requirement for VVPAT, but the Brazilian Congress has attempted to introduce this requirement several times. In 2002, Congress passed electoral law 10.408, which mandated that the TSE begin transitioning to a system with a voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) and that this be piloted in the 2002 national elections. The TSE argued that the pilot results suggested the VVPAT system increased error rates and re-introduced some of the problems associated with the paper system. Civil society advocates of VVPAT argue that the TSE failed to adequately train poll workers and educate voters about VVPAT, thus stacking the deck against it use. 

In 2003, at the behest of the TSE, Congress passed law 1.503, which removed the requirement to adopt VVPAT, instead mandating that each machine record individual votes in a random order. This record would be given the parties so they could tabulate individual votes and check the official vote count. Of course, this digital registry of individual votes does not provide the same level of verifiability as the VVPAT, as voters have no means of verifying their vote.

In 2009, the status quo changed once again. Representatives of the Working Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista or PDT) successfully included language in Law 12.034/09 passed that year, which once again mandated VVPAT by the 2014 elections. Further, the new law required that voting machines not be connected to the machines that verified voters’ identity. The TSE challenged the law in the Supreme Court, which suspended the law on the grounds that if the voter identification machine and the voting machine were not connected, then it would be possible for a voter to vote multiple times. The Supreme Court also expressed concern that if the printer jammed, then polling station workers might see the vote while fixing the printer, compromising the secrecy of the ballot. While it is possible the suspension could be lifted on appeal, civil society activists in favor of VVPAT are not optimistic.

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Brazil: Implementing of Electronic Voting and Counting Since 1996