Last updated on December 17, 2013

In 1997, the Regulation on Requirements and Approval of Voting Machines came into force, which dealt with approval of the use of voting machines by the MoI. The supplier first needed to receive the approval of the Minister on a prototype of the voting machine. Approval was granted on the basis of a statement from an acknowledged certification office, which checked whether the prototype met the requirements as set out in the Electoral Code, the Electoral Decree and the appendix to the 1997 regulation. The Minister did not officially receive any certification reports, and they were not publicly available.

To receive approval to actually use the voting machines, the supplier provided the certification office with 10 voting machines (of which the certification office chose one), so it could be determined whether the voting machines resembled the prototype and the conditions under which it was tested. The decision to approve a voting machine was to be published in the State Gazette. The supplier was then required to make available, at least once every four years, 10 voting machines, out of which the certification office would choose one, so it could be examined periodically. 

The required technical specifications were detailed in an appendix to the regulation. The accreditation office was required to check whether, based on a list from the supplier, the software had been installed in the machines and whether the software did what it was supposed to do. However, NEDAP had successfully lobbied to exclude the part of the software that was used to program the political party lists and the candidates on the voting machine from the certification process. The source code used for all voting machines and computers was closed software owned by the suppliers. No review by other external actors was allowed. Due to these restrictions, it is unclear if a comprehensive check of the complete source code of all software was ever conducted by the certification office. 

Not all of the requirements laid down in the Electoral Code, such as secrecy of the vote or readability of the screen, were elaborated in the regulation. Rules regarding storage, transport and security of the voting machines were also lacking. One month after the regulation came into force, TNO (now called TNO Centrum voor Evaluatie van Instrumentatie en Beveiligingstechniek), which assisted in the drafting of the Regulation, was appointed by the minister as the only certification office. 

Following the regulation’s adoption, different ministers conducted research into the possibilities of recounts and certification, due to minor errors in tabulation software and some limited discussions about these two issues in the media. However, no changes were made until the State Secretary Bijleveld-Schouten withdrew the Regulation on Requirements and Approval Voting Machines in February 2008.

The MoI was responsible for the proper conduct of the election process, and the directorate of Constitutional Affairs and Legislation was responsible for overseeing the regulation of voting machines throughout their development. However, these civil servants, whose expertise was in constitutional and electoral law, lacked the knowledge to deal with the technological aspects of the voting machines. No additional personnel with technical background were recruited. As a result, the suppliers played a large role in deciding which equipment was used, how legislation was written and which parts of the electoral process was part of the certification process.

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Netherlands: Concerns about Electronic Voting